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Terms of reference 
WASTE GENERATION AND RESOURCE EFFICIENCY IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 
I, PETER COSTELLO, Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998, hereby refer waste generation and resource efficiency in 
Australia to the Commission for inquiry and report within twelve months of receipt 
of this reference. The Commission is to hold hearings for the purpose of the inquiry. 
Background 
Australians generate solid waste at a high rate compared with most other OECD 
countries. Technologies and processes to avoid, reduce and recover waste are 
generally not used as extensively in Australia as in some other OECD countries. 
Non-optimal levels of waste represent lost value and opportunities, while imposing 
undesirable economic and environmental costs on society. The objective of this 
inquiry is to identify policies that will enable Australia to address market failures 
and externalities associated with the generation and disposal of waste, including 
opportunities for resource use efficiency and recovery throughout the product life-
cycle (from raw material extraction and processing, to product design, manufacture, 
use and end of life management).  
The inquiry will cover resources associated with solid waste, including: municipal 
waste (eg household collections, electrical and consumer items,) commercial and 
industrial waste, and, construction and demolition wastes. It will not cover wastes 
that exhibit hazardous characteristics and pose an immediate and unacceptable risk 
of harm to human beings or the environment. 
Scope of the Inquiry 
In undertaking this inquiry, the Commission is to examine ways in which, and make 
recommendations on how, resource efficiencies can be optimised to improve 
economic, environmental and social outcomes. This will include an assessment of 
opportunities throughout the product life cycle to prevent and/or minimise waste 
generation by promoting resource recovery and resource efficiency.     




The Commission is to examine and report on current and potential resource 
efficiency in Australia, having particular regard to:  
1.  The economic, environmental and social benefits and costs of optimal 
approaches for resource recovery and efficiency and waste management, taking 
into account different waste streams and waste related activities;  
2.  Institutional, regulatory and other factors which impede optimal resource 
efficiency and recovery, and optimal approaches to waste management, 
including barriers to the development of markets for recovered resources; 
3.  The adequacy of current data on material flows, and relevant economic activity, 
and how data might be more efficiently collected and used to progress optimal 
approaches for waste management and resource efficiency and recovery;  
4.  The impact of international trade and trade agreements on the level and disposal 
of waste in Australia; and  
5.  Strategies that could be adopted by government and industry to encourage 
optimal resource efficiency and recovery.  
The Commission is also requested to report on: the effectiveness of performance 
indicators to measure efficiency of resource recovery practices; the effect of 
government and commercial procurement practices on optimal resource recovery; 
and the impacts of government support to production and recovery industries. 
In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission is to advertise nationally inviting 
submissions, hold public hearings, consult with relevant Australian Government, 
State and Territory agencies, local government and other key interest groups and 
affected parties. 
The Commission is to provide both a draft and a final report. The Government will 
consider the Commission’s recommendations and its response will be announced as 
soon as possible after the receipt of the Commission’s report. 
 
PETER COSTELLO 
20 October 2005     
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Any technology that is applied to mixed waste other than 
traditional methods such as disposal to landfill. AWT 
facilities typically recover some dry recyclables and treat 
organic waste by fermentation or other process. 
Aquifer  A body of permeable rock that is capable of storing 
quantities of water. 
Biogas  A combustible gas derived from the anaerobic 
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recyclables 
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Dry recyclables  Recyclables other than food waste, organic waste from 
gardens and other wet material. Includes plastics, metal, 




An environmental policy approach in which a producer’s 
responsibility for a product is extended to the 
post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle. There are two 
related features of EPR policy: (1) the shifting of 
responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully or 
partially) upstream toward the producer and away from 
municipalities; and (2) to provide incentives to producers to 
incorporate environmental considerations in the design of 
their products.     
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Final cover  The final layer of material used to cover a landfill site after 
it has ceased receiving waste. 
Fly ash  Fine airborne particulates carried out of an incinerator, 
boiler, or furnace in the flue gas after the combustion of 
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to gases that are used as a fuel source. 
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facility 
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An approach which recognises shared responsibility for the 
environmental impacts of a product throughout its full life 
cycle, including end of life management, and seeks to 
reduce adverse impacts and internalise unavoidable costs 
within the product price, through action at the point(s) in 
the supply chain where this can be most effectively and 
efficiently achieved. 
Putrescrible waste  Waste that readily decomposes. Includes food waste and 
organic waste from gardens. 
Pyrolysis  Exposing waste to temperatures over 800 degrees Celsius in 
the absence of oxygen. The waste breaks down to gases that 
are used as a fuel source. 
Recycling  The recovery of used products and their use as raw 
materials in the manufacture of new products, which may 
or may not be similar to the original. 
Resource efficiency  Value added per unit of resource input. 
Resource recovery  The process of extracting a material or energy from a waste 
stream. It includes reuse (using the product for the same or 
different purpose without further manufacture), recycling 
and the recovery of energy from waste. 
Shredder floc  Mainly non-metallic material that is left over from the 
metal shredding process that is applied to end-of-life 
vehicles, white goods and some appliances. 
Virgin materials  Any basic materials for industrial processing that have not 
been previously used. 
Waste  Anything that is no longer privately valued by its owner for 
use or sale and which is, or will be, discarded.  
Waste 
management 
Management of the collection, recovery and disposal of 






OVERVIEW     







•  State and territory waste management policies contain some inappropriate and 
inconsistent objectives. These have led to some jurisdictions adopting unrealistic, 
and potentially very costly, waste minimisation targets.  
•  These policies are giving rise to some unsound interventions including: 
–  using landfill levies to achieve waste diversion targets and raise revenue; 
–  subsidising waste recovery options, such as alternative waste technologies, that are 
costly and have questionable environmental benefits; and 
– introducing mandatory product stewardship or extended producer responsibility 
schemes, where disposal problems have not been adequately demonstrated. 
•  Waste management policy should be refocused on the environmental and social 
impacts of waste collection and disposal, and supported by more rigorous 
cost–benefit analysis, if it is to best serve the community.  
•  As a general rule, policy makers should not use waste management policies to 
address upstream environmental impacts. Where warranted, these are much more 
effectively and efficiently addressed using direct policy instruments, and often 
already are.  
•  Directly addressing relevant market failures and distortions throughout product life 
cycles will assist markets to achieve the right balance between waste avoidance, 
resource recovery and disposal.  
•  Regulation of disposal has improved considerably in recent years, and where 
complied with, appears to have been very effective. However, compliance with 
landfill regulations could be improved considerably. 
•  Waste disposal fees should be based on the full social, environmental and financial 
costs involved. For landfills, this will require:  
–  tightening regulatory compliance so that landfill gate fees include the costs of the 
regulatory measures needed to address disposal externalities; but  
–  abolishing landfill levies (taxes) as these are not based on legitimate costs.  
•  Basic forms of pay-as-you-throw pricing for kerbside waste and recycling services, 
should be more widely adopted, with information on the actual costs for these 
services better communicated to households. 
•  In most large urban centres, for reasons of scale and planning (as with sewage and 
electricity), managing waste disposal is no longer best handled by local 
governments. 
•  The Australian Government should play a leadership role in facilitating (relevant) 
reforms, and where appropriate, developing sound, nationally consistent waste 
management policies. 
     




The amount of waste we generate, and its actual or potential impacts on the 
environment, have long been matters of concern to governments and the community 
generally. In recent times, increasing emphasis has been given to resource 
recovery  — including reusing, recycling and extracting energy from waste. 
Ambitious targets are being set, and more advanced (but more costly) approaches to 
recovering waste are being promoted.  
Against this backdrop, the Australian Government asked the Productivity 
Commission to undertake an inquiry into waste generation and resource efficiency. 
The focus has been on solid, non-hazardous wastes including: municipal waste; 
commercial and industrial waste; and construction and demolition waste.  
The terms of reference are broad, but in essence ask the Commission to advise on 
strategies to address market failures associated with the generation and disposal of 
waste. In this context, market failure includes, but is not necessarily limited to, 
externalities. Externalities are the unintended costs and benefits of an activity that 
are experienced by people or organisations other than those directly involved in that 
activity. For example, a landfill may leak, causing damage (a negative externality) 
to a valued environment.  
The Commission’s charter and the terms of reference require that a communitywide 
approach be taken that considers all of the financial, environmental and social costs 
and benefits of different strategies (box 1). This approach necessarily challenges 
notions of waste being inherently bad and recycling being inherently good. Policies 
that minimise waste are not costless and more recycling is not always a better thing. 
As we try to recycle more and more waste, diminishing returns set in, costs rise, and 
the potential for perverse environmental outcomes increases.  
For example, it might be possible to collect and recycle virtually all glass containers 
used in Australia. But after taking into account all of the costs and benefits — 
financial, social and environmental — this will simply not be justifiable for all 
locations and circumstances.  
The question policy makers must then answer is whether the community has 
reached a suitable balance between waste avoidance, resource recovery and waste 
disposal, and if not, what governments might usefully do to redress the imbalance.     






Box 1  Waste policy should maximise net community benefits not 
resource efficiency 
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry has been guided by the terms of reference 
and its charter as set out in the Productivity Commission Act 1998. These require that 
all costs and benefits of different policy options for addressing market failures be 
considered, and that government intervention be considered only if it produces net 
benefits to the community.  
Another way of putting this is to say that government intervention should aim to assist 
markets to maximise the returns from using all resources — land, raw materials, 
energy, labour and capital. This requires that no other combination of resource use 
could lead to a higher level of community wellbeing. This approach recognises that 
scarce resources have alternative valuable uses, and may yield greater returns to the 
community in other areas, such as education, health or other environmental projects. 
Environmental and social issues can be brought into this framework by giving 
appropriate recognition to relevant externalities. For example, the costs of disposing of 
waste to landfill include the owner’s costs of operating the landfill (a private financial 
cost). But they might also include environmental costs (such as possible impacts on 
the community from any contamination of groundwater), and social costs (such as loss 
of amenity for people living nearby during the operational phase of the landfill). The 
private (nonfinancial) costs and benefits that people might experience through 
participating in recycling activities should also be considered.  
All of these costs and benefits should be brought together in a social cost–benefit 
framework, and quantified wherever possible. This will assist decision makers to 
identify the policy option that maximises net benefit to the community, including 
impacts on the environment. 
An alternative approach that many people have been promoting is that waste policy 
should maximise resource efficiency. Resource efficiency is used in the terms of 
reference and is often interpreted as maximising the returns from using one or more 
natural resources (raw materials and energy). For the economy as a whole, it is 
sometimes expressed in terms of gross domestic product per unit of natural resource 
input.  
This concept has intuitive appeal — maintaining living standards while decreasing our 
call on natural resources would surely be a good thing. But resource efficiency has 
some major limitations as a practical policy tool. The most substantial of these is that it 
only focuses on part of the picture, the natural resource or resources in question. 
Maximising the return to these inputs without any regard to the amount of other inputs, 
such as labour or capital (or indeed other natural resources that might be left out of the 
initial consideration), will not give the best returns to the community. This is why the net 
benefit from all resources is a better measure of the return to the community generally, 
and why policy should focus on maximising net community benefits, not resource 
efficiency. 
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What is waste and how much do we produce?  
Waste can be defined as any product or substance that has no further use or value 
for the person or organisation that owns it, and which is, or will be, discarded. But 
what is discarded by one party may have value for another. Thus, a broad approach 
to defining ‘waste’ can include products that are recoverable by others.  
In 2002-03, Australia generated approximately 32.4 million tonnes of solid waste. 
Approximately 27 per cent of this came from municipal sources, 29 per cent from 
the commercial and industrial sector, and 42 per cent from the construction and 
demolition sector. Waste recovered for recycling in 2002-03 was approximately 
15 million tonnes, almost half of the total generated in that year.  
The wide variety of wastes covered, the varying composition of waste streams, and 
the different environmental impacts of different types of wastes, add a layer of 
complexity to the policy issues. A tonne of broken clay bricks has quite different 
impacts on the environment to a tonne of putrescible household waste. To adapt an 
old catchcry — ‘wastes ain’t wastes’.  
How big a problem is waste? 
Waste is perceived to be a problem for many reasons, but the three reasons most 
often cited are that: waste disposal can harm the environment and human health; 
space for landfills is claimed to be becoming scarce; and waste is the end product of 
a life cycle process that can have upstream environmental and resource depletion 
implications (figure 1). Some people also take an essentially moral view of waste 
generation, arguing that it is symptomatic of wasteful and undesirable 
overconsumption. 
Unintended environmental and social costs of waste disposal  
The main method of waste disposal in Australia is landfill. This can cause 
environmental and social externalities through leachate discharges, gaseous 
emissions, loss of visual amenity, foul odours, and harbouring of disease-carrying 
pests. The main alternative is incineration, which if not properly controlled, can 
produce toxic emissions. Other externalities arise through illegal dumping and 
littering.     






Figure 1  Disposal and recycling in the product life cycle 
This diagram is a simplified representation of what can happen in a product’s life cycle, 
from the time natural resources are mined (in the case of nonrenewable resources) or 
harvested (in the case of renewable resources), through the stages of processing, 
manufacturing, distribution (including wholesaling and retailing activities) to where it is 
consumed. Waste can be generated at all points in the life cycle, not just in the post-
consumer phase. It can be either disposed or recovered in some way (represented 
here as recycling).  
The diagram also shows that environmental and other externalities can occur at each 
stage in a product’s life cycle. From a waste management perspective, downstream 
externalities are those that might arise from disposal or recycling (including the waste 
collection and transport associated with these activities). Upstream externalities occur 
prior to the point at which waste is generated. For example, the ‘externalities’ boxes on 
the left hand side of the diagram indicate the externalities that might occur upstream of, 
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It is difficult to generalise about the extent of the externalities associated with 
landfills. Some pollutants can be persistent and have the potential to be harmful if 
they escape. But not all wastes cause problems in disposal. Most construction and 
demolition waste is relatively inert, and hence does not give rise to many emissions. 
What is clear is that the environmental impacts of modern landfills (that is, those 
that are properly located, engineered and managed) are much lower than old 
landfills.  
The Commission has reviewed the available estimates and considers that, where 
such modern landfills include gas capture and electricity generation, the 
externalities are likely to be no more than $5 per tonne of waste. Without gas 
capture, the external costs could be up to $24 per tonne for wastes with high levels 
of organic content, due mainly to the costs of greenhouse gas emissions. Inert 
wastes appear to produce negligible externalities in landfill.  
Availability of landfill space 
It is sometimes argued that Australia is running out of suitable space to use as 
landfills, and hence landfilling is an unsustainable practice. Typically, landfills have 
used old quarry or mine sites in or near urban areas. Generally speaking, Australia 
is creating new holes faster than we are filling old holes with waste. But it is where 
those holes are located, and their geological suitability for landfills, that are the 
crucial issues. Overlaying this are the concerns of many people about having a 
landfill in their ‘backyard’.  
The Commission considers that these issues are not insurmountable and can be 
addressed for the most part through the market and appropriate planning 
frameworks. To the extent that landfill space near an urban area becomes scarce, 
rising gate fees will make it financially worthwhile to transport the waste further 
afield, thus opening up possibilities for new landfills, and encouraging more 
recycling. 
Upstream issues 
Avoiding waste, or increasing the amount of waste recovered, can have 
environmental impacts in the product life cycle upstream from where it is created 
(figure 1). These can be grouped into two main categories: environmental 
externalities avoided, and sustainability issues. Externalities associated with the 
harvesting of renewable resources, and the extraction of minerals, can include 
greenhouse gas emissions, water and air pollution, landscape degradation, and loss 
of biodiversity. Sustainability concerns include the equity considerations of     





consuming resources today that might not be available for future generations 
(box 2), and managing resource depletion. 
 
Box 2  Ecologically sustainable development policy considerations  
Sustainable development is generally interpreted as ‘development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43). 
Similar approaches have been adopted in Australia. In 1992, Australian governments 
endorsed the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, an objective 
of which is to enhance individual and community wellbeing by following a path of 
economic development that safeguards the welfare of future generations. 
The issue of sustainability is complicated by the diversity of things we pass on to future 
generations. These include: 
•  human capital — knowledge and understanding;  
•  man made capital — economic and social infrastructure; and 
•  natural capital — biodiversity, renewable and nonrenewable resources and 
ecological integrity. 
Additions to, or conservation of, any of these types of capital are likely to contribute to 
sustainability (or at least improve the endowment we pass on to future generations). To 
some extent it might be possible to substitute one type of capital for another. Thus, 
sustainability might be achieved even where some nonrenewable resources become 
heavily depleted. However, some natural resources, such as clean air and water, are 
not readily substitutable.  
Apart from these essential resources, we do not know with any precision what the 
resource needs of future generations will be, so it is difficult to know what needs to be 
conserved. Further complicating this issue, it is likely that technological change will 
mean that we will be able to do more with less, and we might be able to switch our 
dependence on some non-renewable resources to other non-renewable, or renewable 
resources. And as known reserves become scarce, prices will rise, stimulating 
exploration and development of new reserves, greater recycling, conservation through 
greater efficiency of use, and the development of substitutes (where this is possible). 
Besides, the economically-recoverable amount of the sorts of natural resources 
typically recovered for recycling — such as iron, aluminium, copper, and silica — has 
tended to increase over time, not diminish. 
Further issues arise in considering who should be asked to make sacrifices for the 
welfare of future generations: the more advanced economies that currently account for 
a high proportion of resource consumption, or the less developed economies for whom 




To the extent that there is a case for intervention, such upstream issues are best 
addressed as directly as possible, not through waste management policy. Using     
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waste management policy to address these issues is likely to be inefficient and 
ineffective. For example, the kerbside recycling of steel cans might lead to a small 
decrease in the domestic demand for steel (and hence iron ore), and less 
environmental externalities from mining and processing. But it is likely to be far 
less effective than applying direct policy instruments to address particular upstream 
problems. This is especially the case where the problems are specific to particular 
mine sites or practices. In addition, any benefits from curbing domestic 
consumption would be illusory if the iron ore conserved were redirected to exports, 
as is likely for a major minerals exporter such as Australia. 
Taking indirect action through waste management policy also presumes that direct 
actions are not being taken, or that the upstream externalities that have not been 
addressed are substantial. Yet with the exception of a comprehensive response to 
greenhouse gas abatement, a host of existing policies already address directly most 
known upstream externalities occurring in Australia. If greenhouse gas abatement is 
the major unresolved issue, and resource recovery reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions, some cautious downstream intervention — such as subsidies for kerbside 
recycling — might be justifiable. However, government intervention to address 
climate change would be more effectively and efficiently achieved through a 
comprehensive national approach. Once this were done, any downstream 
interventions predicated on greenhouse gas benefits would need to be re-examined 
and, where relevant, removed.  
The rate at which we deplete nonrenewable resources is a concern to many people. 
Yet increasing scarcity will induce rises in prices that dampen demand and 
encourage exploration for new supplies and substitution to other materials. It also 
makes recycling more attractive. Such dynamic responses mean extraction rates for 
nonrenewable resources should be left largely to markets to determine, provided all 
relevant market failures and distortions have been addressed. The Commission 
considers that waste policies are unlikely to be an effective way of addressing 
‘resource scarcity’ issues. 
The Commission is not recommending that market failures further upstream in the 
product life cycle should be ignored. Quite the contrary — direct intervention at 
various points throughout the product life cycle should be continued and where 
necessary supplemented by additional measures. This would help ensure that 
product prices reflect all relevant costs. Complemented by awareness raising 
campaigns that help consumers make more informed choices, this will also help 
address concerns about over-consumption.      





Targets and the waste hierarchy 
Many State and Territory Governments have developed waste management 
strategies based around the concept of the waste hierarchy (figure 2). Under this 
approach, waste avoidance is argued to be preferable to reuse, reuse to recycling, 
and so on. Disposal is seen to be the least desirable option. In compliance with this 
approach, many jurisdictions have set targets for diverting waste, some going so far 
as to aim for zero waste to landfill. This approach is inconsistent with good policy 
principles.  
 
Figure 2  A waste management hierarchy 
 
Source: Victorian Government (2005). 
 
 
Although target setting may be a useful way of improving performance where 
targets relate to sound policy objectives, have been rigorously set, and clear lines of 
accountability can be established, these conditions are inherently difficult to achieve 
with respect to waste diversion. In practice, waste diversion targets have tended to 
be set using technical and other criteria that are highly unlikely to maximise net 
benefits to the community. A better approach would be to address all relevant 
market failures and allow the market to establish the most appropriate balance 
between disposal and resource recovery.  
Similarly, waste management options should not be dictated by the simple priorities 
suggested by the waste hierarchy. High order options in the hierarchy may not 
necessarily be better than lower order options, once all of the costs and benefits to 
Avoidance 
Recycling 




Disposal     
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the community have been considered. Policy makers and regulators might profess to 
use the waste hierarchy as a broad framework, but in practice it appears to have had 
an inordinate influence on waste management policy.  
Some jurisdictions have been (directly and indirectly) subsidising the installation of 
alternative waste technology facilities (for municipal waste) as a means of achieving 
their targets, despite the dubious net environmental benefits of such facilities. Waste 
management policy should aim to achieve the best possible outcomes for the 
community, not prescribe one technical solution at the expense of others. Yet 
jurisdictions’ adherence to the waste hierarchy and waste diversion targets can 
favour policy options that have higher net costs to the community than other 
alternatives.  
Choosing good policy instruments 
A variety of policy instruments have been used in different jurisdictions, with 
varying degrees of success. These include regulation, pricing measures (including 
landfill levies), and extended producer responsibility or product stewardship 
schemes. 
Regulation of disposal has tightened considerably 
The regulation of landfills has tightened considerably in recent times (though more 
could be done to enforce existing standards). While landfill operators have some 
freedom to design their landfills to most efficiently meet licensing requirements, 
jurisdictions often also prescribe certain features drawn from ‘best practice’ 
guidelines. Prescription has the advantages of clarity and certainty, but it can stifle 
innovation and impose additional costs. It would be more appropriate to consider 
landfill proposals on how they would reduce the risk of adverse outcomes to 
acceptable levels, rather than require particular features. Furthermore, it is crucial 
that regulatory solutions are tailored to match the circumstances of particular 
landfills, and that they only address the externalities produced by the landfill, not 
upstream issues.  
Currently, some environmental regulators require that landfills install gas capture 
systems. These systems can have many benefits, including reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, the risks of fires and explosions, and unpleasant odours. While landfill 
gas capture might prove to be one of the more cost-effective greenhouse gas 
abatement options, this would best be judged within the framework of a 
comprehensive national greenhouse response. Regulatory requirements to install 
such systems should be reviewed, whenever this occurs.      





Given that most externalities emanating from modern, fully-complying landfills 
seem to have reached acceptably low levels, any further tightening of the 
regulations would need to be carefully evaluated. 
The other main alternative for disposing of some wastes — incineration — is also 
tightly regulated, and in some Australian jurisdictions effectively banned altogether. 
Although capital intensive, incineration can be combined with energy recovery 
facilities and appropriate flue gas treatment to provide an environmentally 
acceptable alternative to landfill. In Europe, where incineration is common, 
regulations require the use of technologies that have effectively eliminated 
damaging levels of pollution. Lifting the effective bans on the use of incineration of 
certain wastes in Australia, while insisting on appropriate performance standards, 
would appear to be long overdue. 
Other waste management regulation is designed to limit processes, and sometimes 
products themselves. Foreshadowed regulation to reduce the use of plastic shopping 
bags is one example. Governments should ensure that any such regulation is likely 
to deliver a greater net benefit to the community — including impacts on the 
environment — than other policy options. But, based on evidence available to the 
Commission, the case for proceeding with the phase out of plastic bags appears 
particularly weak. A more cost-effective approach to addressing the underlying 
issues of concern would be to target plastic-bag litter directly.  
Getting prices right will help  
If the prices for waste disposal, virgin materials, and manufactured goods reflected 
the full costs involved — including environmental and social externalities — 
markets would be the best way of determining the appropriate mix of resource 
recovery and disposal. Where these externalities have been addressed through 
regulation or market-based instruments, costs would already be internalised in the 
prices of goods and services (including landfill gate fees). Such pricing would also 
allow consumers’ willingness to pay for recycling and waste services to be gauged 
directly. But further refinement of waste disposal price signals is not 
straightforward. 
Varying charges according to the amount of waste can be difficult 
Many firms arrange their own waste disposal services and pay according to how 
much they generate. In contrast, most households are charged a flat annual fee and, 
therefore, have no incentive to reduce the amount of waste they dispose (until they 
have filled their bin). This may exacerbate the extent of any downstream disposal 
externalities.      
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Some local governments have introduced a modest degree of variability into their 
charging arrangements. The most simple of these involves an additional fee for the 
use of a larger than standard bin. Broader adoption of these pay-as-you-throw 
approaches is warranted, where this is cost effective. More explicit cost-based 
charging arrangements for kerbside recycling would also be appropriate. 
Cost recovery has not been fully implemented 
Cost recovery means setting disposal fees to cover the financial, environmental and 
social costs. However, this depends on levels of compliance, which for some 
landfills are relatively poor. State and Territory Governments should do more to 
ensure that all landfills comply with appropriate environmental licence conditions, 
and that government-owned landfills adopt sound charging policies. This would 
also promote competitive neutrality between government and private sector 
providers.  
Landfill levies 
Most Australian jurisdictions impose a levy on waste disposed to landfill, which 
users must pay in addition to gate fees. In some cases, levies vary according to the 
type of waste and location. The primary purpose of levies now seems to be to 
discourage waste being sent to landfill, and thus to support the achievement of 
waste diversion targets. Levies are also used in some cases for raising revenue, with 
some or all of the revenue hypothecated (earmarked) for environmental projects. 
Levies might encourage waste diversion from landfills and achievement of targets, 
but unless based on the environmental and social externalities of the landfill, will 
send the wrong price signals to users. Their use as revenue raising devices is not 
supported, nor is hypothecation to particular expenditure programs. Hypothecation 
introduces rigidities into public sector financing and is rarely warranted. 
Basing levies on the environmental and social externalities of the landfill would be 
very difficult to achieve in practice. Externalities vary according to location, the 
type of waste and how the landfill is constructed and managed. Varying the levy to 
account for these differences with any precision is virtually impossible, and would 
also encourage evasion by waste disposers to gain the cheapest disposal option. The 
practical response might be to average the levies across all landfills (or a class of 
landfills), but this would give no incentive to improve landfill practices. To the 
extent that regulation and other policies already address externalities, levies 
duplicate existing costs. No matter how they are set, landfill levies increase the 
incentive to illegally dump waste — a serious problem in some locations.     





On balance, the Commission does not favour the use of landfill levies, but rather 
regulation that reduces externalities to acceptable levels, and better enforcement. In 
this way, gate fees can internalise the environmental and external costs that would 
otherwise occur, and hence provide appropriate price signals to landfill users. 
Kerbside recycling 
Kerbside recycling is undoubtedly valued by many households, yet it almost 
invariably increases the financial costs of waste management. A substantial 
environmental return would often be necessary if it were to achieve net benefits for 
the community.  
The support for kerbside recycling, and resource recovery generally, stems in part 
from the alleged upstream benefits. But while some upstream issues warrant 
intervention, these would be more effective and efficient if undertaken directly, not 
through waste management policy. Furthermore, some commonly quoted 
assessments of the upstream benefits of kerbside recycling are, in the Commission’s 
view, greatly exaggerated. 
Care also needs to be taken in the design and application of kerbside recycling if it 
is to achieve the best returns to the community. Taking a harder nosed approach to 
restricting the items collected might be appropriate. For example, glass is a 
marginal proposition in comingled collection systems, due to a combination of its 
relatively low value, its high sorting costs, its inertness in landfill and its 
contaminating influence on other recyclables. In some locations, far from markets 
and processing opportunities, undertaking any kerbside recycling is probably not 
worthwhile, even after accounting for all of the environmental benefits. 
Household support for kerbside recycling needs to be tested through more explicit 
cost-based charges, and informed through better education and awareness raising. 
Extended producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes 
As noted earlier, policy makers have increasingly turned to approaches that target 
producers, or distributors, of products that are deemed to be problematic for one 
reason or another. These are called extended producer responsibility (EPR) or 
product stewardship (PS) schemes. 
EPR and PS schemes (which generally require producers to take more responsibility 
for end-of-life disposal or recovery) can include a variety of policy instruments, 
such as take-back schemes, advance disposal fees, deposit refunds, and awareness 
raising. Typically, EPR and PS schemes involve separating the target product from 
the waste stream it is found in (for example, mobile phones in municipal solid     
  OVERVIEW 
 
XXXVII
waste), and using dedicated means for its disposal or recovery. To fund this, levies 
are often used. 
Some EPR and PS schemes operate on a voluntary basis, but increasingly they are 
being implemented through co-regulation. In this model, industry is charged with 
the task of developing a ‘self-regulatory’ scheme, and the Australian, State and 
Territory Governments back this with regulation that picks up free riders, 
effectively making participation mandatory. The Australian Government and 
relevant industry groups have been keen to ensure that policy develops on a more 
coordinated basis where national issues are at stake.  
A number of schemes already exist or are in the pipeline. One of the most notable is 
the National Packaging Covenant (NPC). Others include an existing waste oil 
scheme and foreshadowed schemes for televisions and tyres. Like the NPC, it is 
understood that these new schemes will be introduced via a National Environment 
Protection Measure, and implemented by the jurisdictions through regulations.  
The proliferation of EPR and PS schemes is a concern, because, among other 
things: 
•  there is little evidence to suggest that the problems to which many of these 
schemes are being directed are sufficient to justify the costs of intervention; 
•  they are vulnerable to the influence of vested interests; and  
•  financial incentives in some schemes appear to be based on the waste hierarchy, 
not net benefits to the community.  
Further mandatory schemes should only be introduced where a net benefit to the 
community can be demonstrated and other policy options would not deliver a 
greater net benefit. These conditions are unlikely to be satisfied unless: 
•  there are considerable benefits to the community from avoiding the product’s 
inappropriate disposal, possibly because it is hazardous; 
•  the parties that need to be targeted to make the requirements effective can be 
readily identified and held accountable; and 
•  compliance can be readily monitored and enforced. 
The effectiveness of the NPC will be reviewed in 2008, with some parties already 
calling for it to be substantially strengthened and/or extended. The Commission 
considers that the nature of this review should be changed to focus on the costs and 
benefits of various options, including not continuing with the NPC.  
To ensure future schemes have a sound basis, the Commission recommends two 
reforms. First, policy objectives should be reformulated to focus on reducing risks 
— to human health, the environment and social amenity — from waste to     





acceptable levels. Waste avoidance and resource recovery may be outcomes of 
achieving this objective, but they are not objectives justifying government 
intervention in their own right. Second, there should be a requirement that, before 
intervening, governments consider the findings of an independent review of a 
product’s alleged adverse impacts. The review should define exactly what the 
problem is, attempt to quantify its magnitude, and describe what actions might 
address the problem. It should also make a preliminary assessment of the likely 
costs and benefits of intervention.  
As part of good regulatory practice, the effectiveness and efficiency of all existing 
schemes should be reviewed as a matter of course. 
The role of local government is changing 
The role of local government in waste management is changing, particularly in large 
urban areas. Technical, regulatory and policy developments mean that waste 
management and recycling facilities are becoming bigger and more sophisticated. 
These developments are exacerbating planning and operational issues for all but 
some of the larger local governments. 
Local governments in urban areas are increasingly forming partnerships to jointly 
negotiate with suppliers of waste services, but this is not without its problems. Not 
the least of these is that it does nothing to resolve the tensions between local 
governments over where such facilities should be located. In some states, regional 
approaches have been adopted, but if these do not have appropriate expertise or 
capital backing, and are unable to address the ‘not-in-my-backyard’ reactions to 
planning issues, they can prove little more effective. To address these issues, State 
and Territory Governments should consider:  
•  declaring major waste and resource recovery facilities to be projects of state or 
regional significance, where this is not already the case; and  
•  passing the responsibilities for waste disposal to appropriately-constituted 
regional waste authorities, particularly in those larger urban centres where the 
majority of local governments do not have the scale or resources to efficiently 
and effectively handle such roles. 
Some regulations impede resource recovery 
Inconsistencies in the regulatory requirements of the states and territories are 
creating problems for industry and discouraging resource recovery. In particular, 
differences in definitions, waste classification systems and exemption processes 
mean that some materials are being more heavily regulated in some jurisdictions     
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than others. Greater coordination of classification and exemption systems, and less 
reliance on prescriptive definitions is required.  
Another impediment is that some product standards and government purchasing 
practices continue to favour the use of virgin over recycled products. Some 
jurisdictions have made welcome improvements to product standards, adopting a 
performance-based approach. But old habits die hard, and many participants argued 
there was still room for improvement. 
Role for the Australian Government 
While states and territories hold most of the policy levers in waste management, the 
Australian Government has significant coordinating and leadership roles to play. It 
also has the crucial power to levy indirect taxes — a virtual necessity in 
implementing most mandatory EPR and PS schemes. The Commission considers 
that the Australian Government could play a more significant role by: 
•  supporting research into the significant externalities caused by waste disposal; 
•  playing a leadership role in the development of EPR and PS schemes by 
insisting on clear objectives, and that thorough identification of the problem 
precedes the development of such schemes; 
•  ensuring rigorous adherence to its regulatory impact assessment guidelines (and 
encouraging states and territories to do likewise); 
•  working with states and territories to develop and implement consistent waste 
classification systems and databases; 
•  refining information, education and awareness programs to help ensure the 
community is well informed about the costs and benefits of waste management 
options, particularly with respect to issues of community concern and 
misunderstanding (such as energy-from-waste options); and 
•  ensuring that upstream market failures that concern waste policy makers are 
reviewed by other relevant ministries, and where appropriate, addressed directly. 
Concluding remarks 
Waste management policy should primarily be focused on reducing social and 
environmental risks from waste collection and disposal to acceptable levels. The 
Commission considers that policy makers have become distracted by the pursuit of 
other, waste hierarchy inspired, objectives — such as minimising waste and 
conserving resources — and given insufficient regard to whether their interventions 
would actually lead to net benefits to the community.     





Directly addressing relevant market failures and distortions throughout product life 
cycles will assist markets to determine the right balance between waste avoidance, 
resource recovery and disposal. Waste management policy can play its role in this 
process, but it should not be used to indirectly address upstream environmental and 
social issues. Many of these impacts may warrant intervention, but these would be 
(and often already are) much more effectively and efficiently addressed using direct 
policy instruments.  
Unfortunately, much waste management policy in Australia has been initiated with 
insufficient consideration of all of the likely financial, environmental and social 
costs and benefits. Waste disposal problems, and community support for the 
remedies proffered, are too often simply asserted, rather than demonstrated. Many 
interventions have certainly gone too far. In particular, landfill levies, direct and 
indirect subsidies for alternative waste technology facilities, and some EPR and PS 
schemes, are not justified.  
The reforms the Commission is proposing will help achieve a more appropriate 
balance between waste avoidance, resource recovery and disposal by, among other 
things: requiring a more rigorous approach to identifying environmental problems; 
tightening regulatory compliance; and reinforcing the roles of prices and awareness 
raising in assisting the community to make more informed choices (table 1). 
As in other areas of environmental policy, the way forward is not always intuitively 
obvious. But what is clear is that simple rules such as ‘recycling is good, more is 
better’, are no substitute for sound policy-making procedures. Policy makers and 
community attitudes need to be guided by open and rigorous analysis of costs, 
benefits and risks, if waste management policy is to best serve the community.      
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Table 1  Summary of main issues and the way forward 
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Landfills can damage the environment (chapters 4, 9 and 12 and appendix B) 
• Regulation has tightened 
considerably, but tends to be 
prescriptive. Where 
regulations are complied with, 
environmental damage is 
reduced to low levels.  
• Make regulation as 
performance based as 
possible and tailored to the 
circumstances of each 
landfill.  
• Desired level of pollution 
control achieved at lower cost. 
• Allow operators maximum 
flexibility in meeting 
environmental standards. 
• Enforcement of regulations 
appears variable and lax and 
some (local-government 
owned) landfills do not 
recover their full costs. 




• Ensure full cost recovery of 
government-run landfills. 
• Less risk of environmental 
damage.  
• Full cost pricing (including 
environmental costs) will 
promote the right level of 
recovery. 
• Landfilling is discouraged 
through landfill levies. Levy 
revenue is often earmarked 
for environmental projects. 
• Remove the levies as 
regulations are a better way 
of addressing externalities.  
• Raise funding for projects 
through general revenue. 
• Inappropriate cost impost on 
the community removed. 
• Better assessment of the 
merits of projects funded.  
Waste avoidance and resource recovery can be good for the environment (chapter 4) 
• The upstream benefits of 
resource recovery vary 
according to circumstances. 
Downstream external benefits 
are small. 
• Address upstream sources 
of externalities directly (for 
example, require mining 
operations to meet specified 
standards) and greenhouse 
gas abatement nationally. 
• Far more effective and 
efficient responses to 
upstream environmental 
issues. 
• Lower risk of perverse 
outcomes. 
• Maximising resource 
efficiency (the return to one or 
more natural resources) is a 
major determinant of policy.  
• But, as a partial indicator, 
resource efficiency fails to 
consider the returns from 
using all inputs. 
• Policy should be guided by 
consideration of all inputs 
and all costs and benefits, 
whether financial, 
environmental or social in 
nature. 
• Policies are more likely to 
maximise the returns to the 
community generally. 
• Resource recovery is 
promoted through landfill 
levies, subsidies, state 
strategies etc. 
• Make support for resource 
recovery as transparent as 
possible using direct policy 
instruments. 
• Transparent subsidies and 
charges help householders 
and others make better 
choices. 
• The waste hierarchy is used 
to help guide policy and set 
waste diversion targets. 
• Waste policy should be 
guided by assessments of 
all costs, benefits and risks. 
• Avoids costly measures that 
do not deliver commensurate 
environmental benefits. 
• Targets have been set for 
recycling and waste diversion 
in various jurisdictions.  
• Discontinue use of targets 
as they are difficult to set at 
an optimal level. 
• Full cost pricing will give the 
right balance between 
disposal and recovery. 
• In line with the hierarchy, 
waste avoidance is seen as 
highly desirable. 
• Greater adoption of pay-as-
you-throw methods for both 
recycling and disposal. 
• Reduction in waste generation 
commensurate with full costs 
of collection and disposal. 
  
(Continued on next page)    





Table 1  (continued) 
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Community support for recycling should count (chapters 6 and 11) 
• Surveys show high levels of 
community support for 
recycling, but less is known 
about the strength of this 
support. 
• Support for recycling does 
not always extend to a 
willingness to purchase 
products with recycled 
content. 
• More direct testing of 
people’s preferences and 
willingness to pay for 
recycling.  
• Governments should provide 
better information on, and 
promote debate about, the 
costs and benefits of 
recycling and other waste 
management options. 
• Community and policy 
makers able to make better 
informed waste management 
choices. 
Waste legislation should reduce risks to acceptable levels (chapters 3, 6 and 7) 
• Some of the objects of 
existing State and Territory 
legislation are inappropriate 
and inconsistent. They include 
reducing harm to the 
environment, but also include 
adherence to the waste 
hierarchy, using less 
resources, and avoiding 
waste.  
• Overriding objective should 
be to reduce risks to human 
health, the environment and 
social amenity to acceptable 
levels. 
• Waste avoidance and 
resource recovery are not 
objects justifying 
government intervention in 
their own right. 
• Help avoid perverse 
outcomes, for example, that 
recycling is maximised 
irrespective of net 
environmental benefits.  
• Reduce net costs to the 
community. 
Extended producer responsibility or product stewardship schemes may be warranted in some 
circumstances (chapter 10)  
• Governments have urged 
industries to adopt extended 
producer responsibility (EPR) 
or product stewardship (PS) 
schemes for many products. 
• There is rarely a thoroughly-
researched and clearly-
justified case for government 
intervention.  
• Use much clearer, earlier and 
more rigorous processes for 
identifying where government 
intervention is warranted. 
• Ensure focus is on potential 
harm to human health, the 
environment and social 
amenity. 
• Give closer consideration to 
other approaches, including 
doing nothing. 
• EPR and PS schemes are 
only adopted when there is 
likely to be a net benefit to 
the community. 
Plastic-bag litter can cause problems (chapter 8) 
• Plastic-bag litter is unsightly 
and may harm marine 
wildlife. 
• Governments plan to phase 
out plastic shopping bags by 
the end of 2008. 
• Identify the nature, extent 
and underlying causes of 
plastic-bag litter. 
• Evaluate recent plastic-bag 
reduction efforts. 
• Examine whether other 
options — such as tougher 
anti-litter laws and targeting 
away-from-home sources of 
plastic-bag litter — would be 
more effective. 
• Adoption of the most effective 
and efficient response to the 
problem of plastic-bag litter. 
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Table 1  (continued)  
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Institutional and regulatory factors can impede resource recovery (chapter 12) 
• Classifying materials as 
waste sometimes impedes 
opportunities for them to be 
recovered for recycling. 
• Improve exemption 
processes to help ensure 
recovery opportunities are not 
unduly constrained. 
• Better recovery of materials, 
particularly from industrial 
waste streams. 
• Some product specifications 
favour use of virgin materials. 
• Make product specifications 
performance based wherever 
possible. 
• Better recovery, as materials 
judged on performance, not 
origin. 
Local governments face considerable challenges in providing waste services (chapter 12) 
• Local governments deliver 
kerbside collection services. 
Many also own, or contract 
for the supply of, resource 
recovery and disposal 
services. 
• Planning, scale and 
technology issues are 
requiring regional solutions to 
waste disposal and resource 
recovery. In response, 
different models for regional 
groupings of councils have 
emerged. 
• In large urban centres, State 
Governments should 
investigate moving waste 
disposal and resource 
recovery services to 
appropriately-constituted 
regional bodies. Collection 
could still be managed 
through local government. 
• Retain existing arrangements 
in rural areas with technical 
and other advisory help from 
State and Territory 
Governments. 
• Better matching of tasks with 
responsibilities and 
capabilities. Regional 
approach to planning 
commensurate with regional 
impacts. 
• Potential for waste services 
to be delivered at lower cost, 
due to scale efficiencies in 
contract management. 
 
Using waste to generate energy can be a useful form of resource recovery (chapters 4 and 8) 
• Energy-from-waste plants (for 
disposal of municipal solid 
waste) are not strictly 
prohibited in Australia, but 
are out of favour with many 
policy makers and the 
community. 
• Technological developments 
have provided the potential 
for flue emissions to be safely 
controlled. 
• Such plants are used in many 
developed countries. 
• Modern, well-regulated 
energy-from-waste facilities, 
while financially costly, would 
have minimal net negative 
environmental externalities 
where they displaced fossil 
fuels used in electricity 
generation.  
• Cement kilns meeting all 
relevant environmental 
standards should not be 
prevented from using waste 
as an energy source. 
• Better utilisation of wastes 
that might otherwise be sent 
to landfill. For example, 
packaging that is not readily 
recyclable would provide 
useful energy recovery with 
no adverse environmental 
implications. 
 
Waste data are needed for developing sound policy (chapters 2 and 13) 
• Waste data are inconsistent 
and incomplete.  
• The data are influenced by 
the requirements and 
regulatory structures of the 
different jurisdictions. 
• Past attempts at establishing 
a national waste database 
foundered because it was 
costly and lacked support. 
• EPHC should coordinate the 
development of a nationally-
consistent data set for waste 
management. 
• Adopting common definitions 
would be an important first 
step. 
• Data should only be collected 
where there is a clear policy 
need.  
• Enable comparisons of waste 
management performance 
across jurisdictions.  
• Enable each jurisdiction’s 
waste management 
performance to be compared 
against their policy 
objectives. 
  
(Continued on next page)
     





Table 1  (continued) 
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Life cycle assessment can be used in estimating costs and benefits (chapter 4 and appendix B) 
• Life cycle assessment (LCA) 
can be used to identify some 
of the environmental impacts 
of production processes, from 
raw material extraction to 
final disposal. 
• Some researchers have used 
LCA in estimating the costs 
and benefits of waste 
management policies. 
• The costs and benefits thus 
derived are not adjusted for 
the risks of environmental 
damage occurring. Nor do 
they take into account some 
upstream policies that 
address externalities. 
• Deficiencies relating to risk 
adjustment and failure to take 
upstream policies into 
account mean LCA must be 
used cautiously in estimating 
the costs and benefits of 
waste policies.  
• Some of these deficiencies 
might be able to be overcome 
(at some cost), but given that 
waste policy should focus on 
downstream externalities, this 
should not be given a high 
priority. 
• Where LCA is used, 
consideration should be 
given to referring any 
upstream issues identified to 
relevant upstream policy 
makers. 
• Prevent highly unreliable 
estimates of costs and 
benefits from influencing 
policy development. 
• Help to refocus waste policy 
on the main policy-relevant 




     




Findings and recommendations 
Waste management in Australia  
Australian waste data are collected from a range of sources. Differences in 
definitions and collection methodologies between data sets, and inherent difficulties 
in collecting data on waste, mean that the data have substantial gaps and biases. 
Comparisons between Australia’s waste management outcomes — in terms of waste 
generation, recycling and disposal — and those of other countries should be made 
with caution. Differences in the way waste is classified, data are collected, and the 
economic, environmental and social circumstances of different countries, limit the 
usefulness of international comparisons. 
The costs and benefits of waste 
The total external costs of properly-located, engineered and managed landfills that 
incorporate efficient gas capture (with electricity generation) are likely to be less 
than $5 per tonne of waste. 
Modern, well-regulated energy-from-waste facilities, while financially costly, can 
have minimal net negative environmental externalities, particularly where they 
displace fossil fuels used in electricity generation. 
Taking into account all private and external costs and benefits, properly-located, 
engineered and managed landfills incorporating gas capture and electricity 
generation, are likely to be much less costly than ‘alternative waste technology’ 





FINDING 4.3     





The financial costs of current kerbside recycling systems exceed the financial 
benefits. This is particularly the case where the cost of landfill is low. The case for 
kerbside recycling partly rests on its ability to deliver upstream external benefits, 
which are highly variable, and/or on the community’s willingness to pay for 
recycling services. Technological progress and changes to the design of recycling 
systems may reduce the net financial costs of kerbside recycling. 
The case for government intervention 
Upstream environmental externalities associated with waste are most appropriately 
addressed through directly-targeted policies. Waste policy should only be used to 
address upstream issues where more direct policies are not able to be used, and 
there are reasonable prospects that it would be both effective and produce net 
benefits to the community. These circumstances are likely to be the exception rather 
than the norm.  
The environmental impacts of resource extraction, processing and manufacturing, 
raise more significant sustainability concerns than the depletion of material 
resources. However, waste management policies are an indirect, imprecise and 
generally ineffective means of addressing these issues. Direct policy intervention is 
strongly preferred. 
A waste policy framework 
Australian, State and Territory waste legislation and strategies often: 
•  are not sufficiently focused on reducing risks to human health, the environment 
and social amenity from waste to acceptable levels; 
•  include objects relating to resource conservation and upstream environmental 
protection, even though these issues are more appropriately dealt with through 
directly-targeted policies; and 
•  give a high priority to waste reduction as an end in itself, even though there is 
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Australian, State and Territory waste legislation and strategies should be 
reformulated to focus on reducing risks — to human health, the environment and 
social amenity — from waste to acceptable levels. Objects that detract from this 
focus, such as those relating to resource conservation and upstream 
environmental protection, should be removed. 
Waste management policy should not be used to promote resource efficiency 
(defined as the value added per unit of resource input). This is because measures 
of resource efficiency: 
•  do not take into account the use of all resources; and 
•  often involve aggregating quantities of different materials in a way that does 
not take into account their individual market values or environmental impacts. 
The waste hierarchy and target setting 
To maximise net benefits to the community, waste management policy should be 
guided by rigorous analysis of the financial, environmental and social costs and 
benefits, not by the simple priorities suggested by the waste hierarchy. 
Targets for waste diversion are virtually impossible to set at an optimal level. 
Broad targets do not account for regional differences in waste diversion costs or the 
external costs of different types of waste. Nor are they sensitive to changes in 
market or institutional settings. While they might be argued to have some 
aspirational virtues, targets such as zero waste to landfill lack credibility and are 
unachievable. More importantly, excessive resource recovery can be costly to the 
community and result in perverse outcomes. 
A better approach than using waste diversion targets, would be to directly address 
relevant market failures and distortions throughout product life cycles, thus 
assisting markets to achieve the right balance between waste avoidance, resource 
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Governments should not directly or indirectly impose waste diversion targets as 
part of waste management policy.   
Regulation 
There may be a case for adopting mandatory minimum standards for compost to 
address potential risks to human health or the environment, but this would need to 
be assessed after voluntary industry approaches have been tried and evaluated. 
Current State and Territory landfill regulations mostly focus on the policy-relevant 
externalities of landfill disposal including pollution of air, surface waters and 
groundwater, and amenity losses during the operational life of landfills and after 
their closure. However, some components of regulation have been driven by 
inappropriate objectives, such as increasing resource recovery and waste diversion. 
In addition, some regulations have pursued greenhouse gas abatement — an 
objective that would be best addressed through a comprehensive national approach. 
Landfill regulation should focus on the policy-relevant externalities of landfill 
disposal. It should be based on a rigorous assessment of the risk of damage from 
those externalities, and should aim to reduce that risk to levels at which the cost 
of further reductions begins to exceed the benefit. 
Regulation should consist of a mix of prescriptive and performance-based 
measures and should provide for alternative methods of compliance, if there is a 





RECOMMENDATION 8.1  
Mandatory standards for including recycled content in products should not be 
implemented, as they are unlikely to produce net benefits for the community. 
FINDING 8.1 
FINDING 8.2 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2      




The State and Territory Governments should evaluate the cost effectiveness of 
current regulations in addressing the externalities of landfill disposal, to 
determine whether current requirements are at an appropriate level to deliver the 
greatest net benefit to the community. 
Compliance with landfill licence conditions in Australia appears to be relatively 
poor, and enforcement somewhat variable and lax. 
Once landfill licences are appropriately configured to account for all relevant 
risks and externalities, the State and Territory Governments should ensure that 
all landfills comply with their licence conditions. 
Modern, efficient, well-regulated energy-from-waste facilities have proven to be a 
satisfactory means of disposing of some non-hazardous waste in many advanced 
economies. In theory, Australian regulation does not completely preclude 
energy-from-waste facilities but, in practice, strong community and political 
opposition has, to date, prevented appropriate consideration of this disposal option. 
Regulation and enforcement for litter and illegal dumping are necessary but not 
sufficient to achieve the best result for the community. Accompanying measures, 
such as education, community involvement and moral suasion, can make regulation 
more effective. 
Plastic-bag litter has the potential to injure marine wildlife, including endangered 
species. However, claims that at least 100 000 animals are killed each year by 
plastic-bag litter are not supported by evidence. Such claims appear to be based on 
the misinterpretation of Canadian research on the impact of fishing nets. Some have 
also misinterpreted case studies of individual animals that have come into contact 
with plastic debris (not just plastic bags) as being representative of the overall 
impact of plastic-bag litter. The true extent to which plastic-bag litter injures 
populations of marine wildlife, as opposed to individual animals, is likely to remain 
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Based on the evidence available to the Commission, it appears that the Australian, 
State and Territory Governments do not have a sound case for proceeding with 
their proposed phase out of plastic retail carry bags. Similarly, there does not 
appear to be a sound basis for the Victorian Government’s proposed per-unit 
charge on plastic bags. A cost–benefit study commissioned by the Governments 
shows that the benefits of a phase out or a per-unit charge would be significantly 
outweighed by the costs. This is because the policies would penalise most uses of 
plastic retail carry bags, whereas the potential benefit would only come from the 
small proportion of bags that are littered. A more cost-effective approach would be 
to target littering directly. 
To help ensure governments adopt the best policy approach on plastic bags, the 
Environment Protection and Heritage Council should include the following in its 
forthcoming regulation impact statement: 
•  a clearly-specified objective to reduce plastic-bag litter in a way that 
maximises the net benefit to the community; 
•  a comprehensive review of evidence on the environmental impacts of plastic-
bag litter; 
•  a thorough evaluation of recent initiatives to reduce plastic bags in Australia, 
including consideration of why the large reduction in supermarket plastic 
carry bags in recent years appears not to have translated into an 
environmental improvement; 
•  assessment of an alternative policy approach that, rather than targeting 
supermarkets or most uses of plastic carry bags, involves a combination of: 
–  strengthened litter-reduction policies, such as education, enforcement of 
litter laws, and containment with litter traps and other infrastructure; and  
–  measures focused directly on away-from-home sources of plastic-bag litter, 
including measures that target plastic-bag litter entering marine and 
riverine environments. 
FINDING 8.7 
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Governments should discontinue using landfill levies because: 
•  the externalities of disposal to a properly-located, engineered and managed 
landfill are typically small, and the scope for applying levies without 
duplicating the effect of existing regulation is very limited; 
•  residual disposal externalities vary significantly according to waste type, 
location of disposal and type of landfill facility, and it would be impractical to 
vary the levy to reflect that variability; and 
•  using levies to achieve selected landfill diversion targets and revenue 
generation to fund environmental programs will not encourage outcomes 
which are in the best interests of the community, and may have perverse 
consequences, such as increases in illegal dumping and other forms of 
evasion. 
Charges for household waste collection that vary with the amount of waste could 
promote more efficient outcomes, where they are cost effective and practical to 
introduce. This will depend on the implementation costs and any consequent 
increase in illegal disposal. Wider adoption of simple forms of variable charges, 
such as charging an additional fee for a larger than standard bin, would seem 
desirable, with more sophisticated ‘pay-as-you-throw’ approaches adopted if and 
when they become more cost effective and practical. 
The scope for applying advance, rather than end-of-life, charging for disposal and 
recycling is limited by the difficulties in setting the fee at the correct rate and the 
high administrative cost of such schemes. Advance disposal and recycling schemes 
are only likely to be justified for products carrying a high risk and cost of illegal 
disposal. 
Deposit-refund schemes are typically costly and would only be justified for products 
that have a very high cost of illegal disposal. Container deposit legislation is 
unlikely to be the most cost-effective mechanism for achieving its objectives of 
recovering resources and reducing litter. Kerbside recycling is a less costly option 
for recovering resources, while general anti-litter programs are likely to be a more 
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It is currently not clear what purpose tradeable property rights mechanisms would 
serve in Australian waste policy. Such mechanisms can be useful means of 
achieving targets cost effectively. However, developing meaningful waste disposal 
and resource recovery targets is practically impossible, and enforcing arbitrary 
targets can impose large costs on the community.  
Extended producer responsibility and product 
stewardship 
Mandatory extended producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes — 
involving either industry–government co-regulation or government regulation — 
tend to be costly. They are unlikely to deliver a net benefit unless: 
•  there are considerable benefits to the community from avoiding the product’s 
inappropriate disposal, for example because it is hazardous; 
•  the relevant parties can be readily identified and held accountable; and 
•  compliance with the requirements can be readily measured and enforced. 
The Commission is not convinced that many of the products currently being 
targeted by governments — including office paper, packaging, tyres, computers, 
televisions and other electrical appliances — satisfy all of these requirements. 
The objectives of the National Packaging Covenant and National Environment 
Protection (Used Packaging Materials) Measure should be amended so they are 
consistent with the objects clause of the National Environment Protection 
Council Act 2004. This should include removing the goal of resource 
conservation as a reason for government intervention. 
The terms of reference for the scheduled 2008 review of the National Packaging 
Covenant should be expanded by the Australian Government beyond an 
assessment of effectiveness. An independent review should consider all relevant 
evidence about whether the Covenant (and supporting regulation) delivers a net 
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The Environment Protection and Heritage Council, and its member 
Governments, should adopt the following two reforms to their product 
stewardship and extended producer responsibility policies. 
First, the objective should be reformulated to focus on reducing risks — to 
human health, the environment and social amenity — from waste to acceptable 
levels (that is, where the expected benefits of further reducing the risk are less 
than the costs of doing so). Objects that detract from this focus, such as those 
relating to resource conservation and upstream environmental protection, should 
be removed. 
Second, adopt a prerequisite that, before intervening, governments must consider 
the findings of a thorough review of scientific evidence on a product’s alleged 
environmental and public health impacts. Such reviews should: 
•  be conducted by independent panels of scientists, formed on an ad hoc basis as 
required, who have a history of peer-reviewed research in respected academic 
journals that is objective and relevant; 
•  consider public and relevant industry comment before being finalised; and 
•  make a preliminary assessment of the level of risk compared to the likely costs 
of intervention (informed by relevant economic and financial expertise).  
Such a panel should answer the questions ‘Does a comprehensive review of all 
relevant scientific research indicate that the product’s existing or anticipated 
production process, reuse, recycling and disposal in Australia has the potential to 
cause significant harm to the community and/or the environment? If so, define 
exactly what the problem is, attempt to quantify its magnitude, and describe what 
actions might address the problem, and at what likely cost’.  
A panel’s report should always be completed and published before the relevant 
government(s) begins to design or encourage a product stewardship or extended 
producer responsibility scheme. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3      





Government information provision and procurement 
practices 
Australian governments should identify any major misunderstandings the 
community may have about the risks, costs and benefits of waste management 
issues and address these by ensuring the supply of factually accurate, relevant 
and accessible information to the public.  
Governments should leave the provision of waste-exchange services to private 
markets. 
There are significant practical difficulties in designing and implementing an 
effective system of labelling for recycling, and any mandatory scheme would need to 
be supported by a comprehensive cost–benefit analysis. Where labelling schemes 
are adopted, they should be complemented with government and industry-supplied 
awareness-raising programs and information hotlines. 
Using government procurement practices to create demonstration effects for the 
broader community and assist the development of markets for recovered materials 
is an indirect and, most likely, relatively ineffective way of pursuing those waste 
policy objectives.  
Institutional and regulatory impediments to resource 
recovery 
State and Territory Governments should ensure that all government-operated 
landfills charge users the full costs of waste disposal. 
State and Territory Governments should: 
•  consider making land-use planning and development approvals for major 
waste disposal and resource recovery facilities matters of regional or even state 
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significance, and the responsibility of the relevant minister, where this is not 
already the case; 
•  ensure that land-use planning and development approvals for major waste 
disposal and resource recovery facilities are handled efficiently and effectively, 
providing transparency and consultation for the relevant communities but also 
clarity and certainty for the waste management industry; and 
•  consider shifting the responsibility for waste disposal and resource recovery 
from local government to appropriately-constituted regional waste authorities, 
particularly in those larger urban centres in circumstances where the relevant 
local governments do not have sufficient scale or resources to efficiently and 
effectively handle these roles. 
The Australian Government should work with the State and Territory 
Governments to: 
•  develop and implement a national definition of waste and a national waste 
classification system; 
•  review the appropriate balance between prescriptive and risk-based 
classifications of waste; 
•  standardise, coordinate and improve the efficiency of current processes for 
granting exemptions to recoverable resources from irrelevant environmental 
controls; and 
•  explore opportunities to achieve further consistency in regulatory standards 
applying to waste. 
State and Territory Governments should direct their agencies and local 
governments to develop uniform skip bin policies, and to augment current 
permitting processes with an accreditation system for skip bin suppliers to reduce 
the need for multiple permitting applications. 
Governments responsible for specifying the use of materials for products, 
including building and construction materials, should review all product 
standards that unjustifiably frustrate the use of recycled products and/or call for 
the use of virgin materials, with a view to replacing them with performance-based 
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The Australian Government should ensure that export, import and transit permits 
granted under the Hazardous Waste Act 1989 (Cwlth) are issued expeditiously 
and commence from the day the Minister grants approval, rather than from the 
date of application, unless the applicant requests otherwise. 
Performance measurement 
Performance indicators of the amounts of waste being disposed to landfill or 
recovered have limited value because they do not provide any information on the 
costs and benefits of these options.  
Performance indicators relating to compliance with licence conditions at landfill 
sites may be useful in revealing the extent of externalities, and whether further 
policy intervention is needed. 
Performance indicators of cost effectiveness can have a role to play in measuring 
the cost of achieving social and environmental objectives in waste management, 
and in benchmarking performances of local governments in providing kerbside 
collection services.  
The Australian Government should work with the State and Territory 
Governments to coordinate the development and implementation of a concise, 
nationally consistent data set for waste management that: 
•   facilitates evaluation and comparison of waste management policies across 
jurisdictions; 
•  assists governments in undertaking cost–benefit analysis;  
•  focuses on the data needed to address priority policy issues; 
•  has regard to data collection practices already in use, including the framework 
provided by the Australian Waste Database; and 
•  recognises the importance of government-funded data when there is a market 
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•  The Australian Government has asked the Productivity Commission to conduct an 
inquiry into waste generation and resource efficiency. 
•  The focus of this inquiry is on non-hazardous, solid waste, and three main waste 
streams: municipal solid waste; commercial and industrial waste; and construction 
and demolition waste.  
•  The objective of the inquiry is to identify policies to address market failures and 
externalities associated with the generation and disposal of waste. Externalities are 
the unintended costs or benefits of an activity that are experienced by people other 
than those involved in that activity. For example, a waste processing or recycling 
facility may have adverse effects on the amenity of neighbours (a negative 
externality). 
•  A flexible, value-based approach to defining waste is adopted. This recognises that 
what is waste to one person, might not be to another. It also recognises that 
different types of waste can have different environmental impacts, and the location 
where the waste is produced can be important in terms of the opportunities for cost 
effective recycling or otherwise recovering that material.  
•  The term resource efficiency, which is widely used in waste management policy to 
imply that the amount of material (and energy) used per unit of output be minimised, 
has limitations as a criterion of good public policy.  
•  A focus on net benefits to the community is adopted. This is a measure of the social 
welfare or wellbeing of the community generally, and includes all private costs and 
benefits (whether financial or nonfinancial in nature), and the impact of all relevant 
externalities.  
•  Maximising net benefits to the community requires that the use of all natural 
resources, together with other inputs such as intermediate goods, labour and 




The Australian Government has asked the Productivity Commission (the 
Commission) to conduct an inquiry into waste generation and resource efficiency in 
Australia, and recommend ways in which economic, environmental and social 
outcomes can be improved. This introductory chapter discusses the scope of the 
inquiry and the broad policy background.     




1.1  Scope of the inquiry 
The scope of this inquiry is broad. It covers a wide variety of solid wastes, the 
environmental, economic and social consequences of those wastes, and the policy 
frameworks of all levels of government in Australia.  
What is waste?  
Waste can generally be defined as any product or substance that has no further use 
or value for the person or organisation that owns it, and which is, or will be, 
discarded. It thus excludes products or substances that are reused or sold by the 
organisation that owns them.  
For practical reasons, the definition covers products that are discarded by one party 
but have value for another. Thus, it can include products that are recoverable, 
including through reuse, recycling or by energy extraction. However, what is 
recoverable in one context might not be recoverable in another. For example, in 
many urban locations the costs and benefits of collecting newspapers favour 
recycling, but the opposite might be true for a remote location. As the Business 
Roundtable on Sustainable Development (sub. 70, p. 4) put it: ‘Waste is not an 
absolute — it is a matter of value, place and time’.  
What types of waste are covered? 
The Commission is directed to look at solid waste, that is, the inquiry has not 
focused on policies and practices surrounding the generation, treatment and disposal 
of liquid or gaseous waste. The Commission has been expressly asked not to cover 
hazardous waste (see below).  
The terms of reference specify that the inquiry must cover, but is not necessarily 
limited to, three main solid waste streams: municipal waste; commercial and 
industrial waste; and construction and demolition waste. Thus, for example, under 
municipal solid waste, the inquiry covers the kerbside collection of waste (whether 
separated into putrescible and nonputrescible components or not), away from home 
collection, and hard waste collection.  
The terms of reference also direct the Commission to adopt a life-cycle perspective 
that incorporates ‘raw material extraction and processing, to product design, 
manufacture, use and end of life management’. Waste may be generated during the 
extraction of raw materials, the processing of those materials to intermediate and 
final products, and the consumption of final products (figure 1.1).     
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Figure 1.1  Disposal, recycling and externalities in the product life cycle 
This diagram is a simplified representation of what can happen in the life cycle of a 
product, from the time natural resources are mined (in the case of nonrenewable 
resources) or harvested (in the case of renewable resources), through the stages of 
processing, manufacturing, distribution (including wholesaling and retailing activities) to 
where it is consumed. Note that waste can be generated at all points in the life cycle, 
not just in the post-consumer phase. Waste can be either disposed or recovered in 
some way (represented here as recycling).  
The diagram also shows that environmental and other externalities can occur at each 
stage in a product’s life cycle. From a waste management perspective, downstream 
externalities are those that might arise from disposal or recycling (including the waste 
collection and transport associated with these activities). Upstream externalities occur 
prior to the point at which waste is generated. For example, the ‘externalities’ boxes on 
the left hand side of the diagram indicate the possible externalities that might be 
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The product life cycle approach required the Commission to consider if it were 
appropriate to cover the on-site disposal of waste. On-site disposal is an integral 
feature of many upstream activities and can account for very considerable amounts 
of waste of one sort or another. For example, large amounts of residue are left after 
cropping or forest harvesting, and mineral processing can result in stockpiles of 
byproducts accumulating on or adjacent to processing plants (for example, the red 
mud associated with alumina refining).  
However, the Commission was advised early in the process that it had been the 
Government’s intention for the inquiry to concentrate on off-site, not on-site 
disposal issues, when it drafted the terms of reference. For the most part the 
Commission has followed this approach, but inevitably grey areas emerge that mean 
on-site and off-site issues cannot always be separated. For example, policy 
instruments that affect off-site disposal options can provide incentives for firms to 
adopt on-site disposal methods, such as recovering energy from waste.  
Notwithstanding the general exclusion of on-site disposal the coverage of the 
inquiry has been very broad. The wide variety of waste covered, the varying 
composition of waste streams, and the different environmental impacts of different 
types of waste, have also added a layer of complexity to the inquiry. A tonne of 
broken clay bricks has quite different impacts on the environment to a tonne of old 
lead acid batteries, or a tonne of putrescible household waste. To adapt an old 
catchcry — ‘wastes ain’t wastes’ — meaning that polices designed to address one 
type of waste might not be the best instruments to address other types of waste.  
These differences caution against drawing strong conclusions from comparisons 
between different regions or jurisdictions based on broad measures of waste 
volumes or tonnages. Different institutional and regulatory frameworks can also 
mean that data are collected in different and inconsistent ways.  
The observation made in the terms of reference that Australians generate solid 
waste at a high rate compared with most other Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development countries is not, by itself, very informative. To 
understand the policy relevance of this comparison for Australia necessitates a great 
deal more information about such things as: the composition of waste; the impacts 
of waste on human health and the environment; the determinants of waste 
generation; and the waste disposal and recycling options available to different 
countries. The same applies to comparisons made between jurisdictions or regions 
within Australia (chapter 2). 
The adequacy of the current data is an important element of this inquiry. Good 
policy outcomes will depend on focusing on the key problems we face in waste     
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generation and disposal, and then being able to measure how substantial they are. 
Relevant and comparable data are essential for this purpose. 
Hazardous waste is not directly covered  
The terms of reference specify that the inquiry ‘will not cover wastes that exhibit 
hazardous characteristics and pose an immediate and unacceptable risk of harm to 
human beings or the environment’. But, not surprisingly, this is open to 
interpretation.  
A good starting point for deciding what is hazardous and what is not, is to look at 
state and territory regulations concerning what are commonly called ‘prescribed’ or 
‘controlled’ wastes. These invariably use definitions based on the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, an international agreement ratified by 166 countries, including Australia.  
The Basel Convention uses two approaches to defining hazardous waste. The first is 
to classify something as hazardous waste if it has ‘hazardous characteristics’. These 
characteristics include that the waste is: explosive, flammable, oxidising, poisonous, 
infectious, corrosive, toxic or ecotoxic. In this inquiry, radioactivity is also 
considered a hazardous characteristic. The second approach the Basel Convention 
uses is to list particular types of waste that are considered ‘hazardous wastes’. These 
include waste streams such as clinical waste, waste from specific production 
processes, and some constituents of waste such as zinc, mercury, lead and asbestos.  
The Commission has been guided by the broad framework offered by the state and 
territory regulations, and the terms of reference, in deciding which waste streams 
are covered. Even so, a flexible approach is required for three main reasons: 
•  Despite being based on the Basel Convention, the coverage and treatment of 
different state and territory regulations is not uniform, meaning that a certain 
waste type might be considered to be hazardous in one jurisdiction but not in 
another. This can have implications for the recovery of waste materials where 
cross-border issues arise.  
•  Classifying something as a hazardous waste can limit the subsequent options for 
use of that material, which can change over time as technological and market 
developments occur. For example, boiler fly ash is classified in Queensland as 
controlled (that is, hazardous) waste, whereas in other states it is not, and is 
commonly used as road base.  
•  Some wastes can contain hazardous elements or compounds, but the risks might 
be considered acceptable enough under normal circumstances to allow them to 
be disposed of in general waste streams, such as in municipal solid waste     




(box 1.1). This might be because the hazardous material forms only a small part 
of the overall waste stream, or is in a relatively inert or immobile form. 
 
Box 1.1  Potentially hazardous wastes that might be found in municipal 
solid waste 
Items in the municipal waste stream that exhibit characteristics that could, under some 
circumstances, be described as hazardous include: 
•  lead acid batteries, mobile phones, televisions and computers that can contain toxic 
and ecotoxic heavy metals, such as lead, nickel, copper and cadmium, chromium 
and mercury; 
•  pesticide, paint and household chemical containers, which can contain toxic, 
ecotoxic and poisonous materials; 
•  car parts, which can contain toxic, ecotoxic and poisonous components; 
•  tyres, which can catch fire thus leading to toxic emissions; 
•  domestic smoke detectors, which contain small amounts of radioactive material; and 
•  copper chrome arsenate treated timber. 
 
 
For these reasons, the Commission has endeavoured to use a pragmatic approach to 
determining the boundary between hazardous and non-hazardous waste. Thus, small 
amounts of hazardous waste in the municipal, construction and demolition, and 
commercial and industrial waste streams must be accepted as a reality (albeit 
potentially undesirable), as it is very difficult, and possibly too costly, to attempt to 
prevent such items entering the waste stream or to completely remove them.  
Nonetheless, the Commission considers that this inquiry was not intended to cover 
waste streams that predominantly contain particular types of hazardous solid waste 
including: 
•  radioactive waste; 
•  clinical waste from health services; 
•  asbestos; 
•  sewage, sewage sludge and sewage treatment residues; 
•  agricultural manures; 
•  solid chemical waste classified as hazardous; and 
•  intractable chemical wastes containing compounds such as hexachlorobenzene 
and polychlorinated biphenyls.     
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Market failure arguments for government intervention 
The objective of this inquiry is to ‘identify policies … to address market failures 
and externalities associated with the generation and disposal of waste’.1 ‘Market 
failure’ is a term that refers to circumstances in which markets will not achieve the 
best outcomes for the community. Market failures include negative and positive 
externalities (for example, environmental pollution and research and development, 
respectively), the supply of public goods (for example, disease-control measures), 
market-power issues (for example, the presence, for whatever reason, of monopoly 
power) and imperfect information (for example, information asymmetries between 
buyers and sellers of products). 
Negative externalities have been singled out for particular attention in the terms of 
reference because these can be potentially significant in waste generation and 
disposal. A negative externality will occur when a transaction between two parties 
has detrimental effects on third parties and is not reflected in the prices paid for the 
product concerned. For example, a waste processing or recycling facility may have 
negative effects on the amenity of neighbours (a negative externality). If the 
negative externality is not addressed in some way, the parties directly concerned (in 
this case, the waste facility’s operator and his or her customers) have no incentive to 
curb their production and consumption to take into account their impact on others. 
The presence of negative externalities (and other market failures) may justify 
government intervention (for example, by introducing regulations, creating and 
enforcing property rights, adjusting price signals or providing information). 
However, government intervention can be costly and can introduce its own 
distortions. Taking this into account, government intervention is only warranted 
when the benefits are likely to be greater than the costs involved (chapter 5).  
Market failure is a term that is sometimes confused with situations where a good or 
service is not supplied in the market either because there is insufficient demand or 
the costs of supply are too great. For example, some inquiry participants argued that 
market failure exists in the market for compost, not necessarily because of any 
inherent externalities or market power issues, but because of the presence of 
growing stockpiles of compost. In practice, what appears to be happening is that the 
supply of compost (of varying quality) has been stimulated by landfill levies and 
other policies discouraging disposal of waste to landfill. As a result, nearby markets 
for compost are becoming saturated, and transport costs are ruling out marketing it 
further afield. This is not market failure. 
                                              
1  The distinction between market failure and externality in the terms of reference is considered 
immaterial as an externality is a type of market failure.     




A focus on net benefits to the community 
The terms of reference require the Commission to examine the ‘economic, 
environmental and social benefits and costs of optimal approaches for resource 
recovery and efficiency and waste management’. In conducting this inquiry, the 
Commission is also guided by its economywide charter that requires that all the 
costs and benefits of different policy options be considered, in order to maximise 
community wellbeing. Another way of saying this is that policy should maximise 
net social benefit. 
Net social benefit is the sum of all financial and nonfinancial costs and benefits, and 
includes the value of all externalities (box 1.2). It is a useful way of bringing 
together all costs and benefits, but can be confused with the more narrow definition 
that some people apply to ‘social’ costs or benefits. The reference to ‘economic, 
social and environmental benefits and costs’ implies that these are essentially 
different from each other, yet all fall within a general net social benefit framework. 
For example, some negative externalities might be perceived to be particularly 
social in nature (for example, the amenity impact of a waste facility as mentioned 
previously), while others might be perceived to be more environmental in nature 
(such as the effects of smokestack pollution on the health of living organisms). But 
because these all directly or indirectly affect the wellbeing of members of the 
community, they are all essentially social in nature. To avoid confusion, in this 
report the Commission has used the term net benefit to the community in place of 
net social benefit. 
By focusing on all costs and benefits, this approach will involve tradeoffs; 
something many people are reluctant to accept when it comes to environmental 
issues. But there are competing demands for the community’s limited resources 
(labour, capital and natural resources), meaning that tradeoffs cannot be avoided. 
For example, resources used for more sophisticated waste treatment plants have an 
opportunity cost, in that they are not then available for building hospitals, 
establishing national parks or other uses that may have a greater value to the 
community.  
Resource efficiency 
Resource efficiency is a term that is used in the terms of reference and by many 
inquiry participants to imply that the returns from using one or more materials (and 
sometimes also energy) be maximised. The Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC 2003, p. 9) defined resource efficiency to mean ‘the efficiency 
with which we use energy and materials throughout the economy, i.e. the value 
added per unit of resource input’.      
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Box 1.2  Private and external costs and benefits 
The costs and benefits of economic activities are not measured just by the amount of 
money that changes hands in the marketplace.  
In a well-informed, competitive market, the sale of a product for $X might be seen to be 
an indication of the cost and benefit of the transaction, that is, that the product cost $X 
to bring to market, and that the person or organisation that purchased it did so because 
they expected to gain a benefit of $X from its consumption. In this case, the money that 
changes hands is a private financial cost in the hands of one party and a private 
benefit in the hands of the other. (Note that the term private does not just refer to a 
person, but to all people and all organisations; whether firms or government or 
non-government organisations.) 
But it is not the only private benefit that arises from the transaction. The consumer 
purchases the product because they value it at least as much as the purchase price. 
The excess of their willingness to pay over the actual purchase price is called 
consumer surplus. This is a private, but nonfinancial benefit. 
The costs and benefits associated with the transaction might also extend to third 
parties if there are external effects or externalities. These are not private costs or 
benefits in the sense that they are experienced by someone other than the parties to 
the transaction. Although money has not changed hands, the costs and benefits are 
nevertheless real, and hence should be considered in assessing the overall impacts on 
the community more generally. As noted in the text, there may be ways of internalising 
negative externalities to make the parties to the transaction aware of the wider effects 
(for example, through regulation to limit the extent of harm, or by establishing property 
rights that allow the affected parties to come to some mutually satisfactory 
arrangement). 
Private costs and benefits can also be associated with goods and services that are not 
traded in the market. For example, people might place a value on a pristine area of 
wilderness, and although there might be no market mechanism to reveal their 
preferences, would have a willingness to pay for preserving that environment.  
Net social benefit is the sum of all private costs and benefits and all externalities. In this 
report it is referred to as net benefit to the community. 
 
 
The concept of resource efficiency has considerable intuitive appeal to the many 
people interested in decreasing the community’s dependence on scarce natural 
resources. But by focusing on the use of certain resources and not others, resource 
efficiency measures are likely to be useful only in fairly limited circumstances. For 
example, a resource efficiency measure of the amount of mineral ore that is needed 
to produce a refined product might be useful in comparing two different processing 
technologies. But if it fails to account for all inputs, including other materials, 
energy, capital and labour, this approach will not maximise net benefits to the 
community.     




The terms of reference for this inquiry ask the Commission to make 
recommendations on how ‘resource efficiencies can be optimised’. Given the 
limitations of resource efficiency as an indicator of community wellbeing, the 
Commission’s approach has been to focus on maximising net benefit to the 
community as the more appropriate criterion.  
The limitations of resource efficiency, its application to the waste policy debate, and 
participants’ views, are discussed in more detail in chapter 6. Related issues 
concerning the role of government in addressing resource-depletion issues are 
addressed in chapter 5. 
Ecologically sustainable development 
The Commission considers that maximising net benefits to the community is also 
broadly consistent with the concept of ecologically sustainable development (ESD). 
ESD is often defined in terms of meeting the needs of the current generation in a 
way that does not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The 
Commission considers that ecologically sustainable development is best approached 
through rigorous cost–benefit evaluation. Where all foreseeable impacts are 
considered — short term or long term, private or social — choosing the policy 
option with the highest net benefit would also be consistent with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development (PC 1999). 
However, ESD also raises issues of intergenerational equity, requiring policy 
makers to consider tradeoffs between current and future generations, and to the 
extent that the current generation must make sacrifices for the future, how those 
sacrifices are to be made and by whom. ESD is addressed in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
Other aspects of the terms of reference 
In addition to the items covered above, the Commission is required to give 
consideration to: 
•  institutional, regulatory and other impediments (chapter 12); 
•  the impact of international trade and trade agreements on the level and disposal 
of waste in Australia (chapter 12); 
•  the effectiveness of performance indicators to measure the efficiency of resource 
recovery practices (chapter 13); and  
•  government procurement and commercial procurement practices (chapter 11).     
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1.2 Policy  background 
The changing nature of waste management policy 
Waste management policy in Australia has evolved considerably in the last two to 
three decades (chapter 3). As in most countries, Australian governments have long 
intervened in waste management for public health and amenity reasons. In the 
absence of intervention, households and firms would likely use less-than-ideal 
means of disposal, creating risks of disease, and dumping and littering problems. 
The systematic collection and disposal of waste to a centralised facility offered a 
solution to these problems, but also created new problems.  
Australia’s predominant means of disposing of waste was, and remains, to bury it in 
landfills, but some incineration was also practiced. But these were relatively 
unsophisticated facilities and were used to dispose of a wide range of waste 
(including hazardous waste), with little regard to the environmental risks they 
created. In the 1970s, concerns about these and other impacts led to the enactment 
of environmental protection legislation, and regulations governing waste 
management facilities have been progressively tightened since. Urban growth 
pressures have also limited the options for developing new landfills and other waste 
management facilities in some locations. 
More recently, waste management policy has become concerned with broader issues 
concerning sustainability and conservation. Rather than just focusing on end-of-pipe 
or downstream solutions (that is, waste disposal), a waste hierarchical approach that 
values in decreasing order of preference: avoidance, reuse, recycling, energy 
recovery and lastly disposal, has been adopted. In some jurisdictions and 
applications, these or similar options are applied in strict order. In other cases, they 
are more a consideration of alternatives (chapter 7). Consistent with this hierarchy, 
most jurisdictions have adopted policies of discouraging waste disposal in landfills, 
minimising or eliminating waste (for example, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory have zero waste policies), and increasing the proportion of 
materials that are recycled.  
There has also been growing interest in making producers more responsible for the 
cost of disposing of products at the end of their life. This has resulted in 
considerable pressure to implement extended producer responsibility and product 
stewardship schemes, and has already resulted in the implementation of the 
National Packaging Covenant and the Product Stewardship for Oil program. Other 
schemes relating to tyres, computers, and televisions are being developed 
(chapter 10).     




The roles of the different levels of government  
The roles of the different levels of government in developing and implementing 
waste management policy, and the public and private sectors in providing waste 
management services have also changed.  
Local government 
Traditionally, local government has been responsible for waste collection, disposal 
and resource recovery services for households, and much of the away-from-home 
services offered to the general public (such as street bins and litter abatement). It 
also has a role in planning issues. There are signs that local government is 
struggling with many of the emerging issues and growing community expectations. 
The increasing sophistication of the technologies needed for recycling and waste 
disposal has resulted in fewer, larger facilities. These are often well beyond the size 
needed for any one local government. In an era where it seems that nobody wants a 
waste management facility in their backyard, this in turn exacerbates planning 
issues.  
State and territory governments 
State and territory governments have the constitutional powers for regulating the 
waste management industry. For example, state and territory regulations cover the 
licence conditions for constructing and operating a landfill (chapter 8). In many 
cases, state and territory governments have introduced strategies to minimise waste, 
imposed landfill levies and subsidised recycling. They also tend to provide support 
and/or direction to local governments within their jurisdiction (where relevant).  
Some state and territory governments also provide waste management services 
directly. The most prominent example of this is the New South Wales 
Government’s ownership of WSN Environmental Solutions — the majority supplier 
of municipal waste services in the greater Sydney region. 
Australian Government 
The role of the Australian Government in waste management policy has largely 
been one of national coordination, though it also has the responsibility to ensure 
Australia meets its international commitments (for example, the Basel Convention) 
and it regulates exports. The growing interest in extended producer responsibility 
and product stewardship (EPR and PS) schemes is providing a challenge to the 
Australian Government. To the extent that these are justified, there is a good case     
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for them to be introduced on a nationally-consistent basis. As these schemes can 
involve a tax on the products they target (for example, as is mooted to be the case 
for a product stewardship scheme for tyres), the Australian Government’s taxation 
powers might also be critical to their implementation.  
One means of achieving national coordination is through the Environment 
Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC). Operating under the general auspices of 
the Council of Australian Governments, the EPHC comprises environment 
ministers from all Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand. The ministers from all 
Australian jurisdictions in turn form a statutory body called the National 
Environment Protection Council that has the power to introduce National 
Environment Protection Measures. These measures are a regulatory device for 
developing a common set of rules that are then applied by the states and territories 
either through adoption of consistent policies and/or regulation (chapters 3 and 6).  
1.3  Conduct of the inquiry 
The Commission received the terms of reference for this inquiry on 20 October 
2005. The terms of reference required the Commission to report to the Australian 
Government within twelve months, to hold public hearings, and to produce a draft 
report. 
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry is also governed by the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998 that requires the Commission to conduct inquiries in an open 
and transparent way. The Commission encouraged public participation in the 
following ways: 
•  At the commencement of the inquiry, the Commission advertised nationally and 
promoted the inquiry on its website (the inquiry website is 
www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/waste/index.html). 
•  A circular was mailed to people and organisations that the Commission thought 
might be interested in the inquiry. Subsequent circulars were sent to those who 
had expressed an interest in the inquiry, to keep them posted on inquiry progress. 
•  Informal discussions were held with a wide range of organisations and 
individuals throughout the inquiry. These involved visits to most capital cities. 
•  An issues paper was released in December 2005 to assist and stimulate 
interested parties in preparing submissions to the inquiry. 
•  During February and March 2005, the Commission held public hearings for 
participants to discuss their submissions with the Presiding Commissioner. 
These were held in Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney.      




•  A draft report was released in May 2006 for public comment, and further 
submissions were invited.  
•  During June and July 2006 a second round of public hearings were held to 
discuss the findings and recommendations in the draft report. Hearings were held 
in Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. In both rounds of hearings 
participants in other locations were involved in the Melbourne hearings through 
teleconference links. 
•  Written submissions were placed on the Commission’s web site for others to 
read.2 The Commission received 123 submissions before the release of the draft 
report and 150 since (that is, 273 in total).  
•  Transcripts from the hearings were also posted on the inquiry website.  
The Commission thanks inquiry participants for meeting with the Presiding 
Commissioner and Commission staff, facilitating visits to many industry sites, 
making submissions and discussing those submissions at public hearings. 
Appendix A provides details of these individuals and organisations. 
Like all Commission inquiry reports, the release of this report required that it first 
be tabled in both houses of Parliament. In the terms of reference for the inquiry, the 
Government has undertaken to respond to the report as soon as possible after its 
receipt. 
 
                                              
2  The exception to this general rule was that submissions (or parts of submissions) were not made 
publicly available if they contained information provided in confidence, and it was deemed to 
be in the public interest to accept that information in confidence.     





2 Waste  management  in  Australia 
 
Key points 
•  Though it has improved in recent years, the quality of Australian waste management 
data has traditionally been quite poor. Each state and territory collects and reports 
data differently, and there are gaps in the coverage of regions, waste streams and 
materials. 
•  Despite these data limitations, it is reasonable to conclude that:  
–  Total waste generation per person in Australia has been increasing over time. 
–  In recent years, recycling rates have increased at a faster rate than disposal to 
landfill. Despite this growth, more solid waste is disposed to landfill (54 per cent) 
than is recycled (46 per cent). However, this varies markedly between materials.  
–  The export of recyclable material has increased in recent years, mostly driven by 
increased demand from Asia. 
•  Caution must be used when comparing Australian waste generation, landfill and 
recycling rates with those of other countries. There are significant problems with the 
quality of some data, and the data are not always comparable between countries. 
•  Measured differences between Australian municipal waste generation per person 
and those of other countries may be due to: 
–  differences in the ways that member countries have classified municipal waste in 
their responses to OECD surveys; 
–  differences in the composition of waste — the generally larger housing allotments in 
Australian towns and cities may mean that more green waste is generated in 
Australia than many European countries; and 
– socioeconomic differences including differences in per person income levels, 
population densities and available waste management technologies in the home 
(such as in-sink garbage disposals). 
 
 
This chapter provides a snapshot of the amounts of waste generated, recovered and 
disposed of in Australia. It provides comparisons between the different states and 
territories within Australia, and between Australia and other countries. It also 
discusses some of the reasons for the differences observed. 
Caution should be exercised when interpreting the data provided in this chapter. 
Australian waste data are collected and reported by a variety of organisations 
including: landfill operators, material reprocessors (recyclers), local governments,    




environment protection agencies (EPAs) and their affiliates, and industry 
associations. Each has its own data collection and reporting requirements, and may 
use different waste classifications, and different regional and industry coverage. 
Some state and territory environmental protection and/or waste management 
authorities draw upon these data to report on the quantity and composition of 
material recycled, and/or waste generated and disposed to landfill (DEC 2004e; 
EcoRecycle Victoria 2005d; EPA Queensland 2006b). While the quality and 
coverage of data have improved over time, there are still some gaps and 
inconsistencies, including: 
•  differences between jurisdictions in the classification of waste, the definition of 
recycling and data collection methods; 
•  low (though improving) response rates from reprocessor surveys; and  
•  difficulties in collecting data on waste generation, disposal and recycling in rural 
and regional areas.  
Most of the Australian data presented in this chapter are for 2002-03, due to the 
difficulties in obtaining more recent data that are comprehensive in their coverage 
of waste management activity in Australia. These data were compiled by Hyder 
Consulting as part of the submission by the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage to this inquiry (DEH, sub. 103). Data have also been taken directly from 
international organisations, government and industry sources. 
2.1  Trends in waste generation and disposal 
This section illustrates current and past patterns of waste generation, recycling and 
disposal in Australia. 
Waste generation in Australia 
Australia generated approximately 32.4 million tonnes of solid waste in 2002-03. Of 
this amount, approximately 27 per cent was municipal waste, 29 per cent was from 
the commercial and industrial (C&I) sector, and 42  per cent was from the 
construction and demolition (C&D) sector (table  2.1). Overall, approximately 
1.6  tonnes of waste were generated for every Australian in 2002-03. These     





estimates do not include waste generated and dealt with on-site by the waste 
generator.
1 
Table 2.1  Solid waste generation in Australia, 2002-03 




Total  Per 
person 
  kilotonnes kilotonnes kilotonnes  kilotonnes  kilograms 
New South Wales  3 326  4 196  4 649  12 171  1 828 
Victoria  2 291  2 743  3 575  8 609  1 763 
Queenslanda  1 742  959  1 166  3 973  1 057 
Western Australiab  833  744  1 945  3 522  1 820 
South Australiac  600  677  2 156  3 433  2 255 
Tasmaniad  142  na  na  na  na 
ACTa 111  150  250  674  1  420 
Northern Territorye 68  na  na  na  na 
Total  8 903  9 469  13 741  32 382  1 639 
a Total waste generation estimates for Queensland and the ACT include 105 kilotonnes and 163 kilotonnes of 
‘organics’ respectively that were recycled by the private sector but were not disaggregated by source sector as 
the split was unknown.  b  Incorporates recycling data for the financial year 2004-05. Waste generation 
estimates incorporate landfill disposal data that are for metropolitan Perth only.  c Data are for calendar year 
2003. The estimate of total waste generation includes meat waste, a prescribed industrial waste, which was 
included in the recycling data.  d Municipal waste generation is the sum of the total amount of municipal waste 
disposed to landfill and the total amount of recyclable material collected via kerbside recycling services. 
Kerbside collection data are for 2004-05 and are only available for 9 out of 29 local governments.  e Not 
included in total figures. Municipal waste generation is the sum of the total amount of waste disposed to landfill 
to the total amount of material sold or sent for secondary use (including energy recovery) from kerbside 
recycling services.  na Not available. 
Data sources: ABS (Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat. no. 3101.0); AGO (unpublished); DEH (sub. 103, 
att. A); NEPC (2003, 2005b). 
The generation of waste appears to have been growing over time 
Time-series data from Victoria and the ACT suggest that the amount of waste 
generated in Australia has grown over time. Approximately 1.3 tonnes of solid 
waste were generated per person in both Victoria and the ACT in 1994-95 
(figure  2.1). This amount had risen to approximately 2.0  tonnes and 2.3  tonnes 
per person respectively in 2004-05. This implies an average growth rate in waste 
generation of 4 per cent per person for Victoria, and 5 per cent per person for the 
ACT. 
                                              
1  The data contained in this chapter refer only to waste (including recoverable materials) dealt 
with by a party other than the waste generator. Data on on-site reuse, recycling and disposal are 
not included. On-site waste treatment is common in the mining and mineral processing, 
agriculture, and manufacturing sectors.    




Comprehensive time-series data on waste generation are not available at the 
national level, nor in many jurisdictions. Until recent years, comprehensive data on 
the recycling of putrescible and nonputrescible material have not been available, 
and landfill disposal data have not been available for regions outside of 
metropolitan areas. However, it is likely that waste generation has been increasing 
throughout Australia. 



























a Estimates of waste generation per person were calculated by dividing total waste generation by the total 
population of each jurisdiction. Total waste generation was calculated by adding the total amount of waste 
disposed to landfill to the total amount recycled in each jurisdiction. Victorian data for the financial years 
1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97 were estimated using calendar year data. Estimates of waste generation for 
these years do not include waste disposed to landfill outside of metropolitan Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat, 
Bendigo and the Mornington Peninsula. 
Data sources: ABS (Australian Demographic Statistics, Cat.  no.  3101.0); ACT NoWaste (sub. 36); 
Sustainability Victoria (unpublished). 
The composition of waste from each source varies significantly 
There are significant differences in the composition of each waste stream. For 
example, while almost half (47 per cent) of the municipal waste stream is food and 
garden waste, the commercial and industrial waste stream contains only 13 per cent 
food and garden waste, and the construction and demolition waste stream contains 
almost none (less than one  per  cent) (figure 2.2). In fact, over three-quarters 
(82 per cent) of the C&D waste stream is building rubble (concrete, brick, rubble 
and soil), compared to three  per  cent and one  per  cent for the C&I, and the 
municipal waste streams respectively.     





Figure 2.2  The composition of waste generated in Australia, 2002-03a 
 
                         Municipal






































Construction and demolition 





















a Municipal waste data are for all states and territories except South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Tasmania. Commercial and industrial waste data were sourced from New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia. New South Wales data include some recyclable materials (paper, plastics, glass etc) classified 
under the category ‘other recyclables’. New South Wales data on metals excludes nonferrous metals such as 
aluminium. Construction and demolition waste data are for New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
only.  
Data source: DEH (sub. 103, att. A).    




Differences in the composition of waste streams have implications for the way they 
are managed. For example, the prevalence of food and garden waste in the 
municipal waste stream can make it difficult to extract other recyclable materials 
that are more valuable to reprocessors without first having it sorted by the 
householder. Without proper sorting, many of these materials would have to go to 
landfill due to contamination. 
Also, the large percentage of food and garden waste in the municipal waste stream 
can potentially make it a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, such as 
carbon dioxide and methane, as it biodegrades in landfill. In contrast, the high 
percentage of inert materials in C&D waste implies that it will have only minimal 
environmental impact in landfill (chapter 4). 
The large percentage of uncategorised (other) waste reported for the C&I sector is 
the result of significant gaps in the data. C&I waste data are particularly difficult to 
accurately collect and report due to: 
•  differences in the way that waste data are disaggregated between jurisdictions; 
•  the inability of data collection exercises (including audits) to categorise all of the 
waste in each stream; and 
•  commercial sensitivity issues. 
There are many reasons why waste generation has grown over time 
The amount of waste generated per person in Australia is driven by a number of 
economic, demographic and lifestyle factors. 
International evidence suggests that economic growth contributes to growth in 
waste generation per person (Christiansen and Fischer 1999;  de Tilly 2004; 
OECD 2001b). Australia’s economic prosperity over the past 10 to 15 years has 
undoubtedly contributed to the growing generation of waste. However, the exact 
size and nature of this relationship in Australia is uncertain due to the lack of 
adequate time-series data on waste generation. 
Growth in waste generation per person may have also been driven by the decline in 
the size of the average Australian household (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, sub. 103; Packaging Council of Australia, sub. 67). Average household 
size in Australia decreased by 14 per cent in the 20 years to 2001 (ABS 2004a). The 
Packaging Council of Australia (PCA, sub.  67) argued that this decrease in 
household size has contributed to the ownership of more durable goods per person 
and a wider range of packaged-good sizes. Many of the smaller-sized goods now 
available have greater packaging-to-product ratios than larger goods.     





Other factors contributing to growing waste generation per person may include the 
growing travel time between home and work, and increased purchases of durable 
items. As travel time increases, the amount of time available for domestic tasks 
decreases, and may increase the demand for time-saving devices (such as washing 
machines and dishwashers) and pre-prepared food. The European Environment 
Agency (EEA 2005) has argued that durable goods, such as household appliances 
and electronic devices, are being replaced more often now than in the past due to 
changes in fashion, reduced product durability, and lower prices compared with the 
cost of repairs. 
Resource recovery in Australia 
Resource recovery refers to the creation of a useful resource from what would 
otherwise be waste material. It includes the reuse, recycling, and recovery of 
energy-from-waste. Recycling refers to the recovery of used products and their 
reformation for use as raw materials in the manufacture of new products, which 
may or may not be similar to the original.  
Recyclable materials are collected either by household kerbside collections, public 
recycling bins, or are delivered directly by the householder to recycling depots. 
Large producers of waste in the commercial and industrial, and construction and 
demolition sectors normally arrange for the private collection and delivery of 
recyclable materials to be reprocessed. 
The materials collected are generally reprocessed by specialist recyclers. A range of 
materials — including paper, glass, metals and plastics — are separated, cleaned, 
and reprocessed for use as inputs in the production of new products. Food and 
garden waste (and other putrescibles) can be separated and converted, usually by 
composting, into a nutrient input for parkland, gardens and agriculture.  
Energy recovery is usually carried out through the collection and use of heat 
generated through the controlled combustion (incineration, pyrolysis and 
gasification) of waste materials. Energy can also be generated from methane 
released in the decomposition of waste in landfill. This form of energy recovery is 
discussed in the next section. 
Hyder Consulting (DEH, sub. 103, att. A) estimated that 30 per cent of municipal 
waste, 44  per  cent of C&I waste, and 57  per  cent of C&D waste generated was 
recycled in 2002-03. Overall, the recycling rate was estimated to be 46 per cent 
(table 2.2). However, recycling data should be interpreted with caution, especially 
when making comparisons between jurisdictions and with other countries (box 2.1).    




Table 2.2  Recycling rates in Australia, 2002-03a 





  per cent  per cent  per cent  per cent 
New South Wales  35  33  71  48 
Victoria  33 63 54 51 
Queenslandb  26 22 42 31 
Western Australiac  11 44 21 23 
South Australiad  39 69 67 63 
Tasmania  na na na na 
ACTb  26 35 89 69 
Northern Territorye  10 na na na 
Total  30 44 57 46 
a Recycling rates show the percentage of waste generated in each waste stream (tonnes to landfill disposal 
plus tonnes recycled) that was recycled. b Total recycling estimates for Queensland and the ACT include 
105 kilotonnes and 163 kilotonnes of organics respectively that were recycled by the private sector but were 
not disaggregated by source because the split was unknown. c Data are for 2004-05. Waste generation 
estimates incorporate landfill disposal data that are for metropolitan Perth only. d Data are for calendar year 
2003. Recycling data includes meat waste, a prescribed industrial waste. e Productivity Commission estimate. 
Recycling rates from nonmunicipal waste streams were not estimated due to insufficient data.  na Not 
available. 
Data source: AGO (unpublished); DEH (sub. 103, att. A); NEPC (2003, 2005b). 
 
Box 2.1  Problems with Australian recycling data 
There are many reasons why caution should be used when interpreting Australian 
recycling data. Some recycling data report the amount of material collected for 
recycling, while others report the amount that was actually reprocessed. If a jurisdiction 
or country reports the amounts collected for recycling rather than the amount actually 
reprocessed, effective recycling activity will be overstated. Data for New South Wales, 
Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and the ACT appear to report amounts 
reprocessed, while Queensland data report amounts collected (although this is likely to 
change in forthcoming surveys). Some of the material collected may be stockpiled for 
use in future years, and some may be disposed to landfill due to contamination.  
Using state and territory data to create national recycling estimates may result in some 
overlaps in reprocessing data between jurisdictions. Most jurisdictions’ data sets report 
the material exported/imported in each period, and unless these amounts are explicitly 
taken into account to avoid double counting (and it is likely that they have not), 
recycling estimates may be slightly overreported. Many jurisdictions’ reprocessor 
surveys also suffer from low response rates, which may underreport recycling activity 
in Australia. For example, Queensland recycling surveys had a 54 per cent response 
rate in 2002-03, and in New South Wales the response rate was 63 per cent (though 
responding businesses made up 90 per cent of the industry). 
Sources: DEC (2004e); EPA Queensland (2006b); Knight, L., Queensland Environmental Protection 
Agency, pers. comm., Brisbane, 28 April 2006; Mannall, G., ACT NoWaste, Canberra, pers. comm., 
12 April 2006; Partl, H., Hyder Consulting, Sydney, pers. comm., 10 April 2006.     





Recycling rates have increased over time 
The amount of material recycled in Australia appears to have increased over time 
both as a proportion of total waste generated, and in absolute terms. Victoria 
recycled approximately 40 per cent of its total waste and the ACT 33 per cent in 
1994-95 (figure 2.3). This had risen to 55 per cent and 73 per cent respectively in 
2004-05. 


















a Recycling rates were calculated for each jurisdiction by dividing the tonnes of material recycled by tonnes of 
waste generated (recycled plus disposed to landfill) in each period. Victorian data for the financial years 
1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97 were estimated using calendar year data. Estimates of recycling rates may be 
overestimated for these years due to the lack of landfill tonnage data (with which to calculate them) outside of 
metropolitan Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat, Bendigo and the Mornington Peninsula. 
Data sources: ACT NoWaste (sub. 36); Sustainability Victoria (unpublished). 
While recycling rates for concrete, bricks and asphalt; paper; plastics and metal 
grew substantially in Victoria from 1994-95 to 2004-05, the recycling of glass 
actually fell (Sustainability Victoria 2005). The main reason for this decline appears 
to have been the replacement of crate-based recycling collection systems with 
co-mingled systems. Glass breakage is much greater in a co-mingled system, which 
means that less glass is able to be economically separated and reprocessed. 
While recycling trends could be determined for the materials mentioned above, food 
and garden waste, and rubber (predominantly rubber tyres) experienced great 
year-on-year fluctuations in the tonnes recycled. This appears to be due to 
differences in survey response rates, and industry activity, between periods.    




There are many reasons why recycling rates have increased 
Recycling rates have increased over time for many reasons. In particular, there has 
been an increase in the proportion of Australian households with access to kerbside 
recycling services — from 76 per cent in 1996 to 87 per cent in 2003 (ABS 2003). 
Collection has also become easier for households following the introduction of 
‘wheelie bins’, resulting in a greater quantity and variety of materials now being 
collected. While the greater provision of recycling collection services, and the ease 
of use of new collection methods, have increased aggregate yields of recyclable 
materials, they have also lead to greater contamination rates.
2 
Demand for many of the materials recovered — especially metals and plastics — 
has increased in recent years, encouraging greater levels of recovery (AAC 2004; 
DITR 2004; PACIA 2005). This has been driven, for the most part, by the demand 
for raw materials in international markets. However, commodity markets are 
inherently volatile, and thus while the recovery of some materials is currently 
profitable, it may not be during some periods in the future (box 2.2). 
Landfill levies have been introduced or increased in many states and territories. This 
has created incentives for many in the commercial and industrial, and construction 
and demolition sectors to find alternatives to landfill for the treatment of waste and 
recyclable materials (chapters 3 and 9). 
Many inquiry participants argued there is strong community support for recycling 
(and by implication, this has contributed to growth in recycling rates) (for example, 
ACT Department of Urban Services, sub. DR139; Department of the Environment 
and Heritage, sub. 103; NSW Government, sub. DR195). However, while evidence 
suggests that the majority of households participate in recycling schemes, and 
consider it an important activity, the strength of their support, and its inherent effect 
on recycling rates, is much less certain (ABS  2003; Harrison Market 
Research  2005). Many households’ recycling participation may simply be a 
response to having a convenient and easy to use recycling service provided for them 
(Peter Carroll, sub. 162). Other likely contributors include the actions by many local 
governments to encourage recycling by reducing the size of household 
general-waste bins, and making it less costly to obtain a larger recycling bin than a 
larger general-waste bin. 
                                              
2  Surveys conducted by EcoRecycle Victoria (2005d) (now Sustainability Victoria) suggest that, 
in 2003-04, 5 per cent of material collected for reprocessing was contaminated and had to be 
disposed to landfill. The contamination rate appears to be growing over time as recycling 
tonnages increase.     






Box 2.2  Commodity markets and recovered resources 
Like the virgin materials from which they are derived, many of the materials recovered 
in Australia — such as paper, plastic and metals — are traded on world commodity 
markets. Where recovered materials are close substitutes for virgin materials, the 
prices received for recovered materials will be influenced by both the prices of virgin 
materials and the supply and demand of recovered materials. Given that world prices 
for many virgin materials can be volatile (as shown in the figures below), the prices for 
recovered materials can also be expected to be volatile.  
                    Commodity Export Pricesa 
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a Price indexes use June 2005 as the base period and were calculated using export prices 
in Australian dollars. Price indexes include prices for both virgin and recovered material, 
although the latter component is likely to be small. 
Data source: ABS (International Trade Price Indexes: Australia, Cat. no. 6457.0) 
(Continued on next page)    





Box 2.2   (continued) 
Porter (2002) noted that the prices of recovered materials may be even more volatile 
than the prices of virgin materials. Part of the reason for this is that the supply of 
recovered materials does not respond readily to market conditions. Kerbside collection, 
for example, is subject to long-term contracts, meaning that the supply of recyclables is 
relatively fixed in the short term. If supply does not respond to changes in demand in 
the short term, price fluctuations will be even greater than for virgin materials. 
Recovered materials are also often marginal supplements used as needed in the 
production process (Ackerman 1997). Where this is the case, the demand for 
recovered materials will fluctuate even more than demand for the virgin material. 
However, as markets for recovered materials mature (for example, the investment in 
Australia in a de-inking plant is underpinning domestic demand for used newsprint), or 
new uses are developed for recovered materials, demand will tend to become less 
volatile.  
Prices for virgin and recovered materials are expected to fluctuate over time as new 
supplies of raw materials are discovered, technologies and consumer preferences 
change, and as general economic conditions vary. Such price changes are likely to 
periodically affect the viability of resource recovery in the future. 
 
 
Some materials are recycled more than others 
By weight, building rubble (including concrete, brick, tile and asphalt) and soil are 
by far the most recycled materials. Approximately 5.9 million tonnes of building 
rubble and soil were recycled in New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and 
South Australia combined in 2002-03 (figure 2.4). This was more than twice the 
amount of metal recycled (2.6  million  tonnes), and more than three times the 
amount of paper and cardboard (1.9 million tonnes), and food and garden waste 
(1.5 million tonnes). 
Among the most significant materials recycled, as a proportion of each waste 
material generated, appears to be metals, paper and cardboard, and building rubble 
and soil. Data for Victoria show that metals had the highest recycling rate in that 
state (82 per cent), followed by paper and cardboard (74 per cent), building rubble 
and soil (55  per  cent), and glass (38  per  cent) in 2002-03 (figure  2.5). These 
materials were also among the most recycled in New South Wales and the ACT, 
though the relative percentages and rankings differ.     
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a Data are for New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia only. Other states and 
territories have substantial gaps in their compositional data. Recycling data measure the amount of material 
either reprocessed locally or exported interstate or overseas for reprocessing. Data on metal recycling in New 
South Wales do not include non-ferrous metals. For South Australia, food and garden waste includes meat 
waste. Other waste includes data from New South Wales on ‘other recyclables’ including aluminium and other 
non-ferrous metals, liquid paper board, ‘mixed hardcore’ construction and demolition waste, and other 
construction and demolition waste.  
Data source: DEH (sub. 103, att. A). 























a Recycling and landfill disposal rates were calculated as the total number of tonnes of each material recycled 
or disposed to landfill as a percentage of the total number of tonnes of waste generated. Recycling rates 
measure the percentage of each resource generated that was reprocessed in Victoria or exported interstate or 
overseas for reprocessing. 
Data source: DEH (sub. 103, att. A).    




Some industry bodies collect their own data on the recovery of their products. For 
example, the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association collects data on plastics 
consumption and recycling (box 2.3), and the Newsprint Producer and Publisher 
Group reports on the percentage of newsprint that is recycled. 
 
Box 2.3  The Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association’s reports 
on plastic recycling in Australia 
The Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association has commissioned regular annual 
surveys of plastics recycling in Australia since 2001 (following on from less frequent 
surveys conducted in the 1990s). These surveys are conducted to provide information 
on the import, export, consumption and recycling of plastics to the National Packaging 
Covenant Council and governments. 
Reprocessors, manufacturers and exporters are surveyed for the weights, polymer 
types, source and destination of their plastics. Response rates to surveys are very 
high, with 53  out of 59  reprocessors responding to the survey, and both known 
waste-plastics exporters responding, in 2005. 
Key findings from the most recent survey include: 
•  191  kilotonnes of plastics were recycled in 2004, of which 68 per cent was 
reprocessed locally and 32 per cent was exported to Asia for reprocessing. 
•  From 1997 to 2004, the total recycling rate of plastics increased from 7 per cent to 
13 per cent. 
•  Over half (56 per cent) of recycled plastics came from the C&I sector, 42 per cent 
came from the municipal sector, and 1 per cent came from the C&D sector. 
•  141  kilotonnes of the plastics recycled in 2004 were packaging. Given that 
approximately 634 kilotonnes of plastic packaging were consumed in that year, this 
gives a recycling rate of approximately 22 per cent. 
Sources: PACIA (2002, 2005). 
 
Exports of some recyclable materials have increased 
There has been significant growth in the value of recyclable materials exported 
between 1994-95 and 2004-05. The value of waste and scrap exports of steel and 
iron more than tripled to $335 million; aluminium almost tripled to $267 million; 
and paper more than doubled to $95 million (figure 2.6). Similarly, exports of waste 
plastics grew from 33 kilotonnes in 2001 to 62 kilotonnes in 2004 (PACIA 2005). 
This was driven by growing demand in Asia, and rising world prices. 
Nearly all of Australia’s recyclable-material exports were sent to Asia, driven by 
increasing demand. Australia’s most significant export market was China, though     





substantial quantities of steel and iron were also sent to Malaysia, India and Taiwan 
(AAC 2004; DITR 2004). 

















Paper Steel and iron Aluminium
 
a  Export values have been converted to a constant (June 2005) price level using export price indexes for 
each commodity group. They have also been adjusted from quarterly to annual (financial year) figures. 
Manufacturing waste has not been included in these figures. Paper waste includes waste and scrap of 
unbleached kraft paper, corrugated paper and paperboard; waste and scrap paper or paperboard made 
mainly of bleached chemical pulp; waste and scrap paper or paperboard made mainly by mechanical pulp (for 
example newspapers and journals); and other unsorted waste and scrap paper or paperboard. Steel and iron 
waste includes waste and scrap of cast iron, stainless steel, other alloy steel, tinned iron or steel, and other 
ferrous waste and scrap excluding machining waste. 
Data sources: ABS (unpublished); ABS (International Trade Price Indexes: Australia, Cat. no. 6457.0). 
Similar trends are found in the export of paper and plastic recyclables. A significant 
proportion of mixed waste paper and newsprint is exported to Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, with smaller amounts sent to Korea and China (Newsprint Producer 
and Publisher Group 2005). Large amounts of plastic recyclate, which is mostly 
industrial and post-consumer packaging waste, were sent to Asia, with China being 
the most significant buyer (PACIA 2005). 
There is very little energy recovered from waste in Australia 
An alternative destination for waste is thermal treatment (including incineration, 
pyrolysis and gasification) either with or without energy recovery. There are limited 
data available on the use of thermal treatment in Australia. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that (excluding on-site facilities) little energy recovery is undertaken in 
Australia, other than in cement kilns, where some waste, such as oil and tyres, are 
used as supplementary fuels.    




There are currently no large-scale thermal treatment facilities for the disposal of 
non-hazardous municipal solid waste in Australia. Although historically Australians 
incinerated a great deal of their waste — often with the use of backyard incinerators 
— its use has declined since the 1970s. This decline has been driven by many 
factors, including changes in the public perception of incineration, and the 
increasing stringency of air quality regulations (chapter 8). However, incineration 
continues to be used in many Australian jurisdictions for the disposal of hazardous 
substances — such as clinical and biomedical waste — that are often too dangerous 
to dispose of in other ways. 
Waste disposal in Australia 
Hyder Consulting (DEH, sub. 103, att. A) estimated that 70 per cent of municipal 
waste, 56  per  cent of C&I waste, and 43  per  cent of C&D waste generated was 
disposed to landfill in 2002-03 (table 2.3). 
Table 2.3  Landfill-disposal rates in Australia, 2002-03a 





  per cent  per cent  per cent  per cent 
New South Wales  65  67  29  52 
Victoria  68 37 46 49 
Queensland  74 78 58 69 
Western Australiab  89 56 79 77 
South  Australia  61 31 33 37 
Tasmania  na na na na 
ACT  74 65 11 31 
Northern Territoryc  90 na na na 
Total  70 56 43 54 
a Landfill-disposal rates show the percentage of waste generated in each waste stream (tonnes to landfill 
disposal plus tonnes recycled) that was disposed to landfill.  b These disposal figures are for metropolitan 
Perth only.  c Productivity Commission estimate for municipal waste. It was not possible to estimate landfill 
disposal rates for other waste streams due to insufficient data.  na Not available. 
Data source: DEH (sub. 103, att. A). 
The overall-landfill disposal rate is estimated to be 54 per cent. However, landfill 
data should be interpreted with caution, especially when making comparisons 
between jurisdictions and with other countries (box 2.4).     






Box 2.4  Problems with Australian landfill data 
There are a number of difficulties in the collection and reporting of landfill data, and in 
using these data to identify trends over time. 
It is often difficult to determine the source and composition of waste due to the way that 
waste is generated and disposed. Waste is transported to landfills using a variety of 
methods and from a diverse range of sources. Landfill operators are not in the position 
to determine, except in a broad sense, where waste comes from, nor the composition 
of the waste streams. 
Many jurisdictions have used targeted landfill audits to get an indication of the source 
and composition of waste disposed to landfills. Targeted landfill audits involve 
surveying the people who deliver waste to the landfills about the source and 
composition of their waste delivery, and then visually inspecting this waste after it has 
been unloaded. However, audits are not without their problems. Their results may be 
affected by the characteristics of the landfills targeted and the time(s) of year in which 
they are conducted. Also, differences in methodology may make the results difficult to 
compare between audits. 
Similarly, different waste classification systems are used in different jurisdictions. This 
makes it difficult to compare landfill data between jurisdictions (chapter 12). 
Traditionally, landfill data for regional and rural areas have either not been available, or 
where they are available, their accuracy has been in question. However, this situation 
appears to have improved in recent years. Increasing scale has made more 
non-metropolitan landfills subject to licensing and data collection requirements, and 
increased the use of weighbridges, which improve the accuracy of data. 
 
 
More waste has been diverted away from landfills over time 
The amount of waste disposed to landfill in Australia as a proportion of total 
generated, appears to have fallen. For example, landfill-disposal rates decreased 
from 60 per cent to 45  per cent and 67  per cent to 27  percent respectively, in 
Victoria and the ACT between 1994-95 and 2004-05 (figure 2.7). It is not possible 
to estimate landfill-disposal rates for other jurisdictions over more than a few years 
due to a lack of data. 
Landfill-disposal rates have declined for the same reasons that recycling rates have 
increased. A discussion of these reasons can be found earlier in this chapter.    






















a The landfill-disposal rate is the total tonnes of material disposed to landfill as a percentage of the total 
tonnes of waste generated. Victorian data for the financial years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97 were 
estimated using calendar year data. Landfill data for these years only cover metropolitan Melbourne, Geelong, 
Ballarat, Bendigo and the Mornington Peninsula. ACT landfill disposal data were adjusted by the Commission 
to remove significant quantities of contaminated soil disposed to landfill in 1997-98, and metal floc from 
Sydney disposed to landfill in 1998-99 and 1999-2000. 
Data sources: ACT NoWaste (sub. 36); Sustainability Victoria (unpublished). 
Some waste types are disposed to landfill more than others 
The materials with the greatest tonnages disposed to landfill appear to be building 
rubble and soil, food and garden waste, and timber. Victorian data show that the 
majority of building rubble and soil, and timber came from C&D sources in 
2002-03 (figure 2.8). It is difficult to determine the relative sources, quantities and 
landfill-disposal rates of each waste type for other jurisdictions, or Australia as a 
whole, due to the lack of adequate compositional data. 
Victorian data also indicate that food and garden waste had the highest 
landfill-disposal rate (76 per cent), followed by timber (73 per cent) and plastics 
(72 per cent) in 2002-03 (figure 2.5).     





Figure 2.8  The composition of waste disposed to landfill in Victoria, 
2002-03a 
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a Compositional data are also available for New South Wales and the ACT. Victorian data are used as an 
example. 
Data source: DEH (sub. 103, att. A). 
The use of landfill gas recovery is growing 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH 2005b) has estimated that, 
between 1990 and 2003, the proportion of methane generated in landfills that was 
captured in Australia grew from almost zero to approximately 24 per cent. Once 
collected, the methane and other gases are flared (thus reducing greenhouse 
impacts) or used to generate electricity. The DEH also estimated that up to 
75 per cent of landfills servicing major urban areas and capital cities use gas-capture 
technologies (DEH 2005f). 
Growth in landfill-gas capture has occurred for a variety of reasons. These include 
government incentives and regulatory requirements promoting the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources, attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from landfills, and commercial incentives (DEH 2005b). Other reasons given by 
inquiry participants included occupational health and safety measures, odour control 
and improved revegetation (for example, Victorian  Government, sub.  DR187; 
WMAA Landfill Division,  sub. DR159).  Most of the methane captured in 
Australian landfills is used for electricity generation (for use either on- or off-site). 
Landfill-gas capture does not represent a significant energy source for Australia. 
Landfill-gas capture projects represent only one per cent of total renewable energy 
generation in Australia and less than five  per cent of Australia’s total energy    




consumption came from renewable sources in 2003-04 (ABARE  2005b; 
DEH 2005b). 
The illegal disposal of waste is a significant problem 
Although little data are available on illegal disposal, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that it is a significant problem. The costs imposed on local governments 
from the cleanup of litter and illegal dump sites (chapter 4), and the enforcement of 
littering and illegal dumping laws (chapter 8) can be considerable. Some data are 
available from studies conducted on the nature and causes of littering behaviour, 
and the prevalence of litter in the community. 
Illegal dumping 
Incidences of illegal dumping are only officially recorded when the appropriate 
authorities receive complaints from the public, it is investigated, and the appropriate 
remedies are sought. For example, the Western Sydney Regional Illegal Dumping 
Squad (covering the Baulkham Hills, Bankstown, Fairfield, Hawkesbury, Holroyd 
and Penrith councils) heard 779 complaints, and conducted 782 investigations in 
2002-03 (DEC 2004e). There were 236 penalty infringement notices and 
50  clean-up notices issued in that year to the values of $152  492, and $16  000 
respectively.  
Data on investigations and infringement notices are not necessarily reliable 
indicators of the incidence of illegal dumping. The number of investigations and 
infringement notices reported in any given year will be correlated with the strength 
of illegal dumping regulations, and the resources dedicated to their enforcement. 
Litter 
Data on the incidence of litter, its composition, and littering behavioural trends are 
collected by several industry groups and non-government organisations. A recent 
national study for Keep Australia Beautiful by McGregor Tan Research (2006b) 
found the most significant items in the Australian litter stream (by number) were: 
cigarette butts (49 per cent), plastics (21 per cent) and paper products (17 per cent) 
(figure 2.9). In contrast, volumetric estimates (in cubic metres) suggest that paper 
and plastic products are the most significant litter items, and cigarette butts the least 
significant. The study also found that litter is most likely to be found alongside 
highways, at car parks and at industrial sites. These results are broadly consistent 
with a similar study conducted six months previously (McGregor Tan Research 
2006a).     





Figure 2.9  The composition of litter in Australia, 2006a 





























a Litter is defined as all waste located within any survey site apart from that properly disposed of in a waste 
receptacle. Food is not counted as litter. While most count data (number of litter items) were collected via 
counting each item individually, in some cases, such as where large numbers of cigarette buts were found, 
estimates were used. Volumetric estimates take into consideration that a certain proportion of items found 
would be crushed and weathered. 
Data source: McGregor Tan Research (2006b). 
Studies by the Beverage Industry Environment Council (BIEC 2004) suggest that 
the incidence of correct disposal behaviour (for example, not littering, and placing 
items in the correct bins) by individuals in Australian public places has increased in 
recent years. The majority of people observed in the BIEC studies disposed of items 
correctly in 2004. Sydney and Melbourne were found to have the lowest incidence 
rates of incorrect disposal behaviours of all of the capital cities in 2004, while 
Canberra had the highest. Littering behaviour is more prevalent for particular 
groups and under certain conditions. The people most likely to litter are aged below 
25 years old, unemployed and/or are part of large groups (BIEC 2004). 
Furthermore, the results suggest that some of the most common reasons for 
observed littering behaviour are a lack of sufficient bins and ashtrays in close 
proximity (cigarette butts were the most common litter item observed by number). 
The BIEC (2004) also found that the incidence of correct disposal behaviour was 
greater in locations that were clean to begin with, and in regions where an 
‘environmental awareness’ (for example, anti-litter) campaign was in place. Several 
inquiry participants cited previous government education programs, such as the 
‘Do-the-Right-Thing’ campaign, as contributing to the substantial decrease in litter 
levels since the late 1970s (Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub. 93).    




Australian waste data are collected from a range of sources. Differences in 
definitions and collection methodologies between data sets, and inherent difficulties 
in collecting data on waste, mean that the data have substantial gaps and biases. 
 
2.2  Comparisons with other countries 
This section attempts to illustrate how Australian trends in the management of 
municipal waste compare and contrast with those of other countries. Nonmunicipal 
waste is not discussed due to the significant difficulties in comparing data between 
countries. These difficulties include: differences in economic structures; the lack of 
comparable nonmunicipal waste data in OECD reports; and inconsistencies in the 
application of OECD data definitions between countries. 
Waste generation in Australia and other countries 
Many commentators and inquiry participants have argued that Australians generate 
large amounts of waste by international standards. The terms of reference for this 
inquiry include the statement that ‘Australians generate solid waste at a high rate 
compared with most other OECD countries’. OECD data report that 690 kilograms 
of municipal waste per person was generated in Australia in 2003 (OECD 2005b). 
This places Australia fifth in the OECD rankings of municipal waste generation (out 
of all 30 countries in the OECD), exceeded only by Ireland, the United States, 
Iceland and Norway (figure 2.10). 
Part of the reason for Australia’s high apparent rate of waste generation can be 
explained by the OECD secretariat’s practice of generating its own estimates of 
Australia’s total municipal waste generation since the late 1990s (OECD 2005b). 
The OECD’s estimate of municipal waste generation was 13.8 million tonnes in 
2003. This is significantly higher than estimates made by Hyder Consulting (DEH, 
sub.  103, att.  A) (8.9  million tonnes estimated for 2002-03) and WCS Market 
Intelligence (2001) (8.4 million tonnes estimated for 2001). 
The reasons for these differences may include the OECD’s broader definition of 
municipal waste, the extrapolation by the OECD of data from earlier years, and the 
inclusion of (a potentially significant amount of) C&I waste in estimates for 
Australian municipal waste generation (OECD 2005b). 
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Figure 2.10  Municipal waste generation in Australia and selected OECD 
countries, 2003a 














a Municipal waste is waste collected and treated by or for municipalities. It includes waste originating from 
households, commercial activities, office buildings, institutions such as schools and government buildings, and 
small businesses that dispose of waste at the same facilities used for municipally-collected waste. Household 
waste includes garbage, bulky waste, and separately-collected waste. Data are either for 2003 or latest 
available year. Data for Ireland includes estimates of waste generation by households not served by waste 
collection services. Data for Iceland are for 2002. Data for Norway includes approximately 20 kg per person of 
C&D waste. Per person amounts are adjusted for the population served by municipal waste collection 
services. Data for Australia were estimated based on data for the late 1990s, and may include significant 
amounts of C&I waste. Data for Germany were estimated. Data for Japan are for 2001, and include municipal 
waste collection, waste directly delivered and in-house treatment, but excludes separate collection for 
recycling by the private sector (approximately 22 kg per person). 
Data source: OECD (2005b). 
Waste generation data are not strictly comparable between countries 
Collection, classification and reporting issues make waste data difficult to compare 
between countries. Waste source and type classifications used in each country’s 
data collections are often inconsistent and do not necessarily match those used by 
the OECD.  
This is especially true in the case of municipal waste data. The OECD (2005b, 
p. 68) defined municipal waste as: 
… waste collected and treated by or on the order of municipalities. It includes waste 
originating from households, commercial activities, office buildings, institutions such    




as schools and government buildings, and small businesses that dispose of waste at the 
same facilities used for municipally-collected waste …. Household waste … includes 
garbage, bulky waste, and separately-collected waste. 
However, some countries’ municipal waste data varies significantly from this 
definition. For example, New Zealand municipal waste generation figures only 
include ‘household waste landfilled … and packaging waste recycled’ 
(OECD 2005b, p. 68). Municipal waste generation estimates for different countries 
may be under- or over-reported depending upon how local data definitions compare 
to those of the OECD and the availability of data.  
These, and other, data collection and comparability issues have been identified by 
the OECD and the European Commission in its publications. According to the 
OECD (2005c, p. 8): 
… in many countries, systematic collection of environmental data has a short history; 
sources are typically spread across a range of agencies and levels of government, and 
information is often collected for other purposes. 
Furthermore, a recent review of the European Commission’s Packaging and 
Packaging Waste directive found that member states had not harmonised their data 
collection methodologies (Perchards 2004). This meant that d a t a  w e r e  n o t  
necessarily comparable between members. These weaknesses make it difficult to 
make definitive comparisons of waste generation and management data between 
countries, and as such these data should be used with caution. 
The composition of municipal waste streams differ between countries 
The OECD’s estimate of Australia’s municipal waste generation per person may 
also reflect the greater significance of food and garden waste in the Australian 
municipal waste stream. The proportion of food and garden waste in Australia’s 
municipal waste stream was 50  per  cent in 2002, compared to, for example, 
24 per cent for both Ireland and the United States (figure 2.11). Data from New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia suggest that garden waste made up half 
of food and garden waste in 2002-03 (DEH, sub. 103, att. A). 
There are many other reasons why the weight and composition of waste generated 
in each country may differ. These include:  
•  differences in per person income levels and consumption; 
•  differences in population density and the size of household yards; 
•  the adoption of alternative waste disposal systems, such as household 
composting and in-sink garbage disposal units; and     





•  the prevalence of public parks, sporting grounds and other open spaces. 
Figure 2.11  The composition of municipal waste generated in Australia and 
selected OECD countries, 2002a 
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a Municipal waste is defined as waste collected and treated by or for municipalities. It covers waste from 
households, including bulky waste, similar waste from commerce and trade, office buildings, institutions and 
small businesses, yard and garden waste, street sweepings, the contents of litter containers, and market 
cleansing waste. The definition excludes waste from municipal sewage networks and treatment, as well as 
construction and demolition from the above sources. Data for Australia were estimated using data for the late 
1990s, and may include significant amounts of C&I waste. Data for France on municipal waste include similar 
waste from commerce and trade. Data for Japan on municipal waste exclude municipal waste collected for 
recycling by the private sector. 
Data source: OECD (2005c). 
Resource recovery in Australia and other countries 
Australia’s recycling rate in 2003 (incorporating the recycling of putrescible and 
non-putrescible waste) was approximately 35 per cent of waste generated, according 
to OECD data (figure 2.12). This is similar to other estimates made by Hyder 
Consulting  (DEH, sub.  103, att.  A) (30  per  cent for 2002-03) and WCS Market 
Intelligence (2001) (23 per cent for 2001).    




Figure 2.12  The treatment of municipal waste in Australia and selected 
OECD countries, 2003a 
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a  Categories may overlap because residues from some types of treatment (incineration, composting) are 
landfilled. Categories do not necessarily add up to 100 per cent because other types of treatment may not be 
covered. Data for Iceland are preliminary. Data for the United Kingdom are for 2002. Percentages for Ireland 
are based on collected amounts. Data for Australia are for 2001. Data for the United States on incineration 
capture the amounts after recovery, and on landfill capture the amounts after recovery and incineration. Data 
for France are for 2002. Data for Japan are for 2001, and percentages are based on waste treated by 
municipalities and separate collection for recycling by the private sector. Recycling includes amounts directly 
recycled (including private collection) and recovered from intermediate processing. Landfill includes direct 
disposal (excluding residues from other treatments). Percentages for the Netherlands exclude amounts 
undergoing mechanical sorting before treatment/disposal. 
Data source: OECD (2005b). 
The Australian recycling rate compares favourably with that of other countries 
The Australian recycling rate (35 per cent) is above the OECD average for 2003 
(27 per cent) (OECD 2005b).3 However, it is much lower than the countries with 
the highest recycling rates, Austria and Belgium (61 and 60 per cent respectively) 
and another seven countries including the Netherlands and Germany (both 56 per 
cent). 
                                              
3  The OECD average is a Productivity Commission estimate using OECD (2005b) data. Only 
countries with available non-zero recycling percentages were included in this calculation.     





However, comparisons need to be made with caution. It appears that many EU 
countries only report the total amount of waste collected for recycling, rather than 
the amount that was actually reprocessed (Eurostat 2005). Thus, in some of these 
countries, recycling estimates may be overstated. This is consistent with claims by 
the PCA (sub. 67, p. 30) that there ‘may be a difference of 30 per cent between what 
is collected and what is recovered’ in many European countries. 
There are also problems with the way waste treatment methods are classified in 
other countries. Japan and some European countries use thermal treatment to deal 
with a high proportion of their waste. This type of treatment will typically have 
energy recovery, and therefore it may be classified as recycling rather than disposal 
(OECD 2005c). It is not clear that the distinction between incineration and recycling 
is consistently made in waste data published by the OECD. 
The rate of recycling in different countries may be driven by a number of different 
factors including: community support for recycling and/or aversion to landfills, 
waste policies and the availability of land on which to locate landfills 
(OECD  2002). OECD data suggest that decreasing landfill-disposal rates, and 
increasing recycling rates, are trends occurring in many countries (de Tilly 2004).4  
Waste disposal in Australia and other countries 
Many inquiry participants argued that Australia’s rate of disposal to landfill is too 
high when compared to other countries, and that it should be reduced. According to 
OECD estimates, approximately 65 per cent of Australia’s waste was sent to landfill 
in 2003 (figure 2.12). This is not very different from the average across OECD 
countries (53 per cent)5, and significantly below rates in countries such as Mexico, 
Turkey and Poland (all 97 per cent), and New Zealand (85 per cent). This estimate 
is broadly consistent with those from other data sources. Hyder Consulting (DEH, 
sub. 103, att. A) estimated that the rate of disposal to landfill in Australia was 70 per 
cent in 2002-03, and WCS Market Intelligence (2001) estimated it was 77 per cent 
in 2001. 
Caution should be used when comparing landfill-disposal rates between countries. 
In addition to potential problems with the data’s accuracy and consistency 
                                              
4  Comparisons over time using OECD data should be made with caution. For example, in the case 
of Australia, recycling rates are much higher (and landfill-disposal rates much lower) in more 
recent data releases than in those previously. While Australian data for 2002 were based on 
estimated data for the late 1990s, data for 2003 are based on 2001 percentages (OECD 2005b; 
OECD 2005c). 
5  Productivity Commission estimate using OECD (2005b) data. Only countries with available 
non-zero landfill percentages were included in this calculation.    




(discussed earlier), a range of economic, environmental and social factors also need 
to be considered. These include the financial and regulatory incentives for waste 
treatment methods other than the disposal of waste to landfill, the availability of 
suitable land, and the availability and cost of other waste-management technologies.  
Comparisons between Australia’s waste management outcomes — in terms of waste 
generation, recycling and disposal — and those of other countries should be made 
with caution. Differences in the way waste is classified, data are collected, and the 
economic, environmental and social circumstances of different countries, limit the 
usefulness of international comparisons. 
2.3  The waste management industry 
The waste management industry comprises organisations involved in the collection, 
sorting, recycling and disposal of solid waste. Liquid and gaseous waste, and waste 
treated on-site, are outside the scope of this inquiry and are separated from reported 
statistics unless otherwise specified. 
The four most important areas of activity in the industry include: 
•  the collection and transport of waste and recyclables, often through the use of 
kerbside bin and skip-bin collection; 
•  the sorting of waste and recyclables so that they may either be disposed of, or 
recycled; 
•  the recycling and reuse of material recovered from the waste stream; and 
•  the final disposal of those materials that are not (or cannot be) recovered or 
reused. 
As a share of total revenue, the sector that collects and transports waste is the 
largest component (64  per  cent); followed by the processing, treatment and/or 
disposal sector (27 per cent); and the collection and transport of recyclables sector 
(6 per cent) (figure 2.13). 
The industry is comprised of the trading sector (private firms and government 
trading enterprises), and the general government sector. The general government 
sector is mostly involved in waste collection, transport, and landfill activities at the 
local government level. 
The trading sector dominates the industry. In 2002-03, it earned 90 per cent ($2.7 
billion) of total industry revenue, employed 77 per cent (10 000 people) of the total 
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industry workforce, and accounted for 64 per cent (1200) of the total number of 
organisations in the industry (ABS 2004b).6 
Figure 2.13  Distribution of total revenue in the Australian waste 
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a Data on the general government sector are preliminary. Revenue from sources not shown in the figure, such 
as leasing, hiring, and the generation of renewable energy, are not included.  
Data source: ABS (Waste Management Industry, Cat. no. 8698.0). 
In 2000-01, of the 1200 trading sector operators, the top 50 companies had a total 
market share of 70 per cent (WCS Market Intelligence 2001). Of these companies, 
the top five — Cleanaway, Visy Recycling, Collex, PWM Australia and Thiess 
Services — held 42 per cent of the market. 
                                              
6  The data from which these revenue and employment estimates were derived include liquid 
waste (except through sewer systems). However, the Commission estimates that the liquid waste 
sub-sector accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total number of organisations, and 
10 per cent of total revenue in 2002-03.    




     




3  Government policy responses 
 
Key points 
•  Waste management policy was initially focused around public health issues. From 
the early 1970s, it also started to take into account the environmental impacts of 
waste disposal. 
•  In the early 1990s, public concerns extended to the environmental impacts 
associated with the generation of waste, and the sustainability of natural resource 
use associated with production and consumption. 
•  The Australian, State and Territory Governments responded to these concerns by 
agreeing to national waste strategies intended to protect the environment and 
promote resource sustainability.  
•  These strategies focused mainly on promoting resource recovery to reduce the level 
of waste being disposed to landfill. Landfill diversion targets were adopted as a 
consequence. 
•  More recently, most states and territories have introduced new waste minimisation 
strategies. The objectives of these strategies are diverse and many promote ‘zero 
waste’ to  landfill goals. Landfill diversion targets set most recently are more 
stringent than the targets first set in the 1990s. 
•  Prominent features of these strategies include the use of the waste hierarchy in 
policy making, and the sharing of responsibility between industry and the community 
to manage end-of-life consumer goods.  
 
 
In Australia, as elsewhere, waste management was concerned traditionally with 
addressing the potentially adverse consequences of putrescible waste on public 
health and its associated disamenity (such as odour). From the early 1970s, the 
public became increasingly concerned with the effects of pollution on the 
environment. This concern extended to the management of landfills.  
From the early 1990s, the public’s concerns in Australia extended to the upstream 
consequences of waste generation. These included environmental impacts (such as 
the impacts on sensitive ecosystems from the extraction of natural resources), as 
well as the perceived rapid depletion of non-renewable resources. A number of 
inquiry participants have suggested that landfill space was also a scarce and 
depletable resource.     




This chapter describes the key policy responses that have been undertaken by the 
Australian, State, Territory and local governments from the early 1990s to the 
present day. 
3.1 National  policy  responses 
Australian, State and Territory Governments have introduced a suite of strategies 
and legislation aimed at minimising the amount of waste generated and being 
disposed to landfill.  
Under the Australian Constitution, environmental protection and natural resource 
management are the jurisdiction of the states. According to the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment 1992, the Australian Government’s responsibilities 
relating to ‘national environmental matters’ include: 
(i)  matters of foreign policy relating to the environment and, in particular, negotiating 
and entering into international agreements relating to the environment and ensuring 
that international obligations relating to the environment are met by Australia;  
(ii)  ensuring that the policies or practices of a State do not result in significant adverse 
external effects in relation to the environment of another State or the lands or 
territories of the Commonwealth or maritime areas within Australia’s 
jurisdiction …  
(iii) facilitating the co-operative development of national environmental standards and 
guidelines … (s. 2.2.1, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992) 
National waste strategies 
Many of the policy responses currently in place in the states and territories have 
their origins in two key national policy initiatives adopted in 1992: the National 
Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy (NWMRS) and the National Kerbside 
Recycling Strategy (NKRS). 
National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy 
The NWMRS was published by the Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
Conservation Council (ANZECC 1992). The over-arching goals of the NWMRS are 
to: 
•  encourage the ecologically sustainable non-wasteful use of resources; 
•  reduce potential hazards to human health and the environment posed by pollution and 
wastes; and 
•  maintain or improve environmental quality (CEPA 1992, p. 10).     




The NWMRS represented the first major national waste minimisation strategy that 
had resource efficiency and conservation as a policy goal. However, it was made 
clear in the NWMRS that governments should only pursue waste-related policies if 
they also maximised the net benefits to the community (that is, they met the 
‘economic efficiency’ criterion) (box 3.1). 
 
Box 3.1  Net benefits in the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling 
Strategy 
According to the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy: 
Waste management is not cost free. To improve community welfare and environmental 
amenity it is essential that the costs and benefits of this activity are brought into balance. 
This will involve ensuring that the prices of waste management resources and services are 
adjusted to reflect their full social and environmental consequences. Improving the efficiency 
of a range of markets (including the areas of transport and resource usage for example) will 
be a key factor in working towards optimal recycling levels. 
As the provider and owner of many waste management services and resources, 
governments have a particular responsibility to ensure that their policies and activities are 
consistent with this principle. Government actions designed to influence levels of waste 
generated and recycled should have regard to the economic efficiency of their proposals. 
Within this constraint, governments may also be able to assist the objectives of this strategy 
through their other activities. 
 Source: CEPA (1992, p. 12). 
 
 
A target of reducing the amount of waste per capita going to landfill by 50 per cent 
by 2000 was adopted in the NWMRS (CEPA 1992). This target was set in reference 
to the amount of waste disposed in 1991. Despite the principle agreed to in box 3.1, 
the costs and benefits associated with this target were not estimated, or if they were, 
they were not published. 
To help meet the landfill diversion and recycling targets, the roles of extended 
producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes were also discussed in the 
NWMRS. These schemes place greater responsibility on producers for recovering 
or disposing of specific goods (chapter 10). Products identified in the strategy as 
possibilities for future schemes included used tyres, plastics, batteries, paper and 
packaging (CEPA 1992).  
National Kerbside Recycling Strategy 
This strategy was developed to advance some of the policy actions outlined in the 
NWMRS. Recycling targets were agreed between governments and industries for 
plastic containers, glass, aluminium and steel cans, liquid paperboard containers, 
newsprint and paper packaging. For example, the strategy called for 65 per cent of     




aluminium cans to be recycled by 1995, up from 62  per cent  in  1990 
(ANZECC 1992).  
To assist governments and industries to meet these targets, it was also proposed 
that: 
•  domestic waste charges should be based on full waste disposal costs and 
preferably on a weight or volume basis by June 1994; 
•  more than 90  per  cent of urban households should have regular kerbside 
recycling collection by June 1994; and 
•  at least 60 per cent of households with access to kerbside collections should use 
it at least once a month by June 1993 (ANZECC 1992). 
The development of industry action plans and state and local government waste 
management plans was also called for in the NKRS. Although no longer current 
policy documents, the NWMRS and NKRS have been influential in the subsequent 
development of national, state and territory policies. 
National legislation 
In meeting its international obligations and in facilitating the cooperative 
development of national environmental standards and guidelines, the Australian 
Government has enacted the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) 
Act 1989 (Cwlth) (HWA 1989), and the National Environmental Protection Council 
Act 1994 (Cwlth) (NEPCA 1994). It is also responsible for a number of bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements, each of which can have a bearing on the management 
of waste. 
International agreements  
As noted in chapter  1, the Australian Government is a signatory to the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal (1989)  (the Basel Convention). Under the Basel Convention, the 
Australian Government agreed to control the movement of hazardous waste across 
its international borders. 
The Australian Government implemented the Basel Convention through the 
HWA 1989. The objective of the HWA 1989 is to control the trade (the export,     




import and transit) of hazardous waste (including municipal solid waste) in an 
environmentally sound manner and to protect human beings and the environment.1 
The Australian Government is also a signatory to a range of bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements. These include the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, and four bilateral trade agreements (such as the Australia New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, and the Australia–United States Free 
Trade Agreement). Each of these place limits on how Australian governments can 
use measures such as tariffs, quotas and government purchasing policies to restrict 
imports from signatory trading countries.  
The role of these international agreements in influencing the market for recovered 
resources is considered in chapter 12. 
National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 
The Australian Government enacted the NEPCA 1994 to offer people throughout 
Australia the benefit of equivalent protection from pollution and to reduce any 
distortions to businesses and markets from differences between the states and 
territories in their environment protection measures. In particular, the objects clause 
of the Act states: 
The object of this Act is to ensure that, by means of the establishment and operation of 
the National Environment Protection Council:  
(a) people enjoy the benefit of equivalent protection from air, water or soil pollution 
and from noise, wherever they live in Australia; and  
(b)  decisions of the business community are not distorted, and markets are not 
fragmented, by variations between participating jurisdictions in relation to the 
adoption or implementation of major environment protection measures. (National 
Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cwlth), s. 3) 
The NEPCA 1994 establishes the National Environment Protection Council (NEPC) 
and gives it the power to issue national environment protection measures (NEPMs). 
These are Australian Government regulations that include an environmental 
standard, goal, guideline and/or protocol.2 NEPMs are typically enforced through a 
suite of uniform Acts or regulations at the state and territory level. The NEPC is one 
of the key national environmental policy-making bodies in Australia (box 3.2). 
                                              
1 s.  3(1),  Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989 (Cwlth). 
2  s. 14(3), National Environmental Protection Council Act 1994 (Cwlth).     





Box 3.2  National policy making bodies 
During the 1990s, the Australian and New Zealand Environment Conservation Council 
(ANZECC) was responsible for the development of the National Waste Minimisation 
and Recycling Strategy and the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy. 
From this process, the National Environment Protection Council (NEPC) was 
established in 1992. It comprises ministers (usually environment protection ministers) 
from each Australian jurisdiction. 
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) was created in 2001 from 
the amalgamation of ANZECC, the NEPC and the Heritage Ministers’ meetings. The 
EPHC brings together ministers from all Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand, 
whose responsibilities include environment protection (Department of the Environment 
and Heritage, sub. 103).  




The NEPCA 1994 provides the legislative basis for the Australian Government to 
regulate the interstate transport of waste, among other things. The objectives of the 
National Environment Protection Measure for the Movement of Controlled 
Hazardous Wastes between States and Territories are broadly similar to those of the 
Basel Convention.  
The NEPCA 1994 also provides the regulatory basis for national extended producer 
responsibility schemes. For example, the National Environmental Protection (Used 
Packaging Materials) Measure provides the regulatory underpinning for the 
National Packaging Covenant (chapter 10). The Australian Government is in the 
process of establishing co-regulatory schemes for computers, televisions and tyres 
(chapter 10).  
3.2  State and Territory Government waste minimisation 
strategies 
The NWMRS and NKRS were the guiding policy frameworks for the states and 
territories throughout the 1990s. Most states and territories have subsequently 
introduced new waste minimisation strategies. Not only are these supported by 
environment protection legislation, they are commonly supported by new waste 
minimisation legislation (or amendments to existing environment protection 
legislation) (table 3.1). For example, the WA Government recently introduced the 
Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Bill 2006.      




Table 3.1  Key legislation and selected waste minimisation strategies 
 Waste  minimisation  strategies  Legislation 
New South Wales  • Waste Avoidance and Resource 
Recovery Strategy 2003 
• Waste Reduction and Purchasing 
Policy 
• Used Packaging Materials 
Industry Waste Reduction Plans 
• Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 
• Waste Avoidance and Resource 
Recovery Act 2001 
Victoria  • Towards Zero Waste Strategy 
2005 
• Environmental Sustainability 
Framework 2005 
• Environment Protection Act 1970 
Queensland  • Waste Management Strategy for 
Queensland 1996 
• Environmental Protection Act 
1994 
• The Environmental Protection 
(Waste Management) Policy 2000 
Western Australia  • Statement of Strategic Direction 
for Waste Management in 
Western Australia 2004 
• Environmental Protection Act 
1986 
• Environmental Protection (Landfill 
Levy) Act 1998 
South Australia  • South Australia’s Waste Strategy 
2005–2010 
• Environmental Protection Act 
1993 
• Zero Waste SA Act 2004 
Tasmania  • Guide to Industrial Waste 
Management 
• Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 
• Litter Act 1973 
ACT  • No Waste By 2010 
• Waste Pricing Strategy for the 
ACT 
• Environment Protection Act 1997 
• Waste Minimisation Act 2001 
• Litter Act 2004 
Northern Territory  • Litter Abatement and Resource 
Recovery Strategy 2003 
• Waste Management and Pollution 
Control Act 1998 
Objectives 
The overarching objectives of the new waste minimisation strategies are, broadly, to 
protect the environment and conserve natural resources. For example, the ‘three 
directions’ identified by the Victorian Government for it to become a ‘sustainable 
state’ include: 
•  maintaining and restoring our natural assets 
•  using our resources more efficiently 
•  reducing our everyday environmental impacts. (Victorian Government 2005, p. 3) 
Though these types of objectives are broadly mirrored in the environment and waste 
minimisation legislation of most states and territories, some jurisdictions have 
additional legislative objectives. For example, the objectives of the NSW Waste 
Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2001 include encouraging resource     




efficiency, using the waste hierarchy for policy decision-making, avoiding waste, 
and sharing the responsibility to reduce waste between industry and the community 
(box 3.3). In contrast, some other jurisdictions have fewer and simpler objectives in 
their equivalent legislation. For example, Part IX (Resource Efficiency) of the 
Victorian  Environment Protection Act 1970 has as its objective to ‘foster 
environmentally sustainable uses of resources’. The appropriateness of these 
objectives is discussed in chapter 6. 
 
Box 3.3  Objectives of selected legislation relating to waste avoidance 
and resource recovery 
The key legislation covering waste avoidance and resource recovery in New South 
Wales is the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2001 (WARRA 2001). In 
Victoria, it is Part IX of the Environment Protection Act 1970 (EPA 1970). 
New South Wales 
The objects of the WARRA 2001 are:  
(a) to encourage the most efficient use of resources and to reduce environmental harm in 
accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development,  
(b) to ensure that resource management options are considered against a hierarchy of the 
following order:  
(i)  avoidance of unnecessary resource consumption,  
(ii)  resource recovery (including reuse, reprocessing, recycling and energy recovery),  
(iii) disposal,  
(c)  to provide for the continual reduction in waste generation,  
(d) to minimise the consumption of natural resources and the final disposal of waste by 
encouraging the avoidance of waste and the reuse and recycling of waste,  
(e) to ensure that industry shares with the community the responsibility for reducing and 
dealing with waste,  
(f)  to ensure the efficient funding of waste and resource management planning, programs 
and service delivery,  
(g) to achieve integrated waste and resource management planning, programs and service 
delivery on a State-wide basis,  
(h) to assist in the achievement of the objectives of the Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997. (s. 3) 
Victoria 
In contrast, the object of Part IX of the EPA 1970 is: 
…  to foster environmentally sustainable uses of resources and best practices in waste 
management in order to advance the social and economic development of Victoria. (s. 49)  
 
     




The objectives of waste minimisation strategies in most states and territories have 
given rise to ‘zero waste’, or ‘towards zero waste to landfill’ goals. For example: 
•  the ACT Government (1996) adopted a strategy of No Waste by 2010; 
•  the Victorian Government (2005) adopted a Towards Zero Waste strategy; 
•  the SA Government (2005) adopted a zero waste goal in its Waste Strategy 
2005–2010; and 
•  the WA Government adopted a policy goal of towards zero waste in its Strategic 
Direction for Waste Management (WMB 2004). 
These goals are more stringent than those first adopted in the NWMRS. 
Some key features 
There are a number of key features to the new waste minimisation strategies, two of 
the most prominent being: the requirement to use or consider the waste hierarchy in 
decision-making; and the sharing of responsibility for waste reduction between 
industry and the community.  
Waste hierarchy 
The new waste minimisation strategies have been based on the principle of the 
waste hierarchy. For example, the Victorian Government noted: 
A key criterion underpinning the [Towards Zero Waste Strategy] is the Victorian waste 
hierarchy … [It] provides a framework aimed at minimising resource consumption and 
the consequent environmental and economic costs associated with resource extraction 
and harvesting, as well as in the processing, manufacture, transport and disposal of 
materials. (Victorian Government 2005, p. 13) 
First developed in the 1970s, the waste hierarchy is a simplified list of priorities 
(Rasmussen and Vigsø 2005). Under the hierarchy, policies that avoid waste are 
given highest preference and policies that encourage disposal are given lowest 
preference. The waste hierarchy appeared in the NWMRS though each state and 
territory government has its own version in its respective environment protection 
and waste minimisation legislation (box 3.4). 
The role of the waste hierarchy in policy development is discussed in chapter 7.     





Box 3.4  Examples of the waste hierarchy in practice 
Different interpretations have been given to the waste hierarchy in various strategies 
such as the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy and in the Victorian 
Towards Zero Waste Strategy. 
National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy 
Central to the Strategy is a hierarchy of waste management priorities. In order of preference, 
options selected should be: 
•  waste avoidance — practices which prevent the generation of waste altogether 
•  waste reduction — practices which reduce waste 
•  waste reuse — direct reuse of waste materials for the same grade of use 
•  waste recycling or reclamation — using valuable components of waste in other processes 
•  waste treatment — to reduce hazard or nuisance, preferably at the site of generation 
•  waste disposal. 
In the above hierarchy, the first four stages should always be the preferred approach, being 
selected instead of waste treatment or disposal options. The ideal situation would be to have 
closed loops in overall material flows, with no usable materials lost as waste. 
Victorian Towards Zero Waste Strategy 
The hierarchy has been represented in a graphical form by the Victorian Government 
as follows: 
 
EPA Victoria (nd1), defined containment as the long-term repository storage of 
prescribed industrial wastes ‘requiring a very high degree of control or those pending 
further diversion to productive purposes’. 
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Shared responsibility between industry and the community 
Waste minimisation strategies also tend to refer to the principle of shared 
responsibility. For example, the NSW Government noted that: 
Everyone must accept responsibility for the part that they can play in avoiding waste 
and recovering resources. This includes producer responsibility, product stewardship by 
all parts of the supply chain, consumers and all participants in resource recovery 
processes. (Resource NSW 2003, p. 10) 
Many waste minimisation strategies refer to extended producer responsibility and/or 
product stewardship. While there is no universally agreed definition for either 
concept, extended producer responsibility is often defined to mean that producers 
should take responsibility for a product beyond the post-consumer stage of the 
product’s life cycle. Product stewardship is often defined to mean that all members 
of a community must share the responsibility for the waste of a product over its life 
cycle. In practice, however, these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. 
The role of extended producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes in 
the collection, recycling and disposal of end-of-life consumer goods is taken up in 
chapter 10. 
Implementing waste minimisation strategies 
Each state and territory’s waste minimisation strategy outlines which agencies are 
involved and how the strategy is to be implemented.  
Key institutional arrangements 
A number of agencies are involved in implementing each jurisdiction’s waste 
minimisation strategies. These generally include: 
•  A waste agency that is generally responsible for implementing the jurisdiction’s 
waste minimisation strategy by: negotiating landfill diversion targets with 
industry and local governments; setting landfill levies; assisting industry meet 
their targets by providing information, education, and grants from monies 
collected from landfill levies; and collecting monitoring and reporting on 
progress against the strategy. These include the ACT NOWaste, the NSW 
Department of Environment and Conservation (formerly Resource NSW), 
Sustainability Victoria, Zero Waste SA, and the proposed Waste Authority in 
Western Australia. 
•  The environmental regulator that is responsible for regulating firms to protect 
the environment, such as by licensing landfills. The regulator may also be     




responsible for enforcing extended producer responsibility and product 
stewardship schemes (Victorian Government 2005). In some jurisdictions, such 
as Victoria, the environmental regulator is also responsible for enforcing the 
development of regional waste management plans by local governments. 
•  Local governments that are responsible for providing kerbside collection and 
disposal services, and in a number of jurisdictions, setting aside land for future 
waste and resource recovery facilities, and considering new development 
applications. 
Local governments have responded in a number of ways to meet ratepayers’ 
expectations and their obligations under their waste management plans. They have 
expanded the range of waste management services on offer. Most offer kerbside 
collections for recyclables. Typically, local governments provide two-bin services 
(mixed waste and dry recyclables), though some now provide three-bin services 
(green waste, dry recyclables, and residual waste). Many local governments also 
offer occasional hard waste collections and provide drop-off depots for waste 
disposal and recycling. 
Most local governments have outsourced their waste collection, transfer and 
disposal activities to private contractors. In addition, local governments are 
increasingly entering into partnerships with others to share waste disposal and 
resource recovery facilities, and to access more favourable waste management 
contracts (chapter  12). This is becoming increasingly necessary as local 
governments attempt to comply with state and territory waste minimisation 
strategies. In Victoria, this has been facilitated through the formation of regional 
waste management groups. 
Target setting 
Following on from the NWMRS and NKRS, some jurisdictions have set 
jurisdiction-wide landfill diversion targets. For example, the ACT Government aims 
to be a waste-free society by 2010 (box 3.5). The WA Government is currently 
developing a waste-diversion target for 2020 (WMB 2004). 
To meet these broad targets, jurisdictions typically also set targets for each of the 
solid waste streams. For example, the Victorian Government aims to ensure that at 
least 65 per cent of all municipal solid waste in the state is recovered for reuse, 
recycling or energy generation by 2014 (box 3.5). The SA Government aims to 
increase the amount of construction and demolition waste being recovered and 
reused by 50 per cent by 2010. Though the NSW Government has not adopted a 
zero waste policy, it has adopted a number of jurisdiction-wide targets for each 
waste stream (Resource NSW 2003).     





Box 3.5  State and territory targets for waste 
Targets for New South Wales include (by 2014): 
•  66 per cent recovery of municipal solid waste 
•  63 per cent recovery of commercial and industrial waste  
•  76 per cent recovery of construction and demolition waste  
Targets for Victoria include (by 2014): 
•  a 1.5 million tonne reduction in the projected quantity of waste generated 
•  75 per cent of solid waste recovered for reuse, recycling and/or energy recovery 
•  25 per cent improvement in littering behaviour 
•  65 per cent recovery of solid waste in the municipal sector 
•  80 per cent recovery of solid waste in the commercial and industrial sector  
•  80 per cent recovery of solid waste in the construction and demolition sector. 
Targets for South Australia include: 
•  25 per cent reduction in municipal solid waste to landfill by 2014; 
•  75 per cent recycling of all municipal solid waste material presented at the kerbside 
by 2010; 
•  30 per cent increase in the recovery and use of commercial and industrial materials 
by 2010; and 
•  50 per cent increase in the recovery and use of construction and demolition 
materials by 2010. 
The ACT aims to achieve a waste free society by 2010. 




Targets have also been set at an industry level, sometimes as part of extended 
producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes. Industry targets include: 
•  National Packaging Covenant recycling targets — the Covenant commits 
signatories to an overall packaging recycling target of 65 per cent and no further 
increases in packaging waste disposed to landfill by the end of 2010 
(NPCC 2005). 
•  Plastic bag targets — the Australian Retailers’ Association Code of Practice for 
the Management of Plastic Bags (ARA 2003) required signatories to achieve a 
50 per cent reduction in their supply of high density polyethylene plastic bags by 
December 2005.     




The role of target setting is taken up in chapter  7. Performance indicators are 
discussed in chapter 13. 
Waste management planning 
In fulfilling their commitments under the state waste minimisation strategies, many 
local governments are required to prepare waste management plans. In Victoria and 
South Australia, local governments are also required to prepare regional waste 
management plans (Victorian Government 2005; SA Government 2005). The City 
of Whitehorse, for example, prepared its waste management plan in accordance 
with the plan of the Eastern Regional Waste Management Group (sub.  26). To 
achieve its target of reducing annual waste to landfill by 72 000 tonnes by 2014, the 
city proposed a number of strategies that covered the city’s kerbside collection of 
waste, recyclables and green organics, its collection of hard waste, its recycling and 
waste transfer station facilities, and its waste education campaign. 
Similarly, some firms and industry associations are encouraged to enter into 
agreements and prepare plans that outline how they intend to reduce the amount of 
waste they generate. In the case of extended producer responsibility and product 
stewardship schemes, this includes how they might meet specified landfill diversion 
and recycling targets. For example, each signatory to the National Packaging 
Covenant agreed to prepare an action plan that sets out how it ‘proposes to 
implement and measure its actions and commitments under the Covenant’ 
(NPCC 2005, p. 27). 
Policy instruments 
State and Territory Governments have adopted a range of policy instruments to 
manage waste as well as meet their targets to reduce the amount of waste being 
disposed to landfill, including: 
•  waste management regulations — to control various aspects of the collection, 
transportation and disposal of waste (chapters 8 and 12);  
•  market-based instruments — to provide incentives to charge the waste 
generating and disposal behaviour of households and firms (and include landfill 
levies, advance disposal and recycling fees, deposit-refund schemes and 
subsidies) (chapter 9); 
•  extended producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes — to 
promote shared responsibility between industry and the community (chapter 10); 
and     




•  government provision of information and procurement practices — to address 
problems associated with the lack of information about waste management 
options, to persuade consumers and firms to change their behaviour, and to use 
procurement policies to foster demand for particular resource-conserving goods 
(chapter 11). 
     




      









•  People have some incentives to manage waste in ways that reduce costs, whether 
through waste avoidance, reuse, recycling, or disposal. 
•  Waste management can lead to negative ‘externalities’ — impacts on unrelated 
parties that are not reflected in the private financial costs of waste management. If 
these externalities are significant, the waste management option that imposes the 
lowest financial costs may not be the best outcome from the perspective of the 
community as a whole. 
•  The best outcomes for the community are achieved where all costs and benefits are 
taken into account, whether financial, social or environmental in nature, and where 
net benefits to the community are maximised. 
•  Landfills that are poorly located and managed can impose significant external costs 
through emissions of leachate and greenhouse gases, and loss of amenity to 
nearby residents. 
•  Governments have introduced policies that address many of the externalities 
associated with waste management. In many cases where these policies have been 
implemented, they have reduced the external impacts to low levels. 
•  The external costs of properly-located, engineered and managed landfills that 
incorporate gas management systems are low. These costs are unlikely to exceed 
$5 per tonne of waste. 
•  It is likely that most municipal waste services that incorporate kerbside recycling 
have higher financial costs than would be incurred if all waste were sent to landfill. 
The size of the difference depends on the costs of landfill, the materials collected for 
recycling, the distance to the market for recovered materials and other factors. 
•  The case for kerbside recycling partly rests on its ability to deliver upstream external 
benefits, which are highly variable, and on the community’s willingness to pay for 
recycling services  
•  The financial costs of alternative waste technologies (AWTs) and most dedicated 
energy-from-waste facilities are much higher than the financial costs of landfills. The 
environmental and other external benefits of using an AWT or energy-from-waste 
facility, rather than sending waste directly to a properly-located, engineered and 
managed landfill, appear to be small. Therefore, on balance modern landfills appear 
to have lower overall costs for the community than AWT or energy-from-waste 
facilities, and are likely to be preferred from a net community benefits perspective. 
     




This chapter examines the financial, environmental, human health and other costs 
and benefits of waste collection, disposal, energy recovery and recycling. These 
practices are discussed with reference to the three waste streams being addressed by 
this inquiry: municipal solid waste; commercial and industrial waste; and 
construction and demolition waste. For each process, the drivers of the costs and 
benefits are set out, and where possible, estimates of the typical Australian costs and 
benefits are reported. The estimates of the external costs and benefits are described 
in more detail in appendix B. 
4.1  Taking a net community benefits approach 
For any particular person or organisation, waste materials are anything that is no 
longer privately valued by them for use or sale and is, or will be, discarded. Every 
day, individuals, households and firms make decisions that determine how much 
waste they generate and how they deal with it. These decisions are made in the face 
of a range of competing priorities. Owners of waste will generally be prepared to 
pay for its removal where it takes up space, causes health risks, emits odours or is 
inconvenient to deal with. Because waste disposal can be costly, households and 
firms have some incentives to reduce the amount of waste they generate. This may 
be accomplished by choosing goods and production processes that generate low 
levels of waste, or investing in maintenance to lengthen the life of goods. 
Provided it does not conflict with their other priorities, people can be expected to 
deal with waste in the way that imposes the lowest net costs on them, whether this 
be through recycling, disposal or energy recovery. They might be expected to 
consider: 
•  the financial costs of waste disposal and recycling; 
•  the value of time and effort taken to manage waste; and 
•  any preferences they may have for recycling or reuse that arise from 
environmental concerns. 
In this report, these are referred to as ‘private’ costs and benefits (box 1.2), as they 
accrue directly to the owner of the waste. There may be other costs and benefits 
associated with waste management that are experienced by other members of the 
community. These are often environmental and other types of ‘externalities’ — 
unintended costs and benefits of an activity that are experienced by people other 
than those involved in the activity. 
Externalities associated with waste management can arise as a direct result of waste 
management practices, or at a point in a product’s life cycle before it becomes     





waste. In this report, these are referred to as ‘downstream’ and ‘upstream’ 
externalities (figure 1.1). An example of a negative downstream externality is the 
impact of greenhouse gases emitted from landfills. An example of a negative 
upstream externality is the damage done to mining land in the process of extracting 
minerals that are made into products that eventually become waste. 
The best outcomes for the community are achieved where both the private 
(including financial and non-financial) costs and benefits and the external costs and 
benefits of managing waste are taken into account, and the net benefits to the 
community are maximised (or net costs minimised). This should include the costs 
and benefits that may arise in the future. Because households and firms generally do 
not take external costs and benefits into account, their decisions will not always 
align with what is best for the community. This idea is developed further in the next 
chapter, which examines where governments may be able to intervene to internalise 
the externalities and thereby improve outcomes for the community. 
Taking a net community benefits approach relies on the use of a common unit for 
quantifying costs and benefits, the usual one being dollars. Valuing all of the costs 
and benefits of policy options in dollar terms allows decision makers to readily 
compare the net benefits of each option, and choose the policy that maximises the 
net benefits to the community. 
While valuation in dollar terms is the preferred approach to assessing the costs and 
benefits of policy options, this can be difficult for environmental and social impacts. 
Sometimes the best that can be done is to analyse environmental and social impacts 
in quantified physical terms (for example, number of tonnes of emissions of a 
pollutant avoided) and/or qualitative terms (for example, a description of the 
potential human health and environmental benefits of avoiding emissions of a 
pollutant). 
Potential and expected costs 
The magnitude of some externalities vary according to the circumstances in which 
they occur. For example, a given quantity of a pollutant will often have greater costs 
where people and ecosystems are directly exposed to it in a concentrated form. It is 
important that estimates of the costs and benefits of externalities take this variability 
into account. 
Where externalities are variable, it is important to draw a distinction between 
‘potential’ and ‘expected’ costs. The potential cost refers to a ‘worst-case scenario’ 
that could arise under certain circumstances. The expected cost takes into account 
the potential cost and the probability that it will arise. For the purposes of cost–    




benefit analysis, it is generally the expected cost of an externality, rather than the 
potential cost, that should be included in the analysis. 
Estimating the expected cost of an externality may require a formal assessment of 
the risk that the potential impact will arise (box 4.1). The Commission considers 
that many of the existing estimates of the costs and benefits of externalities 
associated with waste management are overstated because of inadequate accounting 
for risk. Often potential rather than expected costs are reported. There has also been 
inadequate consideration of the least-cost means of dealing with risks. The 
Commission has attempted to undertake some analysis of the risks associated with 
waste management options, and where possible, has based estimates on these 
assessments (appendix B). 
 
Box 4.1  Steps in a risk assessment 
The Productivity Commission (PC  2000) identified four steps that are included in a 
formal scientific assessment of the risk to people’s health posed by pollution. A similar 
procedure could be applied to other risks, such as the risk of damage to ecosystems, 
or the risk of photochemical smog. 
1. Hazard identification — a hazard is a source of potential harm, such as a chemical 
that may be emitted as pollution. This step involves identifying hazards and where 
they might arise.  
2. Exposure assessment — this step involves estimating the probability that people will 
be exposed to a hazard, and the number of people who will be exposed. 
3.  Dose–response assessment — this step involves determining the effects of 
exposure to a hazard. For example, the assessment may aim to determine whether 
the probability that people will develop cancer will increase as a result of exposure 
to a substance. Typically this is done using data from animal toxicity experiments 
and human epidemiological studies. 
4. Risk characterisation — risk is the likelihood that harm will occur as a result of 
exposure to a hazard. The final step in a risk assessment is to draw together the 
information from steps two and three to gain an overall characterisation of the risk 
faced by a human population. 
Source: Adapted from PC (2000). 
 
Life cycle assessment 
Life cycle assessment (LCA) is a material accounting technique that has been used 
by researchers to quantify some of the physical impacts of waste management 
practices, including landfill, recycling, energy-from-waste and composting. Life 
cycle assessment involves quantifying the material and energy inputs into a process,     





and the emissions associated with the process, including emissions of pollutants to 
air, land and water. Depending on the boundaries of the study, LCA can account for 
both upstream and downstream emissions, including ‘cradle-to-grave’ effects. 
LCA is a limited analytical tool, because it accounts only for the flows of some 
natural resources that are associated with production processes. Other valuable 
resources and inputs, such as labour and capital, are omitted from the analysis. This 
suggests that a policy that appears attractive when compared to others using LCA 
may not be the best option for the community as a whole, when all of the relevant 
costs and benefits are taken into account. As well as this limitation, LCA is time 
consuming and expensive. The more complex the product or system being studied, 
the more expensive the analysis, and the less reliable its conclusions are likely to be. 
The Commission’s assessment of LCA is set out in more detail in appendix B and 
chapter 6. 
4.2 Waste  collection 
Waste collection imposes financial and other private costs on waste generators, and 
external costs on the community. 
Private costs and benefits 
Collecting and transporting waste to facilities where it is sorted, reused, recycled or 
disposed of, is costly. The costs depend on the type of waste, its mass, the distance 
it must be transported and the costs of sorting the waste into recyclable and 
nonrecyclable materials. 
Municipal waste collection 
Householders place their waste in one or more bins. This waste is collected in trucks 
and taken to various facilities to be reused, recycled or disposed of. The practice of 
separating waste into a number of bins (typically recyclables and general waste) 
requires time and effort on the part of the householder, and as such it imposes 
nonmonetary costs on them. Community participation in waste sorting and 
recycling suggests that for some members of the community, the personal benefit 
that they derive from taking part in recycling exceeds the cost to them of the 
additional effort required. However, recycling systems that allow householders to 
place a variety of recyclable materials into one bin, rather than having to separate 
the recyclables into paper, plastic, glass and metals, tend to have much higher total 
yields of recyclables (Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics 2001). This suggests that     




some householders who are prepared to place all their recyclables in one bin would 
not be prepared to separate them any further, and hence that the degree of 
community support for recycling may have limits. 
As well as the nonmonetary costs of sorting, waste collection imposes financial 
costs. The main drivers of these costs are the number of bins that are set out, and the 
distance that the waste must be transported. Increasing the number of bins to be 
picked up increases the costs of waste collection, because more trucks and more bin 
lifts are required. Also, the greater the distance the waste is transported, the higher 
the cost incurred. This means that towns and cities with more distant recycling 
facilities and landfills tend to have higher waste collection costs. 
Consultancy firm Nolan-ITU has collected data on the costs of collecting and 
transporting waste in large Australian cities. These data are generally consistent 
with data from other sources. Nolan-ITU (2004b) concluded that, in 2004, for a 
waste management system incorporating two bins per household — one 240 litre 
garbage bin collected weekly and one 240 litre recycling bin collected fortnightly 
— the average costs of collection were $51 per household per year for 
nonrecyclable garbage collection and transport, and an additional $31 per household 
per year for recyclables. Adding another bin for green waste would further increase 
the costs of waste collection. The cost depends on how much waste is disposed of 
and how frequently it is collected. If green waste were collected fortnightly in a 
240 litre bin, the Commission considers that the cost of collection would probably 
be around $30 per household per year (similar to the cost of a fortnightly collection 
of recyclables). 
The costs of collection and transport would be lower if no recycling were 
undertaken, and a single 240 litre bin collected weekly was sufficient for all 
household waste — recyclables and residual garbage. A single bin system would 
cost less than $82 per household per year (the cost of a two bin system), but more 
than $51 per household per year (the cost of collecting the residual garbage in a two 
bin system). This is because only one truck and one bin lift would be needed to 
collect all the waste from each household, but each truck would fill more quickly so 
would need to make more frequent trips to unload. Porter (2002) reported that the 
savings for trucks and bin lifts are greater than the costs of additional trips. This 
suggests that the collection cost for a single bin system would be closer to $51 than 
$82 per household per year — that is, the cost would fall less than half way between 
$51 and $82. For the purposes of this report, the Commission has estimated that the 
costs of collection and transport for a single bin system would be $59 per household 
per year.     





Business waste collection 
Firms whose waste is not collected as part of the municipal waste system have to 
make their own arrangements for waste collection. Depending on the collection 
services available, firms may have opportunities to send some or all of their waste 
for recycling. How much recycling is done depends on the costs to the firm of 
separating the recyclables from the waste and having them collected separately. In 
some industries, these costs prevent widespread recycling. For example, the 
Housing Industry Association (sub.  87) noted that, for small and medium-sized 
firms in the building industry, the limited availability of space in which to sort their 
waste is a considerable barrier to source separation. Larger construction and 
demolition companies may benefit from economies of scale that make sorting their 
waste for recycling more cost effective. 
As well as the costs of on-site waste sorting and storage, the other significant driver 
of the private costs of business waste collection is the cost of transport. The cost of 
waste transport depends on the distance to a landfill or recycling facility. 
Environmental and other external costs and benefits 
The largest external cost associated with waste collection arises from the impact of 
traffic. Waste collection requires large trucks, which are noisy, stop frequently, 
increase congestion and the risks of accidents. They also generate pollution and 
greenhouse gases. The external costs imposed by traffic are higher if the waste has 
been separated into a number of bins prior to collection, as this requires more trucks 
to be on the road. The costs imposed by these externalities are estimated to be $1 to 
$3 per tonne of waste, depending on where it is collected (BDA Group and 
EconSearch 2004; EPA NSW 1996c; appendix B). In urban areas, the external costs 
are closer to $3, while in rural areas, lower population densities mean that the 
external costs are closer to $1. 
The Commission considers that these estimates, while not large, may overstate the 
external costs of waste collection. This is because the estimates do not account for 
all of the measures taken to internalise the externalities associated with road 
transport, such as legal liability, insurance and vehicle emissions standards 
(PC 2006a).     




4.3 Waste  disposal 
Waste disposal options include landfill, incineration and other energy-from-waste 
technologies. This section sets out the drivers of the private and external costs and 
benefits of waste disposal, and provides estimates of those costs and benefits. 
Landfill 
Most waste that is disposed off-site in Australia is sent to landfills. Landfill 
management practices have changed over time, and the characteristics of landfills 
vary according to their location, age and size. Poorly-managed landfills have the 
potential to cause significant damage to human health and the environment. 
Properly-located, engineered and managed landfills reduce the risks of these 
impacts arising. Such landfills typically: 
•  are located in areas where the risk that they will cause damage to human health 
and the environment is reduced to acceptable levels; 
•  incorporate features, such as liners and leachate collection, to reduce the risk of 
leachate emissions; 
•  are operated to reduce the risk of damage to human health and the environment 
while they are being filled; and 
•  are managed after their closure to reduce the risk that they will damage human 
health and the environment. 
In addition to these features, many larger landfills now incorporate systems to 
capture landfill gases, which are flared or used to generate electricity. Gas 
management systems reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from landfills, and can 
also help to control odours and reduce the risk of gas explosions. 
Some inquiry participants claimed that the majority of landfills do not incorporate 
all of these design and management features. For example, SITA Environmental 
Solutions stated: 
… most (>80 per cent) of landfills do not meet this specification and are unlikely to do 
so. (sub. DR143, p. 6) 
However, although many landfills may not incorporate all of the design features set 
out above, other inquiry participants stated t h a t  t h e y  a r e  f o u n d  a t  m o s t  o f  t h e  
landfills that handle large amounts of waste. The Waste Management Association of 
Australia (WMAA) National Landfill Division stated: 
… our national landfill survey shows that 70 per cent of the landfill waste in 
Australia is disposed of in large urban and large regional landfills which, if not at     





best practice, are certainly approaching that. So although there is a large number 
who do not, they don’t handle a lot of the waste. (trans., p. 1130-31) 
Furthermore, progressive tightening of landfill regulations means that new landfill 
proposals must be properly-located and incorporate modern design and management 
features (chapter 8). 
Private costs and benefits 
A fee is typically charged to dispose of waste to landfill. The fee is normally based 
on the mass of the waste, and may be differentiated according to its composition. 
The fee comprises a ‘gate fee’ charged by the landfill operator (table 4.1), the goods 
and services tax (GST) and any applicable state government levy on landfill 
disposal. 
Table 4.1  Average landfill gate fees in Australian cities, 2003-04a 
City  Average gate fee (per tonne of waste)b
Adelaide  $41 
Brisbane  $56 
Canberra   $50 
Gold Coast  $55 
Melbourne  $29 
Newcastle  $39 
Perth  $27 
Sydney  $57 
a The most recent data available for Tasmania indicated that in 2001, the average gate fee for landfills in 
Hobart was $16 per tonne of waste. b  Gate fee excludes landfill levies and the GST. 
Sources: Nolan-ITU (2004b); Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001). 
The WMAA National Landfill Division (sub. 28) estimated that the costs of a large 
‘best-practice’ landfill1 in a capital city would be about $25 per tonne of waste 
(table 4.2). It also indicated that, in addition to these costs, landfill operators will 
include management costs and profit margins in gate fees. Differences in 
management costs, labour costs, profit margins, the price of land and the costs of 
going through local planning processes would explain some of the difference 
between the $25 per tonne of waste figure estimated by the WMAA National 
Landfill Division and the gate fees cited in table 4.1. 
                                              
1  The WMAA National Landfill Division defined ‘best-practice’ landfill as one that: is located to 
reduce the risk of harm to the environment and to reduce the impact on local amenity; is lined 
and has a leachate management system; incorporates gas collection with energy recovery; is 
capped after closure; and has provisions for aftercare for up to 30 years.     




Table 4.2  Estimated costs of ‘best-practice’ landfill 
Cost driver  Cost per tonne of waste
Land purchase including airspace  $2.00
Approvals and site development  $2.00
Cell development  $6.50
Operation including monitoring and fees  $10.00
Capping and rehabilitation  $2.50
Aftercare  $2.00
Total cost  $25.00
Source: WMAA National Landfill Division (sub. 28). 
Environmental and other external costs 
The main environmental impacts associated with landfills arise from landfill gas 
and leachate. Landfills can also lead to loss of amenity caused by litter, dust, odour, 
vermin and visual impacts. 
There have been a number of estimates of the total external costs of landfills in 
Australia and overseas, with some estimates varying widely from others. The New 
South Wales EPA (1996c) estimated that in 1996, depending on location, the 
external costs of landfills in New South Wales were between $10.50 and $33.20 per 
tonne of waste disposed to landfill. The BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) 
estimated that in 2004 the external costs of Australian metropolitan landfills were 
between zero and $14.30. They estimated that, because most rural landfills do not 
incorporate the gas management systems found at large metropolitan landfills, they 
can impose higher external costs — between zero and $16.10 per tonne of waste. 
The ACT Government (2002) estimated that in 2000 the ‘environmental costs’ of 
landfill were $34 per tonne of waste. The OECD estimated that in 1999 the external 
costs of landfills in the United Kingdom were up to £6 per tonne of waste, 
depending on the location of the landfill and whether it has systems to recover 
energy from the waste (Davies and Doble 2004). 
These estimates vary markedly from those of consultancy firm Nolan-ITU (now 
incorporated into Hyder Consulting), that has published a number of estimates of 
the external costs and benefits of waste management systems that include landfill. 
Their estimates are much larger than any other published estimates. Hyder 
Consulting stated that their: 
… best estimate of the environmental externalities of a landfill in Australia compliant 
with legislation (and including gas extraction systems with conversion to electricity), in 
the face of all the existing data gaps and inadequacies, without further research to 
substantiate it is between $100 and $280 per tonne, with the most significant impacts 
arising from air and water pollution. (sub. DR264, pp. 2–3)     





Hyder Consulting’s estimate of the external costs of landfill is based on a landfill 
that is fully compliant with legislation. Such landfills are located to minimise the 
risk of harm to the environment and incorporate engineering features such as liners 
and landfill gas management systems to reduce the risk of damage to human health 
and the environment. This suggests that Hyder Consulting must consider the 
externalities associated with non-compliant landfills to be still larger than the 
estimate of $100 to $280 per tonne of waste it cited for compliant landfills. The 
Commission considers Hyder Consulting’s estimate to be unrealistically large and 
based on incorrect assumptions. The following sections set out the Commission’s 
assessment of the most significant externalities associated with landfill — gas, 
leachate and amenity loss. 
Greenhouse gases 
In most estimates, the largest single contribution to the external costs of landfill 
arises from emissions of methane and carbon dioxide that are produced when 
organic waste decomposes. Both gases contribute to the greenhouse effect, with 
methane being 21 times more potent than carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) reported that disposal of 
solid waste to landfill in Australia was the source of 15 million tonnes of emissions 
of carbon-dioxide equivalent gas in 2004 (DEH 2006). This equates to 2.7 per cent 
of the total greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors in Australia. By way of 
comparison, stationary energy generation was responsible for 49.6  per  cent of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2004, agriculture for 16.5  per  cent and 
transport for 13.5 per cent. 
The composition of the waste in a landfill, and how it decomposes, determines the 
volume of greenhouse gases that are generated. Methane and carbon dioxide are 
generated by the decomposition of organic material, including food waste, garden 
organics, paper, cardboard and wood. Aerobic decomposition of these materials 
releases carbon dioxide, and anaerobic decomposition releases both carbon dioxide 
and methane. Plastics, glass, metals and concrete in landfills do not lead to 
greenhouse gas emissions (Grant et al. 2001). 
Some modern landfills are designed and managed to reduce the quantity of 
greenhouse gases released. This is done by installing a network of pipes that runs 
through the waste to capture the landfill gas. The efficiency of landfill gas capture 
systems varies. For example, the Western Australia Waste Management Board 
stated that ‘the landfill gas capture rate over the life of a landfill has been estimated 
at around 19 per cent’ (sub. DR208, p. 1).     




By contrast, Landfill Management Services Pty Ltd stated that it has: 
… developed its own technology to capture landfill gas and has demonstrated to have 
significantly higher [than 75  per  cent] extraction efficiencies that are supported by 
sub-surface and perimeter monitoring showing zero or minimal release of gases. 
(sub. DR188, p. 2) 
Based on the available evidence, the Commission considers that for the purposes of 
estimating the external costs of landfill greenhouse gas emissions, it is reasonable to 
assume collection efficiencies of up to 75 per cent of landfill gases. 
The captured methane can be burned, which yields heat, carbon dioxide and water. 
Because carbon dioxide has a much lower global warming potential than methane, 
even simply flaring the landfill gas significantly reduces its potential environmental 
impact. In addition, the heat from burning the gas can be used to generate 
electricity, which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by replacing fossil fuels as 
an energy source. The US EPA (1998) calculated that with 75 per cent collection 
efficiency and where electricity generation from landfill gas replaces fossil fuels, it 
is possible to reduce the net greenhouse gas emissions of landfilled municipal waste 
by as much as 92 per cent. 
While the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions are uncertain, some 
researchers have attempted to estimate the costs imposed by emissions. For 
illustrative purposes for this report, the Commission has assumed that the external 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions are between $5 and $20 per tonne of 
carbon-dioxide equivalent emissions (appendix B). This range was chosen to reflect 
the uncertainty that exists regarding the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on 
climate and the environment. Although these estimates should be interpreted with 
care, it is evident that systems that capture landfill gas and use it as a fuel for 
electricity generation can substantially reduce the external costs of landfills 
(table 4.3). 
Non-greenhouse gases 
Landfill gases are comprised mainly of methane and carbon dioxide. Traces of other 
gases emitted from landfills can cause damage to human health and to sensitive 
ecosystems. While the health and environmental impacts of some of these gases are 
well documented, there is limited research on the pathways through which landfill 
gases come into contact with people and sensitive ecosystems. 
Any potential for non-greenhouse landfill gases to cause significant damage would 
be greatly reduced at landfills that are separated from homes, business premises and 
sensitive ecosystems by buffer zones. Where buffer zones exist, the small quantities     





of gases that are emitted are likely to be dispersed, and diluted to levels that make it 
unlikely they will cause damage to human health and the environment. 
Table 4.3  Estimated net external costs of greenhouse gas emissions from 
waste sent to landfilla 




  $/tonne of waste  $/tonne of waste  $/tonne of waste 
 Lowb Highb Lowb Highb Lowb Highb
Landfill with no gas 
management 
4 15 5  21 1  4 
Landfill with gas capture 
and electricity generationc 
0 1  0  2  0  1 
a Based on estimates from AGO (2005) that one tonne of municipal waste generates 0.74 tonnes of carbon-
dioxide equivalent; one tonne of commercial and industrial waste generates 1.04 tonnes of carbon-dioxide 
equivalent; and one tonne of construction and demolition waste generates 0.20 tonnes of carbon-dioxide 
equivalent. b The low estimate assumes that the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions is $5 per tonne of 
carbon-dioxide equivalent. The high estimate assumes it is $20 per tonne. Details are provided in appendix B. 
c Landfill gas management is assumed to reduce the net greenhouse gas emissions of landfills by 92 per cent 
(US EPA 1998). 
Sources: AGO (2005); BDA Group and EconSearch (2004); Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001); 
Tol (2005); Productivity Commission estimates. 
Published estimates of the external costs of non-greenhouse gas emissions from 
landfills range from less than $0.01 per tonne (BDA Group and EconSearch 2004), 
to between $46 and $93 per tonne of mixed municipal waste (Nolan-ITU 2004b, as 
interpreted by the Commission). These and other estimates are analysed in detail in 
appendix B. 
Approximately 85 per  cent of the external costs of landfill gases estimated by 
Nolan-ITU (2004b) are believed to relate to emissions of benzene and methyl 
chloroform. The Commission has undertaken some assessment of the risks posed by 
these gases, and considers it highly unlikely that people or the environment would 
be exposed to emissions of these gases from landfills in concentrations that would 
cause any significant damage (appendix B). This leads the Commission to conclude 
that the external cost of emissions of these gases from properly-located, engineered 
and managed landfills is likely to be close to zero. 
This conclusion for benzene and methyl chloroform causes the Commission to have 
doubts about the estimates Nolan-ITU (2004b) made for the external costs of other 
gases emitted from landfills. Estimates of these costs also appear to be based on 
potential rather than expected costs. Based on other estimates and regulatory 
standards (appendix  B), the Commission concludes that, although uncertain, the 
external cost of non-greenhouse landfill gases is likely to be less than $1 per tonne 
of waste over the full life of a properly-located, engineered and managed landfill.     





Leachate is liquid that has passed through a landfill, and may have become 
contaminated with metallic, organic, and inorganic compounds including toxins. 
Leachate can damage human health and the environment if it comes into contact 
with surface or groundwater and subsequently enters the food chain or comes into 
contact with sensitive ecosystems. The contaminants in leachate that are thought to 
pose the greatest risks are heavy metals, such as lead, mercury, cadmium and 
copper; and metal oxoanions, such as chromate, arsenate and selenate (Scott et al. 
2005). Leachate can contain high levels of ammonia and can have high biological 
oxygen demand, both of which can be harmful to aquatic life. 
There is a shortage of scientific evidence regarding the effects of leachate in the 
short and long term (European Commission 2000a). In particular, there is little 
research on how leachate is transmitted once it leaves a landfill. Depending on local 
circumstances, leachate could quickly find its way into the water table and from 
there into the food chain or sensitive ecosystems where it could do considerable 
damage. Alternatively, the leachate could remain confined in the landfill 
indefinitely, or until it was appropriately treated and discharged to sewers, or it 
could leak through the landfill liner but be confined by impermeable bedrock. 
Estimates of the external costs of leachate damage should take into account the risk 
that leachate will damage human health and the environment. The risks of damage 
from leachate depend on the location of the landfill, its construction (including the 
composition of the landfill liner), and how leachate is managed. 
The risks associated with leachate from properly-located, engineered and managed 
landfills appear to be small. The NSW EPA considered that if landfills were 
operated in compliance with the environmental management guidelines that were in 
place in 1996, all potential damage caused by leachate would theoretically be 
prevented, and therefore leachate would impose no external costs on the community 
(EPA NSW 1996c). The DEH agreed that the potential for leachate and other 
pollutants from modern landfills to damage human health and the environment is 
low: 
… the majority of landfills currently servicing major population centres now meet 
stringent planning and regulatory requirements in relation to location, design, 
construction and operation. Consequently, such landfills generally do not present 
significant risks in terms of generating external environmental costs through air and 
water pollution, noise, dust and the generation and spread of disease. (sub. 103, p. 16) 
The Commission has examined a number of published estimates of the external 
costs of leachate, and of the costs of measures to prevent leachate from escaping 
from landfills (appendix B). These estimates range from less than $0.01 per tonne of     





waste (BDA Group and EconSearch 2004), to between $43 and $89 per tonne of 
mixed municipal waste (Nolan-ITU 2004b, as interpreted by the Commission). 
Nolan-ITU’s estimates appear to be based on the assumption that people and 
sensitive ecosystems are directly exposed to undiluted leachate, irrespective of 
whether or not it escapes from the landfill site — that is, they are potential costs. 
Without addressing the risks of leachate escape, the Nolan-ITU estimates cannot be 
regarded as a reliable estimate of the expected costs of leachate damage. It is the 
Commission’s assessment that they are not appropriately adjusted for risk and are, 
therefore, misleading. Based on other estimates and evidence (appendix B), the 
Commission considers that if landfills incorporate liners and leachate management 
systems, the risk that leachate will damage human health or the environment is 
small, and the external cost of leachate is likely to be less than $1 per tonne of 
waste. 
Amenity effects of landfill 
Landfills can cause loss of amenity for people who live or work near them. The 
impact of the amenity loss depends on where the landfill is located. Empirical 
studies suggest that, if a landfill is located more than five kilometres from 
residential areas, the costs of lost amenity are likely to be less than $0.01 per tonne 
of waste (European Commission 2000a; Porter 2002). When a landfill is located in 
a built-up area and poorly managed, the loss of amenity can impose external costs 
that have been estimated in the Australian context to be up to $3.70 per tonne of 
waste (EPA NSW 1996c). It has been assumed that the typical amenity cost of a 
properly-located, engineered and managed landfill is less than $1.00 per tonne of 
waste. 
The total costs of landfill 
The total costs to the community of sending waste to landfill are comprised of the 
private costs and the external costs. The private costs should be reflected in the gate 
fees charged by landfill operators. As noted, the average gate fees for landfills in the 
Australian states and territories range from $27 to $57 per tonne of waste. 
Having analysed the available evidence, it is the Commission’s view that the risks 
of damage from leachate, non-greenhouse gases and amenity impacts are small if 
waste is disposed to a properly-located, engineered and managed landfill. If a 
landfill incorporates a gas capture system and uses the gas for electricity generation, 
the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to exceed $2 per tonne 
of waste (table 4.4). If a landfill is poorly located and does not incorporate modern     




engineering features and management standards, the external costs could be much 
higher. 
The total external costs of properly-located, engineered and managed landfills that 
incorporate efficient gas capture (with electricity generation) are likely to be less 
than $5 per tonne of waste. 
Table 4.4  Estimates of the external costs of properly-located, engineered 
and managed landfills, per tonne of waste 




Properly-located, engineered and managed landfill  
  Leachate  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Greenhouse gas emissions  $4 to $15  $5 to $21  $1 to $4 
  Other gas emissions  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Amenity  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Total  $4 to $18  $5 to $24  $1 to $7 
Properly-located, engineered and managed landfill with efficient methane capture and 
electricity generation 
  Leachate  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1
  Greenhouse gas emissions  $0 to $1  $0 to $2  $0 to $1
  Other gas emissions  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1
  Amenity  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1
  Total  $0 to $4  $0 to $5  $0 to $4
Source: Productivity Commission estimates (appendix B). 
Energy-from-waste 
‘Energy-from-waste’ describes facilities in which waste is burned and used as an 
energy source. The most common energy-from-waste practice is incineration which, 
while not widely used to manage municipal waste in Australia, is common in many 
developed countries where landfill space is limited. Other waste disposal 
technologies have been proposed, including gasification and pyrolysis, however 
they are not widely used internationally for waste management, and, therefore, this 
chapter does not examine the costs and benefits of those technologies. For the 
purposes of this chapter, ‘energy-from-waste’ refers mainly to properly designed 
and regulated municipal waste incineration that incorporates electricity generation. 
FINDING 4.1     





Private costs and benefits 
Energy-from-waste facilities are a financially costly waste disposal option. The 
New South Wales Alternative Waste Management Technologies and Practices 
Inquiry (Wright 2000) estimated that the net financial cost of such facilities in 
Australia in 2000 would be between $180 and $260 per tonne of waste. The high 
cost of these facilities is mainly due to their high capital costs, which are in part due 
to the pollution controls that are typically required in modern energy-from-waste 
facilities. These costly technologies reduce the environmental impacts of 
energy-from-waste, and internalise many of the environmental and human health 
externalities associated with waste combustion. 
Energy-from-waste facilities can recoup some of their costs by selling electricity 
into the grid. Wright (2000) estimated that the revenue from electricity sales from 
energy-from-waste facilities in Australia would be between $15 and $25 per tonne 
of waste. Porter (2002, p. 73) stated that energy-from-waste facilities in the United 
States ‘often recover their entire operating and maintenance costs through the sale 
of the resulting electricity’. Even where electricity sales are sufficient to cover the 
operating costs of energy-from-waste plants, it appears likely that the high capital 
costs mean that in Australia, energy-from-waste will remain a much more costly 
waste disposal option than landfill for the foreseeable future. 
A less expensive energy-from-waste option is to use selected waste materials as an 
energy source in cement kilns. Cement kilns can use tyres, wood waste, chemicals, 
lubricants and other industrial byproducts as a source of energy. The Cement 
Industry Federation stated that in the year 2004-05, 6  per  cent of the industry’s 
thermal energy requirements were derived from ‘alternative fuels’ including waste 
(sub.  71, p.  2). Because the capital costs of cement kilns are recovered through 
cement manufacture, and the waste materials can decrease energy costs, they can be 
a cost effective option for the disposal of some waste materials. Due to the high 
temperatures and long residence times involved, many cement kilns appear to 
comply with stringent environmental controls, including when using waste as a fuel. 
Environmental and other external costs and benefits 
The main external impact of a properly configured energy-from-waste facility is the 
emission of greenhouse gases. Emissions of other gases, amenity loss and the 
effects of ash and other solid waste residues disposed to landfill can all be managed 
in a way that reduces their impacts to low levels (appendix B). 
The combustion of one tonne of municipal waste leads to the emission of 
approximately one tonne of carbon dioxide (appendix B). If the energy from the     




combustion is used to generate electricity, the demand for other energy sources such 
as fossil fuels may be reduced. This can offset the emissions of greenhouse gases 
from waste combustion. 
Where energy-from-waste displaces electricity generated by burning fossil fuels, the 
net external cost of greenhouse gas emissions from waste combustion would be 
between $1 and $14 per tonne of waste.2 In such cases, the external costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions from an energy-from-waste facility would be lower than 
the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions from a landfill with no gas 
management system. If waste combustion displaced hydroelectricity — which 
causes minimal greenhouse gas emissions, the external cost of greenhouse gas 
emissions would be between $5 and $20 per tonne of waste (appendix B). In these 
circumstances, landfill, even without gas capture would lead to lower net 
greenhouse gas emissions than energy-from-waste. 
Modern, well-regulated energy-from-waste facilities, while financially costly, can 
have minimal net negative environmental externalities, particularly where they 
displace fossil fuels used in electricity generation.  
Illegal waste disposal 
Illegal disposal includes littering and illegal dumping of waste. Litter is waste that is 
improperly disposed of in the environment instead of in waste containers. Littering 
may be deliberate, negligent or accidental. Illegal dumping is deliberate improper 
disposal of large volumes of waste. Both litter and illegal dumping impose external 
costs on the community. The Industry Commission (IC 1996) identified four 
negative impacts of illegal waste disposal: 
•  loss of aesthetic value 
•  danger to wildlife 
•  danger to human health 
•  the high costs of collection. 
It is very difficult to estimate the external cost imposed by litter and illegally 
dumped waste (for example, see the discussion on plastic bags in chapter 8). 
However, it is clear that significant volumes of waste are illegally disposed in 
Australia (chapter 2), and the community is prepared to incur considerable costs to 
                                              
2  Assuming that the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions is between $5 and $20 per tonne of 
carbon-dioxide equivalent (appendix B). 
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combat illegal waste disposal. For example, the Institute for Sustainable Futures 
(ISF 2001) estimated that NSW local governments spend $92 million on litter 
collection and management each year. According to the Municipal Association of 
Victoria, ‘Victorian local government annual litter costs, including litter prevention 
are around $100  million’ (sub.  DR179, p.  5). These figures suggest that local 
governments spend between $14 and $20 per person per year on litter control, 
which equates to as much as $400 million per year nationally. 
Non-government organisations and the community also commit significant amounts 
of time and money to combat illegal waste disposal. KESAB Environmental 
Solutions stated: 
State-based Keep Australia Beautiful National Association offices jointly budget an 
estimated $4 million per annum towards litter, waste reduction and environmental 
education programs across Australia. (sub. 20, p. 8) 
Further, KESAB Environmental Solutions (sub. 20) estimated that the community 
provided 2 to 3 million volunteer hours to KESAB litter reduction programs each 
year. The public expenditure on illegally disposed waste, and the willingness of the 
community to donate time and money to reduce its impact, indicate that illegal 
waste disposal imposes significant external costs on the community. 
4.4  Municipal recycling and resource recovery 
A range of municipal recycling activities are undertaken in Australia, including 
kerbside recycling and AWT processing. While municipal recycling is common, 
only 20  per  cent of Australia’s recycled materials are recovered from municipal 
waste (chapter 2). 
Kerbside recycling 
Approximately  90 per cent  of  Australian  households have access to kerbside 
recycling for paper and packaging, and many others can drop off their recyclables at 
depots. Because most recyclables from households are collected through kerbside 
recycling, this section focuses on the private and external costs and benefits of that 
system. 
Private costs and benefits 
After they have been collected, comingled paper, plastics, metals and glass are 
typically delivered to a materials recovery facility (MRF) where they are sorted for     




further processing. Operators of MRFs usually charge a gate fee to accept 
recyclables. The average MRF gate fee in Australian cities is between $30 and 
$45  per tonne of comingled material (Nolan-ITU 2004b). In one reported case, 
however, MRFs pay for the recyclables that are delivered to them. Dick Gross said 
that councils in the western region of Melbourne are being paid ‘$20 per tonne, 
$10 a tonne if we need some cartage’ (trans., p. 101).  
The size of the gate fee charged, or the payment offered, depends on a number of 
factors, including the: 
•  cost of sorting the recyclables 
•  revenue earned by selling the sorted materials 
•  level of competition in the market. 
The cost of sorting depends on the composition of the incoming materials, the level 
of contamination, and the size of the MRF (table 4.5). In general, the more materials 
included in the comingled collection system, the higher the average costs of sorting 
for all materials.  
Table 4.5  Average materials recovery facility (MRF) sorting costs 
Material  Small MRF 
(20 000 tonnes per year) 
Medium MRF 
(100 000 tonnes per year) 
Large MRF 
(180 000 tonnes per year) 
  $/tonne $/tonne $/tonne 
Paper 60  50  40 
Glass 120  105  80 
Other containersa 300  240  200 
Average for 
comingled materials 
143 122  95 
a Such as metal and plastics. 
Source: Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001). 
In the case of recycled glass, the figures reported in table 4.5 do not represent the 
full costs of recovery. If it is to be recycled into new glass packaging, such as 
bottles and jars, the recovered glass must usually be sorted by colour — green, 
brown and clear. Standard MRFs can not do this, except with unbroken bottles or 
large pieces of glass. Most glass that is recycled in a comingled collection system is 
broken during collection, compaction and transport. Mixed broken glass must be 
sent to a ‘beneficiation’ plant if it is to be sorted by colour. There is currently only 
one such plant in Australia, in Laverton on the outskirts of Melbourne. Gerard van 
Rijswijk (sub. DR191) reported that because there is no glass beneficiation plant in 
Sydney or Brisbane, 70 to 80 per cent of the glass collected in those cities cannot be     





sorted for recycling, and hence would not be recycled into glass packaging. Instead, 
it may be used to make insulation or road base or simply disposed to landfill. 
Glass beneficiation is financially costly due to the advanced technologies applied, 
and, therefore, if glass is to be recycled into new bottles and jars, the total financial 
cost of recovery is likely to be more than the $80 to $120 per tonne of glass reported 
in table 4.5.  
Once the recyclables have been separated by material, they can be sold for 
reprocessing. Depending on the material, resale can offset some or all of the costs of 
collection and sorting. The price received depends (among other things) on the price 
of the equivalent virgin materials and the cost of processing recovered materials 
compared with virgin materials. 
If producing a product of a given quality from recovered materials is less costly 
than producing it from virgin materials (taking into account the costs of collection 
and sorting) it would be expected that the financial benefits would be sufficient to 
encourage firms to recycle. This may be the case if extracting, processing and 
manufacturing a product from virgin materials requires large inputs of valued 
resources, such as energy, water, labour and capital, and recycling uses less of these 
inputs. For some materials — such as aluminium and steel — the value of the 
‘embodied’ resources that are saved by recycling is generally sufficient to 
encourage firms to collect and reprocess the materials for profit. Other materials — 
such as glass — have far fewer valued resources ‘embodied’ in them, and are costly 
to sort and reprocess. In these cases recycling imposes financial costs, and can 
generally only occur if it is subsidised by the community. 
The price paid for recyclable materials will also be influenced by volatility in the 
market for recovered materials. All of the materials recovered by kerbside 
collections in Australia are potential substitutes for virgin materials, and the prices 
of virgin materials fluctuate. For example, prices for iron ore and aluminium are 
currently high, and it is anticipated that worldwide demand will rise 
(ABARE 2006). This would be expected to increase the prices paid for recovered 
steel and aluminium. By contrast, Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) reported 
that the price of recovered glass had fallen from $90 per tonne in 1995 to $72 per 
tonne in 2001, and inquiry participants have predicted that the price of glass is 
likely to remain at this level for some time (Australian Council of Recyclers, 
sub. 40, att. prepared by Hyder Consulting). The volatility inherent in commodity 
markets means that while recovering some materials may currently deliver financial 
benefits (or impose financial costs), this may not always be the case in the future 
(box 2.2).     




The third factor that could influence MRF gate fees is the level of competition in the 
market. If MRF operators are not subject to competitive constraints, the gate fee 
they charge may be higher than would be necessary to cover their costs (including a 
commercial rate of return). 
Downstream external costs and benefits 
Some downstream externalities (figure 1.1) can arise directly from the impacts of 
recycling systems. The downstream externalities associated with kerbside recycling 
include the impact of the extra trucks that collect the recyclables, the amenity 
impacts of MRFs, and the benefits of avoided leachate and landfill gas. Because 
most of the recyclable materials collected are inert, the external benefits of not 
sending them to landfill are small. 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) estimated the size of the downstream 
externalities arising from kerbside recycling and concluded that the downstream 
costs and benefits are small and effectively cancel each other out. The Commission 
agrees that the net downstream externalities associated with recycling are not likely 
to be significant. 
Upstream external costs and benefits 
The upstream external benefits of recycling (figure 1.1) are associated with using 
recovered materials instead of virgin materials. The main upstream benefits of 
recycling are: 
•  The extraction of virgin materials can lead to damage to mining land and loss of 
forest values. If the damages are not accounted for in the costs of using virgin 
materials, they are externalities. Where virgin materials are replaced with 
recycled materials, these negative externalities may be avoided. 
•  Processing virgin materials can lead to greenhouse gas emissions, and air and 
water pollution, some of which may represent externalities. The process of 
recycling can also lead to negative environmental externalities. Often where 
recovered materials are used, however, some processing activities are either not 
required or may be simplified, and so some negative environmental externalities 
are avoided. 
Upstream impacts are highly variable and depend on how and where virgin 
materials are extracted, transported and processed (chapter 5). However, not all of 
the damages arising from the use of virgin materials can be considered to be 
externalities. Direct policy interventions, such as obligations on firms to minimise 
or repair damage they cause, undertake offsetting environmental improvements, or     





pay pollution taxes or penalties serve to internalise some externalities. The costs of 
these measures will be reflected in the costs of using virgin materials. Nonetheless, 
the Commission accepts that in some circumstances, kerbside recycling can reduce 
the damage to human health and the environment that is associated with the 
extraction, transport and processing of virgin materials. 
The Commission is aware of only one attempt to estimate the external costs and 
benefits of kerbside recycling in Australia. Consultants Nolan-ITU and SKM 
Economics (2001) estimated that kerbside recycling delivers external benefits of 
approximately $420 per tonne of mixed recyclables collected, almost all of which 
arises upstream. 
The Commission’s assessment of this estimate is that it was made without adequate 
accounting for risk, uncertainty and the effects of upstream policies. It also counts 
the depletion of natural resources as an ‘externality’. Because industries that extract 
natural resources generally respond to anticipated future scarcity in their current 
production decisions, there appears to be no general market failure associated with 
the extraction of non-renewable resources. Therefore, it is not correct to count 
resource depletion as an externality (appendix  B). The Commission considers it 
likely that, after appropriate risk adjustment and the exclusion of upstream resource 
depletion as an externality, the upstream benefits of kerbside recycling would be 
much less than $420 per tonne of mixed recyclable materials recovered 
(appendix B). 
The Commission has not completed its own overall estimate of the upstream 
benefits of recycling. This would be a complex task due to the variability of 
upstream impacts, and the need to comprehensively assess the effects of all the 
relevant upstream policies. Because upstream policies would be expected to change 
over time, estimates of upstream benefits would change, and recycling that was 
once justified on the grounds of upstream benefits may no longer be appropriate. 
Furthermore, while such estimates may provide some indication of the need for 
policy intervention, they should not lead to the conclusion that intervention should 
occur through waste management policy, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
Improving kerbside recycling systems 
It is likely that the costs of kerbside recycling systems could be reduced and the 
benefits increased. One important area for improvement is selecting the materials to 
be collected. This selection should be guided by the ease of sorting and the prices 
for the recovered materials. In general, aluminium, steel, some paper and cardboard, 
and some plastics are likely to be the most desirable materials to collect. In many 
cases, collecting glass and less readily recyclable plastics is not worthwhile.     




Reducing the number of materials collected has the added benefit of reducing 
sorting costs, and contamination, for those materials that are collected. In areas that 
are distant from markets for recovered materials, the best outcome for the 
community may be not to have kerbside recycling. 
Also, it seems likely that technological developments will reduce the costs of 
sorting and materials recovery over time. Increases in the demand for recycled 
materials could further reduce the costs of recycling. This could come about through 
increased demand by consumers for goods containing recycled materials, or through 
increased demand for all raw materials, virgin or recycled. However, markets for 
raw materials are likely to experience ongoing volatility, and when demand and 
prices for virgin raw materials fall, so will the financial benefits of recycling 
(box 2.2). 
Alternative waste technologies 
Alternative waste technologies (AWTs) are technologies that are applied to mixed 
waste, other than traditional methods such as disposal to landfill. There are 
currently six AWT facilities operating in Australia, and contracts have been signed 
for at least three more (WMAA, New South Wales, Alternative Waste Treatment 
Working Group, sub.  30). Councils in the Western Region of Melbourne have 
announced their support for an AWT facility that will cost $700 million over its 
expected 20 year life (Minchin 2006). 
All of the existing AWT facilities in Australia use a combination of mechanical and 
biological treatments, involving manual and mechanical sorting of mixed waste to 
recover recyclables and non-organic fractions from the waste. The organic fractions 
are then decomposed to produce biogas for electricity generation. Some of the 
residue of the organic treatment may be suitable for application as a soil 
conditioner, and the rest is sent to landfill along with non-organic waste that was not 
recovered for recycling. Some may also be suitable for application as daily cover —
material that is spread over the landfill each day to reduce the impacts of odour, 
windblown litter and vermin. For example, in the case of the UR-3R (Urban 
Resource – Reduction, Recovery and Recycling) facility operating at Eastern Creek 
in the western suburbs of Sydney, around 25 per cent of the waste received is sent to 
landfill after treatment (WSN Environmental Solutions 2005). 
Private costs and benefits 
AWT facilities are capital and labour intensive, which makes them costly to build 
and operate. Some of the costs can be offset by the sale of recyclable materials, soil     





conditioner and electricity. Inquiry participants have identified a significant 
oversupply of compost and soil conditioner in Australia, which suggests that the 
revenue from sales of soil conditioner is likely to be small (WMAA NSW Branch 
(Commpost NSW) trans., p. 488). 
A further revenue source may come from earning Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target (MRET) certificates. Firms that generate electricity from renewable 
sources — including AWT facilities — are allocated certificates that they can sell to 
firms who have obligations under the MRET to meet a certain proportion of their 
energy requirements from renewable sources. 
The revenue earned from all these sources is much less than the costs of operating 
an AWT facility, and to cover the difference, AWT facility operators charge a 
substantial gate fee. The WMAA Alternative Waste Treatment Working Group 
estimated that AWT facilities in Australia would require gate fees of between 
$90 and $140 per tonne of waste to be commercially viable (trans., p. 391). 
Environmental and other external costs and benefits 
Alternative waste technology facilities can have negative impacts on the amenity of 
nearby residents and firms. They can also have external benefits, such as: 
•  the waste sent to landfill is more chemically stable, which reduces the volume of 
landfill gases and leachate that are generated; 
•  some AWT facilities incorporate renewable energy generation, which reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions; and 
•  some additional recyclables are recovered from the municipal waste stream, and 
as discussed earlier, this can give rise to upstream environmental benefits. 
The external benefits of sending waste to an AWT facility depend on the system it 
is replacing. If the waste would otherwise be sent to a properly-located, engineered 
and managed landfill that incorporated a gas management system with electricity 
generation, the expected benefits of avoided landfill gas and leachate would, in the 
Commission’s estimation, be less than $2 per tonne of waste. 
There are some upstream benefits that arise from the recovery of dry recyclables 
from mixed waste, but typically only about 10 per cent of the incoming waste is 
recovered for recycling (WSN Environmental Solutions 2005). As noted, the 
upstream benefits of recycling are highly variable and depend on the factors 
identified previously.      




There may be other small benefits associated with the application of the soil 
conditioner generated by AWT facilities. Most of these benefits, however, accrue to 
the owners of the land where the soil conditioner is applied, or to the owner of the 
AWT facility, and so there are unlikely to be significant external benefits. 
Comparing municipal waste management systems 
The net community benefits approach provides a framework for identifying the 
waste management option that is most suitable for particular circumstances. The 
best outcome from the perspective of the community as a whole is the option that 
minimises the net costs of waste management, including the private and external 
costs and benefits. Three options that could be considered are: 
•  sending all municipal waste to landfill; 
•  kerbside recycling of paper and packaging with residual garbage sent to landfill; 
and 
•  kerbside recycling of paper and packaging with residual garbage processed 
through an AWT facility. 
Energy-from-waste is another option for managing the combustible component of 
municipal waste (including organic waste and plastics). At the moment, there are no 
energy-from-waste facilities operating in Australia specifically for municipal waste, 
and due to their high financial costs, it appears unlikely that any will be established 
in the near future. Due to this, the Commission has not analysed in detail the costs 
and benefits of energy-from-waste. 
The net financial costs of the three waste management systems under consideration 
depend on the costs of collection and transport, the costs of landfill disposal, MRF 
sorting, and AWT processing and revenue from the sale of recovered materials. The 
financial costs of waste management in a city with high costs of landfill are set out 
in table 4.6. Landfill levies and the goods and services tax, although they are real 
costs to waste generators, are not included. This is because the purpose is to 
compare the costs and benefits to the community as a whole. Transfer payments — 
such as landfill levies — serve to redistribute some of the community’s income, but 
are not related to the costs of supplying a good, or its value to consumers 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006). As such, they change the distribution of the 
community’s income, but do not, in themselves, entail a cost to the community as a 
whole. 
Green waste collection is now a fairly common element of municipal waste 
management systems. Adding a green waste collection to any of these options 
would increase the costs of waste collection, probably by around $30 per household     





per year if the green waste were collected fortnightly. Any gate fees charged by 
firms accepting the green waste would further increase the costs of this service.3 
Table 4.6  Average financial costs of waste management in a major 
metropolitan centre with high costs of landfilla 
  Units  All waste 
to landfill 
Kerbside recycling and 
waste to landfill 
Kerbside recycling 
and waste to AWT 
Collection and transportb  $/household/year  59 51  51 
Landfill and AWT gate 
feesc 
$/household/year  51  39  62 to 97 
Recyclables collection 
and transport to MRF 
$/household/year  .. 31  31 
MRF Gate feed  $/household/year  ..  -4 to 10  -4 to 10 
        
$/household/year  110  117 to 131  140 to 189  Total financial cost 
$/tonne  122  130 to 145  155 to 209 
a Based on 691 kg of garbage and 211 kg of recyclables per household per year (Nolan-ITU 2004b). Also 
assumes that the value of the time and effort taken by householders to separate recyclables is equivalent to 
the benefit they derive from recycling. b Assumes that the costs of transport to AWT facilities are the same as 
transport to landfills. c Gate fees do not include landfill levies. d A negative number indicates that the MRF 
operator is prepared to pay for recyclable materials. If a MRF operator were prepared to pay $20 per tonne of 
material, as claimed by Dick Gross (trans., p. 101), the net financial benefit would equate to approximately 
$4 per household per year. Note that MRF gate fees may overstate the financial costs of sorting recyclables 
where MRFs are earning above-normal commercial rates of return. .. Not applicable. 
Sources: Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001); Nolan-ITU (2004b); Productivity Commission estimates. 
Even where landfill costs are high and MRFs pay for recyclables, sending all waste 
to landfill has a lower financial cost than a system incorporating kerbside recycling 
(table 4.6). In some cases, however, where recycling may not be justified on 
financial grounds, it may be preferred to sending all waste to landfill if it delivers 
external benefits. The difference between the financial costs of landfill only, and 
landfill plus recycling systems gives an idea of the magnitude of the external 
benefits that would be necessary to make recycling the best option for the 
community. 
For example, in a city such as Sydney where landfill gate fees are high — 
$57 per tonne of waste, not including the landfill levy (table 4.1) — the financial 
cost of a landfill-only system would be around $122 per tonne of municipal waste. 
If MRF operators were prepared to pay $20 per tonne for recyclables, the financial 
                                              
3  The Commission understands that in metropolitan areas, supplies of compost currently exceed 
demand. This suggests that firms would charge a gate fee to accept green waste. WM Waste 
Management Services Pty. Ltd. stated that the ‘going rate for green waste processing is around 
$35 per tonne’ (sub. DR140, p. 3). If demand for compost were to increase, it is possible that 
firms would be prepared to pay for green waste, which would offset some or all of the costs of 
collection and processing.     




cost of a system with kerbside recycling and garbage to landfill would be around 
$130 per tonne of municipal waste. If recycling delivered external benefits of more 
than $8 per tonne of municipal waste — approximately $32 per tonne of recovered 
materials4 — then adding a kerbside collection would deliver a net benefit to the 
community. 
In Melbourne, where landfill gate fees are estimated to be $29 per tonne of waste 
(table 4.1), the financial cost of a landfill-only system would be around $94 per 
tonne of waste. If MRF gate fees were high — for the sake of illustration assume 
$45 per tonne — the financial cost of a system with kerbside recycling would be 
around $124 per tonne of municipal waste. In this case, kerbside recycling would 
deliver net benefits to the community only if it delivered external benefits worth 
over $125 per tonne of material recovered. 
The Commission agrees with Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) that the 
downstream benefits of kerbside recycling are small. The upstream benefits could 
tip the balance in favour of recycling, but these benefits are highly variable, and 
depend on the degree to which externalities have already been internalised. 
Much of this discussion has been based on the assumption that the benefits that 
householders gain from participating in kerbside recycling are equal to the costs to 
them of sorting their waste for separate collection. If householders gain benefits 
from recycling that exceed the cost of their efforts, and would be prepared to pay to 
participate in the system, kerbside recycling could become privately cost effective 
in more circumstances. However, if this assumption is to be used to justify kerbside 
recycling systems that would otherwise not deliver net benefits to the community, 
household willingness to pay for recycling should be tested transparently, not just 
asserted by policy makers. 
Currently, there would appear to be no circumstances in Australia under which 
AWT treatment would be less financially costly than landfill for treating mixed 
municipal waste. Even in a city that faced high costs of landfill disposal and had 
access to low cost AWT facilities, sending mixed waste to AWT facilities, rather 
than to landfill, would increase the total financial costs of the system by at least 
$25  per tonne of municipal waste. In states and territories where landfill is 
inexpensive, the difference between the costs of landfill and AWT treatment is 
much larger. 
The external benefits of sending waste to an AWT facility, rather than a properly-
located, engineered and managed landfill that incorporates gas capture and 
                                              
4  Based on the assumption that around one quarter of the material in municipal waste is 
recyclable.     





electricity generation, are considered to be small, and insufficient to justify sending 
waste to an AWT facility. AWT treatment prior to landfill of residual waste may 
have some environmental benefits if the waste would otherwise be sent to an 
unlined landfill that was located in an environmentally sensitive area or close to 
homes and businesses, and incorporated no gas management system. However, 
installing a liner and gas management system in the landfill, or transporting the 
waste further afield to a properly-located, engineered and managed landfill would, 
in most circumstances, be a more cost-effective way of reducing the external costs 
of waste disposal than building an expensive AWT facility. 
Although they have not been set out in detail in this section, the costs and benefits 
of energy-from-waste are in many respects similar to the costs and benefits of 
AWTs. Like AWTs, the financial costs of energy-from-waste are much higher than 
the financial costs of landfill. And as is the case with AWTs, energy-from-waste has 
no significant external benefits over properly-located, engineered and managed 
landfills. 
When the financial, environmental and social costs and benefits of the various 
systems that are available for waste management are compared, properly-located, 
engineered and managed landfills, combined in some circumstances with 
appropriate kerbside recycling, appear to impose the lowest net costs on the 
community. 
Taking into account all private and external costs and benefits, properly-located, 
engineered and managed landfills incorporating gas capture and electricity 
generation, are likely to be much less costly than ‘alternative waste technology’ 
plants or dedicated energy-from-waste facilities, in most, if not all, circumstances. 
The financial costs of current kerbside recycling systems exceed the financial 
benefits. This is particularly the case where the cost of landfill is low. The case for 
kerbside recycling partly rests on its ability to deliver upstream external benefits, 
which are highly variable, and/or on the community’s willingness to pay for 
recycling services. Technological progress and changes to the design of recycling 
systems may reduce the net financial costs of kerbside recycling. 
4.5  Business waste recycling 
Many firms generate waste that can be recycled. For example, offices create large 
amounts of paper waste, supermarkets throw away hundreds of cardboard boxes 
FINDING 4.3 
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each day, and pubs must dispose of thousands of glass bottles each week. Concrete, 
bricks and other rubble from construction and demolition projects can be crushed 
for use as road base. Industrial byproducts are often homogeneous and produced in 
large volumes, and may be useful as inputs into production for other firms. 
Recycling of commercial, industrial, construction and demolition waste constitutes 
the vast majority (80 per cent) of recycling in Australia (chapter 2). 
Private costs and benefits 
Firms that generate recyclable waste can either send it to landfill or for recycling. If 
it is less costly to send the waste for recycling, they will usually prefer that option. 
In some cases, firms will choose to recycle even if it is a more costly option, 
because of a desire to demonstrate ‘green credentials’ to the community, or because 
of the preferences of staff. 
The financial costs of recycling depend on the costs of sorting, collection and 
transport, and the value of the recycled material. If the material is highly valued — 
for example some scrap metals — and disposed of in large volumes, a recycler may 
be prepared to pay a firm to collect their waste. If the material is not highly valued, 
or only a small amount of waste is generated — for example, rubble from small 
building projects — the costs of collection may exceed the benefits of selling the 
recycled material, so it will not be sought after by recyclers, and will be sent to 
landfill. 
Recycling will only occur where both the waste generator and the recycler are 
aware of the potential for mutual benefits. There could be cases where recycling 
does not occur because waste generators and recyclers lack information about each 
other’s requirements. Waste exchanges have been canvassed as one way of 
facilitating the development of these markets (chapter 11). Another way would be 
for a third party to intervene to encourage recycling. An example of where this is 
occurring is the Kwinana Industrial Area (box 4.2), where firms are acting to exploit 
industrial synergies including those in waste generation. 
Environmental and other external costs and benefits 
Like all of the waste management options addressed in this chapter, there are 
downstream external costs associated with business waste recycling that arise from 
transport and amenity issues. These costs are probably not large. 
The downstream external benefits depend on the composition of the waste. If it is 
relatively inert — for example steel and concrete from construction and demolition 
projects — the avoided downstream impacts are probably small. If the waste     





contributes to toxic leachate or landfill gases — for example some industrial 
waste — and these emissions are not properly controlled, the external benefits of 
recycling could be larger. As with kerbside recycling, the upstream benefits of 
recycling waste generated by firms vary according to circumstances. 
 
Box 4.2  The Kwinana industrial area 
The Kwinana Industrial Area is located 35 kilometres south of Perth. The area was 
established in the 1950s, and is home to 40 industries including smelters, chemical 
producers, refineries, energy generation and port facilities. The Eco-efficiency 
Committee of the Kwinana Industries Council investigates opportunities for organic and 
inorganic waste recycling in the area. Currently there are 32 ‘byproduct synergies’ in 
the area involving the reuse of solid, liquid and gaseous wastes (Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Western Australia, sub. 97). 
Inquiry participants identified examples of recycling that occur in the Kwinana Industrial 
Area: 
… a pigment plant supplies waste hydrochloric acid to a nearby chemical manufacturer to 
produce ammonium chloride for synthetic rutile production by the pigment plant. Previously, 
the ammonium chloride was imported at considerably higher cost. (Business Roundtable on 
Sustainable Development, sub. 70, support documents, p. 62) 
     




     





5  The case for government intervention 
 
Key points 
•  Markets take many of the costs and benefits of managing waste into account and 
thereby provide incentives to reduce waste generation and undertake recycling. But 
‘market failures’ can result in these incentives not being as strong as they should be. 
•  Waste management policies that address the environmental and social externalities 
of waste disposal are warranted where the costs of intervention are less than the 
benefits. 
•  Unchecked negative externalities from resource extraction and production processes 
could result in too much waste being generated, not enough recycling and excessive 
environmental damage. Policies that target the source of these externalities directly 
are likely to be the most efficient option. Using waste management policies to 
address these upstream externalities is indirect and likely to be ineffective.  
•  The benefits of using direct policies apply also to sustainability concerns. To achieve 
sustainable development it may be necessary to take specific action on 
intergenerational equity grounds to preserve certain forms of natural capital, such as 
biological diversity. But using waste management policies to address upstream 
threats to such natural capital is not recommended. 
•  Sustainable development considerations are unlikely to justify using waste policies to 
slow market-driven rates of extraction of nonrenewable resources.  
•  The collection and transport of waste from households in a particular area may be 
most efficiently done by a single firm. This ‘natural monopoly’ characteristic of waste 
collection, together with the desirability of ensuring waste is collected from all 
households, can warrant government delivery of the service. 
•  The ‘public good’ characteristics of some information can cause market failure. 
Accordingly, there may be a role for governments to provide some general 
information on waste management. Where governments deliver waste services they 
should provide information where this improves the overall efficiency of the service.  
•  The existence of financial subsidies for the use of virgin materials is not a valid 
argument for extending them to recovered resources, nor for using any other waste 
management policy to counteract them. The case for subsidising an activity, or 
removing a subsidy, should be made on its own merits. Besides, it is likely that 
subsidies to the use of virgin materials have declined in recent years. 
•  The concerns of some members of the community about waste do not justify a policy 
response that imposes costs on others, if those concerns are not well founded. 
     




Inquiry participants have articulated various arguments for why governments should 
take policy action on waste management. This chapter tests the validity and strength 
of these arguments. Section  5.1 develops a criterion for doing this and the 
subsequent sections consider the main arguments raised in light of this criterion. 
5.1  Government intervention and market failure 
Private incentives 
Markets create incentives for producers to reduce the quantity of material resources 
in their products — provided this can be done without compromising the features 
that consumers and distributors value, such as performance, quality, safety and 
protection of the product during distribution. Where firms are able to do this, they 
will save money on materials and their profits will tend to increase. As a 
consequence, the amount of waste that their products create when they reach the 
end of their useful lives will decrease. For example, the Australian Food and 
Grocery Council reported: 
In 1988, the Australian soft drink industry used an average of 453 grams of packaging 
in the manufacture and distribution of each litre of soft drink. By 1997, the amount of 
packaging required had been reduced to 150 grams per litre, an average reduction of 
67 per cent. The weight of the average glass ‘stubby’ has been reduced by 25 per cent 
over the past 15 years. (Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub. 93, p. 24) 
Recycling can be a business opportunity for firms that are seeking to reduce the 
costs of managing their waste, and for firms that collect and sort recyclables or 
manufacture products that have recycled content. For example, firms that generate 
large quantities of waste cardboard, such as supermarkets, can often reduce their 
costs by having the cardboard collected for recycling rather than for disposal.  
Consumers also influence waste outcomes. They may choose to purchase products 
that are more expensive but more durable, or do not have excessive packaging, in 
part to reduce the hassle and costs of disposal. Some consumers also seek out 
products that are perceived as environmentally friendly due to their ability to be 
recycled, inclusion of recycled content, or other factors that relate to waste. 
Because there are market incentives to reduce waste and undertake recycling, the 
scope for effective government intervention is limited mainly to circumstances 
where these incentives do not reflect the true costs and benefits to the community 
that are associated with waste. That is, where there is market failure.     






Market failure refers to circumstances in which markets do not allocate resources to 
achieve the best returns for the community. Where there is market failure, 
government intervention may produce net benefits to the community. However, 
government intervention can be costly and introduce its own distortions. For 
intervention to be warranted, the benefits that are likely to result must outweigh the 
costs involved. The various types of market failure are described in box 5.1. 
 
Box 5.1  Types of market failure 
Public goods exist where provision for one person means the product is available to 
all people at no additional cost. Public goods are non-rivalrous (that is, consumption by 
one person will not diminish consumption by others) and non-excludable (that is, it is 
difficult to exclude anyone from benefiting from the good). Common examples include 
flood-control dams, national defence and street lights. Given that exclusion would be 
physically impossible or economically infeasible, the private market is unlikely to 
provide sufficient quantities of these goods. The nature of public goods makes it 
difficult to assess the extent of demand for them. It is ultimately a matter of judgement 
whether demand is sufficient to warrant government provision. 
Externalities  (or spillovers) occur where an activity or transaction has positive 
(benefits) or negative (costs) economic welfare effects on others who are not direct 
parties to the transaction. An example of a positive externality is disease immunisation, 
which protects the individual, but also lowers the general risk of disease for everyone. 
Governments often subsidise activities that have significant positive externalities. 
Examples of negative externalities may include pollution and large buildings that block 
sunlight to their neighbours. Legal restrictions and/or pricing mechanisms can regulate 
such activities. Public goods and externalities are similar analytically — externalities 
have public good characteristics in that they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. 
Information failures occur where there is insufficient or inadequate information about 
such matters as price, quality and availability for firms, investors and consumers to 
make well-informed decisions. In some instances, markets can address these 
problems through intermediary products — for example, consumers purchasing 
advisory services. But where the issues are highly technical, the government may 
perceive a role to complement or verify market supplied information — for example, 
government licensing, registration and labelling regulations for pharmaceuticals. 
Natural monopoly occurs where it is more efficient for one firm to supply all of a 
market’s needs than it would be for two or more firms to do so. It usually arises where 
there are significant economies of scale resulting from fixed costs which are large 
relative to the variable costs of supply. It can also arise in network industries (such as 
mail delivery) where there are strong economies of density. Monopolies may charge 
excessive prices, so regulation or government ownership is often adopted. 
Source: Adapted from PC (2001). 
 
     




This focus is found in the inquiry terms of reference that states that the ‘objective of 
this inquiry is to identify policies that will enable Australia to address market 
failures and externalities associated with the generation and disposal of waste’. 
Therefore, in assessing arguments for government intervention the Commission has 
concentrated on opportunities to produce net benefits to the community through 
addressing market failures. Another valid basis for government intervention might 
be if it improved intergenerational or intragenerational equity (section 5.4). 
5.2  Environmental and social impacts of waste 
disposal 
Until recent years the main argument used to justify government intervention in 
waste management has been that waste disposal can have negative impacts on the 
environment and people’s health (chapter  3). As discussed in chapter  4, the 
existence and severity of these impacts depends on the type of waste and the 
manner of disposal. Landfills can leak polluted leachate into groundwater, emit 
greenhouse and other gases, and inconvenience people living nearby by creating 
odour, traffic noise and attracting feral animals to the site. Odour and traffic noise 
can also be issues for materials recovery and alternative waste technology facilities. 
Illegal dumping of waste is potentially hazardous to the environment and can be 
costly to remove. Littering is a public nuisance that can also kill or injure wildlife. 
These and other environmental and social impacts of waste disposal have long been 
the target of waste management policy. 
These impacts often represent negative externalities — a type of market failure. 
That is, there are costs imposed on people other than those disposing of, or legally 
receiving, the waste. Because those responsible do not bear all of the costs of their 
actions, these impacts tend to be greater than is desirable. There is, therefore, at 
least the potential that government intervention could produce net benefits, 
depending on the costs of the intervention. As it is the collection, sorting, treatment 
and disposal of the waste that is causing these problems, the most direct and 
efficient response is generally to use waste management policy. The exception is 
greenhouse gas emissions, which ideally should be dealt with through broader 
greenhouse gas abatement policy, as explained in chapter 6. 
Developing the case for using waste management policy to address negative 
externalities from waste disposal requires an assessment of the size of the 
externalities, which has been provided in chapter 4. This assessment indicates the 
magnitude of the possible benefits of government intervention, which needs to be 
considered in light of the effectiveness and costs of any proposed policy to see if net 
benefits to the community are likely to result.     





5.3  Upstream environmental impacts 
An argument that has gained prominence recently is that government intervention in 
waste management is needed to address ‘upstream’ environmental impacts 
associated with waste. In this context, ‘upstream’ means preceding the point at 
which material becomes waste in the product life cycle (figure 1.1). The main types 
of upstream impacts that inquiry participants have referred to are: 
•  environmental damage from extracting mineral resources and producing forest 
resources; 
•  air and water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions that occur during the 
processing of virgin materials and subsequent manufacturing; and 
•  resource depletion from extracting natural resources. 
The link with waste is that some of these impacts might be avoided if less waste 
were generated and more recycling undertaken. 
A distinction needs to be drawn between environmental impacts and natural 
resource conservation. Arguments for government intervention to slow the 
depletion of natural resources (such as minerals) are mainly related to concerns over 
sustainability, rather than externalities or other types of market failure. This section 
concentrates on environmental impacts. Resource conservation is addressed in 
section 5.4, which deals with sustainability. 
Participants’ views 
Many inquiry participants expressed the view that addressing upstream impacts is 
an important reason for governments to pursue waste management policies. For 
example, the Australian Council of Recyclers (ACOR) mentioned avoided water 
and air pollution, and conservation of mineral, forest and water resources as reasons 
for governments to support resource recovery and recycling (sub. 40). The report 
Independent Assessment of Kerbside Recycling in Australia (Nolan-ITU and SKM 
Economics 2001) is frequently used to support this argument. For example, in 
discussing the environmental costs of waste Eco Waste cited findings from this 
report: 
… the Nolan-ITU report … found that whilst the direct cost to householders for a 
separate recycling service was some $26/yr, the net economic/environmental benefit 
was some $68/household/yr. An advantage of some $42/household/yr, or an advantage 
some 60 per cent greater than the apparent direct costs. (sub. 83, p. 6) 
The Nolan-ITU report found that the environmental benefits of kerbside recycling 
were almost entirely upstream. While the Commission has concluded that the     




Nolan-ITU report substantially overstates the upstream environmental benefits, it 
nevertheless seems that the environmental benefits from kerbside recycling are 
more likely to occur upstream than downstream (chapter 4). 
Some inquiry participants opposed the use of waste management policy to address 
upstream environmental impacts and resource depletion. For example, the Business 
Roundtable on Sustainable Development recommended: 
… that waste management policy should focus on downstream waste disposal impacts 
rather than seeking to drive upstream benefits. (sub. 70, p. 1) 
Advantages of using direct policy 
Like the impacts of waste disposal (discussed in the previous section), upstream 
environmental impacts can be negative externalities. For example, if mining caused 
a deterioration in the quality of water in nearby streams, and the mining company 
were not required to ameliorate this or pay appropriate compensation, there would 
be a negative externality. Upstream externalities may result in excessive 
environmental damage because firms engaged in these activities do not face the full 
cost of their actions. These externalities may also cause virgin materials to be 
cheaper than they should be and this may, consequently, result in more waste 
generation and less recycling than is desirable.  
Where there are upstream environmental externalities there may be a case for 
governments to intervene to address them. In the language used by ACOR 
(sub. DR197, p. 1), this will help to ‘get right the price for the services of nature’. 
However, unlike the impacts of waste disposal, upstream impacts are not caused by 
waste but by production and consumption. The association with waste is indirect, 
which strongly suggests that it would be better to use policies that target the 
problem directly. For example, if industrial pollution from processing virgin 
materials is a problem it would be more appropriate to use pollution policy, rather 
than waste management policy, to address it. 
This general principle is recognised in various guides to good regulatory practice, 
including the Office of Regulation Review guide to regulation, which states that the 
‘measure adopted should be carefully targeted at the identified problem so that it 
does not impact unduly on other areas’ (ORR 1998, p. D4). Examples of policies 
that are used to directly address upstream environmental externalities are provided 
in box 5.2.      






Box 5.2  Examples of policies that can be used to address upstream 
environmental impacts  
Air and water pollution 
•  Regulation of emissions — industrial and other emissions of air and water pollutants 
can be regulated in various ways. For example, in Queensland, under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994, activities that will, or have the potential to, 
release contaminants into the environment are regulated through licensing and 
development approvals (PC 2003). 
•  Emission targets — for example, the National Environment Protection (Ambient Air 
Quality) Measure sets maximum acceptable concentrations for various air 
pollutants. 
•  Pollution fees — for example, the NSW Environment Protection Authority 
administers a load-based licensing scheme that sets limits on the pollutant loads 
emitted by holders of environment protection licences, and links licence fees to 
pollutant emissions. Firms engaged in a range of industrial and other activities are 
required to have an environment protection licence (EPA NSW 2003b). 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
•  Voluntary agreements — for example, the Australian Government’s Greenhouse 
Challenge Plus program supports and encourages industry to manage greenhouse 
gas emissions through reporting emissions, and developing and implementing 
action plans to achieve abatement. 
•  Mandatory generation of low emission energy — for example, the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target places a legal liability on wholesale purchasers of 
electricity to contribute towards the generation of an additional 9500 gigawatt hours 
of renewable energy annually by 2010 (AGO 2003). 
Mineral extraction 
•  Regulation of environmental standards — in addition to complying with pollution 
regulations, mining companies are required by regulations and licence conditions to 
rehabilitate the land after the closure of a mine (appendix B). 
•  Mandatory environmental offsets — for example, in South Australia the Native 
Vegetation Regulations 2003 require that all mining that involves the clearance of 
native vegetation must be undertaken in accordance with a management plan that 
the Native Vegetation Council is confident will result in a significant environmental 
benefit on the site or elsewhere in the region. This requirement is in addition to 
on-site rehabilitation requirements (DWLBC 2005). 
(Continued on next page) 
 
     





Box 5.2    (Continued) 
Forest production 
•  Banning harvesting — for example, almost 70  per  cent of old growth forests in 
Regional Forest Agreement regions are in conservation reserves (BRS 2003). 
Regional Forest Agreements cover regions where commercial timber production is a 
major native forest use. 
•  Regulating harvesting — there is a range of State and Territory Government 
regulations and other policies designed to limit or ameliorate the environmental 
impacts of timber harvesting. For example, the Victorian Code of Forest Practices 
for Timber Production is a regulatory instrument that applies to commercial timber 
production on both public and private land. It aims to ensure that harvested forest 
land is adequately regenerated, environmental values are conserved and water 
supply catchments are protected. The Victorian Environment Protection Authority 
conducts annual audits of compliance with the code on public land (DSE 2006a). 
•  Log pricing that compensates for environmental impacts — for example, the 
National Forest Policy Statement (that has been endorsed by Australian, State and 
Territory Governments) includes the principle that logs from publicly-owned native 
forests will be priced so as to provide an adequate return to the community from the 
use of a public resource (DAFF 2002). 
 
 
The main advantages of using direct policies to address upstream externalities are 
that they can: 
•  respond to location-based variability; 
•  respond to operation-based variability; 
•  minimise the risk of perverse outcomes; 
•  address the environmental impacts associated with products irrespective of 
whether they are exported or used domestically; and  
•  use negotiations to determine mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Location-based variability 
There can be a wide variation in the environmental costs of mining a tonne of a 
mineral, harvesting a tonne of wood fibre or emitting a tonne of a pollutant, 
depending on the location of these activities. Mining can involve the destruction of 
a large area of native vegetation with high conservation and recreational values, or 
affect only a small area of previously cleared or sparsely vegetated land. Forest 
harvesting can take place in native forest that has high conservation and recreational 
values, or in forest plantations. Air pollutants can be emitted in areas of high     





population density that have high existing pollution loads, or in remote areas where 
the effects on human health and the environment can be much lower.  
Direct policy is able to respond to these variations in environmental costs. For 
example, air pollution policy is able to respond by using pollution charges and other 
policy instruments that vary by region, enabling the pollution control effort to be 
tailored to the particular problem. This is a feature of NSW Government policy that 
allows pollutant load fees that apply to environment protection licence holders to 
vary by a factor of up to seven, depending on conditions in individual local 
government areas or catchments (EPA NSW 2005).  
By contrast, waste management policy is not generally able to respond to 
location-based variations in environmental costs. For example, paper recycling 
might be subsidised in part as a means of reducing the environmental impacts of 
timber harvesting. However, it is very unlikely that such a subsidy could 
discriminate between paper made from wood fibre sourced from high conservation 
value native forests and paper made from plantation grown fibre (or between wood 
fibre sourced domestically and fibre from overseas). Greenhouse gas emissions 
appear to be the only significant upstream environmental externality that is not 
subject to location-based variability (appendix B). 
Operation-based variability 
The environmental costs of mining, forestry and virgin material processing depend 
in part on the characteristics of particular operations or facilities. For example: 
•  mining operations can have good or poor processes for managing impacts on 
water quality; 
•  forest harvesting operations vary in the standard of environmental controls that 
are employed to protect watercourses and prevent soil erosion; and 
•  facilities that process particular virgin materials vary in the quantity of air and 
water pollutants, and greenhouse gases they emit due to variations in processing 
technology, pollution controls, energy efficiency and their source of energy. 
Direct policy is well placed to respond to these differences by prescribing minimum 
environmental standards or by basing pollution charges on the actual performance 
of individual operations. If waste management policy were to be used instead, all 
operations of a particular type would end up being treated as if they had equal 
environmental impacts per unit of output.     




Minimising the risk of perverse outcomes 
It is generally easier to limit the occurrence of unintended consequences when 
implementing direct, rather than indirect policies. This is because achieving the 
intended outcomes by using indirect policies usually relies on uncertain linkages. If 
waste policy is used to target upstream environmental impacts, unintended perverse 
consequences can arise. For example, landfill levies have been introduced in part to 
encourage recycling and, thereby, achieve upstream environmental benefits. They 
may, however, cause: 
•  An increase in illegal dumping of waste — as people seek to avoid the higher 
cost of legal disposal. 
•  Recycling operations to be less viable — as the levy often has to be paid on the 
residual material that can not be recycled. For example, it was reported by the 
Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of New South Wales, that the 
recycling of old cars was now becoming financially unviable in some regional 
areas because of the requirement to pay an increased levy on the shredder floc 
waste (trans., p. 406). Such cars may be sent to unlicensed landfills that are not 
subject to the levy. 
•  Waste to be transported long distances — as people seek to avoid the levy. For 
example, the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of NSW reported 
that waste was being exported from the Sydney metropolitan area to unlicensed 
landfills that were not subject to the levy (trans., p. 911). 
•  Health risks — as levies may encourage the improper disposal of hazardous 
waste. For example, Hanson Landfill Services (DR125) stated that levies on 
asbestos disposal in Victoria discourage the clean up of asbestos-contaminated 
sites and encourages people to hide asbestos among other waste. 
Addressing the environmental impacts associated with exports 
Direct policy is able to respond to environmental impacts when and where they 
arise. By contrast, waste policy is able to respond only indirectly to impacts that 
occur upstream of waste. Many production activities undertaken in Australia, 
particularly mining, produce commodities that are exported (table 5.1).  These 
commodities eventually end up as waste in other countries and, hence, are largely 
beyond the influence of Australian waste management policy. In addition, measures 
taken to reduce the waste from Australian consumption of these goods would be 
largely futile if reduced domestic consumption were made up for by increased 
exports.     





Table 5.1  Selected Australian commodity statistics, 2004 
‘000 tonnes 
 Production  Consumptiona Exports
Aluminium  1 894  313  1 534
Iron ore  234 008  9 815  211 359
Lead 674  39  715
Black coal  299 880  66 990  231 310
a Production minus exports may not equal consumption due to changes in inventories and other factors. 
Source: ABARE (2005a). 
Mutually beneficial negotiation 
Some negative environmental externalities are overwhelmingly felt by a small and 
readily defined group of people. Under such circumstances, the firm causing the 
externality and those affected may be able to negotiate a mutually beneficial 
agreement. This suggests that the best form of government intervention may simply 
be to create and/or help enforce property rights.  
The type of externality described often arises in the context of mining. In some 
situations, the environmental impacts of mining may primarily be a local issue. 
Mining policy can attempt to delineate between such issues and those that require a 
policy response that protects broader interests and values. Negotiations over local 
issues could involve modifications to the operation of the mine to protect particular 
environmental and social values, and/or compensation in the form of financial 
payments, provision of community infrastructure or a guarantee of employment for 
local people. Such opportunities to efficiently deal with the environmental impacts 
of mining at the local level are not available through the use of waste management 
policies. 
Conclusions 
Each of the advantages of using direct policy is substantial. When taken together 
they bring into question not only the efficiency of using waste policy to address 
upstream environmental externalities, but their capacity to have much effect at all. 
The main argument for using waste policy to tackle upstream issues claimed by 
some inquiry participants is the difficulty, or impracticality, of using more direct 
approaches. For example, the Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) 
stated: 
It is recognised that, in many cases, targeted policies are preferred to address market 
failures. However, where difficulties in implementing such targeted policies exist, the     




promotion of recycling and recovery could be a valid and practical mechanism to 
achieve upstream objectives. (sub. 103, p. 25) 
The Municipal Waste Advisory Council (MWAC), a standing committee of the WA 
Local Government Association, similarly stated: 
[We] argue for intervention on the basis that current levels of waste disposed of straight 
to landfill are a reflection of market failures which make virgin raw materials cheaper 
than their full associated costs would suggest. … an intervention seriously tackling 
externalities in commodity markets is politically unfeasible, so policy makers should 
take responsibility for setting resource efficiency objectives. (sub. 52, p. 5) 
The WA Waste Management Board also argued that direct policy was deficient: 
One reason it has fallen to ‘waste policy’ areas [to address upstream externalities] is 
that the issues are not being adequately addressed elsewhere. (sub. DR208, p. 2) 
The Commission considers that any case for using waste policy to address upstream 
externalities would have to be very carefully evaluated and be based on an inability 
to effectively use more direct policies. It should not be presumed that governments 
do not intervene upstream. A host of policies are directed at upstream externality 
issues (box 5.2). Greenhouse gas emissions stand out as an area where there is no 
comprehensive policy, although there are a variety of greenhouse gas abatement 
initiatives.  
Where a waste policy is proposed due to the failure of upstream policies, it still 
needs to be assessed as to the likelihood of achieving net benefits to the community. 
It is unlikely that net benefits would be achieved, given the potential for perverse 
outcomes and the uncertain linkages between waste policy and desirable upstream 
changes. If there is an exception, it is likely to be the externalities associated with 
upstream greenhouse gas emissions. However, using waste policy to address these 
would need careful analysis and continued review, given the possibility of policy 
changes in this area in the future, both nationally and internationally. 
The Commission considers that, for all the reasons noted above, it is highly unlikely 
that a waste management policy would be the best way of tackling an upstream 
environmental externality. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of a 
number of commentators, including Porter (2002), Palmer, Sigmund and Walls 
(1997) and BDA Group and EconSearch (2004). In other words, directly targeted 
policies should be applied at each stage of the product life cycle, where this is 
warranted, to address environmental externalities and other market failures. 
Contrary to the interpretation of some inquiry participants (for example, Brisbane 
City Council, sub. DR154), the Commission advocates tackling problems at their 
source and cautions against only using ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions.     





Upstream environmental externalities associated with waste are most appropriately 
addressed through directly-targeted policies. Waste policy should only be used to 
address upstream issues where more direct policies are not able to be used, and 
there are reasonable prospects that it would be both effective and produce net 
benefits to the community. These circumstances are likely to be the exception rather 
than the norm. 
5.4 Sustainability  issues 
Several participants have argued that governments should intervene because current 
consumption is unsustainable and this is reflected in excessive waste. Furthermore, 
they argue that waste management practices are unsustainable, or inconsistent with 
sustainable development (ACOR, sub.  40; MWAC, sub.  52; NSW Government, 
sub. 95). Sustainability is a difficult concept and there are many different definitions 
of what it means. The Commission favours the World Commission on Environment 
and Development’s definition of sustainable development: ‘development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987, p. 43). As this definition implies, sustainable development is 
about equity, both between and within generations. 
In the previous two sections the case for government intervention has been assessed 
against a net community benefits criterion. It might be argued that this criterion 
does not give sufficient weight to the interests of future generations as it gives 
undue consideration to the preferences of people who are currently alive. If this 
were accepted then addressing the sorts of market failures discussed previously 
might improve sustainability, but still be insufficient to achieve intergenerational 
equity. To consider this argument further the concept of sustainable development 
needs some elaboration. 
The capital stock approach 
The concept of a stock of capital is central to the idea of maintaining or improving 
welfare over time. The stock of capital inherited by a generation from the previous 
generation includes human capital (knowledge and understanding), man-made 
capital (economic and social infrastructure) and natural capital (biodiversity, 
renewable and nonrenewable resources, and ecological integrity). Most 
prescriptions for sustainable development require that the total stock of assets 
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passed on to future generations should be at least as great as that inherited, but the 
best mix of capital assets is often undefined. Thus, a key issue is the degree of 
substitutability between these types of capital. There are differing views on the 
extent to which substitution is possible. 
Solow (2005, p.  507) argued that ‘what we are obligated to leave behind is a 
generalized capacity to create wellbeing, not any particular thing or any particular 
natural resource’. This approach assumes that substitution between different types 
of capital may be possible and that a decline in natural capital might be acceptable 
providing this decline were balanced by increases in human or man-made capital. 
Those that subscribe to this view do not necessarily envisage a general decline in 
natural capital in the future. To the contrary, these proponents often point out that 
people’s concern for the environment tends to increase with income. Therefore, 
provided that the political system is responsive to these preferences, environmental 
protection will tend to rise more than proportionally with economic growth 
(Neumayer 2003). 
Others take a more cautious approach. For example, Pearce, Markandya and 
Barbier  (1989) argued that particular attention should be paid to natural capital 
because: 
•  Not all amenities and services provided by the natural environment can be 
substituted with human or man-made capital. 
•  Uncertainty in our understanding of the substitutability of natural systems and 
future technological developments suggests a risk-averse approach to the use of 
natural capital is needed. 
•  Environmental damage can be irreversible, affecting all future generations. 
•  Environmental degradation can lead to price differentials between polluted and 
non-polluted areas. This can disadvantage those on lower incomes, who are less 
able to respond to these price changes or choose an area with less pollution, and 
who might, therefore, bear a disproportionate share of the burden of 
environmental degradation. 
Discounting the future 
Another issue in implementing sustainable development is the choice of an 
appropriate social discount rate. The discount rate allows benefits and costs that 
occur at different times to be compared. Discounting recognises that costs and 
benefits incurred in the short term are valued more highly than costs and benefits 
incurred much later. One of the rationales for discounting is that capital has an 
opportunity cost. Using a discount rate of, say, 2 per cent per annum would result in     





a proposal being accepted if it cost $1 million today and provided a benefit of 
$2.7 million in 50 years time. Setting such a low discount rate would not be sensible 
if there are alternative investments that would earn a higher rate of return (for 
example, a $1 million investment that earned 5 per cent per annum would return 
about $11 million after 50 years).  
It has been argued that low discount rates should be used for projects with a 
significant environmental component to prevent unfair discrimination against future 
generations (Goodin 1986). However, how the use of natural resources or 
environment protection will be affected by using low discount rates is ambiguous 
(Markandya and Pearce 1991). For example, application of a low discount rate to a 
dam project that has a high capital cost and low annual benefits accruing over many 
years can inflate the future benefits relative to the costs, and result in a decision to 
construct the dam rather than conserve the original habitat (IC  1996). With 
reference to this example, MWAC (sub. DR190) argued that it is unusual for the use 
of high discount rates to provide superior environmental outcomes. The example, 
however, highlights a more general issue reported by Markandya and Pearce (1991, 
pp. 140–1): 
… as the discount rate rises so the level of investment overall falls, slowing the pace of 
economic development in general. Since natural resources are required for investment, 
the demand for such resources is lower at higher discount rates. 
Most economists reject the idea of using a special (low) discount rate for projects 
with major environmental impacts. Neumayer (2003) points out that the 
substitutability of natural capital is the real issue, not discounting. Markandya and 
Pearce (1991) argue that environmental concerns might be better tackled by 
developing the concept of sustainability as a specific policy issue that recognises the 
constraints imposed by the need for sustainability, rather than attempting to adjust 
the discount rate. For example, one way to meet the condition of sustainability is to 
require that any environmental damage associated with one project be balanced by 
projects designed specifically to improve the environment. 
Government policy 
Many governments have introduced policies on sustainable development that give 
special attention to natural capital. In Australia, all levels of government adopted 
the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD) in 1992. 
The core objectives of this strategy are: 
•  to enhance individual and community wellbeing and welfare by following a path of 
economic development that safeguards the welfare of future generations 
•  to provide for equity within and between generations     




•  to protect biological diversity and maintain essential ecological processes and 
life-support systems. (Commonwealth of Australia 1992, p. 8) 
The achievement of these objectives is promoted by maintaining (or increasing) the 
total stock of capital and protecting/maintaining particular aspects of natural capital 
(biological diversity and ecological processes and life-support systems). 
Accordingly, additions to (or conservation of) any of the types of capital is likely to 
contribute to sustainability (or at least improve the endowment we pass on to future 
generations). Where there are tradeoffs between them, however, the effect on 
sustainability can be unclear. It should not be automatically assumed that actions 
taken in the interests of environmental protection will always contribute to 
sustainability. It is possible that such protection could impose costs that lead to 
reduced investment in human or man-made capital that would have been more 
valuable to future generations. Such costs might also reduce the community’s 
capacity to respond to present-day equity issues (such as assisting people who are 
currently poor). Hence, this is a complex area requiring judgement and careful 
evaluation, rather than simplistic notions that actions or policies in a particular area 
must always be supported. 
The sustainability of waste disposal 
Concerns over the sustainability of waste disposal relate mainly to landfilling, as 
this is the most common means of disposal in Australia and many other countries. It 
is a quite common perception that suitable landfill space is running out and hence 
that landfilling is unsustainable. This perception was, for example, widespread in 
the United States in the 1980s, and increased pressure for government action on 
waste and recycling (Ackerman 1997). Over time, however, it has become clear that 
there is no immediate ‘landfill crisis’ in the United States (Ackerman 1997). In fact, 
it has been estimated that all US garbage produced over 1000  years could be 
contained in landfill occupying less than one-tenth of one  per  cent of US land 
(NPRI 1997). With a much lower population density than the United States, the 
prospect of Australia as a whole running out of suitable landfill space is even more 
remote and does not constitute a sustainability concern. Indeed, due to mining and 
quarrying activities, Australia is creating more potential ‘airspace’ for landfill than 
it is using. 
While landfill space will not run out in an absolute sense, the cost of disposing of 
waste to landfill may increase due to increasing land prices and transport distances. 
Increasing environmental standards and other requirements may also cause landfill 
costs to increase over time. The extent to which these factors are likely to drive up 
the costs of waste disposal in the future varies between regions. Sydney stands out 
as the city where costs have increased most in the past. Evidence of this is seen in     





relatively high landfill gate fees (table 4.1) and the practice of transporting some 
waste more than 200 kilometres to a landfill at Woodlawn.  
Some policy analysts have characterised future increases in landfill costs as an 
intergenerational externality.1 In general, it can be assumed that current landfill 
prices account for the scarcity value of landfill space. Accordingly, prospective 
future increases in landfill costs are not ‘external’ to the current market and so 
should not be regarded as externalities.   
In addition, the prospect of increasing costs for disposal to landfill is not a 
sustainability concern because sustainable development does not require future 
generations to be provided with low-cost landfill space. Where landfill capacity 
does become scarce, and gate fees rise, the incentives for waste avoidance and 
recycling activities will also rise. Increases in landfill costs might also make other 
waste disposal options, such as alternative waste technology and low emission 
energy-from-waste facilities, more attractive. 
It has also been suggested that the long-term legacy of landfills is a sustainability 
issue. For example, the Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet stated: 
At best landfills are concentrated sources of environmentally deleterious materials 
(contaminated sites) on the margins of cities that will be unsuitable for higher value 
land uses for many years to come. At worst, landfills may be sources of off-site impacts 
on public health and the environment well beyond their useful life. … the impact of 
landfill sites are not fully understood. (sub. 114, p. 4) 
There are two parts to this issue. First, old landfill sites may only be suitable for a 
limited range of uses over a long time period and second, old landfill sites may 
cause serious environmental problems in the distant future.  
With respect to land use, it should be noted that landfills are often established on 
old quarry or mine sites that are already degraded. After they have been used for 
waste disposal, they are generally required to be rehabilitated and are then often 
used as sports grounds, public open spaces and golf courses (EPA Victoria 2004b). 
 
                                              
1  For example, EPA NSW (1996c, p. 62) estimated that the intergenerational externality costs of 
landfill were between $3 and $12 per tonne of waste in the Sydney area, and between $1.50 and 
$6 per tonne in rural areas. These estimates were based on a report by Travers Morgan (1992) 
that found that government-owned landfills servicing Sydney were failing to incorporate the 
scarcity value of landfills (which they termed ‘landfill user costs’) into their prices. Given the 
increase in the amount of waste going to privately-owned landfills and the application of 
competitive neutrality principles to government operations in more recent years, such 
underpricing is unlikely to still be occurring in major urban centres in Australia.     




WM Waste Management Services stated: 
The use of landfill to rehabilitate former extractive industry sites is a very effective way 
of returning a site to its original landform … without the need to import large quantities 
of virgin soil. The alternatives to rehabilitating former extractive industry sites without 
landfilling often result in a large unusable hole remaining. (sub. DR140, p. 2) 
Accordingly, the range of potential uses for old landfills can be broader than those 
for old quarries. The use of an old quarry as a landfill can actually improve local 
amenity in the long term. 
The potential for environmental damage from waste disposal can warrant 
government intervention (section 5.2). The question here is whether any extra, or 
more stringent, measures are needed to reduce the risks to future generations on 
equity grounds. O’Leary and Tchobanoglous (2002) report that the potential for 
emissions of pollutants to occur is generally greatest during the operation of 
landfills and for a few decades after closure. This suggests that the risks to future 
generations may be small. However, given that there is some uncertainty and that 
the environmental values potentially at risk may not be easily substituted for, there 
may be a case for taking a reasonably cautious approach on intergenerational equity 
grounds. For example, a slightly more stringent regulatory regime for landfills than 
that suggested by cost–benefit analysis might be preferred, on equity grounds, if this 
significantly reduced the risk of future environmental damage. However, it can be 
costly to further reduce what may already be small risks and the benefits of this can 
be small (box  5.3). Hence, such considerations need to be carefully evaluated. 
Investing resources to get only small benefits at very high costs is not in the 
interests of the current or future generations. 
Upstream sustainability issues 
Upstream issues feature strongly in arguments for government action on waste 
(section 5.3). There are two distinct sustainability issues involved: the conservation 
of material resources (such as minerals); and the environmental impacts of mining, 
forestry, processing and manufacturing. The objectives of the NSESD suggest that 
different approaches to each of these may be warranted. 
Resource conservation 
Natural reserves of nonrenewable resources such as bauxite, iron ore and coal are 
reduced by their extraction and use. Many resources are, however, in plentiful 
supply and are likely to remain so for many generations. For example, given proven 
world coal reserves, the present rate of coal mining could continue for over     





200 years (CEC 2003). In Australia, demonstrated resources that are economic to 
extract have risen over recent decades for some minerals (table 5.2). This may seem 
paradoxical, given that large quantities of these minerals have been extracted over 
the last 30  years. It is, however, common for demonstrated resources to remain 
relatively stable or increase over time because exploration efforts tend to only be 
stimulated once reserves drop below what is required over the next 20 to 40 years 
(CEC 2003). The demonstrated resources at any one time are, therefore, not 
necessarily indicative of any geological shortage. 
Some materials that are present in waste and recycling streams are shown in 
table 5.2. For example, aluminium cans are produced from bauxite. There are some 
nonrenewable resources not covered, such as sand (used in making glass and 
concrete) that are available in extremely large quantities relative to their use. Other 
resources, such as the wood fibre used to make paper, are renewable and so supplies 
can potentially be maintained indefinitely. 
 
Box 5.3  Long-term costs and benefits of landfill regulations in the 
United States 
In the United States in 1991, almost half of the population drew their drinking water 
from aquifers and other ground water bodies (US EPA 1993). Because of this, the US 
EPA identified leachate from landfills as a potential risk to human health, and 
attempted to quantify the risk that leachate would cause cancer in people living near 
landfills. Its analysis — reported in Porter (2002) — suggested that each year there 
was less than 1  chance  in 10  million that leachate from the average landfill in the 
United States would cause a cancer death. 
The US  EPA introduced new regulations on the location, construction and 
management of landfills in 1991. It estimated that this would prevent 2.4 cancer deaths 
over the next three centuries. The US EPA also estimated that the new regulations 
would cost a total of US$450  million per year. Porter (2002) calculated that this 
equates to a cost of approximately US$32 billion per cancer death prevented (in net 
present value terms). 
Porter (2002, p.  63) also reported that public policy in the United States generally 
‘embraces policies that save lives at a cost of less than US$1 million per life saved, 
rejects policies that save lives at a cost of more than US$5 million, and thinks very 
carefully about the policies in between’. Rejecting some policies that would have saved 
lives at a cost of say $6 million per life, but implementing another that costs $32 billion 
per life saved would not be a sensible use of the community’s resources. Accordingly, 
the reduced risk of cancer deaths could only go a small way to justifying the new 
landfill regulations — there would need to be other benefits for them to be warranted. 
 
     




Table 5.2  Trends in economic demonstrated resources, Australia 
  Unit 1975 1985  1995 2005 
Black coal   ‘000 million 
tonnes 
19.5 34.0  49.0 39.2 
Iron ore  ‘000 million 
tonnes 
17.8 16.2  17.8 16.4 
Bauxite ‘000  million 
tonnes 
3.0 2.9  2.5 5.8 
Nickel million  tonnes  1.9  1.7  3.7 23.9 
Copper  million  tonnes  5.9 16.1  24.0 41.7 
Lead  million  tonnes 13.9 14.5  18.2 23.8 
Zinc  million  tonnes 19.3 21.2  38.8 41.8 
Source: Geoscience Australia (unpublished). 
The prices of many material resources have declined over the last 50 years or more. 
For example, even with the ‘resources boom’ of the last few years, the International 
Monetary Fund price index for metals was lower in real terms (deflated by the US 
consumer price index) in 2005 than in 1957 (IMF 2006). Technological advances in 
resource extraction, processing and manufacturing have contributed significantly to 
lowering prices and easing scarcity constraints. 
Where a resource does become increasingly scarce, the world price tends to rise. 
High prices for a resource: 
•  encourage exploration for new supplies — higher prices stimulate investment in 
exploration and make it economic to mine lower-grade mineral deposits; 
•  encourage more economical use — consumers and firms tend to economise on 
the use of items that increase in price;  
•  make recycling more attractive — high value materials, such as copper, steel 
and aluminium, are profitable to recycle in many instances; and 
•  promote substitution to other materials — the vast majority of materials can be 
replaced by others, and technological advances increase the range of possible 
substitutions over time (for example, copper has been partly replaced by other 
materials in a range of applications (including domestic water pipes and 
telecommunication cables) for cost and other reasons). 
Such dynamic responses generally mean that it is sensible to leave extraction rates 
for material resources largely to markets (provided all significant market failures 
and distortions have been addressed) (appendix B). Doing this can, however, reduce 
the total stock of resources for future generations. This is clearly the case for fossil 
fuels that are burnt, but less certain for materials that become solid waste, as these 
can be recycled (either immediately or through future mining of landfills).      





While the sustainability of nonrenewable resources, such as minerals, was regarded 
as important by some participants, other observers have argued that there are higher 
priorities and/or that there is no case for policy intervention. For example, the 
Commission for the European Communities, in considering the sustainable use of 
natural resources concluded: 
At present the environmental impacts of using nonrenewable resources like metals, 
minerals and fossil fuels are of greater concern than their possible scarcity. 
(CEC 2003, p. 4) 
Neumayer (2003, p. 4), in discussing sustainable development, argued: 
… a combination of the distinctive features of natural capital with the prevalence of 
risk, uncertainty and ignorance make a persuasive case for the preservation of certain 
forms of natural capital that provide basic life-support functions … Conversely, no 
explicit conservation policy for nonrenewable resources used in the production of 
consumption goods seems warranted. 
These sorts of arguments appear to have informed the development of some 
sustainability policy in Australia. For example, the objectives of the NSESD do not 
suggest that particular attention needs to be paid to extraction rates for material 
resources. Depletion of, for example, the stock of iron ore is unlikely in itself to 
threaten biological diversity or essential ecological processes and life support 
systems. Accordingly, the NSESD does not require governments to take specific 
action to slow market-driven rates of resource extraction. 
Any such action would have the potential to leave both the current and future 
generations worse off. This is because less resource extraction now is likely to 
reduce investment in human and man-made capital. Future generations, therefore, 
could be left with greater natural reserves of resources, but this might not be 
sufficient to compensate them for a reduced endowment of other forms of capital. 
To put this in historical context, if previous generations had greatly curtailed their 
use of resources, living standards in Australia today would almost certainly be 
lower than they are.  
If it were decided that some government action to slow the rate of extraction of 
resources was required on sustainability grounds, the most direct means available 
would be to use natural resource policy. For example, taxes or quantitative 
restrictions on the extraction of nonrenewable resource could be used. Given that 
Australia is, overall, a much larger exporter of mineral resources than a consumer 
(table 5.1), using waste management policy alone would only have a small effect.     





As discussed, upstream environmental impacts raise more significant sustainability 
concerns than depletion of material resources. Policies that address negative 
environmental externalities and produce net community benefits assist in addressing 
these concerns. This should be done in a way that considers private and external 
(including environmental) costs and benefits, both short and long term. In a report 
on the implementation of ecologically sustainable development, the Productivity 
Commission found that many of the observed shortcomings could be traced back to 
failures to follow such good practice policy making (PC  1999). Nonetheless, 
meeting the NSESD objective to ‘protect biological diversity and maintain essential 
ecological processes and life support systems’ may require action to be taken on 
intergenerational equity, as well as efficiency, grounds. Any such government 
intervention, however, is also best done via direct policy. All of the advantages of 
using direct policy, discussed in section 5.3, apply equally to both efficiency and 
equity objectives. 
The environmental impacts of resource extraction, processing and manufacturing, 
raise more significant sustainability concerns than the depletion of material 
resources. However, waste management policies are an indirect, imprecise and 
generally ineffective means of addressing these issues. Direct policy intervention is 
strongly preferred. 
5.5  Government delivery of waste services 
Governments have long intervened in waste management by delivering some waste 
services. Local governments are typically responsible for waste collection from 
households, and some operate landfills. Some state governments also deliver waste 
services. This section looks at the validity of the arguments for these interventions. 
Household waste collection 
Governments originally became involved in waste collection due to concerns about 
public health and amenity (chapter 3). The market failure at issue here is the 
negative externalities created by the improper disposal of waste. For example, a 
household that piled its garbage in the backyard could affect nearby residents due to 
the smell and attraction of disease-spreading vermin. These issues can also be seen 
in terms of public goods. Government intervention may be warranted to ensure that 
waste does not pose a significant health risk or create odour problems. 
FINDING 5.2     





There is another potential market failure in that household waste collection may be 
a natural monopoly. That is, waste collection in an area may be most efficient (and 
less intrusive) when undertaken by a single firm due to economies of density. These 
economies relate to the advantages of using one truck to empty all the bins in a 
street. Under these circumstances, government intervention may be warranted to 
avoid inefficiencies from a dominant firm overcharging and/or inefficient entry of 
multiple firms. 
The three main possible government responses are to: 
•  allow competition in the market 
•  provide the service itself 
•  manage competition for the market. 
Competition in the market 
Competition in the market involves allowing households to contract directly with 
waste service providers. There are few countries that rely on competition in the 
market for the collection of household waste (OECD 2002). One such country is 
Finland, which has a long tradition of this practice in some municipalities. A study 
conducted in Finland in 1997 found that ‘collection costs were 20 to 25 per cent 
higher in those regions with in-the-market competition compared to those regions 
with a local monopoly chosen by competitive tendering’ (OECD 2002, p. 127). An 
earlier US study also found higher costs in cities that allow in-the-market 
competition (OECD 2002). As well as higher costs, such competition would also be 
likely to result in more trucks being on the road and, hence, more noise and 
congestion. These findings tend to add weight to the argument that household waste 
collection is a natural monopoly requiring some form of government intervention. 
Ensuring that a service is delivered to all households is also difficult where there is 
competition in the market.  
Government provision  
Local government provision of waste collection services was the norm until recent 
years and is still practiced in some areas. Under this arrangement local governments 
employ workers, buy or lease trucks and manage the collection of waste. While it 
allows a universal service to be delivered, it does not allow for competition. Lack of 
competition may result in excessive costs and inadequate incentives for innovation.     




Competition for the market 
Governments can manage competition for the market through competitive tendering 
to select a single service provider for a given waste type in an area (for example, 
there could be one service provider for garbage and another for recyclables). Under 
this arrangement, governments are said to ‘deliver’ the service, but they do not 
directly ‘provide’ it. Competition for the market captures the efficiencies of density 
and the benefits of competition. As indicated by the evidence referred to above, it 
has been shown to result in lower costs than competition in the market in some 
places. This form of government delivery also allows for a service to be provided to 
all households.  
Other waste services 
Local government waste collection services typically cover some small businesses. 
The arguments for governments to deliver collection services to households apply 
equally to these firms. However, for firms that produce large amounts of waste, or 
have specific requirements as to the frequency of waste collection, economies of 
density do not apply. Competition for waste collection is, therefore, appropriate and 
there is no need for governments to deliver these services. 
As mentioned, some governments own and operate landfills. This may be a 
response to concerns over monopoly pricing. That is, that a landfill at significant 
distance from other landfills may be able to charge excessive prices due to 
inadequate competition. However, given reasonable planning approval processes for 
new landfills, the possibility of new entrants can limit opportunities for this to 
occur. Accordingly, government ownership of landfills does not seem to be 
warranted. In general, apart from waste collection for households and small 
businesses, there appears to be little justification for government delivery or 
provision of other waste services.  
5.6  Other arguments for government intervention 
Some additional arguments for government intervention on waste that were 
mentioned, but generally given less prominence, by inquiry participants are 
considered below.      






Some inquiry participants suggested that community expectations alone warrant 
government intervention on waste management. For example, the 
NSW Government argued: 
The community clearly supports waste reduction and recycling, and has a right to 
demand these services from government and industry alike. (sub. DR195, p. 1) 
 
The WA Waste Management Board stated: 
The WA Government is committed to serving its community — governments are 
elected to implement policies on behalf of the community. Waste and recycling 
generates a considerable amount of community interest. To assert that this should be 
given much less weighting, which seems to be implied [by the Productivity 
Commission], is unrealistic. (sub. DR208, p. 1) 
Where governments deliver waste services they should, of course, take community 
preferences into account. Making information available on the full costs of current 
services and on what is done with the various types of waste can assist in this 
process. Where changes to services are contemplated, community input on 
preferences and willingness to pay should be sought. An important means for 
testing willingness to pay is to offer households choice over the level and type of 
service they receive and pay for.  
For broader policy making, community expectations and concerns should also be 
considered and can help to identify waste management issues requiring attention. In 
the Commission’s view, however, the expectations of some community members do 
not justify a policy response that imposes costs on others (either directly or through 
the tax system), unless there is a reasonable basis for these expectations. For 
example, if a community group proposed that landfill levies be introduced because 
this was the best way to reduce upstream environmental damage, then this reasoning 
should be carefully tested. If it is found, as the Commission considers is very likely, 
that environmental protection can be more effectively and efficiently achieved 
through directly-targeted policies then governments should reject the proposal to 
intervene through waste policy, and instead, take more direct action.   
Governments also have a role in influencing community expectations by promoting 
well-informed debate on waste issues (chapter 11). As the DEH stated: 
While being mindful of community values and expectations, governments must take 
responsibility to inform and shape community understanding on issues important to 
society. Indeed, this is done routinely across a wide suite of policies that relate to     




employment, education, health and welfare, science, transport etc. Waste policy should 
be no different. (sub. DR214, p. 15) 
Information failures 
Some inquiry participants argued that information failures relating to waste 
warranted government intervention. For example, the DEH contended that social 
welfare could be increased by addressing ‘a lack of complete information on the 
part of waste generators/consumers and waste managers’ (sub. 103, p. 29). 
There are a number of situations in which imperfect information can lead to poor 
waste outcomes. These include where: 
•  consumers do not have adequate information on the costs of disposal of a 
product at the time of purchase and this leads them to make choices they later 
regret; 
•  the owner of waste is unaware of opportunities to sell or give it away and so 
incorrectly believes disposal to be the least-cost option;  
•  firms generate too much waste, or otherwise manage it poorly, because they do 
not have the information needed to manage waste well; 
•  firms, in designing products, do not take environmental damage from disposal 
into account due to a lack of knowledge; and 
•  waste is incorrectly disposed of due to a lack of knowledge, leading to the 
contamination of recyclables or unsafe treatment of hazardous material.  
There are three main areas where there may be a case for governments to intervene 
to address imperfect information. The first is where information has public good 
characteristics. That is, where information can be used many times over without 
reducing what is available to others, and it is difficult to exclude people from its use 
even if they do not pay for it. This can lead to inadequate incentives for private 
provision of information. This is most likely to occur for information of a general 
nature, such as waste management tips for households. The second area is where 
providing information improves the efficiency and effectiveness of government 
waste services. This is most relevant to education on the correct use of government 
delivered garbage and recycling services. Finally, suppliers may have greater 
information than purchasers on the environmental risks posed by disposal of 
products. That is, there may be information asymmetry that impedes the efficient 
functioning of markets (chapter 11). 
Elsewhere, government intervention to address waste-related imperfections in 
information is generally not warranted. In some cases, the cost of providing     





information may outweigh the potential benefits. In other cases, it is more efficient 
and equitable to rely on markets to provide waste management information. This is 
most clearly the case for firms that have specific information requirements 
concerning waste management. Such firms have the incentive to obtain the 
information they need (chapter 11). 
Virgin materials subsidies 
Several inquiry participants were concerned about the availability of subsidies for 
using virgin materials that were not available to firms using recovered materials 
(Alex Fraser Group, sub.  27; ACOR, sub.  40; DEH, sub.  103, app. A). ACOR 
argued: 
There are many subsidies available to primary resource producers including (amongst 
others): 
•  diesel excise exemption 
•  low cost electricity  
•  tax breaks 
•  accelerated depreciation 
•  permission to dispose of materials on-site with no penalty.  
These subsidies, [that total] … an estimated $5.7 billion per year, put secondary 
resources at a competitive disadvantage and should be extended to apply to resource 
recovery. (sub. 40, pp. 10–11) 
Some of the claimed subsidies, however, may not be subsidies at all. For example, 
applying fewer environmental controls to on-site disposal of mining over-burden 
might simply be because these activities do not pose significant risks to the 
environment or human health. 
The figure of $5.7  billion is sourced from a study done by the Australian 
Government’s Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories (DEST 1997). 
It relates to estimates of financial subsidies to a range of Australian resource 
activities. The major components of the total subsidy were: 
•  water — particularly in rural areas ($3.3 billion); 
•  energy use — transport fuels/roads and other uses, particularly in urban areas 
($1.2 billion); 
•  energy production from primary sources — fossil fuels, renewables and 
electricity ($0.8 billion); 
•  natural attractions — management costs (for example, for national parks) that 
are not recouped through user fees ($0.2 billion); and     




•  extraction of forest products — public agency costs not recouped through 
royalties and other charges for forest products ($0.1 billion) (DEST 1997).  
While the reported subsidies by no means apply exclusively to firms using virgin 
materials, they seem likely to apply to such firms to a greater extent than to those 
using recovered materials. This is because recycling often uses less water and 
energy. The estimates themselves, however, are uncertain. For example, the study 
estimates a substantial subsidy to road users, while acknowledging that some 
Australian studies estimated that road user charges actually exceeded road costs. A 
recent Productivity Commission draft report found that ‘road user charge revenues 
from heavy vehicles more than cover their attributable infrastructure costs’ 
(PC 2006a, p. 4.31). 
Also, the DEST study frequently mentions competitive neutrality policies as a 
possible instrument for removing subsidies. Under the National Competition Policy 
agreements that the Australian, State and Territory Governments committed to in 
1995, competitive neutrality policies have been pursued in all jurisdictions 
(PC 2005c). Accordingly, it seems likely that public sector reforms have reduced 
subsidies since 1994 — the year for which the DEST estimates apply. 
More recent evidence is provided by the Commission’s regular reviews of the 
amount by which various Australian industries benefit from government assistance. 
The Commission’s measure of budgetary assistance includes both specific industry 
budgetary outlays and tax concessions. The Commission found that for 2004-05, 
budgetary assistance amounted to $0.21  billion for mining and $0.04  billion for 
forestry and logging. Total budgetary assistance to all industries was $4.55 billion, 
with most of this falling outside the category of subsidies to the use of virgin 
materials (PC  2006b). These estimates, however, only include Australian 
Government assistance. 
In summary, there are some financial subsidies that apply to firms using virgin 
materials, but these are likely to have declined in recent years. Many of these firms 
also pay royalties to governments and it could be argued that these more than cancel 
out any subsidies. Royalty expenses incurred by firms in the coal, oil and gas 
extraction, and metal ore mining industries totalled $3.8  billion in 2003-04 
(ABS 2006). There are also subsidies to recycling that do not apply to the use of 
virgin materials (chapter 9). Accordingly, it is unclear whether the use of virgin 
materials is subsidised to a greater extent than the use of recovered resources. 
If it were the case that the subsidies to the use of virgin materials were higher than 
those for recovered materials this would tend to promote waste generation and 
discourage recycling. This issue is similar to the upstream externalities discussed in 
section 5.3, as reported by the DEH:     





The 1998 OECD report entitled Improving the Environment Through Reducing 
Subsidies concluded that many subsidies damage the environment by encouraging 
over-production and the wasteful use of inputs. Where environmental externalities are 
not fully internalised into the price of virgin material, the effect is similar to a subsidy 
on the virgin material … (sub. 103, p. 31) 
There may be a case for governments to remove some subsidies. There may, 
however, be valid reasons for others. For example, governments often subsidise 
research and development on the grounds that it provides spillover benefits to the 
community. The benefits of such subsidies may outweigh the costs, including costs 
associated with negative distortions. The existence of a subsidy in one area, 
therefore, is not a valid argument for it to be matched in another area on the grounds 
that this will counteract the distortion. The case for subsidising an activity, or 
removing a subsidy, should be carefully assessed on its own merits. 
Barriers to waste reduction and resource recovery 
Several inquiry participants argued that governments should intervene to address 
barriers to waste reduction and resource recovery and these issue are also raised in 
the inquiry terms of reference. The barriers most commonly mentioned are: 
•  environmental externalities and subsidies that favour the use of virgin materials 
•  behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers 
•  regulations that unnecessarily impede resource recovery 
•  lack of demand for recovered resources. 
Environmental externalities and subsidies 
The environmental externalities discussed earlier in this chapter can cause barriers 
to waste reduction and resource recovery. For example, if virgin material prices do 
not include the environmental costs of their production (or there are financial 
subsidies) recovered resources may be at a cost disadvantage, creating a barrier to 
their use. Where such underpricing occurs it would also discourage firms from 
taking appropriate steps to economise on the use of virgin materials and this could 
result in excessive waste. There may be a case for government intervention to 
address these barriers using policies that directly target the problem, as previously 
discussed.      




Behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers 
Some inquiry participants argued that firms fail to reduce waste and recover 
resources even where this is in their own commercial interests. The DEH reported 
Australian evidence that the barriers responsible for this included: 
•  a lack of information and expertise, particularly among smaller firms 
•  a resistance to cultural change on the part of management 
•  competing business priorities, especially the pressure for short-term profits 
•  the high initial cost of new, cleaner technology. (sub. 103, pp. 40–1) 
Apart from a lack of information (addressed above and in chapter 11) these barriers 
are behavioural, cultural or organisational in nature. They are not market failures 
and the case for governments to intervene to address them is weak. The 
identification by an external party of an unrealised waste management opportunity 
does not mean that a firm’s managers have misplaced priorities. It might just mean 
that they are using their limited resources to pursue more promising opportunities. 
(A more detailed account of some of these barriers as they relate to energy 
efficiency is covered in PC (2005b)).  
Government intervention to force firms to consider particular opportunities is often 
justified by case studies that purport to show how beneficial such interventions can 
be. The counterfactual of what else firms have left undone by attending to these new 
government requirements is never studied. A competitive market is the best means 
of continuing to encourage firms to innovate and capture significant opportunities to 
improve efficiencies. Those that fail to do so will eventually fail. Governments 
should restrain their impulse to provide ‘guidance’ to firms about their priorities 
unless there are real market failures that justify government intervention. 
Regulatory barriers 
There may be regulatory barriers to the development of markets for recovered 
resources. For example, there may be regulations that specify that recovered 
resources cannot be used for a particular purpose, even when they are able to 
perform adequately. Such problems are created by governments. Governments can, 
therefore, seek to find solutions through improved regulation and policy 
coordination, as discussed in chapter 12.  
Lack of demand 
The absence of a market for recovered resources can arise simply because of a lack 
of demand for a recovered resource and/or a lack of supply of a suitably priced     





recovered resource. A number of participants indicated that they would be prepared 
to undertake more recycling, but feel frustrated that they are unable to find the 
necessary customers or obtain feedstock. 
These difficulties can arise because of market conditions, or as a result of 
government policies elsewhere in the economy. As Tech Partners Australia noted, 
economic conditions prevent recycled wood from being used in particleboard:  
… why isn’t wood waste from construction and demolition being used[?] The primary 
reason is economic/cost. Most manufacturers of particleboard have been established 
close to their traditional source of raw materials, the forest. Coincidently the forests are 
generally in regional areas whereas construction and demolition waste is located in the 
major capital cities of Australia. This creates a major logistical problem and contributes 
to the financial disincentive for the use of construction and demolition wood waste in 
particleboard. (sub. 35, p. 2) 
In the case of compost, government intervention to divert organic waste from 
landfill has resulted in an excess supply of compost in Sydney and elsewhere. 
Commpost NSW (a working group of the NSW Branch of the Waste Management 
Association of Australia) reported that compost stockpiles in the Sydney 
metropolitan region had grown from 280 000 tonnes to almost 421 000 tonnes in the 
twelve months to March 2006 (trans., pp. 488–9).  
Lack of market demand is not in itself a valid reason for government intervention, 
as this represents the ordinary operation of markets. Where another government 
intervention is responsible for creating an excess of supply over demand, as with 
compost in Sydney, this brings into question the effectiveness of that intervention.  
Wasteful consumption 
For a number of commentators and inquiry participants, the generation of waste is 
symptomatic of a wider social problem — the community’s predilection to the 
wasteful consumption of goods and services. Resourceco argued: 
Waste management in Australia largely reflects the nature of the throw away society in 
which we live. Marketing strategies have promoted over many years that our lives are 
incomplete without the latest and greatest and the most up to date gadgets. 
(sub. 46, p. 2) 
ACT NOWaste identified the failure of governments to address consumerism and 
wasteful consumption as the root cause of the growth in waste generation: 
There is little being done in the ACT, or across Australia, to address waste avoidance 
and excessively high levels of consumerism and wasteful consumption patterns. Waste 
agencies are struggling to tackle this issue and there appears to be little strategic action     




by all levels of government to discourage excessive consumption and address product 
design and life cycle issues. (sub. 36, p. 2) 
The Waste Management Association of Australia, Queensland Division saw a need 
for a waste policy response to wasteful consumption: 
… I believe there is a strong emphasis needed on the wasteful consumption issue. 
When we see that there are over $5 billion of fresh food waste produced in Australia 
each year — and we take the Australia Institute’s data on that — it highlights the issue. 
(trans., p. 315) 
Generally speaking, it can be presumed that consumers will only buy things they 
expect to derive some benefit from. On occasions they may end up not using 
something and throwing it out. In the Commission’s view this is not necessarily a 
public policy concern because consumers are generally best placed to make their 
own consumption decisions. If there is a role for governments, it would appear to 
relate more to information and awareness raising rather than waste policy. For 
example, it might be desirable for schools to develop students’ understanding that 
consumption decisions have environmental consequences and that advertising aims 
to make products seem as desirable as possible. 
Creating jobs 
Some inquiry participants suggested that government intervention to promote 
recycling would have a benefit in providing more jobs (Zero Waste Australia, 
sub.  4; Brisbane City Council, sub.  DR154; Visy Industries, sub.  DR177). For 
example, Zero Waste Australia stated that ‘recycling programs … have created 
many thousands of jobs worldwide’ (sub. 4, p. 1). They went on to say: 
When looking at the comparison in balance we should acknowledge that waste to 
landfill does give the community jobs — but only about a third of the jobs you get with 
recycling. (sub. 4, p. 2) 
The fact that recycling employs a lot of people is evidence only that it can be 
expensive, not that it is necessarily a worthwhile thing to do. Using labour and other 
resources on recycling means that they cannot be used to fulfil other goals, such as 
building schools or hospitals. For this reason, any jobs required for recycling should 
count as a cost (for wages, superannuation etc), not a benefit. Jobs in the recycling 
industry would be expected to mainly replace jobs elsewhere in the economy, rather 
than reduce unemployment.     




6  A waste policy framework 
 
Key points 
•  Waste management policy should be based on maximising net benefits to the 
community. 
– The financial and non-financial (including environmental and social) costs and 
benefits associated with waste should be taken into account. 
–  Policy should directly address the relevant market failures, the most important being 
the negative externalities associated with waste disposal. 
•  The costs and benefits associated with waste management vary significantly 
between regions and so uniform outcomes throughout Australia for waste disposal 
and recycling are not desirable.  
•  The environmental costs of disposal are negligible for some types of waste and high 
for others. Policy should reflect this. 
•  Charging for waste services at less than the full cost, and failing to charge according 
to the quantity of waste disposed, tend to encourage too much waste generation and 
disposal, and can unnecessarily add to environmental impacts. 
•  Waste policy assessment would benefit from improved methods for estimating 
downstream environmental externalities. Improving estimates of the upstream 
external costs and benefits of waste policies should not be given a high priority as 
such impacts are best addressed by upstream policies. 
•  Resource efficiency, as it is usually defined, does not take into account the use of 
resources/inputs such as capital and labour, is often deficient in the way it treats 
multiple resources, and can encourage indirect (and ineffective) policy responses. 
Accordingly, promoting resource efficiency is not a suitable objective for waste 
policy. 
•  More policy coordination is not always better. There are benefits from both 
decentralised government action and uniform policy across jurisdictions and these 
need to be weighed up on a case-by-case basis. 
•  In regard to greenhouse gas emissions, a consistent national approach that 
considers all abatement options is needed. Piecemeal industry-specific approaches, 
such as using waste policies to tackle greenhouse gas abatement will not deliver the 
best outcome for the community. 
•  The Environment Protection and Heritage Council has developed a framework for 
identifying waste issues for which national collaboration would be appropriate. This 
framework is generally sound, but could be improved further. 
     




This chapter sets out a waste management policy framework that is used in later 
chapters in assessing specific policy options. It is also intended to be of direct use to 
governments in developing policy.  
6.1 Policy  principles 
It is important that waste management policy is consistent with good practice policy 
principles as promulgated in government publications such as the Office of 
Regulation Review’s A Guide to Regulation1 (ORR 1998) and various Council of 
Australian Government guidelines (for example, COAG 2004). Box 6.1 sets out 
policy assessment criteria, based on ORR (1998), that are used in this report. The 
main body of this section expands on the most important principles for guiding the 
development of waste management policy. 
Focus on the impacts of waste disposal 
The objectives of waste management policy should relate primarily to the 
environmental and social externalities of waste disposal, including those for landfill, 
energy-from-waste, illegal dumping and littering. The Commission considers that 
the objective should be to manage waste so as to reduce risks to human health, the 
environment and social amenity to acceptable levels (that is where the expected 
benefits of further reducing the risk are less than the costs of doing so). There may 
also be some information failures that warrant government intervention. 
As discussed in chapter  5, upstream environmental externalities associated with 
waste (figure  1.1) are most appropriately addressed through other, more 
directly-targeted, policies. In theory, waste policies could be used where more direct 
policies were not able to be justified or effectively used, there were reasonable 
prospects of such intervention being effective and net benefits to the community 
were likely to result. The Commission considers that these circumstances are likely 
to be the exception rather than the norm.  
It is also important that policy objectives do not confuse means with ends. For 
example, reducing the quantity of waste going to landfill could be one means for 
achieving the objective of reducing the environmental impacts of waste disposal. 
This means should not be elevated to the status of an objective. If this were done, 
reducing quantities of waste that do not cause environmental problems (inert waste) 
could be seen as desirable, even though this would not contribute to the real 
                                              
1  This guide is to be updated in a new Office of Best Practice Regulation publication titled Best 
Practice Regulation Handbook, due out in late 2006.     




objective. Similarly, increasing recycling rates, or achieving recycling targets, are 
not appropriate objectives because they are not legitimate ends in themselves. 
 
Box 6.1  Policy assessment criteria 
1.  Does the policy directly target a market failure? — As government intervention 
is not costless, it is important that there is a valid reason for it. The existence of market 
failure indicates there may be a role for government action. Measures that directly 
target the problem are generally preferable. If a measure is indirect, the reason for not 
using more direct policy should be made explicit and rigorously tested. 
2.  Is there a clear objective? — The objective should be clear, concise and as 
specific as possible, but specified broadly enough to allow consideration of all relevant 
solutions. 
3.  How effective is the policy likely to be? — This involves assessing the extent to 
which the policy is likely to achieve its objective. Reviews of past performance of the 
policy, or similar measures, in Australia and internationally can be useful in making this 
assessment.  
4.  Is the policy likely to deliver net benefits? — This requires comprehensively 
assessing the costs and benefits from a communitywide perspective (including private 
and external costs and benefits, both short and long term). Costs to the community 
include those to government, firms and consumers. In the first instance, costs and 
benefits must be estimated before the policy is introduced and some uncertainty is 
inevitable. However, this uncertainty can be reduced over time by conducting ex post 
policy evaluations. Such evaluations are critical to the ongoing improvement of policy.  
5.  Are the distributional outcomes acceptable? — Policies have different impacts 
on different groups and some may be left worse off. Costs and benefits accruing to 
particular groups in society should therefore be assessed and considered by 
policymakers. The acceptability of outcomes from an intergenerational equity 
perspective may also need to be considered to ensure consistency with the National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development. However, taking a net community 
benefits approach greatly assists in achieving the objectives of ecologically sustainable 
development and it is unlikely to be necessary to go beyond measures suggested by 
this approach. 
6.  Is the policy better than the alternatives? — It is important that all feasible policy 
options are considered during the policy making process to ensure that the best option 
is identified. The best option is generally the one that delivers the largest net benefits. 
If no policy delivers net benefits, government intervention is not warranted. This simple 
prescription becomes more subjective if there are items that cannot be valued. In these 
cases, the concept of ‘cost effectiveness’ may be useful for determining the best 
option. That is, if two options are equally effective in meeting an objective, the one that 
imposes the least cost should generally be preferred. Distributional considerations are 
also relevant to identifying the best policy option. 
 
     




Chapter  3 outlined the objects of various national, state and territory waste 
legislation and related strategies. In general, these objects are poorly aligned with 
the policy-relevant market failures. In particular, they tend to focus strongly on 
resource conservation and upstream environmental protection. Resource 
conservation is a questionable objective, but if it is pursued this is best done via 
direct policy, rather than waste policy. Upstream environmental externalities are 
important, but again should be (and often are) pursued by directly-targeted policies. 
Addressing resource conservation and upstream environmental protection through 
waste policy is generally inconsistent with maximising net benefits to the 
community. 
Most of the waste legislation and strategies also include an objective of reducing or 
minimising waste. Reducing waste is sometimes a means for achieving legitimate 
policy objectives, such as reducing the externalities from waste disposal, but is not 
an end in itself. 
The only possible market failure that reducing waste could be said to be closely 
aligned with is information failure. That is, the notion that some households and 
firms generate and/or dispose of too much waste because they do not have access to 
information that would allow them to reduce waste. However, as discussed in 
chapter 5, many of the reasons put forward for why waste-reduction opportunities 
are not always taken up do not amount to market failures. Further, information 
failures, where they exist, only warrant government intervention in 
narrowly-defined circumstances. The prominence given to waste reduction in much 
of the legislation and strategies is out of proportion to the size of any possible 
market failure. 
Australian, State and Territory waste legislation and strategies often: 
•  are not sufficiently focused on reducing risks to human health, the environment 
and social amenity from waste to acceptable levels; 
•  include objects relating to resource conservation and upstream environmental 
protection, even though these issues are more appropriately dealt with through 
directly-targeted policies; and 
•  give a high priority to waste reduction as an end in itself, even though there is 
no market failure that would justify this.  
 
FINDING 6.1     




Australian, State and Territory waste legislation and strategies should be 
reformulated to focus on reducing risks — to human health, the environment and 
social amenity — from waste to acceptable levels. Objects that detract from this 
focus, such as those relating to resource conservation and upstream 
environmental protection, should be removed. 
Make all costs and benefits count 
Leaving waste management outcomes entirely to the market would be likely to 
result in some important environmental and social costs being ignored. By contrast, 
a waste hierarchy approach to policy tends to overlook the financial and other costs 
associated with collecting, transporting, sorting and processing waste. Taking a 
net-benefits approach to policy, as advocated by the Commission, requires that all 
of these costs and benefits be considered by policy makers.  
Taking all costs and benefits into account promotes the overall efficiency with 
which labour, capital and material resources are used. High costs (such as for 
sorting the recyclables from a particular waste stream) indicate that valuable 
resources are being used — whatever type of resources these may be. It is important 
that policy makers are cognisant of this and only support waste management options 
that increase net financial costs (after any recoveries) where they have rigorously 
established that there are more than commensurate environmental or social benefits. 
Such an approach supports recycling where the benefits exceed the costs. In 
determining whether there are net benefits from recycling, it is not appropriate to 
regard materials in the waste stream as always having an inherent value (as 
suggested by some inquiry participants, such as Eco Waste, sub. 83). Value depends 
on factors such as the quantity of a material, the degree to which it is mixed with 
other wastes, the distance to markets and the market price. In many cases these 
factors result in waste materials having a negative value. As suggested by the 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development: 
… the aim is to identify opportunities for efficiency gains through the recovery and 
reuse of resources, but only where it will contribute to an improvement in overall 
economic efficiency, including avoiding external costs such as pollution. 
(sub. 70, p. 11) 
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Getting prices right 
Getting prices right for waste services is a powerful means for ensuring that costs 
and benefits are taken into account. The ‘right’ price being one that reflects both the 
private and external costs associated with providing the service. Achieving this 
ensures that the incentives for waste generation and disposal, resource recovery and 
environmental protection, are appropriate.  
Private costs 
In general, private providers of waste services must build private costs into their 
prices or risk going out of business. For government-delivered waste services, 
however, there is sometimes evidence of undercharging, with unrecovered costs 
being made up through general taxation or rates. Rectifying undercharging can 
improve incentives, as discussed. Efficient pricing can also promote competition 
between government and private service providers.  
Landfills and waste collection are both areas where prices are important. Landfill 
charges should be sufficient to cover the full cost of the service, including 
complying with all licence conditions, site remediation, aftercare and a return on the 
investment in the landfill (chapter 12 discusses this further). Waste collection 
should also be charged for on a full cost basis, or at least the full costs be made 
transparent to ratepayers. There are also some advantages in each household being 
charged according to the quantity of waste they put out for collection. This 
approach, sometimes referred to as ‘pay-as-you-throw’, is discussed in chapter 9. 
External costs 
Chapter 4 discusses the environmental and other external costs and benefits that can 
arise from waste management practices. Where external costs exist, the incentives 
for environmental protection, waste avoidance and recycling may not be as strong 
as they should be. This is because the costs are imposed on people who are not 
involved in creating them. Where government intervention to address external costs 
is warranted, there are three possible options: 
1.  Preventing them from occurring — for example, waste facilities could be subject 
to regulations to reduce the risks that emissions from them will cause 
environmental problems. 
2.  Making private agents pay for amelioration — for example, the owners of waste 
facilities could be required to pay for cleaning up any pollution they cause.      




3.  Introducing commensurate taxes or levies — for example, a levy on material 
going to a waste facility could be introduced and set at a level equivalent to the 
external cost. 
These options essentially lead to external costs becoming private costs, either 
directly or indirectly. The externality is said to be internalised. In the process, the 
environmental or other harm is either prevented or discouraged. The aim is 
generally to reduce the risks of harm to the level at which the cost of further 
reductions begins to exceed the benefit. The best option for addressing external 
costs depends on the circumstances — an issue explored in later chapters. 
Assessing costs and benefits 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments have acknowledged the principle 
that all relevant costs and benefits should be considered when deciding whether 
government intervention is necessary, and the most efficient form of intervention. 
This principle is formalised in the regulation impact assessment processes used by 
most governments and in the Council of Australian Government’s guidelines for 
national standard-setting bodies (COAG 2004). Cost–benefit analysis is a tool that 
is commonly used for this purpose. Cost–benefit analysis is not restricted to 
financial items. When correctly applied, it also considers any changes in community 
wellbeing arising from changes in environmental amenity, health and safety 
outcomes and other less tangible outcomes (ORR 1998). 
In a practical sense, some costs and benefits are too small or too tenuously linked 
with the policy to be worth estimating. Accordingly, it is necessary to set a 
‘boundary’ for the analysis based on the materiality of less direct costs and benefits. 
This raises the question as to whether upstream costs and benefits should be 
estimated for cost–benefit analyses of waste management policies. Life-cycle 
assessment has been used for this purpose, but the Commission’s view is that some 
of these attempts have been flawed in a number of respects (chapter 4; appendix B). 
It may be possible to overcome these flaws. However, it is not clear that this would 
be worth the effort because upstream market failure should not drive waste 
management policy. If genuine upstream benefits were found through life-cycle 
assessment, and this resulted in a proposed waste management policy meeting the 
cost–benefit test, the best course of action would generally be to intervene directly 
upstream to address the market failure and then to reassess the waste policy cost–
benefit analysis. Accordingly, improving techniques to estimate the upstream costs 
and benefits for the purpose of waste management policy assessment does not 
warrant being given a high priority. Government attention to address market failures     




throughout the product life cycle is, of course, an important role for relevant policy 
makers in those areas. 
Valuing environmental externalities 
The Commission has found a range of shortcomings with past attempts at valuing 
both downstream and upstream environmental externalities of waste management 
activities (chapter 4; appendix B). While some problems are inevitable given the 
complexity of the task, policy assessment could be improved by: 
•  Calculating expected values — some methods for estimating environmental 
costs produce ‘potential costs’. Such costs can be converted to ‘expected costs’ 
by accounting for the probability of their occurrence. In cases where risk is a 
major consideration, more sophisticated risk analysis may also be useful. Such 
analysis could consider whether the proposal under consideration is the 
least-cost means of abating the risk to acceptable levels. It may also be worth 
compiling more detailed information on the different levels of damage that could 
occur, but which are uncertain. This information could be used in sensitivity 
analyses to examine the effects on cost–benefit outcomes of changes in 
assumptions. 
•  Discounting future costs and benefits — costs and benefits that occur in future 
years should be discounted to present values. This is consistent with government 
guidelines for cost–benefit analysis that apply in some jurisdictions (for 
example, Commonwealth of Australia 2006). 
•  Describing impacts in physical as well as dollar terms — including concise 
physical descriptions of the environmental impacts (including the pathways 
through which damage can occur) alongside dollar estimates could help policy 
makers and other stakeholders interpret them and better subject them to rigorous 
analysis. 
•  Utilising appropriate methodology — appropriate use of government guides, 
such as the Australian Government’s Handbook of Cost–Benefit Analysis 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006), can improve the accuracy and consistency 
of estimates. 
As discussed above, it may not be worthwhile estimating the upstream costs and 
benefits of proposed waste management policies. If they are estimated, this should 
be done cautiously. In particular it would be important to:  
•  Recognise that many potential upstream benefits are influenced by upstream 
policies — upstream policies (for example, forest policy) may act to internalise 
upstream externalities (chapter  4). This internalisation is sometimes not 
accounted for in life-cycle assessment. Where full internalisation has been     




achieved by an upstream policy (for example, through taxes or environmental 
offsets) no net upstream benefit or cost should be included in a waste 
management policy assessment. 
•  Not include depletion of mineral resources as an externality — the depletion of 
nonrenewable resources, such as minerals, does not in itself constitute an 
externality (appendix B). 
Acknowledge that variations in waste outcomes are desirable 
As explained in chapter 4, the costs and benefits of waste management vary greatly 
according to location. Waste disposal might be much more costly in one city than 
another, due to differences in the availability and proximity of suitable landfill 
space. Distance to markets for recyclables, and therefore the financial and 
environmental costs of transport, is much higher in some areas than others. It is 
desirable that these differences flow through to regional variations in recycling rates 
and other waste outcomes in order to achieve the best results for the Australian 
community. 
Costs and benefits also vary with the type of waste. This is particularly so for the 
environmental costs of waste disposal, as indicated in table 6.1. The Tellus Institute 
in the United States, for example, found that half of landfill externalities was from 
‘the handful of potentially-hazardous products in the waste stream, such as 
oil-based paints and batteries’ (Ackerman 1997, p. 39). This suggests that waste 
policy should pay particular attention to the potentially-hazardous waste that forms 
a small part of the waste streams under consideration in this inquiry. The benefits of 
reducing the generation, increasing the recycling, or ensuring the safe disposal of 
such waste may be substantial and outweigh the gains that could be made from 
influencing waste outcomes for much larger quantities of non-hazardous waste.  
Table 6.1  Potential environmental impacts of different types of waste in 
landfill 
Type of waste  Examples  Main potential impacts when disposed to landfilla 
Inert waste  Glass, most plastic, 
concrete, soil. 
None. 
Putrescible waste  Food scraps, green 
garden waste. 
Greenhouse gas emissions; and release of organic 
compounds to leachate that can increase the 
mobilisation of heavy metals and other toxic compounds 





Source of heavy metals and other toxic compounds that 
can be mobilised in leachate. 
a The existence and severity of actual environmental impacts depends on the siting, construction and 
management of landfills.     




Respond appropriately to community preferences 
The rationale for government delivery of waste collection services rests partly on 
the desirability of having a universal service (chapter 5). Accordingly, it is 
important that at least a basic level of service is provided to all households for 
public health and amenity reasons. Beyond this, however, the preferences of 
households should inform the design of the services that are offered. 
A high proportion of Australians indicate that they support recycling, but less is 
known about the strength of this support (chapter 2). To help gauge this, local 
governments could provide ratepayers with information on the costs of providing 
services and what is done with the various types of waste. As indicated in chapter 4, 
this would generally show that kerbside recycling is currently somewhat more 
financially costly than sending all waste to landfill. If information on the extra 
amount being paid for recycling were provided, the community would be able to 
make more informed decisions about this service. Options could include: continuing 
with it unchanged; modifying it (for example, collecting only higher-value 
materials); or discontinuing the service. Similarly, if a change from landfilling to 
use of an alternative waste technology facility were proposed it would be important 
for the community to be provided with information on the cost and other 
implications of this change.  
Decisions also need to be made on which elements of waste services are common to 
all households and which are optional. Offering appropriately priced choices can 
result in a better match with the needs of individual households and improve the 
price signals for waste avoidance and recycling. For example, there are advantages 
in the provision of a separate bin for green waste being optional. Some households 
do not generate much green waste and others deal with it on-site (for example, by 
composting). Having a compulsory green-waste bin would force these households 
to pay for a service they do not need and reduce the incentive for others to move to 
home composting. 
What about resource efficiency? 
The principles outlined above focus on an assessment of all costs and benefits rather 
than just resource efficiency. While this was foreshadowed in chapter  1, the 
Commission’s approach to resource efficiency may require further explanation, 
particularly as some inquiry participants were of the view that the draft report did 
not adequately deal with this issue (Victorian Government, sub. DR 187; Tasmanian 
Government, sub. DR164; WMAA NSW Branch, sub. DR150).     




Inquiry participants offered various definitions of the term ‘resource efficiency’, as 
shown in box 6.2. While the definitions vary somewhat, most of them imply that the 
returns from using one or more raw materials (and sometimes also energy) should 
be maximised. For the purposes of this report, resource efficiency is taken to mean 
‘the value added per unit of resource input’, as suggested by the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC 2003, p. 9).  
 
Box 6.2  Definitions of resource efficiency 
Several inquiry participants interpreted resource efficiency as maximising the return to 
be achieved from use of one or more raw materials (and sometimes also energy). For 
example, the Department of Premier and Cabinet Tasmania stated: 
If resource efficiency were measured as the dollar value of goods and services produced per 
tonne of raw materials consumed, then disposal to landfill would represent a negative impact 
on resource efficiency. (sub. 114, p. 1) 
The Municipal Waste Advisory Council stated that resource efficiency was:  
The relative quantity of natural resources required by a particular process per unit of output. 
(sub. 119, p. 5) 
The Waste Management Association of Australia, NSW Branch quoted a European 
Commission definition of resource efficiency: 
… the efficiency with which we use energy and material throughout the economy, i.e. the 
value added per unit of resource input. (sub. DR150, p. 12) 
 
 
Resource efficiency and waste management policy 
Resource efficiency is a partial measure in that it considers some inputs to 
production (one or more raw materials) and not others (including labour and 
capital). Consequently it is not always desirable to increase resource efficiency. 
This is because doing so can involve using labour and/or capital with a high value in 
order to save raw materials with a relatively low value. 
The partial nature of resource efficiency, however, does not prevent it from having 
some useful applications. For example, many people find it useful to compare the 
fuel efficiency of cars, while still recognising that other attributes of the car, such as 
safety and price, are important. Similarly, there may be advantages in analysing 
some production processes according to a partial metric, such as how much of a raw 
material is used per unit of output. In the end, however, the question of whether a 
more resource-efficient process provides overall benefits (after considering the costs 
of all inputs/resources) needs to be considered. The potential value of using 
measures of resource efficiency also relate more to firms interested in improving 
their specific production processes, rather than to waste policy makers.     




Resource efficiency can also be measured for more complex systems where there 
are many different material inputs and many outputs. For example, the quantity of 
materials used per unit of gross domestic product has been calculated for some 
countries (Neumayer 2003). It is not clear, however, that anything is gained by 
adding up the number of tonnes used of different materials, given that each material 
has a different value and the environmental consequences of extracting, producing 
and using each are different. Because of this (and because other inputs are not 
considered) such measures do not indicate whether one country’s economic or 
environmental performance is better than another’s. Differences between countries 
on this measure are likely to relate more to the structure of their economies than the 
efficiency with which they use resources. 
Several inquiry participants suggested that waste management policy should be 
used to promote resource efficiency. The main argument for this seems to relate to 
sustainability. For example, the Municipal Waste Advisory Council acknowledged 
that resource efficiency had some limitations, but argued:  
… a role exists for policy makers to scrutinise outcomes and make determinations 
about what is required to make systems sustainable. In performing this role, a measure 
like resource efficiency, narrowly defined as the ratio of natural resource inputs to 
economic output, provides policy makers with an important tool to use in making these 
determinations. (sub. 52, p. 18) 
There are two ways that promoting resource efficiency might be argued to lead to 
improvements in sustainability. First, increasing resource efficiency could lead to a 
slowing of the rate of depletion of natural resources, such as minerals. It is the 
Commission’s view, however, that no specific waste management policy measures 
to conserve such natural resources are warranted, either on efficiency or 
intergenerational equity grounds. Provided the market failures and distortions 
associated with resource extraction and processing are appropriately dealt with, 
markets provide the best way of handling the scarcity of these resources. These 
issues were considered in more detail in chapter 5.  
Second, resource efficiency might be taken as an inverse proxy for the 
environmental externalities occurring throughout the product life cycle. 
Accordingly, it might be postulated that action is needed to reduce material flows 
through the economy (and thereby increase resource efficiency) in order to reduce 
environmental damage. While there may be a crude relationship between material 
flows and environmental damage, this does not suggest that action to reduce 
material flows is the best way of addressing environmental externalities.  
 
     




As argued by Neumayer (2003, p. 181): 
The call for general reductions in material flows is not guaranteed to be ecologically 
effective, but is guaranteed to be highly economically inefficient with respect to 
whatever reduction in environmental damage might be achieved.  
The argument for increasing resource efficiency in order to reduce environmental 
damage has much in common with the argument for using waste management 
policy to address upstream environmental impacts. In fact, for some purposes they 
amount to the same thing. Accordingly, conclusions reached in chapter  5 are 
relevant here — environmental externalities and sustainability concerns are most 
appropriately addressed by directly-targeted policies. Indirect means, such as 
through influencing resource efficiency, are likely to be at best inefficient and quite 
probably ineffective. 
Waste management policy should not be used to promote resource efficiency 
(defined as the value added per unit of resource input). This is because measures 
of resource efficiency: 
•  do not take into account the use of all resources; and 
•  often involve aggregating quantities of different materials in a way that does 
not take into account their individual market values or environmental impacts. 
Taking a net community benefits approach to resource use 
While maximising resource efficiency is not in the community’s best interests, it is 
desirable that raw materials and other inputs are used in a way that maximises net 
benefits to the community. Among other things, this requires: 
•  production of raw materials (for example, by mining or forest harvesting) to 
only proceed where the benefits outweigh the costs (including environmental 
costs);  
•  that opportunities to use less of a raw material be taken where this can be done 
while keeping the quantity of all other inputs (including labour and capital), and 
the quality of the product, the same; 
•  product design to be appropriately influenced by the costs of all inputs and the 
cost of waste disposal; and 
•  the least-cost (including all environmental, social and financial costs) means of 
dealing with waste be used, whether this be through reuse, recycling or disposal. 
Government policy can promote these outcomes by addressing market failures 
where they occur throughout the product life cycle. This is likely to involve policies 
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for mining, forestry, agriculture, transport, manufacturing and waste management 
activities that address environmental externalities and other market failures. 
Accordingly, waste management policy has a role to play, together with a whole 
range of other directly-targeted policies, to promote the judicious use of raw 
materials.  
Where appropriate government interventions have been made, markets would 
normally be expected to respond in ways that best promote community wellbeing. 
For example, if a raw material becomes more expensive because the environmental 
externalities associated with its production are internalised, firms will look for ways 
to economise on its use. This might, among other things, result in less waste 
generation and/or more recycling.  
6.2 Policy  coordination 
Waste management policy has traditionally been seen as a local issue, requiring 
action mainly at the local government level. Several trends have, however, changed 
this situation, including the: 
•  increasing size and sophistication of waste recycling and disposal facilities; 
•  challenge of planning for fewer but larger waste facilities in or near large urban 
centres; 
•  greater interest by State and Territory Governments in influencing waste 
outcomes; and 
•  burgeoning interest in policies, such as product stewardship schemes, that may 
require a national approach. 
These trends increasingly require that attention be given to coordinating policies 
between the different levels of government. In addition, there is a need for waste 
management policy to be coordinated with other policies. 
General principles of coordination 
Achieving appropriate policy coordination requires balancing the benefits of 
decentralised government action against the benefits of having uniform policy 
within a region, state or within Australia (box 6.3). 
The principle of subsidiarity, which recognises that decisions whose impact is 
restricted to a local area should be made at the local level, can be useful in 
determining the best approach to policy coordination. The European Community     




makes use of this principle to require that actions be left to member states unless ‘by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, [it] be better achieved by the 
Community’ (van den Bergh 1996, p. 363). 
 
Box 6.3  Benefits of decentralised versus uniform government action 
Benefits of decentralised government action 
•  Development of more effective policies — different approaches in different 
jurisdictions can allow for greater innovation and opportunities for learning from the 
experiences of others. 
•  Reduced information asymmetries — it may be easier for local agencies to obtain 
accurate information about the firms and communities who are to be regulated or 
provided with services.  
•  Closer matching with community needs — regional variations in community needs 
may justify differences in government objectives, policies and services.  
•  Greater responsiveness — local agencies may be able to respond more quickly to 
community needs. 
Benefits from having uniform policy across a region or broader area 
•  Scale economies for government — costs of policy development, planning, 
implementation and service delivery may be lower when undertaken centrally or 
collectively. 
•  Scale economies for firms — costs may be lower because one product or service 
can be supplied across a region, or across Australia, rather than having variations to 
meet local requirements. 
•  Reduced transaction costs — compliance costs may be lower where uniform 
information requirements and administrative procedures apply in different 
jurisdictions. 
•  Enhanced competition — uniform regulation may encourage Australian firms to 
expand their operations across jurisdictions and encourage foreign firms to supply 
the Australian market. 
•  More effective treatment of externalities — where government action is required to 
address externalities, it may be more effective when taken at a level that can 
‘internalise’ the effects of the externality. For example, greenhouse gas emissions 
are believed to have a global impact, which suggests that a national response that 




     




The applicability of the principle of subsidiarity to some waste management policies 
is evident in several submissions to this inquiry. For example, the Local 
Government Association of the Northern Territory stated: 
The ‘Best Practice’ model of integrated waste management is often difficult to achieve 
for remote underdeveloped communities. In these types of communities initiatives that 
are promoted or imposed by the State/Territory and Australian Governments can be 
uneconomical and difficult to achieve. (sub. 19, p. 3) 
Some of the benefits of coordination can be achieved without having uniform 
policies across jurisdictions. For example, harmonisation (agreement on common 
policy elements) can be used to embed common data definitions, measurement 
systems and product standards within waste management policies that differ in other 
respects. Another aspect of policy coordination is consistency — that is, ensuring 
that policies do not contradict one another. For example, each government should 
make sure that its waste management policies are consistent with broader policy 
settings. 
Applying coordination principles 
These principles of coordination have been used in a number of contexts in other 
chapters. In particular, in determining whether: 
•  government delivery of waste services in large urban centres is best done by 
individual local governments, regional groupings of local governments or fully 
constituted regional bodies (chapter 12); 
•  there are policies in other areas that should be better coordinated with waste 
management policies (in order to, for example, not inappropriately impede 
resource recovery) (chapter 12);  
•  there is value in having common data definitions for waste across all 
jurisdictions (chapter 13); and 
•  particular waste policies are consistent with the broader policy objective of 
promoting community wellbeing (chapters 7–10). 
Two further coordination issues are considered below. 
Coordination with greenhouse gas abatement policy 
There are some greenhouse gas abatement policies that affect waste management. 
AGL, a firm that, among other things, develops landfill gas generation facilities, 
reported that commercially-valuable certificates can be earned from: 
•  flaring methane at landfill sites under the Greenhouse Challenge Plus program;     




•  producing electricity from landfill gas under the Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target scheme; and 
•  avoiding methane emissions through electricity generation at landfills under the 
NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement scheme (sub. 62). 
In addition, there are some state-based waste management policies that address 
greenhouse gas emissions. For example, gas capture systems are sometimes 
required to be installed at new landfills for greenhouse gas abatement and other 
reasons. Some governments have also justified landfill levies partly on the basis of 
greenhouse gas emissions (BDA Group and EconSearch 2004). 
Addressing greenhouse gas emissions through waste management policy has the 
disadvantage that some of the abatement measures pursued may have a higher cost 
(per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent gases) than for some other abatement options 
(unrelated to waste) that are not currently being pursued. 
Improving policy coordination in this area would best be pursued through a 
comprehensive national approach to greenhouse gas abatement. As well as 
promoting least-cost abatement, this would allow Australia’s greenhouse response 
to be considered in light of international efforts to address what is a global issue. 
The Commission’s review of National Competition Policy addressed this issue and 
recommended: 
The Australian Government, in consultation with State and Territory Governments, 
should as a matter of urgency develop a more effective process for achieving a national 
approach to greenhouse gas abatement. (PC 2005c, p. 349) 
Following a meeting on 3 June 2005, the Council of Australian Governments 
announced that it had: 
… agreed to set up a Senior Officials’ group to examine the scope for national 
cooperation on climate change policy, focusing on areas of common ground between 
jurisdictions where practical progress can be made. (COAG 2005, p. 7) 
Existing arrangements for national coordination 
Some inquiry participants argued for national coordination of some waste 
management policies. For example, the NSW Government stated: 
There are some areas of waste policy where a national approach could result in a more 
efficient and effective approach. Examples include product stewardship and extended 
producer responsibility. (sub. 95, p. 13) 
The National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (NEPC Act) assigns to the 
NEPC the function of making National Environment Protection Measures     




(NEPMs). NEPMs may relate to a range of matters, including environmental 
impacts associated with hazardous waste, and the reuse and recycling of used 
materials. As discussed in chapter 10, a NEPM for product stewardship schemes is 
being developed.  
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) (a body related to the 
NEPC, having similar but wider membership) has also developed a National Waste 
Framework (included in appendix D). This framework is used to determine waste 
issues upon which national collaboration would be appropriate. 
The Commission considers that this framework is sound in most respects. Indeed, it 
includes many principles of good policy design and accordingly some parts of it 
could be useful for State and Territory Governments in guiding the development of 
their own waste management policies. That said, there are some improvements that 
could be made to the EPHC framework as outlined in box 6.4. 
 
Box 6.4  Suggested changes to the EPHC National Waste Framework 
•  ‘Resource use efficiency’ is included as a factor to consider. Because ‘resource 
efficiency’ and ‘resource use efficiency’, as commonly defined, can imply that raw 
materials should be conserved even where this is not in the community’s best 
interests, these terms should not be used.   
•  In considering the significance of a waste problem the framework requires that the 
‘potential for resource recovery’ be considered. This should either be deleted or 
replaced by the ‘potential for efficient resource recovery’. This is because resource 
recovery should not be promoted where the costs of recovery outweigh the benefits. 
•  While there is mention of ‘benefits and costs’ there should be a more explicit 
acknowledgement that government intervention is only warranted where this has 
been carefully evaluated and is considered likely to deliver net benefits to the 
community. 
•  ‘The level of social and community concerns’ is listed as a primary consideration in 
assessing the priority of an issue for national cooperation. In the Commission’s view 
this is a secondary consideration to the others listed (that is, ‘significance of impact 
or harm’ and ‘analysis of the cost and associated benefits of any action’). The 
concerns of some community members do not justify a policy response that 
imposes costs on others if there is no reasonable basis for these concerns. 
Accordingly, community concerns should be considered, but they do not in 
themselves justify a policy response. Furthermore, community concerns are able to 
be, and should be, influenced by informed debate about risks, costs and benefits. 
Community concerns that exist in the absence of such debate are not a good basis 
for policy making. 
 
 
     





7  The waste hierarchy and target 
setting 
Key points 
•  The waste hierarchy should be regarded only as a simplified, indicative list of 
priorities intended to guide waste management policies. 
•  The waste hierarchy does not take into account the range of costs and benefits 
associated with different waste management options.  
•  Strict adherence to the waste hierarchy can lead to waste management outcomes 
that are unsuitable for the circumstances, and costly to the community. While it 
offers the appeal of ‘easy’ answers, it risks circumventing the study of all relevant 
costs and benefits which is required in order to develop sound policy. 
•  The waste hierarchy features in each state and territory’s waste management 
legislation. This has resulted in policy makers tending to focus on achieving 
outcomes that are consistent with the waste hierarchy rather than on providing net 
benefits to the community. 
•  Targets are commonly used throughout Australia to guide waste management 
planning. They include landfill diversion targets, recycling targets and targets for 
individual industries.  
•  Targets can be useful where they are consistent with sound policy objectives and 
set using rigorous analysis. However, existing waste diversion targets used by 
waste policy makers appear to have been based more on the priorities suggested 
by the waste hierarchy and what is technically achievable rather than on rigorous 
cost–benefit analysis. Such target setting can impose net costs on the community. 
•  Waste diversion targets set at the jurisdiction level do not recognise important 
differences within a jurisdiction. They also do not recognise that different types of 
waste have different environmental impacts. More disaggregated targets tailored to 
particular waste types and location could be set, but would require considerably 
more information. 
•  Zero waste targets are particularly problematic because they are inherently 
unachievable. 
•  Governments should not use the waste hierarchy nor targets derived from it to 
develop or monitor waste management policy. They should instead address 
relevant market failures, and use policy instruments that would most efficiently and 
effectively address these failures. 
 
     




The waste hierarchy and targets derived from it are common tools used in waste 
management policy. While it is claimed they are used in an overarching and 
strategic manner, governments have tended to apply the waste hierarchy literally in 
setting priorities for waste management, and as a basis for setting targets for 
particular waste management options, such as greater diversion from landfill or 
increased recycling (waste diversion targets). Policies such as regulation, extended 
producer responsibility schemes, landfill levies and subsidies for resource recovery 
are commonly used to assist in achieving waste diversion targets and other 
outcomes consistent with the waste hierarchy. The waste hierarchy (first discussed 
in chapter 3) is considered  in section 7.1. Target setting is discussed in section 7.2. 
7.1  The waste hierarchy 
The waste hierarchy is a simplified list of priorities (Rasmussen and Vigsø 2005), 
that favours some waste management options over others, for example, reuse over 
recycling, recycling over disposal, and so on. The presumption underpinning the 
waste hierarchy is that the environmental costs are generally lower if waste is 
avoided altogether and higher when waste is disposed to landfill (Ackerman 2005).  
The waste hierarchy is a standard feature in every State and Territory Government 
environment protection and waste minimisation legislation. It has the advantage of 
being simple to communicate to policy makers, the waste management industry and 
the public. As the Municipal Waste Advisory Council (MWAC) noted: 
The Waste Hierarchy is extensively used by waste educators as a means of 
communicating to individuals the different strategies they can use to reduce their 
negative environmental impacts. (sub. 119, p. 9) 
Some participants have suggested that the waste hierarchy is used in a manner 
consistent with good policy making, avoiding imposing costs on the community. 
For example, the MWAC contended: 
Mindful of its limits, waste policy practitioners apply the waste hierarchy mindful of 
the economic and political compromises which will be demanded in the broader policy 
context in which they operate. (sub. 119, p. 9) 
The Local Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales also noted: 
The Associations are strongly supportive of the Waste Hierarchy, however it is 
acknowledged that it is not an exact law of physics that can be applied to all situations. 
It is a guide to assist with the decision-making process. (sub. 98, p. 3)     





Application of the waste hierarchy can impose costs 
Problems can arise, however, when governments intervene to move the 
management of a waste ‘up the hierarchy’ without having regard to the costs and 
benefits to the wider community of doing so. The fact that the waste hierarchy 
features in all state and territory waste management legislation heightens this risk. 
Location of waste 
The waste hierarchy does not take into account that the cost of resource recovery 
relative to disposal can vary significantly depending on location, as explained in 
chapter 4. Waste can be costly to transport from remote areas, and government 
intervention that leads to an increase in resource recovery of such remotely located 
waste — even where it has relatively high inherent value, such as some metals — 
may impose net costs on the community. The Plastics and Chemicals Industry 
Association noted this problem: 
The inherent simplicity of the waste hierarchy can also be one of its major 
disadvantages. If literally and inflexibly applied the waste hierarchy can lead to 
inappropriate and inefficient waste options being mandated. Where it is used as a guide 
it should produce best results. An example is the management of waste in regional and 
remote locations where prohibitive costs of recycling infrastructure and technology 
would require inordinately high transport costs to take the waste to the technology in 
urban centres. (sub. 120, p. 8) 
The Waste Reduction Group also noted the costs to the community of resource 
recovery in regional and remote areas: 
Our member Councils are faced with the situation that the populous are continually 
educated via government that ‘recycling is environmentally beneficial regardless of 
location’. There is no reference [to] or consideration of the actual cost to the 
community. Councils consequently find it extremely difficult and would be seen as 
being anti ‘Green’ if they did not provide recycling services for small communities … 
This is applicable in Victoria, and although rural areas do not have to comply to the 
same degree as their urban counterparts, the cost of supporting this requirement is 
prohibitive and is an additional burden on rural communities due to small volumes and 
large travel distances involved. (sub. DR206, p. 1) 
Types of waste 
The costs and benefits of waste disposal options are also influenced by the type of 
waste being disposed. As set out in chapter 4, waste that does not biodegrade in 
landfill does not lead to greenhouse gas emissions. Glass, plastics, aluminium and 
ferrous metals are largely inert in landfills and are not significant contributors to     




leachate (appendix B). Similarly, most construction and demolition waste, such as 
concrete, is inert and produces few or no externalities in landfill. Seeking to move 
such waste ‘up the hierarchy’ would impose net costs on the community if 
additional costs incurred by disposers are not offset by the benefits of reduced 
environmental externalities.  
As discussed in section 5.3, some participants to the inquiry suggested that 
government intervention through waste management policies signalled by the waste 
hierarchy is necessary to address the ‘upstream’ environmental impacts associated 
with the generation of waste. These include environmental damage from extracting 
virgin material, air and water pollution associated with materials processing and 
manufacturing, and resource depletion. The Commission does not dispute that there 
can be externalities in these upstream areas. However, it considers that such issues 
are best addressed by direct policy intervention close to the externality concerned 
(and often already are), rather than using broad, indirect policy such as adherence to 
the waste hierarchy.  
Application of the waste hierarchy can lead to poor policy outcomes 
There is a concern among some participants that the waste hierarchy is not being 
used just as a general guide to waste management priorities, but rather is 
influencing waste management decisions in a more direct and distortionary way. 
Applying the waste hierarchy can lead to poor policy outcomes if it circumvents 
good policy practice (chapter 6). This was noted by the Business Roundtable on 
Sustainable Development: 
… good policy and regulatory process has been compromised in much recent waste 
policy development that has been dominated by the waste hierarchy and waste 
minimisation objectives … (sub. 70, p. 8) 
The Waste Management Association of Australia (WMAA), National Landfill 
Division also noted: 
When logical arguments are put forward by the Landfill Industry about the direction of 
waste policy and regulation, they are often dismissed because of the rigid application of 
the waste hierarchy. It has been used as a convenient escape clause to avoid more 
rigorous policy analysis. (sub. DR159, p. 2) 
Some inquiry participants suggested that any decision using the waste hierarchy 
must have regard to the specific issues. As noted by the Cement Industry 
Federation: 
Decisions made on a ‘waste hierarchy’ basis must be made with full knowledge of 
technically available and commercially available options and through end-product 
market testing. (sub. 71, p. 5)     





The Commission considers that the influence of the waste hierarchy on policy 
development and waste management decisions is likely to have resulted in net costs 
to the community. The choice of waste management activity for a particular 
individual or organisation should depend on the costs and benefits of each waste 
management option, including the external costs to the environment. The waste 
management option with the highest net benefit to the community will not always 
be consistent with the preferred option suggested by the waste hierarchy. 
Subsequent chapters describe various instances where current waste management 
policies do not follow good policy practice principles. Adherence to the waste 
hierarchy appears to be a major contributing reason for this. 
To maximise net benefits to the community, waste management policy should be 
guided by rigorous analysis of the financial, environmental and social costs and 
benefits, not by the simple priorities suggested by the waste hierarchy. 
7.2 Targets 
Targets can be an important component of performance management. Many targets 
are aspirational, designed to assist in determining priorities, defining agreed 
directions and motivating staff (UK Audit Commission 2005). The Commission 
considers that targets are useful for setting goals for policies that are genuinely 
based on addressing market failures where it can be demonstrated that the benefit of 
meeting the target outweighs the cost. Targets that specify the outcome, but not how 
it is to be achieved, allow those accountable for meeting targets to meet them at 
lowest cost.  
In waste management policy, targets for waste diversion are widely used. In some 
instances they are used as a motivational tool and to educate the public. As noted by 
the City of Whitehorse, having a waste target to aspire to: 
… can be most beneficial in that it provides scope to trigger lateral approaches and 
thinking outside the square by participants. Council uses targets to assist its strategy 
direction and Council’s community education programs can be enhanced by using 
targets as a reference point. (sub. 26, p. 8)  
However, problems can arise when waste diversion targets become the focus of 
policy. Setting waste diversion targets, and making the appropriate parties 
accountable, can be difficult. If waste diversion targets have been set without 
rigorous and transparent analysis of the costs and benefits, their achievement is 
likely to impose net costs on the community. When they have been set too high, not 
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achieving targets can be demotivating, and when they have been set too low, they 
can lead to complacency.  
Setting a target for the amount of waste diverted from landfill or recovered does not 
take into account that there might be financial and environmental costs of achieving 
the target that outweigh environmental and social benefits. Depending on the 
circumstances, such as the size and location of a landfill, the costs of diverting some 
types of waste may be greater than the benefits.  
In most cases in Australia, waste diversion targets set by governments are not 
mandatory. This means that in order to be effective they need to be supported by 
other policies such as landfill levies, subsidies and educational programs. For 
example, in Victoria, non-mandatory targets are underpinned by ‘product 
stewardship arrangements, engagement and education partnerships with industry 
and government, funding and support, and regulatory tools’ (Victorian 
Government  2005). Such policy instruments can result in net costs to the 
community unless they are addressing a relevant market failure. Even in the absence 
of clearly defined incentives to meet targets, government pressure can result in 
changed behaviour that may lead to net costs to the community.  
The City of Whitehorse noted: 
The waste management needs of the Whitehorse community must be set within the 
obligations of Commonwealth and State Government legislation, and the initiatives 
necessary to meet statutory waste minimisation policies and targets. (sub. 26, p. 1) 
Moreover, Councillor Dick Gross, City of Port Phillip, said: 
We’re interested in [alternative waste technology] because (a) the [Victorian 
Government’s] Towards Zero Waste policy tells us that we have to and (b) other tiers 
of government are interested in subsidising it … We are getting assistance, so because 
of that assistance I can then go to councils and say that it actually makes economic 
sense, financial sense, from the local government perspective …  
Now, of course Towards Zero Waste has an uncertain legal consequence because it’s 
policy, not law. Councils don’t deny policy though; they might whinge about it but they 
generally comply because we’re a tier of government and we’re expected to, and we 
will. (trans., pp. 104–5) 
Using targets as an overarching guide runs the risk that policy objectives will be set 
according to the need to meet targets, rather than to address market failures or other 
social and environmental issues. Moreover, policies may be evaluated on whether 
targets have been met, rather than on whether they have provided net benefits to the 
community. Meeting targets may become an end in itself, rather than the means of 
achieving particular objectives.      





There are problems with broad targets  
Location of waste 
Some broad targets set at a national or jurisdictional level do not take into account 
the different costs of dealing with waste in different regions. For example, recycling 
materials collected from rural and remote areas imposes additional financial cost, as 
well as possible additional traffic congestion and emissions from trucks (known as 
external costs, discussed in chapter 4). In order to be consistent with a net benefits 
to the community approach, waste diversion targets would need to be established 
for different regions within jurisdictions. While there appears to have been some 
recognition of regional differences by some governments in setting waste diversion 
targets, jurisdiction-wide programs generally impose additional, inconsistent 
obligations on local governments. For example, the WMAA, National Landfill 
Division noted: 
There has also been limited analysis on the implications of location on the targets. The 
cost–benefit [ratio] of recycling one tonne of material depends on proximity to markets. 
The State Governments are expecting the targets to be exceeded in metropolitan areas 
to compensate for below target performance in non-metropolitan areas. (sub. DR159, 
p. 3) 
Types of waste 
Waste diversion targets also do not take into account that different types of waste 
have different environmental impacts in landfill. This is analogous to the issue of 
moving inert waste ‘up the waste hierarchy’, discussed above. Using such targets to 
override normal market signals about the merits of recycling and to divert inert 
waste from landfill, is likely to impose unnecessary costs on landfill users in a futile 
attempt to reduce the cost of externalities that do not exist.   
There are particular problems with zero waste targets 
A number of jurisdictions have recently adopted zero waste targets (chapter 3). The 
proliferation of zero waste targets has particular disadvantages. First, many 
materials cannot be continually recycled. The Packaging Council of Australia 
(PCA) noted: 
Degradation is a feature common to many materials that are repeatedly recycled. While 
technology improvements continue to extend the capacity to reuse many materials, for 
some materials there are practical limits to their reuse and recycling. The natural fibres 
that make up paper and cardboard can be reused around five times before they are too 
degraded to be reused except as pulp. (sub. 67, p. 14)      




This suggests that some materials will not be able to be further recycled from a 
technical perspective and will need to be disposed of. 
Second, there are diminishing marginal returns to resource recovery, including 
recycling, suggesting that the optimal level of recycling is less that 100 per cent. 
Porter (2002) noted that recycling gets more expensive the more types of materials 
that are recycled. He also observed that while too little recycling will lead to wasted 
resources, too much recycling may also lead to wasted resources by trying to 
recycle unsuitable types of material. This was noted by Mr Adrian Vlok: 
Because local governments and regional councils are being driven to follow the waste 
hierarchy and all matters ‘zero waste’, the arbitrary targets … can only be achieved by 
recovering this organic component of the waste stream. 
In Australia the evidence shows chasing this waste fraction has a very high cost, little 
or no environmental benefit and is technically, financially and administratively 
complex. (sub. DR259, p. 5) 
The PCA also noted the increasing costs of higher levels of resource recovery: 
The relatively obvious problem with zero waste targets is that the marginal cost of 
diversion or avoidance increases as the rate of waste generation approaches zero. The 
resources spent eliminating the diminishing remnants of waste would almost certainly 
be better allocated to other initiatives. 
While any object or material can be recycled or recovered if money is no object, 
recycling is an industrial process with its own environmental impacts, and it is worth 
doing only if there is a net environmental gain … 
Recycling has environmental impacts like any other industrial process. To meet an 
80 per cent recycling rate, Australia would either have to waste resources recycling 
packaging not suited to recycling, or use thicker and heavier recyclable packaging 
where it is not necessary, or try to eliminate packaging in some cases, with a 
consequent increase in food wastage. (sub. 67, pp. 28–9) 
This suggests that the pursuit of zero waste will incur additional financial and 
environmental costs from pursuing resource recovery beyond a level that maximises 
net benefits to the community. It may also result in unintended consequences of 
losing some features of products that consumers value. 
There are problems with the way existing targets are set 
Waste diversion targets are inherently difficult to set. They presume that market 
forces are insufficient to achieve the appropriate balance between resource recovery 
and waste disposal that will maximise net benefits to the community, and that 
somehow governments can impute what the optimal outcome should be. Yet to do 
so would require a good deal of information that would be impossible or very costly     





to collect. As a result, much target setting tends to be undertaken following 
incomplete technical and economic analysis or on an arbitrary basis. 
Numerous participants expressed concern that targets are not set on the basis of 
rigorous cost–benefit analysis, but rather are motivated by aspirations to reduce 
waste and increase recycling. The WMAA, National Landfill Division observed 
how targets appear to be set: 
State Government representatives … have stated that the targets are not arbitrary, but 
are the results of careful analysis. That analysis is at best to look at the potentially 
recyclable and reusable materials still going to landfill and basing the target on that 
figure. There has been very limited analysis of the marginal costs of the potential 
recycling or reuse and cost–benefit analysis of results. (sub. DR159, p. 3) 
The PCA also considered that the setting of the National Packaging Covenant 
recycling target was not soundly based. It concluded: 
… the use of targets in this policy area tends to be politically motivated and symbolic 
rather than strategic and comprehensive. For recycling, the underlying approach often 
seems to be no more scientific than ‘recycling is good, more recycling is better and 
100 per cent recycling is environmental heaven.’ (sub. 67, p. 28) 
Similarly, the Australian Food and Grocery Council (sub. 93, p. 13) stated that ‘the 
setting of targets (in the Covenant) without adequate data or robust impact 
[analysis] is questionable’. The National Packaging Covenant Industry Association 
(NPCIA) also noted: 
… the NPCIA cautions against the use of targets based on less than a full consideration 
of social, economic and environmental costs and benefits, and against failure to 
understand practical realities of what can be achieved. (sub. 92, p. 19) 
Some targets can risk regulatory capture 
Target setting can risk being unduly influenced by particular sectors of the industry 
or advocacy groups to suit themselves rather than the broader public good. This is 
known as regulatory capture. This occurs when political pressure is applied to 
governments to set targets consistent with a particular group’s objectives, rather 
than to maximise net benefits to the community. The NPCIA suggested that this 
occurred in the setting of the targets under the National Packaging Covenant: 
The NPCIA was fully involved in the development of targets, in close consultation with 
jurisdictional and Commonwealth representatives. The process was disruptive and 
disjointed, with advocacy groups seeking target proposals based on unrealistic, 
unsubstantiated and inaccurate representations of the current state of packaging 
recovery in Australia and inappropriate comparisons against other programs, especially 
those in Europe. (sub. 92, p. 19)     




Setting targets at the right level is difficult 
Policy makers can run into difficulties even when attempts are made to set targets 
using rigorous analysis. Any cost–benefit analysis would require good information 
about the potential costs and benefits of reaching the target, including how those 
costs and benefits may change over time. However, there are difficulties 
generalising the costs and benefits of waste disposal or resource recovery activities, 
and reliable data are generally not available.  
Good data are needed to set sensible targets in the first place, and to monitor 
progress against those targets. Target setting associated with resource recovery 
requires information to be available about the amount of waste being disposed to 
landfill and being recycled. Although such data are available, there are problems 
with data quality (chapters 2 and  13). But rigorous cost–benefit analysis also 
requires information about numerous other variables, including the cost of diverting 
recyclable waste from landfill and the environmental benefits of doing so. There is 
also information asymmetry between waste generators and governments about the 
current costs of waste diversion.  
The difficulties associated with waste diversion target setting are exacerbated over 
time. Future costs are difficult to predict because of technological developments and 
various social factors that influence waste generation. The costs can also be affected 
by market conditions that are difficult to predict. For example, the prices of 
recyclables and commodities, and currencies constantly change, influencing the cost 
of recycling. Waste diversion targets are not sensitive to such changes and hence, 
over time, will lead to net costs to the community.  
The Commission is not aware of any study that sought to quantify the costs and 
benefits of adopting the original National Waste Minimisation and Recycling 
Strategy (NWMRS) target. The reasoning behind the choice of the target is not 
transparent. Nor does it appear that some states and territories have given much 
consideration to transparently quantifying the costs and benefits of setting their 
current targets. For example, the targets adopted in the NSW Waste Avoidance and 
Resource Recovery Strategy were based on an option proposed by the NSW 
Independent Inquiry into Alternative Waste Management Technologies and 
Practices (Resource NSW 2003). This option represents the ‘aggressive’ scenario 
that seeks to maximise the diversion of waste from landfill. It appears that little 
weight was placed on the financial costs1 and too much weight was placed on 
factors favourable to maximising waste reduction (box 7.1).  
                                              
1  Wright (2000) uses the term ‘economic’ to describe one of the criteria. This use of ‘economic’ 
is consistent with the Commission’s use of the term ‘financial’ to describe private, financial 
costs.     






Box 7.1  The NSW Independent Inquiry into Alternative Waste 
Management Technologies and Practices 
In 2000, the NSW Government commissioned an Independent Inquiry into Alternative 
Waste Management Technologies and Practices (‘the Wright Committee’) to 
recommend the range of waste reduction scenarios the Government would use in 
meeting its waste management goals. 
To arrive at its recommendations, the Wright Committee used a technique known as 
multi-criteria analysis. Multi-criteria analysis is an alternative to cost–benefit analysis as 
a method of ranking projects. The technique is most commonly used when information 
about the costs and benefits of each option is unavailable or when it is difficult to 
express certain impacts in monetary terms. In using multi-criteria analysis, the decision 
maker ranks each option by scoring it against a number of subjective criteria. 
The Wright Committee used four criteria (technical, environmental, social and 
economic) and gave them equal weighting. The Wright Committee justified the equal 
weighting on the grounds of the uncertainty associated with valuing environmental 
costs and benefits. 
It is not clear why this approach was used over cost–benefit analysis, particularly when 
at least some of the information was readily available to make a partial cost–benefit 
analysis possible — such as the capital and operating costs and at least some of the 
environmental benefits of each technology. 
This suggests that the Wright Committee under-weighted some criteria (such as 
‘economic’) and over-weighted others (such as ‘social’ and ‘technical’). The effect of 
this approach was to give the highest ratings to those technologies that best met the 
waste hierarchy (for example, alternative waste technologies) and the lowest ratings to 
those technologies that least met the waste hierarchy (such as bioreactor landfills). 
Sources: Wright (2000); Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (UK) (nd). 
 
 
Some participants to the inquiry have claimed that their waste management targets 
are set using rigorous cost–benefit analysis. The Victorian Government, for 
example, noted:  
… Victoria’s Towards Zero Waste strategy and its targets has been supported by 
economic modelling and analysis that show net economic benefits to Victoria in 
addition to the resource efficiency benefits. (sub. DR187, p. 17) 
The modelling referred to above is a cost–benefit analysis undertaken by the Allen 
Consulting Group (2003). While it is commendable that cost–benefit analysis has 
been attempted, the Commission is of the view that this work is fundamentally 
flawed because of some of the underlying assumptions made in this economic 
modelling. The ‘environmental benefits’ of reprocessing used by the Allen 
Consulting Group (2003) were derived from SKM (2003), that in turn based its 
estimates of the environmental benefits of reprocessing on Nolan-ITU and SKM     




Economics (2001). Chapter 4 and appendix B explain why the Commission believes 
that the estimates of the environmental benefits in Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics 
(2001) are significantly overstated. This leads the Commission to conclude that the 
environmental benefits of the Victorian Towards Zero Waste Strategy are likely to 
be much lower than was assumed by the Allen Consulting Group (2003).2  
The Commission also considers that the Allen Consulting Group (2003, p. 14) has 
overstated the true costs of landfill. Landfill levies appear to be included in the 
landfill prices per tonne (p. 13) used in the analysis and, therefore, inappropriately 
inflate the cost of landfill. As noted in chapter 4, levies are transfer payments to 
government, and should not be counted as a cost in cost–benefit analysis.  
Furthermore, it is likely that the Allen Consulting Group has overstated the financial 
benefits of the Towards Zero Waste Strategy, because the analysis assumes that 
there will be ‘no net financial impact for businesses’ from the Strategy (p. 14). 
Rather than giving a net benefit to the community, the Commission considers it 
more likely that a correct analysis of this Victorian Government policy would 
demonstrate that it will lead to a net cost to the community.  
A better approach is for governments to intervene on the basis of market failure and 
allow market forces to reveal the level of waste disposal and resource recovery that 
maximises net benefits to the community. Rigorous cost–benefit analysis is required 
to evaluate the options for intervention, and to identify the option with the highest 
net benefit to the community. 
Assigning accountability is difficult 
If it is important that targets are met, rather than being simply aspirational, 
accountability for their achievement must be assigned to suitable parties, including 
consequences for targets not being met. However, achieving targets may be subject 
to a number of factors that are beyond the control of those accountable. A close link 
between the efforts of those accountable and outcomes needs to be demonstrated in 
order for targets to be achievable. Otherwise, undue costs may be incurred trying to 
meet targets that have been set without regard to external factors, and consequences 
may be imposed that are out of step with the intentions of the targets. In these 
instances, the cost of the target is likely to outweigh the benefit. 
                                              
2  For example, the Allen Consulting Group (2003, p. vi) report noted ‘The only instance in which 
the net economic benefits are (slightly) negative is when the future costs of landfill are assumed 
to be low and when the environmental benefits from reprocessing are also assumed to be low’.   
It later noted ‘The [net present value] of the net economic benefits [of] the Strategy … is 
slightly negative for the low value scenario (-$16 million to -$30 million)’ (p. 24).     





An example of the potential for this can be seen in the National Packaging 
Covenant, which includes three overarching targets (box 10.3) that signatories are 
expected to achieve.3 Signatories to the Covenant have indicated that there is 
significant pressure, in the form of the threat of a more prescriptive regulatory 
regime, to meet targets. For example, Amcor Australasia noted that it: 
… is concerned … that any perceived lack of progress towards meeting the Covenant’s 
arbitrary targets by the mid-term 2008 review may trigger a strict regulatory approach 
at the expense of taking a broader, more balanced and longer-term policy response. 
(sub. DR167, p. 3) 
This suggests that there may be significant consequences for not meeting the targets 
in the Covenant. However, chapter 10 notes that the targets are arbitrary and the 
benefits are yet to be substantiated. Moreover, factors beyond the signatories’ 
control, such as the price of recyclables and kerbside recycling recovery rates, will 
impact on their ability to cost effectively meet the targets, especially the recycling 
targets. Trying to achieve a target that is subject to external influences is likely to 
impose net costs on the community. 
Targets are often not met in practice 
The difficulty in setting suitable waste diversion targets is demonstrated by the 
results in meeting such targets to date. The targets set under the NWMRS proved to 
be unattainable for many jurisdictions. For example, the amount of waste landfilled 
for the Sydney metropolitan region increased from 1.0 tonne per person in 1992 to 
almost 1.2 tonnes per person in 2000, instead of falling to the targeted 0.5 tonnes 
per person (EPA NSW 2003c). 
According to ACT NOWaste, the final target of zero waste to landfill is proving 
difficult to achieve. While 554 000 tonnes of materials were recovered in the ACT 
in 2004-05 (up from 136 000 tonnes in 1994-95), 204 000 tonnes continued to be 
landfilled: 
While levels of resource recovery have steadily increased, overall waste consumption 
and generation rates [are] also increasing, making it difficult to achieve substantial 
reductions in levels of waste disposal to landfill. (ACT NOWaste - ACT Department of 
Urban Services, sub. 36, p. 1)  
                                              
3  Those who do not sign up to the Covenant will be subject to the supporting National 
Environmental Protection Measure (Used Packaging Materials), which includes provisions for 
jurisdictions to impose financial penalties on brand owners who fail to demonstrate that they 
have undertaken to recover consumer paper and packaging in which their products are sold.     




A different approach to target setting 
There is an alternative to setting waste diversion targets. This is to identify targets 
that relate directly to policy objectives that are consistent with the Commission’s 
preferred approach of intervening on the basis of market failure and allowing 
market forces to reveal the level of waste disposal and resource recovery that 
maximises net benefits to the community.  
Targets that directly relate to a legitimate policy objective, such as reducing 
externalities, may be effective in assisting policy makers communicate their 
priorities and allocate resources. For example, the Commission has found that 
compliance with landfill licensing conditions is relatively poor, and enforcement is 
variable (section 8.5). Assuming that landfill licenses are appropriately configured 
to account for relevant risks and externalities involved, a target of full compliance 
by all licence holders might not be an unreasonable goal for governments to aspire 
to.  
In conclusion 
By setting waste diversion targets in the absence of reliable data and rigorous 
assessment of the costs and benefits, policy makers seem to be hoping for the 
best — that the benefits will follow or that the costs will not be insurmountable. 
This is evident in the recent announcement that the landfill levy in New South 
Wales will be set in accordance with the need to achieve the landfill diversion target 
rather than in accordance with the overall financial, social and environmental costs 
associated with landfilling (chapter 9). 
Setting appropriate waste diversion targets is a complex and ultimately futile task.  
It is unrealistic to expect governments to be able to determine what the optimal 
level of diversion should be. This would be better determined by allowing market 
forces to find this level once all relevant externalities are priced into goods and 
waste disposal options. The Commission considers that the preferred policy 
approach would be for governments to intervene only on the basis of market failure 
(or regulatory failure). Waste management decisions should be based on the costs 
and benefits of each waste management option, including all external costs. The 
waste management option with the highest net benefit to the community will 
seldom, and then only accidentally, be consistent with a particular waste diversion 
target set using technical or arbitrary criteria. 
Targets for waste diversion are virtually impossible to set at an optimal level. 
Broad targets do not account for regional differences in waste diversion costs or the 
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external costs of different types of waste. Nor are they sensitive to changes in 
market or institutional settings. While they might be argued to have some 
aspirational virtues, targets such as zero waste to landfill lack credibility and are 
unachievable. More importantly, excessive resource recovery can be costly to the 
community and result in perverse outcomes. 
A better approach than using waste diversion targets, would be to directly address 
relevant market failures and distortions throughout product life cycles, thus 
assisting markets to achieve the right balance between waste avoidance, resource 
recovery and disposal. 
Governments should not directly or indirectly impose waste diversion targets as 
part of waste management policy.  
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•  The regulatory principles developed by the Council of Australian Governments and 
others should be followed when designing waste management regulation. In 
particular, policy makers must demonstrate that government intervention is justified 
and regulation is the best option. 
•  Landfill regulation appears to have the capacity to be effective in addressing 
potential downstream externalities. However, it appears that the enforcement of 
landfill licensing requirements should be tightened. 
•  In theory, there are few regulatory constraints on energy-from-waste processes but, 
in practice, they are constrained by negative community and political perceptions. 
With current regulation, energy-from-waste facilities can effectively dispose of some 
waste at little risk to human health or the environment.  
•  In other countries, take-back regulations have increased recycling, yet have been 
very costly and not necessarily more effective than other options. Self-regulated 
labelling schemes, on the other hand, can be relatively low cost and effective. 
•  Recycled content standards are likely to be less cost-effective than options that 
target policy objectives more directly. 
•  Littering and illegal dumping are best addressed by combining regulation with other 
measures, such as education, community involvement and moral suasion. 
•  A cost–benefit study commissioned by the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Governments shows that their planned phase out of plastic shopping bags would 
impose a large net cost on the community, even when the total environmental 
benefit is assumed to be much greater than available analysis suggests. 
Governments should consider alternative policies that more directly address the real 
issue of concern — the small proportion of bags that are littered. 
 
 
This chapter outlines principles for good regulatory practice and assesses current 
and potential forms of waste management regulation in Australia. The focus of this 
chapter is on regulation that addresses externalities — primarily, regulation 
associated with putrescible waste. Hence, most of the regulation examined is related 
to municipal waste, and some aspects of commercial and industrial waste. The 
regulatory impediments associated with commercial and industrial, and construction 
and demolition waste are discussed in chapter 12.     




For the purpose of this chapter, regulation covers a ‘spectrum ranging from 
self-regulation where there is no [direct] government involvement, through various 
regulatory arrangements with increasing degrees of government influence and 
involvement, to explicit government regulation’ (IDCQR 1997, p. IX). 
Regulation can be divided into two categories: 
•  prescriptive-based regulation that specifies the technical means for attaining a 
particular outcome; and 
•  performance-based regulation that specifies the desired outcome in particular 
terms, but allows individuals to determine how to achieve that outcome 
(ORR 1998). 
Both forms of regulation are considered in this chapter. 
8.1  Principles of good regulation  
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG 2004, p. 5) has noted that ‘the 
burden of proof that a regulation is necessary remains with the proponents of 
regulatory action’. This condition is more likely to be satisfied if policy makers 
follow the general policy principles developed in chapter 6 and the specific 
regulatory principles developed by COAG and others (COAG 2004; ORR 1998; 
Regulation Taskforce 2006). The latter principles require policy makers to consider 
options, conduct a thorough cost–benefit assessment and consult with interested 
parties (box 8.1). 
In a regulation impact statement (RIS) or as part of good regulatory practice, policy 
makers identify which of three possible regulatory forms is likely to be the most 
effective and efficient in the circumstances: self-regulation, co-regulation or explicit 
government regulation (box 8.2). In choosing the regulatory form, policy makers 
should weigh up a variety of factors including: the extent of the risk; the severity of 
the problem; the nature of the relevant industry; the need for flexibility or certainty 
in regulatory arrangements; and the availability of resources (ORR 1998, p. E15). 
All three regulatory forms are evident in the waste management policy arena. For 
example, the plastics industry self-regulates the plastics coding system, whereas 
explicit government regulation is the approach taken in regulating waste disposal. 
Co-regulatory approaches are also used, especially for extended producer 
responsibility (EPR) and product stewardship (PS) schemes (chapter 10).     
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Box 8.1  General principles for designing and assessing regulation 
The recent report of the Regulation Taskforce (2006, p. v) noted good regulatory 
process requires governments to apply the following six principles: 
• Governments should not act to address ‘problems’ through regulation unless a case for 
action has been clearly established. This should include evaluating and explaining why 
existing measures are not sufficient to deal with the issue. 
• A range of feasible policy options — including self-regulatory and co-regulatory approaches 
— need to be assessed within a cost–benefit framework (including analysis of compliance 
costs and, where relevant, risk). 
• Only the option that generates the greatest net benefit for the community, taking into account 
all the impacts, should be adopted. 
• Effective guidance should be provided to regulators and regulated parties to ensure that the 
policy intent of the regulation is clear, as well as what is needed to be compliant. 
• Mechanisms such as sunset clauses or periodic reviews need to be built in to legislation to 
ensure that regulation remains relevant and effective over time. 
• There needs to be effective consultation with regulated parties at the key stages of 
regulation-making and administration. 
 
Some inquiry participants claimed that governments had not followed good 
regulatory practices in designing waste management regulation. For example, the 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (BRSD) stated ‘the failure of … 
[government] agencies to follow principles of good practice policy, which were 
designed to deliver productive outcomes and agreed to at COAG’ was a significant 
shortcoming in the current approach to waste management policy (sub. 70, p. 1). 
Similarly, Collex (sub. 80, p. 2) alleged that, despite the adoption of the COAG 
principles, ‘there is still room for significant advance in regulatory processes’. 
This chapter considers all costs and benefits, whether financial, environmental or 
social in nature, to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation covering the 
following components of waste management:  
•  waste avoidance and resource recovery 
•  collection and transport 
•  sorting, treatment and processing 
•  disposal 
•  litter and illegal dumping.     





Box 8.2  Advantages and disadvantages of different regulatory forms 
Compared with explicit government regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation can 
provide a number of advantages including: 
•  lower government administration costs, because such regulations are developed 
and often administered by business; 
•  lower compliance costs for business; 
•  innovative inducements for compliance; 
•  rules that are tailored to specific needs and thus better targeted; 
•  improved information flows, using clearer terms; 
•  enhanced flexibility, responsiveness and speed of implementation and modification; 
and 
•  greater responsiveness to consumer demands based on additional information 
gained from, for example, the complaints mechanism. 
Potential disadvantages of self-regulation and co-regulation include: 
•  restrictions on competition (such as increased barriers to entry); 
•  some businesses not complying with minimum standards (such as ‘free-rider’ 
problems); 
•  ineffective sanctions for non-compliance; 
•  reductions in consumer choice, by imposing minimum standards that do not allow 
consumers to choose lower cost/quality products or services; and 
•  business may not have the resources and capacity to develop or administer a 
quasi-regulatory or co-regulatory scheme. 
Explicit government regulation is often considered to offer more certainty, industry-wide 
coverage, and greater effectiveness compared with other forms of regulation because 
of the availability of legal sanctions. Thus, it is often preferred in dealing with high 
risk/high impact public issues. However, explicit government regulation also has the 
following drawbacks: 
•  it is standardised and inflexible, and cannot easily change over time and with 
conditions. It may also impede technological progress and innovation; 
•  there are time lags between making and amending legislation; 
•  it is not well suited to driving continual improvements in the quality of services; and 
•  compliance costs may be high. 
Source: Adapted from ORR (1998). 
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8.2  Waste avoidance and resource recovery 
This section focuses on regulations that promote waste avoidance and resource 
recovery, which include recycled-content standards and take-back regulations. 
Other policy instruments that could promote this objective, including landfill levies, 
deposit-refund schemes, subsidies and various forms of information provision are 
covered in chapters 9 and 11. 
Recycled-content standards 
Recycled-content standards require products to be manufactured with a certain 
minimum amount of recycled materials. Such standards are prescriptive.  
There are no known examples of recycled-content standards for the manufacture of 
products in Australia. There are, however, examples of minimum standards that 
require the use of certain products in various construction projects and these are 
discussed in chapter  12. Other countries, including the United States, currently 
impose recycled-content legislation on the manufacture of some products (box 8.3). 
Some inquiry participants (for example, Brisbane City Council, sub. DR154) 
proposed that recycled-content standards be introduced in Australia. The Australian 
Council of Recyclers (ACOR) stated: 
A minimum target could be set for all manufacturers and importers for the use of 
recycled content material in their products. Manufacturers and importers using virgin 
material and no recycled content material in their products would have to purchase 
certificates from manufacturers exceeding the minimum usage target, that is, 
recyclers/reprocessors holding surplus certificates … (ACOR, sub. 40, att. 1, p. 27) 
Such standards were claimed to provide both a direct benefit through ‘additional 
cash flow to the recycling industry’ and an indirect benefit through ‘recycled 
materials becoming more competitive’ (ACOR, sub. 40, att. 1, p. 27). They were 
also seen as being beneficial because they can conserve virgin materials.  
On the other hand, Amcor (sub. DR167) did not support the introduction of 
recycled-content standards and argued that there were many factors (in particular, 
consumer preferences) that could affect the appropriate level of recycled content. 
Recycled-content standards may reduce landfill externalities by decreasing the 
waste disposed to landfill. However, this benefit is likely to be small, as most of the 
likely standards would relate to materials that are relatively inert in landfills and 
have only low environmental impacts, such as plastics, paper and glass.     




Given there may not be significant downstream externalities from landfilling 
recyclable products, the argument from some parties for recycled-content standards 
largely depends on whether recycling materials produces significant upstream 
benefits. However, as argued in chapter 5, upstream externalities vary according to 
circumstances and are best addressed through a more direct policy. 
 
Box 8.3 Recycled-content  legislation — the US experience 
Around 12 US states have recycled-content legislation for newsprint, while another 13 
have ‘quasi-regulated’ standards. In 2000, the required recycled content ranged from 
33 to 50 per cent of total input materials. The standards typically require newsprint 
manufacturers to produce newsprint with around one third recycled fibre. 
Manufacturers that fail to comply with the particular standard may be subject to civil 
penalties, such as fines. However, producers may be exempt from liability if recycled 
fibre is unavailable within a reasonable time or in sufficient quantity. 
There are also recycled-content standards for glass and plastic products. In California, 
there are recycled-content laws for glass, plastic garbage bags and rigid plastic 
containers. For example, rigid plastic containers must: (1) contain 25 per cent recycled 
content or (2) be made of material that is recycled at a rate of 25 per cent or (3) be 
reusable. 
It is unclear whether US recycled-content legislation has been successful. One study 
attempted to measure the effectiveness of the legislation but found there were large 
estimation problems (Worley 1992). Another study concluded that effectiveness 
depends on whether the producers can find end markets for products with recycled 
content, and this was not yet known (Hendren 1992). 
However, what is clear is that Australia’s voluntary scheme for recycling newsprint 
(detailed in appendix C) has achieved the world’s highest rate of newsprint recycling 
(around 75 per cent) and has consistently exceeded its targets over the past 15 years 
(PNEB, sub. 2). The Publishers National Environment Bureau stated that newsprint 
made at the Norske Skog newsprint mill in Albury contained 40 per cent recycled fibre 
made up of approximately 60  per  cent  recovered newspaper and 40  per  cent 
recovered magazine paper (Kelett, F., pers. comm., 27 April 2006). 
 
 
In addition, any upstream benefits of recycled-content standards may be small after 
accounting for the costs. Recycled-content standards can reduce the flexibility and 
innovation in the manufacturing process and may sometimes increase processing 
costs. As a result, there may be a net environmental cost. They may also be difficult 
to enforce, because it can be difficult to identify whether a product contains 
recycled material. In addition, such standards effectively require producers to 
provide an end-use market for recycled materials, regardless of cost. Targeting an 
input in this way is an indirect, distortionary policy approach (chapter 9), and not 
likely to deliver a net benefit for the community.     
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The Commission, therefore, does not support recycled-content standards. Likewise, 
the Commission does not support policies that require products to be made with 
100  per cent virgin materials. Instead, the amount of recycled content or virgin 
material in a product should be based on cost, availability and performance. If 
including recycled content adds to a product’s performance at a reasonable cost, it is 
likely to be included by a manufacturer with no need for regulation. For example, 
the newsprint industry in Australia has found it commercially worthwhile to recycle 
a large amount of newsprint without the need for recycled content-standards to be 
imposed (box 8.3). 
Mandatory standards for including recycled content in products should not be 
implemented, as they are unlikely to produce net benefits for the community. 
Take-back regulations 
Take-back regulations require suppliers to retrieve their products from final 
consumers for the purpose of materials recovery, recycling and/or disposal. Such 
regulations have been a prominent feature of waste management policies in 
European countries.  
One of the earliest, and most well known, examples is an ordinance that Germany 
introduced in the early 1990s requiring producers to take back and recycle used 
packaging. The ordinance gives suppliers the option of either collecting and 
processing their used packaging themselves, or doing it collectively through an 
industry body. Businesses adopted the latter option by establishing a body called the 
German Dual System (Duales System Deutschland).  
Packaging suppliers that choose to participate in the Dual System have to pay a 
licence fee that allows them to use a registered trademark — the Green Dot logo — 
on their products. The fee is meant to cover the collection and processing costs 
incurred by the Dual System, and so varies between suppliers according to the type 
of packaging and its weight and volume (Emergo Group 2004). Having the Green 
Dot logo on packaging enables consumers to identify which products can be 
returned through the Dual System’s collection infrastructure. 
The Dual System has the advantage that fixed collection and processing costs can 
be shared among firms, thus enabling economies of scale to be achieved. However, 
it literally creates a dual system that to a large extent duplicates established waste 
collection services. 
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Research indicates that the German take-back requirement for used packaging has 
been effective in reducing waste and increasing recycling (Quoden 2004). However, 
it also appears to have been very costly and not necessarily more effective than 
other policy options: 
Germany’s celebrated take-back program for packaging has a mixed record, with high 
costs for performance achieved. Under its Green Dot EPR [extended producer 
responsibility] program, Germany exceeded its waste-recovery targets. But over [the] 
same time period, with no EPR system in place, the US experienced even greater 
reductions in total packaging used per unit of output. Canadian packaging 
manufacturers, who set a voluntary reduction target of 50 percent in packaging sent for 
disposal, achieved that goal four years ahead of schedule with no EPR and at lower 
costs than Germany. (Schwartz and Gattuso 2002, p. iii) 
Nevertheless, Germany’s take-back arrangements for used packaging have inspired 
other European countries to adopt policies to reduce packaging waste, including use 
of the Green Dot logo. The European Union has issued a Directive on Packaging 
and Packaging Waste to harmonise the different countries’ approaches, and EU 
Member States have established an umbrella organisation of national compliance 
schemes — Packaging Recovery Organisation Europe — for this purpose. European 
countries have also introduced take-back requirements for other products, including 
electronics and electrical equipment, motor vehicles, waste oil, and batteries. 
Given the high cost of Germany’s arrangements for packaging, the Commission is 
not convinced that take-back regulations are appropriate. The case for take-back 
regulations is especially weak when the environmental costs of disposal are likely to 
be small, as is the case for most packaging. This view is reinforced by the 
Commission’s assessment in chapter 9 of a special type of take-back scheme known 
as container deposit legislation.  
8.3  Waste collection and transport 
This section addresses regulation relating to the collection and transport of 
municipal waste. 
Collection 
Local governments are responsible for regulating municipal waste collection 
services, including kerbside recycling, green and hard waste collections.  
Regulation typically aims for effective collection that ‘minimises the impact on 
community health and the environment’ (Local Government Association of 
Queensland nd).  In addition, some jurisdictions have argued that regulation of     
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collection is beneficial because it can play a role in ‘reducing the amount of waste 
going to landfill’ (Municipal Association of Victoria 2006). 
Collection regulation differs across each local government area, but typically 
includes restrictions on what can be disposed and recycled. Hazardous materials are 
banned from disposal in household waste bins for health and safety reasons. These 
include: car batteries; asbestos; and hazardous chemicals. Other materials are 
banned because they are large or potentially hazardous and include: car parts; 
industrial hard waste; and waste from construction sites. 
Local governments also stipulate what items can be placed in recycling bins. These 
usually include: all paper-related products; steel and aluminium cans; most types of 
glass; and some plastics (usually only codes 1, 2 and 3). Items such as chemical 
containers, appliances and some cartons (for example, long-life milk containers) are 
typically not suitable for recycling collections. In addition, other materials should 
not be placed in a recycling bin as they may contaminate the recycling stream. 
These include general rubbish, garden organics, oil, food, light globes, nappies, 
ceramics and crockery.  
There are also restrictions on green waste collections. Householders can use this 
service, where available, to dispose of: leaves; branches and small logs; grass 
clippings and weeds; and flowers. Items such as plastic bags; sand; soil; household 
rubbish; food scraps and paper-related products are banned. 
Restricting what can be placed in a ‘general waste’ or a recycling bin provides a 
benefit to collectors, landfill operators and recyclers because it reduces the risk of 
harm from contact with potentially hazardous waste. In addition, restricting what 
can be placed in recycling bins or disposed as green waste provides a direct benefit 
to both sorters and processors by decreasing contamination. Non-contaminated 
waste streams lead to lower costs and higher recovery rates, as less sorting and 
processing is required. Restrictions may also alleviate specific processing issues. 
For example, if undetected, crockery incorrectly placed in a recycling bin can cause 
recovered glass to be unsuitable for recycling. 
However, requiring householders to separate waste into a number of bins involves 
time and effort. This cost varies across systems, and will be higher when multiple 
bins are used. This cost may be partially or fully offset if householders gain 
satisfaction from the act of recycling (chapter 4). 
Banning certain types of waste and recyclables from collection and disposal could 
inconvenience householders and impose additional costs on them by, for example, 
requiring a trip to a transfer station or a chemicals disposal facility.     




Collection requirements could also raise collection costs. For example, systems with 
more than one bin require additional collection trucks and labour requirements 
(chapter 4).  
In conclusion, collection restrictions can be effective in reducing the external 
impact on the community and increasing recycling. Providing householders with 
convenient options to correctly dispose of common prohibited waste might reduce 
the risk of inappropriate disposal. These restrictions currently appear to be 
frequently disregarded by householders (see, for example, GRD Ltd, trans., 
pp. 564-5) and are only likely to be effective when coupled with other measures, 
such as information guides, and convenient and acceptable alternatives. 
Transport 
In general, waste transport is only regulated by state or territory environmental 
authorities if ‘it has the potential to cause environmental harm’ (EPA 
Queensland 2004c, p. 1). Accordingly, in all jurisdictions, transporting hazardous 
waste, such as asbestos, is a licensed activity under environmental protection 
legislation (NEPC  2004). However, in most jurisdictions, transporting 
non-hazardous, solid waste is not a licensed activity. Instead, it is regulated through 
other forms of legislation (such as occupational, health and safety (OH&S) 
legislation and road and rail transport legislation), and relevant local government 
rules relating to noise and litter. 
South Australia is an exception — it requires the transport of non-hazardous solid 
waste to be licensed. Specifically, transporters taking waste from domestic premises 
on behalf of a council and/or taking solid waste from any commercial or industrial 
premises are required to be licensed under Schedule 1 of the Environment 
Protection Act 1993. 
Given most jurisdictions do not regulate the transport of non-hazardous solid waste, 
it is unclear why such regulation is needed in South Australia. The transport of solid 
waste may not pose significant additional environmental externalities over transport 
generally. While the transport of solid waste may create external costs due to noise 
and litter, these are best dealt with by local governments, either directly or through 
contractual arrangements with service providers.     
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8.4  Waste sorting, treatment and processing  
This section addresses regulations relating to the sorting of waste at waste transfer 
stations and materials recovery facilities and regulations governing compost 
production. 
Sorting 
Sorting regulation applies to waste transfer stations and materials recovery facilities. 
A waste transfer station is a facility where waste is received from householders and 
separated for subsequent transportation to a recycling facility or landfill. A 
materials recovery facility (MRF) is a facility where recyclables are sorted. Once 
sorted, recyclables are ready to be processed at recycling plants. For example, 
plastics can be separated and sent to a plastics processing plant. 
In some states and territories, a waste transfer station must be licensed to receive 
waste. In Queensland, licences require operators ‘to take all reasonable and 
practicable measures to minimise the likelihood of environmental harm’ and 
comply with ‘any other legislative obligations’, such as planning and OH&S 
legislation (EPA Queensland 2004b, p.  1). Similarly, in South Australia, waste 
transfer stations (or ‘waste depots’) must be licensed under the Environment 
Protection Act 1993. In other jurisdictions, such as Victoria, transfer stations do not 
have to be licensed, and only have to comply with general legislative requirements 
such as the provisions in environmental protection legislation governing pollution 
and various local government planning rules.  
Unlike waste transfer stations, materials recovery facilities are not typically required 
to have ‘waste-related’ licences for the receipt of recyclables. This is due to the 
small environmental and social impacts likely to arise from sorting recyclables 
(Leverenz et al. 2002). Instead, such facilities must operate in accordance with other 
legislation and local government requirements. Operators of these facilities will 
typically be required to: 
•  contain litter and dust — for example, by the use of buffer zones and fencing; 
•  keep records — for example, at materials recovery facilities, loads may need to 
be weighed and the data reported to the relevant authority; and  
•  manage the receipt of waste — for example, at transfer stations, particular types 
of waste (such as tyres and car batteries) may need to be separated into 
designated areas (EPA Queensland 2004b). 
In addition to state and territory licensing and/or local government requirements, 
three jurisdictions — Tasmania, Queensland and Victoria — have voluntary     




guidelines for the construction and/or operation of waste transfer stations. In 
Victoria and Tasmania, the guidelines apply to every transfer station (EcoRecycle 
Victoria 2004, DPIWE 1996). The Queensland guidelines, however, only apply if a 
transfer station receives 20  000  tonnes or more of waste per year (EPA 
Queensland 2004b). 
Regulation for waste transfer stations or  materials recovery facilities can reduce the 
negative social impacts associated with waste and recyclables, particularly, litter, 
odour and dust. For example, siting a facility away from residential areas means the 
community is less likely to be affected (chapter 4). However, if the externalities 
associated with sorting are small, such that the negative social impacts can be 
reduced with existing general regulation, there is no clear case for specific 
regulation of waste transfer stations or materials recovery facilities. 
Composting  
Compost is a mixture of decayed organic matter used to fertilise soil. It can be 
produced from two different sources: 
•  green waste (such as leaves and grass clippings); or  
•  general waste (excluding dry recyclables) by using mechanical and biological 
processes in an alternative waste technology (AWT) plant. 
Composting can be regulated in two respects — how composting facilities are 
operated, and compost standards. 
Regulation of composting facilities 
Currently, large-scale composting facilities have to be licensed under state or 
territory environmental protection legislation. For example, in South Australia, 
composting works must be licensed under the Environment Protection Act 1993 
when production capacity exceeds 200 tonnes per year. 
Licenses requirements typically require: 
•  facilities to be appropriately sited — for example, buffer distances between the 
facility and other sensitive land uses;  
•  groundwater and surface water to be protected from contamination — for 
example, compost heaps and other material stockpiles could be required to be set 
up on a non-permeable base to prevent leachate contamination; and 
•  aspects such as noise, pests, birds, litter and odour and other amenity impacts to 
be contained to acceptable levels.      
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Some jurisdictions have developed ‘best practice’ guidelines for the siting, 
operation and management of composting facilities (EPA Victoria 1996, DEC 
2004a). The relevant authorities can use these when assessing licence applications 
and can require that particular measures recommended in the guidelines are 
included in the licence conditions. 
National guidelines have also been developed by the WMAA, Compost Australia 
Division (WMAA NTCOR 2004). The guidelines were designed to assist 
composters to plan composting facilities that process source-separated organic 
waste (WMAA NTCOR 2004, p. 3). 
The BRSD (sub. 70, att. 5) argued that current requirements for some composting 
facilities were too prescriptive, and that classification of compost as a waste can 
lead to excessive regulation. In most states and territories, regulations governing 
composting facilities do not distinguish between different waste sources (for 
example, New South Wales) (DEC 2004a). One notable exception is Victoria. In 
that jurisdiction, where an operator can demonstrate that the facility will be 
processing relatively uncontaminated organic waste, and there are no unacceptable 
environmental risks, lesser requirements are imposed so operators only have to 
comply with planning requirements (EPA Victoria 1996). This seems to be an 
appropriate distinction. 
Compost standards 
Generally, the composition of compost is not subject to mandatory standards. 
Instead, some operators may choose to comply with voluntary Australian standards 
or guidelines. 
Voluntary Australian standards provide a baseline level of protection for human 
health and the environment. The standards contain specified limits for pathogen 
levels and these limits differ according to product type.1 
In Victoria, the EPA ‘best practice’ guidelines suggest that product should not 
contain harmful pathogens, and should be tested to prove batches meet claimed 
specifications (EPA Victoria 1996). The national WMAA guidelines require 
compost to be ‘fit for purpose’ (WMAA NTCOR 2004, p. 12). In this regard, the 
guidelines encourage operators to comply with the relevant Australian standard. 
                                              
1  Relevant Australian standards include: AS 4454 (2003) for composts, mulches and soil 
conditioners; AS 3743 (2003) for potting mixes; AS 4419 (2003) for soils for landscaping and 
garden use; and AS 4422 (1998) for playground surfacing.     




One regulation in New South Wales — Protection of the Environment Operations 
(Waste) Regulation 2005 — prohibits some types of waste from being applied to 
agricultural land. These include fly ash, waste residues from any industrial or 
chemical process, industrial and hazardous waste, or waste containing traces of the 
above. Healthy Soils (trans., p. 50) suggested that the regulation was motivated by 
concern that materials containing heavy metals could be applied to the soil. The 
blanket prohibition can be overturned by individual exemptions from the NSW 
EPA. However, Healthy Soils claimed that the only way to obtain an exemption was 
by following a series of prescriptive requirements that discouraged innovation in 
developing new compost products and could often destroy the organic value of 
compost. It argued that a blanket prohibition combined with a conservative and 
unduly prescriptive approach to issuing exemptions, imposed high compliance costs 
on compost producers (trans., p. 50). 
The WMAA, Compost Australia Division (sub. 55) advised the Commission that 
most compost does not meet the minimum Australian standard. Such compost is 
typically used in agriculture or viticulture, for example, as a soil conditioner, or in 
urban applications, for example, as fill for sports grounds. It noted, however, that 
compost sold at retail outlets typically does meet the Australian standard. 
SITA Environmental Solutions (trans., p. 499) explained that most compost is of 
poor quality because there is no market incentive to produce high quality compost. 
That is, compost that meets the voluntary Australian standard does not receive a 
price premium over non-compliant compost.  
Inquiry participants generally supported the introduction of a minimum standard for 
compost (for example, Custom Composts, sub. 96; WA Department of Agriculture, 
sub. 81). However, there were many different views about how this standard should 
be implemented — from self-regulation, through industry-led co-regulation, to 
legislation or mandatory licensing requirements.  
The issue of quality appears to have prompted a series of industry developments. 
The WMAA, Compost Australia Division reported that the Australian standard for 
compost (AS  4454 (2003)) was in the process of being updated, and there are 
discussions about making it mandatory across the whole compost industry. It also 
noted that minimum standards are currently being developed by government 
departments and agencies in New South Wales and Victoria. 
Further, a recent industry review supported the introduction of a marketing 
campaign that focused on quality:  
A standard or ‘fit-for-purpose’ label needs to be developed to address end-user needs 
and promote the idea of different quality products. Quality assurance strategies need to 
be pursued to ensure compliance and quality products. A code of practice (or other     
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quality initiative) could be called for. (Resource Consulting Services Pty 
Ltd 2006, p. v) 
The Commission accepts that there may be a case for mandatory minimum 
standards for compost on health and safety grounds. That is, if there is a significant 
risk that compost will contain harmful pathogens and/or toxic contaminants, then it 
may be appropriate for the product to meet a minimum standard to reduce the risk 
that it will cause damage to human health or the environment. However, the 
Commission has not been given any evidence of major health and safety problems. 
Beyond a minimum level of safety, there may be a case for a voluntary, industry-led 
accreditation scheme for higher quality compost products (similar to the Heart 
Foundation’s tick for food products). 
There may be a case for adopting mandatory minimum standards for compost to 
address potential risks to human health or the environment, but this would need to 
be assessed after voluntary industry approaches have been tried and evaluated. 
8.5 Waste  disposal 
Waste disposal regulations include: the design and management of, and restrictions 
relating to, landfills; and the limits placed on incineration and energy-from-waste 
processes. 
Landfill 
Over the past few decades, landfill regulation has tightened considerably. To a large 
extent these changes appear to be the product of an improved understanding of the 
potential environmental and social impacts of landfills, shifts in community values 
and technological progress. As a result, the design and management of landfills in 
Australia has progressed significantly (appendix B). While older landfills had little 
or no controls over leachate, landfill gases and other environmental problems, 
modern landfills are often required to include containment and monitoring 
processes.  
Nonetheless, some of the recent changes in landfill regulation appear to have been 
driven by waste hierarchy considerations as well as by the objective of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from landfill disposal.  
FINDING 8.1     





Currently, landfill regulation is administered by state or territory government 
authorities (table 8.1).2 Each jurisdiction has environment protection legislation that 
provides the broad regulatory framework for environmental measures. Under this 
legislation, the relevant state or territory government authority can design and 
implement regulations, policies and guidelines that target more specific issues such 
as landfills. 
Objectives 
The objectives of landfill regulation vary from one jurisdiction to another, but are 
expressed along similar lines of reducing risk to the community and the 
environment. The degree to which landfill regulation aims to reduce risks also 
varies. In Victoria, landfill regulation is designed to provide ‘the highest practicable 
level of protection for the community and environment, including local amenity and 
aesthetic enjoyment’ (EPA Victoria 2004c, s. 9(1)). In New South Wales, landfill 
regulation has been set so that operators manage ‘the risks landfilling poses to the 
quality of air, water, land and community amenity … in the most effective way 
possible’  (EPA NSW 1996b, p. 1).  Similar objectives are pursued in other 
jurisdictions (for example, EPA Queensland 2004a). 
These statements imply that the risks from landfills should be reduced to very low 
levels. But risk can never be entirely eliminated, meaning that regulation should aim 
to reduce landfill risks (and hence expected environmental impacts) to ‘acceptable’ 
levels. More stringent regulation might reduce risks further but that would require 
additional resources, and those resources might achieve a better return to the 
community if devoted to other policy options, whether in waste management or 
elsewhere in the economy. There are also the consequences to future generations to 
consider. Landfilling regulation might need to make tradeoffs between current and 
future generations according to the risks that a landfill poses throughout its working 
life and during its post-closure phase. 
                                              
2  In some jurisdictions, local governments regulate smaller-sized landfills. For example, in New 
South Wales, landfills receiving waste from just one local government area or taking less than 
75 000 tonnes of waste per year, or taking less than 650 000 tonnes of total waste over the life 
of the site, are regulated by the relevant local council (DUAP 1995, p. 7).     
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Table 8.1  Legislation, regulations and guidelines relating to landfillsa 
State / 
Territory 
Acts and regulations  Landfill guidelines  Government 
authorities 
NSW  Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 
Protection of the Environment 
Operations (Waste) Regulation 2005 
State Environmental Planning Policy 














Victoria  Environment Protection Act 1970 
Waste management policy (WMP) 
(Siting, design and management of 
landfills) 2004  
BPEMb — siting, 





Qld  Environmental Protection Act 1994 
Environmental Protection (Waste 
Management) Regulation 2000 
Environmental Protection (Waste 
Management) Policy 2000 
Landfill siting, design, 
operation and 
rehabilitation 2004 — 
environmentally 
relevant activity 75 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
WA  Environmental Protection Act 1986 
Environmental Protection Regulations 
1987 
Environmental Protection (Rural 
Landfill) Regulations 2002 
Siting, design, operation 






SA  Environment Protection Act 1993 
Environment Protection (General) 
Regulations 1994 
Environment Protection (Waste 
Management) Policy 1994 
Landfill facility 
guidelines 2005c 
Guidelines for major 




Zero Waste SA 
Tasmania  Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 
Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control (Waste 







NT  Waste Management and Pollution 
Control Act 1998 
Waste Management and Pollution 
Control (Administration) Regulations 
1998 
Guidelines for the siting, 
design and 
management of solid 
waste disposal sites in 




ACT  Environment Protection Act 1997 
Environment Protection Regulation 
2005 
Waste Minimisation Act 2001 
Waste Minimisation Regulation 2001 
None  Environment ACT;  
ACT NOWaste, 
Department of Urban 
Services 
a Regulations relating to landfill levies are not included. b Best practice environmental management.  c These 
are draft guidelines only. 
Sources: DUAP (1995); DPIWE (2004); EPA NSW (1996b); EPA NT (2003); EPA  Victoria  (2001a); EPA 
Queensland (2004a); EPA SA (1998, 2005b); Department of Environment WA (2005c).     




Risk assessment is best placed within the context of good regulatory practice, such 
that: ‘decision making is transparent, consistent and accountable; … it utilises all 
relevant information; … costs, benefits and risks are identified, assessed and 
compared; and … measures are targeted at, and proportionate to, the problem’ 
(Peterson 2006, p. 30). Yet there is little evidence that risk assessment has been 
adequately considered in regulatory assessment processes to date (see below and 
also chapter 4 and appendix B). 
Landfill regulations in detail 
There are three common landfill types — landfills taking: 
•  only solid inert waste and fill material; 
•  putrescible waste, solid inert waste, fill material and some forms of prescribed 
industrial waste; and 
•  hazardous and prescribed (liquid and solid) waste (EPA Victoria 2004c). 
This chapter focuses on the first two types of landfills — that is, solid, non-
hazardous waste landfills. These landfills are typically regulated through licence 
conditions  pertaining to construction and operation. 
However, not all non-hazardous landfills are licensed. In most jurisdictions, 
landfills serving a small population (typically fewer than 1000–5000 people) and/or 
receiving a small volume of waste (typically less than 20 000 tonnes per year) are 
not required to obtain licences (for example,  EPA Victoria 2001a;  EPA 
Queensland  2004a; Department of Environment WA 2005c). Nevertheless, even 
these would still be subject to general planning regulations, as well as legislative 
provisions governing actions that cause pollution.  
Each landfill site has different environmental characteristics and, hence, the 
requirements attached to a particular licence can vary. Requirements may differ 
according to: 
•  hydrogeological, geological and other localised conditions — these conditions 
have a critical bearing on the need for, and nature of, environmental protection 
measures. For example, one landfill may be located in an impermeable area of 
rock or clay and will, therefore, require less stringent measures for leachate 
control, compared with a landfill located in a more sensitive area (such as near a 
water course); 
•  waste disposed — the type and amount of waste is a relevant consideration when 
examining the extent of the environmental and social impacts. For example,     
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solid inert landfills have only minor environmental impacts and, thus, for 
example, do not require liners; and 
•  size and location — regional variation in population density and the assimilative 
capacity of the environment are factors that influence the degree of potential 
environmental damage. For example, other things being the same, small, remote 
rural landfills will pose different risks to humans compared with larger landfills 
in metropolitan areas. 
Landfill licensing conditions consist of a mix of prescriptive and performance-based 
measures. Most states and territories have adopted a broad performance-based 
framework that requires landfill operators to achieve certain environmental 
outcomes. For example, Victoria’s Waste Management Policy (Siting, Design and 
Management of Landfills) requires licence holders to ‘meet the objectives … and … 
each required outcome’ of the ‘best practice’ guidelines (EPA Victoria 2004c, 
s. 15(3)). Regulators may negotiate with applicants the measures that will be needed 
to achieve those outcomes. These measures may be lifted from the ‘best practice’ 
guidelines, but alternatives that provide at least as good an environmental outcome 
can be considered. In Queensland, licence conditions are set to achieve certain 
outcomes, and guidelines provide optional (but not exhaustive) means for achieving 
those outcomes (EPA Queensland 2001, 2004f). Similar approaches are used in 
other states and territories (DPIWE 2004; EPA NT 2003; EPA SA 2005c; 
Department of Environment WA 2005c; DUAP 1995; EPA NSW 1996b).  
Licensing requirements apply to the four main stages of a landfill’s life:  
•  siting 
•  design  
•  operation and management  
•  closure and post-closure.  
These are discussed below. 
Siting 
The location of a landfill is a major determinant of the extent to which it poses 
environmental and social risks (EPA SA 2005c). Siting requirements for ‘best 
practice’ landfills generally cover: 
•  location restrictions — such as buffer distances, meeting local community 
concerns, distances to waste sources and site access; 
•  available land area — such as existing infrastructure and land use patterns;     




•  soil characteristics and topography — such as proposed landfill type and 
potential ultimate uses of the closed site; and 
•  local conditions — such as environmental, climatic, geologic, hydrogeologic 
and hydrological conditions (DUAP 1995; EPA NT 2003; EPA Victoria 2001a, 
2004c; DPIWE 2004; EPA SA 2005b; Department of Environment WA 2005c). 
Various siting requirements must be met before the construction of a landfill site is 
approved, with some jurisdictions imposing stricter requirements than others. For 
example, in New South Wales, the planning authority (DUAP) must consider 
whether a landfill taking more than 75 000 tonnes of waste per year complies with 
the many ‘locational principles’ in that State’s Environmental Planning Policy 
(SEPP  48, cl. 12; DUAP 1995, p. 7). In comparison, in the Northern Territory, 
operators of a similar sized landfill may ‘deviate from the minimum level of 
performance’ if justification for doing so is provided to, and approved by, the 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA NT 2006). 
Some aspects of siting are prescriptive. For example, all states and territories except 
New South Wales specify a minimum buffer distance between the landfill site and 
other sensitive land uses, such as residential dwellings (average minimum is 500 
metres) and surface waters (100 metres) (for example, DPIWE 2004; EPA 
NT 2003;  EPA Victoria 2001a;  EPA  Queensland 2004a). Victoria, Western 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania also specify a minimum distance between the 
bottom of the landfill and the groundwater level — typically 2 metres above the top 
aquifer for landfills accepting putrescible waste. In New South Wales, buffer 
distances are not prescriptive. That is, the State’s policy and guidelines note that the 
distance must be the ‘minimum required’ to ensure environmental objectives are 
met (DUAP 1995, p. 17). This issue is discussed further below. 
Design 
After a site has been selected, the landfill must be designed to protect the 
environment to an acceptable level. Design requirements can include: 
•  installation of engineering systems — such as liners, leachate collection and cell 
containment; 
•  environmental resource management — such as surface water, groundwater and 
air quality monitoring; 
•  logistics management — such as noise and traffic, site security and fencing; and 
•  other layout requirements — such as the location of access roads and 
weighbridges (DPIWE 2004; EPA NSW 1996b; EPA NT 2003;     
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EPA Victoria 2001a; EPA SA 2005b; Department of Environment WA 2005c; 
EPA Queensland 2004a). 
Large, modern landfills taking putrescible waste are almost invariably required to 
install liners and systems to collect or contain leachate (figure 8.1). For example, in 
Queensland, large landfills are required to install systems with the equivalent 
performance capability of the following:  
•  an engineered earthen (clay) liner (0.6 metres thick) placed directly above a 
flexible membrane liner made of high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
(0.0015 metres thick); 
•  a leachate collection system capable of limiting the level of leachate to ensure 
that the pooling depth for leachate in the bottom of the landfill never exceeds a 
height of 0.3 metres; and 
•  water quality monitoring (surface water and groundwater) that allows for 
periodic assessment of the system performance during both operation and 
post-closure care (EPA Queensland 2004g). 
In Tasmania, landfills ‘must be designed to contain leachate over the time that the 
waste poses a risk to protected environmental values for groundwater’ 
(DPIWE 2004, p. 28). The guidelines recommend ‘an engineered clay liner as the 
minimum control required for putrescible landfills’, and state that landfills taking 
some prescribed waste should install artificial materials such as geomembranes 
(DPIWE 2004, p. 28). Similar provisions exist in other jurisdictions (EPA Victoria 
2001a; EPA NSW 1996a; EPA SA 2005b; Department of Environment WA 2005c). 
Landfills are typically divided into a series of cells (figure 8.1). In some 
jurisdictions, operating landfills on a cellular basis is a design requirement (for 
example, EPA Victoria 2001a). In others, operators sometimes use a cellular 
approach voluntarily, because of the practical benefits it can provide. Filling waste 
cell by cell minimises the size of the active tipping face, therefore minimising daily 
cover requirements and the negative effects associated with litter and odour 
(EPA NT 2003). 
Regulators may also require that gas capture systems be installed. For example, in 
Queensland, new, large landfills (those taking more than 75 000 tonnes per year) are 
required to install a landfill gas system ‘for the recovery, collection and 
management (including beneficial use) of landfill gases’ (EPA Queensland 2004g, 
p. 2).      




Figure 8.1  Elements of landfill design 
 
Source: DPIWE (2004). 
Operation and management 
After a landfill has been sited, designed and constructed, a landfill must operate in 
accordance with its licensing conditions. Most jurisdictions impose prescriptive 
requirements on technical issues such as: the availability of access roads; litter 
control; burning of refuse; pest and animal control; fire management; and staffing 
(EPA Victoria 2001a; EPA  NSW  1996b; DPIWE 2004; EPA SA 2005b; 
Department of Environment WA 2005c).  
All jurisdictions impose standards relating to contamination of groundwater by 
leachate. For example, in New South Wales, leachate must be controlled to ensure 
‘neither groundwater nor surface water is polluted’ to unacceptable levels (EPA 
NSW 1996b, p. 4). Controlling leachate in this way requires effective mechanisms 
for early detection of pollution, such as the regular monitoring of groundwater 
through wells/bores (EPA NSW 1996b; figure 8.1).  
Closure and post-closure 
Closure and post-closure regulations are designed to ensure that long-term 
environmental impacts are acceptable. Landfill aftercare practices can be required     
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up to 30 years after the site has closed (DPIWE 2004). To guard against long-term 
environmental risk, closure and post-closure requirements can include: 
•  rehabilitation practices — a financial assurance may be required from the 
original operator to cover potential problems;  
•  restrictions on afteruse — permitted uses may include sports grounds and golf 
courses; 
•  landfill caps — caps should divert surface water to avoid the formation of 
leachate. Caps may contain plastic and/or clay products and may be similar in 
nature to landfill liners (figure 8.1); and 
•  environmental monitoring and management — groundwater, surface water, 
leachate and landfill gases may be required to be monitored and managed until 
the long-term risk is deemed acceptable (for example, DPIWE 2004; EPA NSW 
1996b; EPA NT 2003; EPA Victoria 2001a; EPA Queensland 2004a). 
Financial assurances 
In most states and territories, environment protection legislation allows the relevant 
authority to require upfront financial assurances from landfill operators. Financial 
assurances can guarantee that the future costs of addressing the negative impacts of 
a landfill are borne by its operator, even if the operator becomes insolvent or leaves 
the country. There are two potential applications for financial assurances in landfill 
regulation. They can be used to cover liabilities that are certain to occur in the 
future, such as post-closure rehabilitation of landfills. When used in this manner, 
assurances act as a performance bond imposed on the landfill operator. Another 
potential use of assurances is as insurance to cover potential liabilities that may or 
may not arise — for example, remediation of the consequences of pollution. 
The distinction between the two potential applications of assurances is important in 
the context of selecting the financial instrument that would most effectively achieve 
the desired outcome. Thus, in the case of performance-bond type assurances, the 
major issue is that the landfill operator funds their known liabilities and the most 
appropriate instrument for achieving that objective is some form of financial 
guarantee. When the assurance covers liabilities that may or may not occur, an 
additional objective is to efficiently manage the risks of those liabilities arising. An 
insurance policy may be the most appropriate form of assurance in that instance. 
In Victoria, both private and local government operators of licensed landfills are 
required to provide financial assurances addressing different aspects of operator 
liability, including: remedial action in the event of pollution during the landfill’s life 
and after its closure; site rehabilitation; and post-closure care of the site (box 8.4).      





Box 8.4 Financial  assurances  for  landfills in Victoria 
Sections 19A(2A) and 21 of the Environment Protection Act  1970 allow financial 
assurance to be required from a landfill operator. The assurance must be provided in 
addition to the compulsory third party liability insurance. 
Financial assurances consist of three components:  
•  Remedial action — this covers potential costs of addressing pollution during the 
landfill’s operation and after its closure. The funds for this component of the 
assurance can be sourced either by individual operators or through an approved 
mutual fund. The size of the assurance can be determined using a default formula 
based on annual waste tonnage and a fixed cost component, or by a risk 
assessment of potential remedial action costs at the 95 per cent confidence limit.  
•  Site rehabilitation — this covers the cost of works required to close the landfill. The 
calculation is made for each landfill based on the worst case scenario of a third 
party closing the landfill and assuming the largest area of the landfill that may be 
open at any time.  
•  Site aftercare — this covers the cost of maintaining the cap and pollution prevention 
infrastructure, and environmental monitoring. The costing is based on a default 
period of 30 years after the closure of the landfill or a shorter period if the operator 
can demonstrate that the waste has stabilised or decomposed. 
Typically, the remedial component of assurance is provided via an insurance policy, 
while the remaining components are financed through bank guarantees or similar 
measures.  
Assurances are reviewed every five years and can be amended or discharged on the 
basis of an environmental risk assessment by the Environment Protection Agency. 
Landfill operators can also apply to amend or discharge the assurance at any time. 
Source: EPA Victoria (2001b). 
 
 
The guidelines on financial assurances for Victorian landfills (EPA Victoria 2001b) 
include a sample calculation of financial assurance for a hypothetical landfill 
covering a total area of 26 hectares and accepting 150 000 tonnes of waste per year. 
The assurance was estimated to be around $5.1 million, comprising a $2.6 million 
remedial action component, a $1.5 million site rehabilitation component and a 
$1 million site aftercare component.  
The WMAA, National Landfill Division supported the use of financial assurances: 
Application of financial assurances to landfills for closure cost and remediation of 
environmental pollution are an effective way of forcing landfill operators to meet 
environmental and operational standards. The risk based analysis involved to quantify 
the size of the financial assurance provides an incentive for improvement of operational 
standards. (sub. DR159, p. 2)     
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Financial assurances have been widely used in US environmental regulation, 
including the regulation of landfills. Some commentators (for example, Hickman 
1998; Lee and Jones-Lee 1993; US EPA 2001) suggested using financial assurances 
in US landfill regulation was problematic. Common problems included 
underestimating the post-closure period and size of operator liability and accepting 
as assurance financial instruments, such as self-insurance or insurance by a 
subsidiary, that did not provide the requisite level of financial security. However, 
the former issue is not unique to financial assurances, while the latter could be 
addressed through instrument design.  
Boyd (2001) identified several implementation challenges with using financial 
assurances in US environmental regulation. In particular, calculation of the size of 
assurances was often difficult, especially in the case of long-term environmental 
issues applying to landfills. Regular monitoring and review is typically required for 
the duration of the assurance to ensure its size reflects the potential liabilities. 
Further, in the United States, disputes over whether the firm had met its obligations 
and could discharge the assurance, have sometimes resulted in litigation. The issue 
of allowing flexibility in the choice of financial instruments (to reduce compliance 
costs) without jeopardising the security of the resulting assurance also posed 
challenges. Nonetheless, he suggested: 
In every regulatory context to date, private financial markets have developed to provide 
the insurance, bonds, and other financial instruments necessary to demonstrate 
assurance, and they provide these products at reasonable cost. (Boyd 2001, p. 30) 
Boyd concluded that, compared to the alternative of taxpayer-funded remediation 
and rehabilitation of landfills, financial assurances were a relatively low-cost and 
effective way of improving environmental outcomes.  
The Commission considers that appropriate use of financial assurances to 
complement landfill regulation could deliver a number of benefits. First, they have 
equity advantages in providing security that the external costs of landfill would be 
covered by landfill operators rather than future taxpayers. Second, they force the 
operators to include these costs in their current balance sheets, and discourages the 
entry into the market of operators with insufficient resources to cover potential 
future liabilities. Third, financial assurances provided in advance of potential 
breaches, and easily accessible by the relevant authority, could serve as an 
additional compliance enforcement mechanism. Finally, if the size of the assurance 
reflects the true remediation and post-closure costs of landfills, landfill operators 
would have an incentive to reduce those costs through improving landfill design and 
operations. To the extent that these improvements are cost effective, this would lead 
to a net benefit for the community. Hence, when used in conjunction with other     




landfill regulation, financial assurances could act as a mechanism for efficiently 
managing the risks that remain after landfill regulation.  
Thus, the Commission supports the use of financial assurances in principle. 
Assurances would need to be underpinned by a robust and transparent assessment of 
the potential remediation and rehabilitation costs and be subject to regular review. 
Further, assurances should be designed and applied in a way that minimizes 
compliance costs. This could involve a requirement to release components of the 
assurance as soon as the relevant obligation has been satisfied by the landfill 
operator. Allowing flexibility in the choice of assurance instruments (subject to an 
assessment of their financial risk), would improve accessibility to assurance and 
also improve cost-effectiveness by allowing operators to tailor the instrument to 
minimise the relevant risks.3 Finally, it is important that the application of 
assurances is not restricted to privately-operated licensed landfills. For example, in 
Victoria all landfills are potentially subject to the requirement to provide assurances 
(EPA Victoria 2001b). Ensuring that assurances apply to all landfills would 
promote full cost recovery by all operators, improve competitive neutrality, and 
promote intergenerational equity. 
Benefits and costs 
The key benefit of landfill regulation is that it facilitates the safe disposal of solid 
waste. It also can lead to an improvement in neighbourhood amenity in the long 
term, for example, by rehabilitating quarries. As noted in chapter 4, the total 
external costs of properly located, engineered and managed landfills that 
incorporate gas capture (with electricity generation) are likely to be less than $5 per 
tonne of waste. Without these features the externalities could be substantial, 
depending on location. Therefore, it would appear that waste management policy — 
of which regulation appears to have been by far the most potent instrument4 — has 
had a marked effect in reducing landfill externalities in recent times.  
                                              
3  For example, a feature of the remedial (insurance) component is the high uncertainty of an event 
requiring remediation occurring. This uncertainty (and hence the required size of the assurance) 
could be reduced by allowing landfill operators to pool their risks by joining mutual funds. A 
hypothetical calculation of the aggregate remedial assurance required from 12 Victorian 
landfills joining a mutual fund showed that it was likely to be 36–45 per cent lower than if 
separate assurances were provided by each landfill (Sarjeant 2006). 
4  The other main instrument that may influence disposal externalities is landfill levies, but as 
discussed in chapter 9, these are not based on externalities, and have practical problems that 
limit their effectiveness and efficiency.     
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The effectiveness of the current regulatory approach was noted by several inquiry 
participants. For example, the Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) 
noted: 
… regulation has in recent decades addressed many of the negative externalities 
directly associated with disposal of waste to landfill … (sub. 103, p. i) 
BDA Group and McLennan Magasanik Associates (2003, p. 7) also contended that 
stringent environmental regulation has led to a reduction in externalities from 
landfills.  
Several participants (for example, WMAA, NSW Division, sub. DR150) argued 
that early results of a national landfill survey conducted by WMAA, National 
Landfill Division showed that 80 per cent of Australian landfills did not have the 
features of a properly located, engineered and managed landfill specified in 
chapter 4. However, WMAA, National Landfill Division stated that most of those 
landfills were small rural landfills, while the larger municipal and regional landfills 
accepting around 70 per cent of all waste were already achieving or approaching 
that level of performance (trans., pp. 1130-31).  
The apparent discrepancy between the standards of small rural landfills and large 
metropolitan landfills (whether due to the differences in licence conditions or due to 
the fact that some landfills are not licensed) may be appropriate, if it reflects the 
differences between the social and environmental risks posed by those landfills. The 
external costs of small remote landfills are likely to be lower and may not justify the 
imposition of the same controls as those that apply to large municipal landfills 
(particularly, in view of the costs to governments of monitoring and enforcing 
compliance). The Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet (sub. 114) also 
suggested it was difficult to impose stringent requirements on small landfills 
because, in the absence of the economies of scale that can be achieved by large 
metropolitan landfills, this would raise the costs of landfill disposal to prohibitive 
levels. A cost–benefit analysis of the NSW Landfill Management Guidelines 
(discussed below) supported the contention that it was appropriate to impose less 
stringent requirements on smaller landfills. Nonetheless, the NSW Department of 
Environment and Conservation (trans., p. 888) indicated that it received criticism 
that the current threshold levels at which a landfill would need to be licensed were 
too high, and that it was currently reviewing those thresholds. 
Features of the regulations that appear to have been particularly effective in 
reducing externalities include: location constraints; requirements to install liners and 
caps; gas collection systems; measures to reduce amenity impacts; and post-closure 
rehabilitation. One participant claimed that the combination of covers and liners has 
been effective in reducing leachate emissions to more or less negligible levels     




(WMAA, National Landfill Division, trans., p. 155). And gas management systems 
appear to be effective in capturing up to 75 per cent of the methane in a landfill 
(appendix B). 
The costs of compliance with landfill regulation do not appear to be inordinately 
high. As noted in chapter 4, the WMAA has advised that the financial costs of 
operating a large modern landfill are of the order of $25 per tonne of waste. 
Recognising that some costs would be incurred in the absence of regulation, the 
costs of compliance are likely to be substantially less than $25 per tonne. Even the 
cost of introducing some additional control measures may not be great. For 
example, as noted in appendix B, the cost of introducing a liner and leachate control 
system suitable for landfilling of hazardous waste may only be around $3 per tonne 
greater than that of a liner and leachate control system of a non-hazardous landfill. 
(However, until the incremental benefits of further reducing risks associated with 
landfilling non-hazardous waste are known, such a move could not be 
recommended).  
The WMAA, National Landfill Division (sub. 28) warned that the costs of 
enforcing the full suite of regulations on older landfills might lead to their closure. 
This might, nevertheless, be an appropriate outcome, if it leads to a net benefit to 
the community. 
While it appears that many of the features of landfill regulation could reduce 
external costs of landfills to low levels without imposing high compliance costs, 
there has been little research on whether the regulations lead to a net community 
benefit. A study of the costs and benefits of the Landfill Management Guidelines in 
New South Wales (Travers Morgan 1995) looked at the impact of landfill 
regulations for a range of scenarios (box 8.5). It concluded that implementation of 
the guidelines was likely to generate significant benefits for large putrescible waste 
landfills. On the other hand, for small landfills, implementation of the guidelines — 
particularly the requirements relating to leachate and landfill gas management — 
was likely to result in a net cost to the community. 
It is difficult to make generalisations about the net benefit of landfill regulations. 
The regulations differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and can be tailored to the 
circumstances of an individual landfill, and hence the costs and benefits will vary. 
Further, as discussed in chapter 4, little ex post analysis of existing regulation has 
been carried out, which precludes an assessment of whether the current level of 
stringency is one that would result in the most beneficial outcomes for the 
community.     
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Box 8.5  Key results of the cost–benefit analysis of NSW Landfill 
Management Guidelines 
Impact of regulating a putrescible landfill accepting 250 000 tonnes of waste per 
annum 
•  The net community benefit over 50 years of introducing leachate controls, in 
addition to location requirements, was in the range of -$0.9 million to $6.2 million, 
depending on whether the landfill was in an area of low or high risk of groundwater 
pollution. 
•  The net community benefit over 50 years of introducing gas control measures 
(excluding greenhouse gas abatement benefits) was around $5.8 million. 
•  The net community benefit over 50 years of introducing amenity protection 
measures, including compaction, covering of waste, waste acceptance and 
screening, litter and fire controls, was around $22.3 million. 
Impact of regulating a putrescible landfill accepting 5000 tonnes of waste per 
annum 
•  The net cost to the community over 50 years of introducing leachate controls, in 
addition to location requirements, was around $1 million. 
•  The net cost to the community over 50 years of introducing gas control measures 
(excluding greenhouse gas abatement benefits) was around $0.3 million. 
•  The net benefit to the community over 50 years of introducing amenity protection 
measures was around $0.1 million. 
Source: Travers Morgan (1995). 
 
 
Overall, it appears that many of the features of the regulatory regime focus on the 
relevant objectives. What is at issue, however, is whether all features of the 
regulations are necessary or appropriate. 
Are there some unnecessary features? 
In chapter 6, the Commission recommended that waste management policy should 
focus primarily on externalities from waste disposal. Furthermore, it was stressed 
that to be most effective and efficient, policy instruments (such as regulation) 
should be aimed as directly as possible at the relevant problem, and intervention 
should produce net benefits, after due consideration is given to risk.  
This framework allows consideration of the degree to which landfill regulation is 
achieving good policy outcomes. Two questionable features that are sometimes 
required in the current regulatory regime are:      




•  the requirement to collect and (as a minimum) flare landfill gases; and 
•  requirements to divert waste from landfill (which is sometimes imposed, 
presumably to achieve waste hierarchy related objectives).  
Gas collection systems appear to be reasonably effective ways of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, as discussed in chapter 6, greenhouse gas 
abatement would be best addressed through a comprehensive national approach, not 
through landfill regulation. Several participants (for example, WMAA, National 
Landfill Division, sub. DR159; Victorian Government, sub. DR187)  also argued 
that landfill gas collection could provide other benefits such as lower odour, lower 
on-site risk of fire and explosion, and improved growth of revegetation on landfill 
caps.  
However, it is unclear whether non-greenhouse gas abatement benefits would 
justify the prescriptive requirement to install a gas collection system. First, some of 
the above benefits may already be targeted by other regulatory requirements. For 
example, the buffer and cover requirements of landfill regulations may address most 
of the odour problems and occupational health and safety legislation would already 
require landfill operators to minimise the risk of fire or explosion. Second, in some 
cases, landfill operators may have a financial incentive to install a gas collection 
system. Landfill gas can be used for electricity generation, providing the operator 
with some supplementary income. And, in many cases, operators have received 
additional incentives through other government policies, including the Australian 
Government’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target scheme (ORER 2006). 
The Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council (sub. DR155, p. 7) argued that adoption 
of gas collection systems ‘has largely occurred without the prompting of 
regulators’, and the WMAA, National Landfill Division (sub. DR159) stated that 
this practice was generally supported by the industry. Hence, if the objective is to 
target the non-greenhouse abatement benefits of such systems, it is unclear that 
separate regulation mandating their installation is needed. If the objective is to 
pursue the benefits of greenhouse gas abatement, the requirement to install gas 
collection systems may be warranted. However, the costs and benefits of such 
regulation would need to be assessed against all other greenhouse gas abatement 
options. Given that the requirement (as it currently applies) does not appear to 
impose high compliance costs, this assessment can be made whenever a 
comprehensive national response to greenhouse gas abatement is introduced. 
The second questionable feature of some regulatory regimes involves requirements 
to divert non-hazardous materials from landfill disposal. For instance, under 
Victorian and Western Australian landfill regulation, waste must be sorted on-site, 
or at a transfer station, to achieve diversion of recyclable materials (EPA Victoria     
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2004c, s. 16(3); Department of Environment WA 2005c). Similarly, in Tasmania, 
the relevant outcome is to divert ‘waste materials that can be reused or recycled 
from landfills to minimise the loss of capacity’ (DPIWE  2004, p. 5).  Suggested 
measures include the installation of ‘hardstand’ areas to recover stockpiles of 
material, and designing waste acceptance practices so sorting can occur on-site.5  
It is unclear how the imposition of mandatory diversion requirements would lead to 
a benefit to the community. Such requirements appear to do little to address external 
costs of landfill disposal, and seem to be motivated by the objective of capturing 
upstream benefits. Using landfill regulation to address these upstream benefits is an 
indirect, and probably ineffective approach (chapter 5). Further, there are private 
incentives for landfill operators to divert some waste from landfill. For example, 
some materials sent to landfill can be economically recycled after full consideration 
of all the relevant costs. Also, since landfill disposal costs relate primarily to the 
volume of the waste, there may be an incentive to divert some low density waste out 
of landfills (Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council, sub. DR155). Where there are 
private incentives to divert materials, regulation would appear unnecessary.  
Is landfill regulation too prescriptive? 
As discussed earlier, some aspects of regulation — in particular those relating to 
landfill siting — are prescriptive. Prescription can have several advantages over 
performance-based approaches. It offers greater clarity and transparency for both 
the regulator and the landfill operator. Also, compliance with prescriptive 
requirements can be less costly to demonstrate and monitor. Hence prescription may 
offer greater certainty of compliance for the regulator and the operator.  
Nonetheless, the use of prescriptive requirements carries a number of costs. One 
drawback of prescriptive requirements is that they are often generic. There is a risk 
that such requirements would not reflect the variability in the circumstances 
applying to different locations and, hence, that the outcomes actually achieved 
would not deliver a net benefit to the community. Ipswich City Council (trans., 
p.  928) argued that generic licence conditions were a common problem in 
Queensland. It gave an example of one of their landfills being required to comply 
with stringent leachate controls, when the quality of the groundwater in the area was 
worse than that of leachate, due to mining operations in the district. 
                                              
5  A further regulatory measure that has been implemented at landfills overseas is banning 
particular non-hazardous waste from being disposed to landfill. SITA Environmental Solutions 
(sub.  42) indicated that such bans have been implemented in Europe. It cited regulations 
requiring pre-stabilisation of putrescible waste prior to landfill and bans on e-waste (such as 
computers).     




Further, requiring the use of a particular method of achieving the outcome could 
impose high compliance costs and prevent innovation and adoption of other more 
cost-effective approaches. For example, in a number of jurisdictions (including 
Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania), there is a prescriptive 
requirement to locate landfills a certain minimum distance above groundwater 
levels. In Victoria, the Waste Management Policy (Siting, Design and Management 
of Landfills), specifies a minimum distance of two metres (EPA Victoria 2004c). 
WMAA, National Landfill Division stated that strict interpretation of this 
requirement would prevent the location of landfills in disused basalt quarries, 
because the basalt was typically mined 10–15 metres below the top groundwater 
aquifer. It claimed that this requirement would produce little environmental benefit: 
… that regulation will mean that there will never be another basalt quarry landfill in the 
northern part of Melbourne … The last cell that we built at Wollert cost us 
$3.5 million, and we spent $1 million just filling the bottom, before we even built any 
of the liner. That’s a few metres deep. Can you imagine the cost of making it 12 or 15 
metres deep, and will you have enough material to do that? … you can’t dump any old 
material in there. It's got to be engineered, it’s got to be stable, otherwise the liner is 
very susceptible to rupture … But in terms of the aquifer … the upper aquifer is fairly 
inactive … If you drill a hole in it and put a pipe in it, you’ll get water sitting in it, but 
it doesn’t move around very much. So whether the impact on that aquifer will be very 
great is doubtful … (trans., pp. 1135–37) 
In justifying the requirement to site landfills two metres above the watertable, EPA 
Victoria suggested that, while the current lining and leachate management 
requirements reduced the risks of groundwater pollution to low levels, the buffer 
requirement provided an important additional contingency. It argued that while 
compliance with this requirement could be costly, the costs of remedying 
groundwater pollution could also be very high and that it was often impossible to 
restore groundwater quality (EPA Victoria 2004b). 
However, the use of prescriptive rules to manage the risk of landfill operations will 
not always result in a net benefit to the community. The benefits of the separation 
requirement will vary between different locations. For example, the risk of 
groundwater pollution would vary depending on the hydrogeologic characteristics 
of the area, while the social and environmental cost of leachate entering the 
groundwater would depend on the migration pathways of that groundwater, its 
current and future beneficial uses, and the eco-systems in the areas potentially 
affected. It is also likely that the costs of complying with the requirement would be 
substantial. It is, therefore, important that the prescriptive requirement is 
supplemented with an alternative performance-based method of compliance.  
In Victoria, landfills that do not comply with the above requirement may potentially 
be licensed if:     
  REGULATION  191
 
•  this is warranted by the regional circumstances; and  
•  the operator satisfies the EPA via a separate environmental audit that sufficient 
additional design and management practices will be implemented 
(EPA Victoria 2004b).  
WMAA, National Landfill Division was concerned that this option was unviable. It 
argued that because environmental auditors were personally liable for their 
statements, they were unlikely to certify at the design stage that any alternative 
measures were guaranteed to provide the same groundwater protection as the buffer 
requirement. The new Victorian policy has just come into effect and the practical 
effect of these provisions is still unclear. However, it is important that there is a 
thorough risk assessment of the costs and benefits of any proposed performance-
based method of compliance and that this is incorporated into a full cost–benefit 
assessment of the application for the landfill licence.  
Concerns about the regulation focusing on inappropriate objectives and being too 
prescriptive have led the Commission to suggest a model of landfill regulation 
(box 8.6). 
 
Box 8.6  The Commission’s suggested model of landfill regulation  
The Commission considers that regulation of non-hazardous landfills should contain 
measures to address policy-relevant externalities associated with waste disposal, and 
reduce risks of damage from these externalities to acceptable levels (that is where the 
expected benefits of further reducing the risk are less than the costs of doing so). 
Policy-relevant externalities include pollution of air, surface waters and groundwater, 
and amenity losses, both during the operational life of landfills and after their closure. 
The regulatory approach should focus on ways of achieving these outcomes and 
hence would require site-by-site assessment of the measures that might be needed to 
reduce risk to acceptable levels. These might include requirements relating to: 
•  siting, such as locating landfills away from built-up areas, groundwater reserves, 
rivers and other water courses and sensitive ecosystems;  
•  design, such as impermeable liners, drains and leachate treatment systems; 
•  operation and management, such as might be necessary to contain litter, vermin, 
odour, noise, fire and other negative impacts; and 
•  closure and post-closure, such as capping landfills with impermeable materials to 
prevent water ingress, post-closure monitoring of groundwater and rehabilitation. 
In the Commission’s view, landfill regulation should not be driven by greenhouse  gas 
abatement objectives nor by waste hierarchy goals that include arbitrary requirements 
to divert non-hazardous materials from landfill. 
 
     




Compliance with and enforcement of regulation 
The environmental performance of landfills will depend on the nature of landfill 
licence conditions, the degree to which operators comply with those conditions, and 
enforcement. Several participants (for example WMAA, NSW Branch, sub. DR150) 
argued that while, in theory, regulations could reduce externalities to low levels, in 
practice, a lot of landfills did not achieve that environmental standard.  
To some extent, this outcome could be explained by the variability of licence 
conditions due to location and the risks posed by particular landfills. However, 
some participants (for example, SITA Environmental Solutions, sub. DR143) also 
suggested that poor compliance with landfill licence conditions contributed to this 
outcome. 
While it is difficult to determine the extent to which non-compliance impacts on 
environmental performance, it appears that compliance is variable. 
Audit reports for New South Wales (EPA NSW 2000, 2002) show poor compliance 
by rural and municipal landfill operators (box 8.7).  
An audit of 17 rural landfills in South Australia in 2001 identified problems with 
compliance in areas such as: provision of fencing around the site; provision of daily 
cover of waste; litter control; site supervision during disposal; and control of 
asbestos disposal (EPA SA 2002). 
The Western Australian Waste Management Board also indicated that landfill 
compliance required improvement, particularly in rural areas (sub. DR208).  
Several inquiry participants raised concerns about the lack of enforcement of 
landfill regulation (WMAA, New South Wales, AWT Working Group, sub. 30; 
Collex, sub. 80). SITA Environmental Solutions (sub. DR143) argued that poor 
enforcement allowed non-compliant landfill operators to operate at lower cost and 
thus undermine compliant landfill operators. 
Currently, monitoring of compliance typically involves the regulators conducting 
annual site inspections, and responding to complaints. In addition, the operator is 
required to submit information to the regulator on the landfill’s ongoing 
environmental performance. If a landfill is found to be in breach of its licensing 
conditions, the relevant authority may either issue an infringement notice for a 
minor breach, or commence prosecution proceedings for a substantial breach.     
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Box 8.7  NSW landfill audit results 
In 2000, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) conducted compliance 
audits of 15 landfills in the Sydney South Coast and Hunter Regions. The major 
findings were: 
•  Seven landfills had failed to meet their waste cover licence conditions. 
•  Three landfills had inadequate waste screening processes. 
•  Five landfills had not complied with their waste cover obligations, including not 
covering the working face of the landfill and using incorrect cover materials. 
•  Five landfills had not complied with their obligations to prevent litter from escaping 
the site. 
•  Three landfills had failed to provide adequate capping and revegetation of filled 
areas. 
In 2000-01, the NSW EPA conducted compliance audits of 30 rural landfills. The major 
findings were: 
•  Twenty four landfills had not complied with their air pollution control obligations. 
Major issues included the absence of fire prevention and control measures and poor 
control of odour and gas emissions due to inadequate daily cover of waste. 
•  Twenty eight landfills had not complied with their surface water and groundwater 
pollution control obligations. Major issues included inadequate measures to control 
leachate (22 landfills) and groundwater (24 landfills) and five instances each of 
actual groundwater and surface water pollution. 
•  Fifteen landfills had inadequate waste screening and acceptance procedures and at 
fifteen landfills waste storage practices created a risk of water pollution. 
•  Twenty five landfills had inadequate pest, weed and vermin controls and twenty five 
landfills had inadequate controls to prevent litter escaping the site. 
Source: EPA NSW (2000, 2002). 
 
 
Generally, it appears that the relevant state authorities have carried out few 
prosecutions for breaches of landfill licence conditions and pollution. For example, 
in New South Wales, between July 2003 and July 2006, there were only two 
prosecutions of landfill operators (Lawlink NSW 2006). In May 2006, Ballina Shire 
Council was fined $35 000 for breaching their landfill licence condition by failing 
to monitor leachate levels between January 2002 and May 2005. In July 2006, the 
Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation was fined $75 000 for accidentally 
discharging between 116 000 and 124 000 litres of leachate from the Lucas Heights 
landfill into an adjacent creek. In South Australia, between 1999 and July 2006, 
there were four prosecutions of landfill operators (EPA SA 2006).      




Examination of the relevant authorities’ annual reports shows that in 2004-05, there 
were no reported instances of major prosecutions and infringements at landfills in 
Australian states (DEC 2005; EPA Queensland 2005; EPA Victoria 2005a; 
Department of Environment WA 2005a; DPIWE 2005 and EPA SA 2005a). This 
can be contrasted with major prosecutions and infringements made by 
environmental authorities in other non-waste management areas. For example, in 
New South Wales, there were eight major prosecutions against commercial 
companies for licence breaches, and in Victoria, there were five (DEC 2005; EPA 
Victoria 2005a).  
The NSW Department of Environment and Conservation suggested that looking 
solely at prosecutions provided a misleading picture of enforcement activity 
because it deployed a suite of enforcement measures (trans., p. 889). For example, 
in 2004-05 it carried out 73 inspections to monitor the types of waste accepted at 
landfills, resulting in four penalty infringement notices for unlawfully accepting 
degradable and industrial waste. It also carried out 40 inspections to monitor waste 
disposal and storage practices, resulting in five penalty infringement notices 
(DEC 2005). 
WMAA, National Landfill Division argued that state authorities were reluctant to 
enforce licence conditions to the point of closing the landfill: 
If you close down a landfill, it causes major disruption, and it may be the only waste 
disposal facility in that area, so there’s some reluctance to take such a draconian 
measure and things have been let go ... (trans., p. 1130) 
SITA Environmental Solutions (sub. DR143, p. 11) argued that ‘issues of resources, 
evidentiary requirements and the limited value of penalties have provided 
disincentives for EPAs to pursue illegal operations’. Darwin City Council also 
commented that poor resourcing hindered compliance monitoring and enforcement 
in the Northern Territory (trans., p. 1085).  
In light of the above, the Commission considers that compliance with landfill 
licences in Australia is a problem and enforcement could be improved. 
In conclusion 
Although landfill regulation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in the main, it 
now appears that modern, fully-compliant landfills in Australia are effectively 
dealing with waste disposal externalities. However, in some respects, regulation has 
become sidetracked in attempting to address other objectives. Examples include 
requirements to install gas collection systems for greenhouse gas abatement reasons, 
and requirements to divert non-hazardous waste to satisfy waste hierarchy priorities.     
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Further, some generic prescriptive features of the regulation may impose high 
compliance costs on landfill operators. In these respects, the Commission concurs 
with the views of Westlake who stated: 
The important concept is that a … landfill should be sited, designed and operated in a 
way that is appropriate to the local conditions and which reduces the associated risks to 
an acceptable level. In this context, the setting of politically determined, prescriptive 
requirements for landfill design and operation are inappropriate at best and may be 
detrimental to the objectives of sustainable landfill development. Similarly, strict 
adherence to a waste management hierarchy, regardless of, for example, economic 
markets (for example, for recycled goods) and of regional- or waste-specific variations, 
may not represent the most effective and lowest risk option for waste disposal. 
(Westlake 1997, p. 460)  
Regulators should focus on measures that address waste management 
policy-relevant problems as directly as possible and should not be diverted by other 
objectives. They should also provide appropriate performance-based compliance 
alternatives, whenever a prescriptive requirement could impose high net costs on 
the community.  
While regulation has led to substantial improvements in the environmental 
performance of landfills, it is not clear whether the current quantum of regulation is 
adequate, falls short or exceeds what is needed to maximise net benefit to the 
community. What is reasonably clear, however, is that any further tightening of 
landfill regulation beyond these measures would not appear justified at the moment, 
and should only be considered after a thorough cost–benefit analysis is conducted. 
Furthermore, as argued elsewhere, it would seem appropriate for governments to 
assess the effectiveness of the current regulations and more accurately measure the 
residual levels of externalities. Lastly, it is apparent that enforcement could be 
improved. 
Current State and Territory landfill regulations mostly focus on the policy-relevant 
externalities of landfill disposal including pollution of air, surface waters and 
groundwater, and amenity losses during the operational life of landfills and after 
their closure. However, some components of regulation have been driven by 
inappropriate objectives, such as increasing resource recovery and waste diversion. 
In addition, some regulations have pursued greenhouse gas abatement — an 
objective that would be best addressed through a comprehensive national approach. 
 
FINDING 8.2     




Landfill regulation should focus on the policy-relevant externalities of landfill 
disposal. It should be based on a rigorous assessment of the risk of damage from 
those externalities, and should aim to reduce that risk to levels at which the cost 
of further reductions begins to exceed the benefit. 
Regulation should consist of a mix of prescriptive and performance-based 
measures and should provide for alternative methods of compliance, if there is a 
likelihood that a particular requirement could impose unjustifiably high 
compliance costs. 
The State and Territory Governments should evaluate the cost effectiveness of 
current regulations in addressing the externalities of landfill disposal, to 
determine whether current requirements are at an appropriate level to deliver the 
greatest net benefit to the community. 
Compliance with landfill licence conditions in Australia appears to be relatively 
poor, and enforcement somewhat variable and lax. 
Once landfill licences are appropriately configured to account for all relevant 
risks and externalities, the State and Territory Governments should ensure that 
all landfills comply with their licence conditions. 
Incineration and energy-from-waste processes 
Modern incinerators burn solid waste, capture the energy generated from its 
combustion and use it to generate electricity; hence, the term ‘energy-from-waste’. 
In Australia, there are currently no large-scale energy-from-waste facilities for the 
disposal of municipal non-hazardous, solid waste. The last incinerator closed in 
Waterloo, Sydney in 1996 due to pollution concerns (Greenpeace 2003). Two recent 
proposals for energy-from-waste facilities — at Kwinana, Western Australia in 
2002 and at Brighton, Tasmania in 2003 — were abandoned due to intense 




RECOMMENDATION 8.4     
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However, there are some energy-from-waste processes currently operating in 
Australia, often as part of a manufacturing complex. These processes use 
agricultural, forestry or manufacturing by-products for heat or energy generation or 
for conventional fuel substitution, typically in cement kilns. 
Incineration and energy-from-waste processes must be licensed in all states and 
territories. In South Australia, for example, the incineration of municipal solid 
waste requires a licence under the Environment Protection Act 1993. Similar 
provisions are contained within the environmental protection legislation of other 
states and territories. 
Licensing requirements are commonly based on two potential environmental 
concerns — the emission of contaminants into the air through exhaust stacks, and 
the toxicity of the ash residue. Accordingly, state and territory governments require 
incinerators and energy-from-waste facilities to comply with performance-based 
standards for air emissions and ash residue. 
All jurisdictions have similar forms of regulation for air emissions as required under 
the associated National Environment Protection Measure (NEPM) for air quality 
(NEPC 1998). The regulation sets out pollutant standards, such that pollutants must 
not exceed a specified maximum concentration (typically in parts per million by 
volume) over a period of time (typically over an hour or a day). Regulated 
pollutants include: nitrogen dioxide; sulphur dioxide; particulate matters; mercury 
compounds; dioxins and furans (NEPC 1998). Operators are also required to 
comply with standards for pollutant monitoring. 
Fly ash (a component of the ash residue) is listed as a prescribed or a controlled 
waste in environmental protection legislation (for example, in Western Australia 
under the Environmental Protection (Controlled Waste) Regulations 2004).6 Fly ash 
is prescribed because it can contain toxic metals — mercury, cadmium or lead. As a 
result, regulations restrict how fly ash is transported and disposed. For example, if 
fly ash contains more than a specified quantity of lead, it must be disposed of at a 
hazardous waste landfill. 
Benefits and costs 
Requiring incinerator operators to effectively control air discharges to meet 
specified concentration levels means that the incinerator must be equipped with 
modern technologies (air pollution equipment such as scrubber devices that use a 
liquid spray to neutralize acid gases, and filters that remove tiny ash particles). Such 
                                              
6  Fly ash is also listed as a ‘controlled waste’ in the NEPM on the Movement of Controlled Waste 
(NEPC 2004).     




technologies have proven to be very effective in reducing emission levels in other 
countries.  
For example, in Germany, where regulations prescribe that these technologies be 
implemented, the emission levels of dioxins and other pollutants are low 
(appendix B). The technologies used in Germany have resulted in gases emitted 
from incinerators being ‘no longer relevant in terms of public health’ (German 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
2005, p.  7). Further, in Switzerland, modern incinerators equipped with energy 
recovery received 99 per cent of unsorted solid waste in 2004, and still met stringent 
environmental standards (SAEFL 2005). 
Reduced air pollution leads to many benefits, such as improved health, amenity, and 
visibility. For example, smog can aggravate existing respiratory ailments such as 
asthma, or increase the risk of respiratory problems, as well as reduce visibility 
(EPA Victoria nd2). 
Prescribing conditions for the disposal of fly ash in a hazardous waste landfill 
would provide a benefit, if it reduced the environmental risks associated with 
groundwater contamination from ash leachate. 
However, incinerators equipped with modern technologies have the potential to 
produce relatively inert ash (CIF, sub. 71; US EPA 2006b). Regulations that do not 
distinguish between ash on the basis of its hazardous characteristics can, therefore, 
impose costs for little or no benefit. A possible example is the Queensland 
Environmental Protection Regulation 1998, because it prevents the use of inert fly 
ash in valued applications, such as road base (CIF, sub. 71; US EPA 2006b). 
Other compliance costs can include the implementation of modern technologies to 
ensure that emissions are below specified concentration levels. This involves very 
large capital costs (chapter 4). 
Enforcement of environmental quality objectives — both air emissions standards 
and ash requirements — may be quite costly, as detailed monitoring and reporting 
are likely to be required. However, such enforcement seems appropriate. 
Likely future developments 
In Australia, some energy-from-waste processes have had great difficulty being 
approved due to an anti-incineration mindset. The memory of some of the dirty 
incinerators of yesteryear persist. However, several inquiry participants revealed 
that there is interest in revisiting this issue. The BRSD (trans., p. 90) observed there 
will be some circumstances where energy-from-waste processes provide the most     
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economic and sustainable solution to waste disposal. The Packaging Council of 
Australia (sub. 67, p. 13) suggested there are times when energy recovery is both 
cost-effective and environmentally efficient. 
In addition, the introduction of a guide produced by the WMAA, Energy from 
Waste Division should help address concerns and facilitate a more informed debate 
within the community about energy-from-waste processes (box  8.8). The 
energy-from-waste guide was introduced to help operators determine: 
i) whether the materials in question are suitable for [energy] conversion  
ii) whether the immediate impacts of the conversion activity are acceptable: that is, will 
the benefits be optimised and the disbenefits minimised or eliminated? (WMAA, 
Energy from Waste Division, sub. 82, att. 1, p. 2) 
 
Box 8.8  Sustainability guide for ‘energy-from-waste’ practices 
The sustainability guide was developed by the WMAA, Energy from Waste Division. 
The guide provides a basis for determining whether materials are suitable for 
conversion to energy, and whether the immediate impacts of the conversion activity 
provide a net benefit. The guide outlines when it is appropriate to use materials for 
energy-from-waste purposes through an ‘assessment roadmap’. The roadmap involves 
asking the following series of questions: 
•  Is an energy-from-waste process the best use of material?  
–  Should consider life-cycle analysis, materials flux analysis, risk assessment and 
benchmarking. 
•  If yes, then can optimum conversion be achieved?  
– Should consider feedstock characterisation, conversion pathways and site 
characteristics. 
•  If yes, then are environmental outcomes adequately controlled? 
–  Should consider pre-treatment or fuel preparation, site availability and selection. 
•  If yes, then are social outcomes adequately controlled? 
–  Should consider emissions to air, land or water, traffic issues, odour, dust and other 
issues. 
•  If yes, then is the delivery of commitments certain? 
– Should develop compliance criteria (such as ISO standards, national pollutant 
inventory emissions or triple bottom line) and monitor progress with audits. 
•  If yes, then can the commercial interface be managed? 
– Should demonstrate that the structuring of the project to achieve commercial 
viability does not compromise the environmental and social outcomes. 
Source: WMAA, Energy from Waste Division (2004) (attachment to sub. 82). 
 
     




The WMAA, Energy from Waste Division prepared this guide because it was 
concerned that fractions of solid waste that are potential sources of energy and have 
no further practical value for reuse, recycling or reprocessing — were being lost to 
landfill disposal (sub. 82, att. 1).  
Other energy-from-waste processes are limited by regulatory impediments in some 
jurisdictions. For example, the cement industry uses some waste materials as an 
alternate energy source, yet noted there are regulatory impediments that restrict 
energy recovery for certain materials. In particular, the Cement Industry Federation, 
(sub. DR174) claimed that the use of waste oil was distorted by the differential 
subsidy rates under the Product Stewardship for Oil Program (appendix  C). 
Different regulation across states and territories regarding the use of tyres and 
carbon dust in cement kilns is also a problem. In some jurisdictions, these materials 
are deemed as hazardous and prohibited from use, while in others, they are not 
classified as hazardous and can be used (CIF, trans., p. 62). 
Regulatory restrictions that do not allow energy-from-waste processes to compete 
on a level playing field, and that are not otherwise addressing valid concerns, need 
to be reconsidered (chapter 12). 
With appropriate design and pollution controls, energy-from-waste processes can be 
managed so there is only a negligible environmental impact. Although 
energy-from-waste processes are costly, they can provide benefits by displacing 
electricity generated from fossil fuel. In addition, an energy-from-waste facility can 
have lower greenhouse gas impacts compared with a landfill without gas capture 
(chapter 4).  
Community opposition to energy-from-waste is symptomatic of a broader problem 
discussed throughout this report, that being that community attitudes to particular 
waste policy issues have often been influenced by incomplete or inaccurate 
information on the relevant risks, costs and benefits. The Commission considers that 
there is a clear role for Australian governments in correcting ill-informed 
community perceptions with regard to the costs and benefits of different waste 
disposal options, including the capture of energy from waste (see chapter 11 for 
more detailed discussion).  
Modern, efficient, well-regulated energy-from-waste facilities have proven to be a 
satisfactory means of disposing of some non-hazardous waste in many advanced 
economies. In theory, Australian regulation does not completely preclude 
energy-from-waste facilities but, in practice, strong community and political 
opposition has, to date, prevented appropriate consideration of this disposal option. 
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8.6  Litter and illegal dumping 
Litter refers to waste that is improperly disposed of outside the regular disposal 
system. Littering usually involves small quantities of waste such as plastic bags, 
cigarette butts and cigarette packaging, and chewing gum. Illegal dumping, on the 
other hand, is a deliberate act of disposal, and usually involves relatively large 
quantities of waste. Regulations relating to litter and illegal dumping raise similar 
issues and so are considered jointly in this chapter. 
This section discusses the issues relating to general anti-litter regulation and 
analyses the foreshadowed regulatory response to a particular source of litter —
plastic shopping bags.  
General regulation 
All states and territories have litter regulation — either through explicit litter 
legislation or litter provisions within environmental protection legislation —
administered and enforced by environmental authorities and local councils. Illegal 
dumping is regulated through environmental protection legislation. While state or 
territory regulation tends to cover commercial quantities of illegal dumping, local 
councils impose penalties on smaller-scale, local dumping. For example, in 
Queensland, dumping more than 20 litres of waste is unlawful under the 
Environmental Protection (Waste Management) Regulation 2000, while dumping 
less than 20 litres of waste is prohibited under relevant local government rules.  
Typically, litter and illegal dumping regulation prohibits depositing waste into or 
onto land or waters in a public place or an open private place (includes littering 
from a vehicle). The regulations also prescribe penalties for such practices. For 
example, in the Northern Territory, persons found littering may be fined $2000 
under the Litter Act 1999. While penalties are typically imposed on the persons 
littering or dumping the waste, land owners with knowledge of dumping may also 
be held liable and fined.  
Such regulation can provide benefits through a decrease in the amount of litter and 
dumped waste, and reduce adverse impacts on health and safety, wildlife and visual 
amenity (chapter 4). However, enforcement costs may be large, as it is hard to 
determine who is responsible for a particular infringement. 
Over time, litter and illegal dumping regulation has increased. In addition, there has 
been an increase in the amount of enforcement. For instance, in New South Wales, 
there has been a large increase in the number of fines issued, from fewer than 800 in 
1999 to around 8700 in 2003-04 (DEC 2004c). In Victoria, the number of     




infringement notices grew from around 4700 in 1998-99 to around 18  200 in 
2004-05 (EPA Victoria 2005a).  
However, EPA Victoria (2005b) claimed the amount of littering and illegal 
dumping is not declining, despite the increase in regulation and enforcement. Litter 
and illegal dumping are significant problems and impose large costs. In Western 
Australia, it is estimated that $16 million is spent on countering litter and illegal 
dumping each year (Department of Environment WA 2005b). In New South Wales, 
a $6 million illegal dumping package was introduced in 2002, with on-the-spot fines 
for illegal dumping doubling for individuals and more than tripling for corporations. 
(EPA NSW 2003c). Additional resources may be introduced in the future in New 
South Wales, because it is anticipated that dumping will increase as landfill levies 
rise (Daily Telegraph, 17 February 2006, p. 3). 
Studies on the effectiveness of litter and illegal dumping regulation conclude that 
regulation and other related policies need to take account of local conditions in 
order to change behaviour and reduce the amount of littering and dumping. For 
instance, a study in New South Wales concluded that litter and dumping 
interventions ‘will be effective when strategies fit the characteristics and 
circumstances of the various public place activities associated with different sites’ 
(BIEC 1999, p. 6). In this regard, EcoRecycle Victoria found that an educational 
program called ‘bin it or swim in it’ has been effective in reducing litter in the water 
in Port Phillip Bay (EcoRecycle Victoria 2005c). 
Inquiry participants also noted that littering and illegal dumping is partially a 
behavioural issue. The Packaging Council of Australia (sub. 67, p. 35) stated that 
‘people are less likely to litter in places where there is no rubbish on the ground 
already.’ Similarly, EcoRecycle Victoria noted ‘it is well recognised that litter 
creates more litter’ and ‘positive messages are more powerful and effective’ than 
regulatory responses (EcoRecycle Victoria 2005c).  
Therefore, it appears that regulation that is generally targeted at reducing littering 
and illegal dumping is likely to be more effective when it is coupled with additional 
measures. Examples of such measures can include: educational programs; the 
provision of adequate infrastructure (appropriate bins and associated servicing); 
industry involvement (providing information about disposal on containers); and 
community involvement (use of enforcement hotlines and clean up programs). For 
example, in the City of Greater Dandenong in Victoria, regulation, in combination 
with litter patrols and the use of high visibility black and yellow markings on 
dumped materials, led to the removal of the majority of dumped materials within 
72  hours (MAV, sub. 113). Chapter 11 provides examples of public education 
campaigns in targeting littering behaviour. The Commission supports government 
provision of education and moral suasion measures targeting littering behaviour,     
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provided the information is accurate and relevant, is likely to be under-supplied by 
private markets, and can be delivered at a relatively low cost. 
Regulation and enforcement for litter and illegal dumping are necessary but not 
sufficient to achieve the best result for the community. Accompanying measures, 
such as education, community involvement and moral suasion, can make regulation 
more effective. 
Foreshadowed phasing out of plastic bags 
The Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments have jointly announced a 
goal to phase out plastic bags by the end of 2008 (EPHC 2005e). They have yet to 
decide how this would be implemented, but it appears that a phase out would apply 
to plastic retail carry bags, with possible exemptions for purposes such as in-store 
packaging of bread, fruit and meat.7 This section outlines the case for government 
intervention, assesses the results of recent bag-reduction efforts, and identifies the 
resulting lessons for policy makers. 
The case for government intervention 
The key rationale for reducing plastic retail carry bags is that they can be a 
particularly undesirable source of litter. Specifically, plastic-bag litter: 
•  can be highly visible and long lasting, since plastic bags easily become airborne, 
are moisture resistant, and take many years to decompose; and 
•  has the potential to injure or kill wildlife, particularly in the marine environment 
through ingestion or entanglement.8 
Government intervention to reduce plastic-bag litter could be justified if, as seems 
likely, it is a ‘public good’. That is, litter reduction would be undersupplied by 
private parties because ‘free riders’ cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits. 
Or alternatively, litter is oversupplied because litterers cannot always be made to 
pay for the costs they impose on others. 
Other concerns — such as a scarcity of landfill space and natural resources — have 
also been mentioned as reasons to reduce plastic bags. However, these do not 
                                              
7  The term ‘plastic retail carry bag’ is used here to refer to a lightweight polymer carry bag 
provided at the point of sale for carrying and transporting retail goods. 
8   The EPHC (2002) reported that plastic-bag litter on land does not appear to be a major problem 
for wildlife, despite reports that some cattle have died from plastic bag consumption. 
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appear to be a sound basis for government intervention. For example, plastic bags 
take up little landfill space, and their inert characteristics can actually help to reduce 
a landfill’s potential for adverse environmental impacts: 
… plastic bag disposal to landfill is estimated at … roughly 0.2 per cent of total solid 
waste going to landfill each year in Australia [by weight].  
… the environmental impact of plastic bags in landfill is likely to be low due to their 
essentially inert or unreactive nature. It appears that plastic bags may have some 
landfill management benefits including stabilising qualities, leachate minimisation and 
minimising greenhouse gas emissions. (EPHC 2002, p. 11) 
A report commissioned by the Australian Government found that the impact of 
plastic-bag litter on Australia’s marine wildlife is very uncertain: 
Actual numbers of animals injured or killed annually by plastic-bag litter is obviously 
nearly impossible to determine. (Nolan-ITU 2002, p. 30) 
Nevertheless, some have claimed that at least 100 000 animals are killed each year 
by plastic bags. For example: 
In the marine environment plastic-bag litter is lethal, killing at least 100 000 birds, 
whales, seals and turtles every year. (Planet Ark nd, p. 1) 
Nolan-ITU (2002) noted such claims are based on a study conducted near 
Newfoundland (Eastern Canada) in the early 1980s. The National Association of 
Retail Grocers of Australia (NARGA, sub. DR266) observed that the study 
quantified the number of animals killed by fishing nets, not plastic bags. In 
particular, the study’s authors stated: 
This paper reports on the catch of marine birds and mammals in fishing nets … We 
identify and discuss the key factors influencing net-mortality and those species most 
vulnerable to entrapment in active or discarded fishing gear (Piatt and Nettleship 1987, 
p. 344) 
The authors concluded: 
Summer surveys of the incidental catch of marine birds and mammals in fishing nets 
around the east coast of Newfoundland indicated that over 100 000 animals were killed 
during a 4-year period (1981–1984). (Piatt and Nettleship 1987, p. 344) 
The Commission asked several organisations that have been active on plastic-bag 
issues to help identify an alternative study that demonstrates that plastic-bag litter 
kills at least 100 000 animals every year. None of the organisations identified such a     
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study.9 Many parties have, however, highlighted case studies of individual animals 
that have come into contact with plastic litter. Such case studies rarely, if ever, 
isolate the impact of plastic bags from other potentially-harmful forms of plastic 
litter. Nor do the case studies measure how marine litter (let alone plastic bags) 
affects whole populations of a particular species (as opposed to individual animals). 
The overall impact of plastic-bag litter on marine wildlife is likely to remain very 
uncertain because it is extremely difficult to measure how whole populations are 
affected. Laist  (1997) summarised the measurement problems in an extensive 
review of research on animal entanglement in marine debris: 
Most animals vulnerable to entanglement are highly migratory … and tend to be 
scattered across wide ocean areas … When dispersed throughout their ocean ranges, 
animals are visible for only brief instances at or above the sea surface. The fleeting 
glimpses of wildlife afforded from the decks of ships or plane windows does not 
provide a reasonable opportunity to detect entangled animals … Moreover, animals that 
become entangled and die may quickly sink or be consumed by predators at sea, 
thereby eliminating them from potential detection … As a result, most data on 
entangled animals at sea are opportunistic anecdotal records. When systematic 
sampling efforts have been attempted, small sample sizes have precluded statistically 
meaningful analyses. 
Most entanglement records have, therefore, been gathered by land-based observers 
examining animals that strand on beaches or congregate seasonally on shorelines … 
Reliance on such land-based sampling, however, introduces a number of common 
sampling biases … Most important, live entangled animals returning to shore include 
only those survivors entangled in debris light enough or close enough to shore to allow 
them to swim or fly to land. (Laist 1997, pp. 100–1) 
Nevertheless, his extensive review of the evidence suggests that, while significant 
amounts of marine debris may come from land-based sources, fishing is the 
principal source of items hazardous to marine wildlife: 
The types of marine debris most commonly associated with entanglement are fishing 
nets, monofilament line, lost crab traps and fish pots, rope, and strapping bands. The 
greatest source of this material is commercial fishing operations, although cargo 
vessels, recreational fishing, and land-based sources also may be significant 
contributors … 
Because of the predominance of fishing-related debris in entanglement incidents, 
source-reduction efforts should focus on incorporating new management measures into 
                                              
9  Some parties have cited a literature review by David Laist (1997) as the source for a similar 
claim that plastic marine debris (not just plastic bags) kills over a million birds and 100 000 
marine mammals and turtles each year (for example, MCS 2006). However, he did not make 
such a finding. The Commission also confirmed with David Laist that he had not made such a 
finding in any other research.     




fishery management programs to avoid losses and to increase recovery of such items. 
(Laist 1997, pp. 117–8) 
Thus, it appears that efforts to protect marine wildlife would be more effective if 
they put greater emphasis on the risks associated with fishing-related debris. 
Reflecting the above-mentioned measurement difficulties, the Threatened Species 
Scientific Committee (2003) advised the Australian Government it was unable to 
find sufficient evidence that marine debris — which can include many things other 
than plastic bags — would cause a species to become extinct, endangered or 
vulnerable. However, the Committee did find that twenty  species already 
considered to be endangered or vulnerable were adversely affected by marine 
debris. This led to the listing of ‘injury and fatality to vertebrate marine life caused 
by ingestion of, or entanglement in, harmful marine debris’ as a ‘key threatening 
process’ under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth). 
Plastic-bag litter has the potential to injure marine wildlife, including endangered 
species. However, claims that at least 100 000 animals are killed each year by 
plastic-bag litter are not supported by evidence. Such claims appear to be based on 
the misinterpretation of Canadian research on the impact of fishing nets. Some have 
also misinterpreted case studies of individual animals that have come into contact 
with plastic debris (not just plastic bags) as being representative of the overall 
impact of plastic-bag litter. The true extent to which plastic-bag litter injures 
populations of marine wildlife, as opposed to individual animals, is likely to remain 
very uncertain because it is extremely difficult to measure. 
Dealing with the litter problem 
The (limited) available data suggest that measures to reduce plastic-bag litter will be 
more cost effective when tightly focused on the narrow circumstances where bags 
are likely to be littered, rather than targeting all uses of plastic retail carry bags. For 
example, research commissioned by the Australian Government estimated: 
•  only 0.8 per cent of plastic bags become litter; 
•  plastic bags account for 2 per cent of all litter items (by number)10; and 
                                              
10 More recent surveys conducted for Keep Australia Beautiful suggest this is an overestimate. The 
latest results show that ‘light-weight carry bags’ accounted for 0.7 per cent of all litter items by 
number in May 2006 (McGregor Tan Research 2006a). 
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•  around 2 per cent (or $4 million) of annual expenditure on cleaning up litter is 
attributable to plastic bags (Nolan-ITU 2002). 
Nevertheless, available estimates do suggest that, in absolute terms, plastic-bag 
litter is significant. A report prepared for the DEH estimated that Australians used 
about 3.9 billion HDPE retail carry bags in 2005 (Hyder Consulting 2006).11 If 
0.8 per cent of these were littered, it would equate to roughly 31 million plastic 
bags. This is essentially a guess and so should be interpreted with great care. 
NARGA (sub. DR266, DR269) noted there is no data to support the view that the 
littering-rate for plastic bags is as high as 0.8 per cent. NARGA (sub. DR269) also 
questioned widely-cited estimates by Nolan-ITU  (2002)  that, combined with 
estimates of bags removed in litter clean ups, imply that   
a net quantity of 40–60 million plastic bags are added to the environment each year: 
If it were true that a net 40–60 million plastic bags … entered the environment each 
year, there would be substantial numbers of plastic bags in every street. As these 
quantities of bags have been in use (and presumably littered to the same extent) for 
over 20 years, we are talking about an accumulation of over 1 billion bags on our 
streets [since plastic bags take many years to decompose]. 
Where are they?  
We would suggest that there has been a gross overestimation of the number of bags 
littered, with both the figures used to estimate the number of bags entering the 
environment as litter and being removed from the environment in clean-up activities 
having no factual foundation. (sub. DR272, p. 4) 
In any case, governments, retailers and community groups have already taken 
various initiatives on plastic retail carry bags. Among the measures that most 
directly target the litter problem are guidelines developed by governments for the 
management of plastic-bag litter at landfill sites and outdoor public places, such as 
recreational parks and shopping precincts (EPHC 2005c, 2005d). These are the 
locations where plastic-bag litter is most likely to occur (EPHC 2002; Nolan-ITU 
2002).12 
Other initiatives have tended to focus on reducing the use of plastic retail carry 
bags, particularly in supermarkets. The major supermarket chains adopted a code of 
                                              
11  HDPE retail carry bags — sometimes referred to as ‘singlet’ or ‘single-use’ bags — are 
typically provided by supermarkets at checkouts and appear to be the most common type of 
plastic retail carry bag. Nolan-ITU (2002) estimated that 90 per cent of all plastic retail carry 
bags issued in Australia were HDPE bags, with the remainder being mostly LDPE (low density 
polyethylene) retail carry bags, such as those provided by department stores. 
12 Nolan-ITU (2002) estimated that roughly 60 per cent of plastic-bag litter is linked to away-
from-home uses, such as takeaway food consumed in public places. The remaining 40 per cent 
was attributed to inadvertent littering during waste management activities, such as from bins at 
shopping centres and from unloading at landfills.     




practice and have spent over $50 million on plastic-bag initiatives (ANRA 2006, 
sub. DR207; ARA 2003, sub. DR211). Governments have encouraged shoppers to 
avoid using plastic retail carry bags and publicly supported retailers that stop 
supplying such bags. Marrickville  Council (sub. DR151) noted it employs a 
‘plastic-bag reduction officer’ to aid its efforts. Community groups have also been 
active in discouraging the use of plastic retail carry bags. A prominent example is 
the ‘say NO to plastic bags campaign’ run by Clean Up Australia (sub. DR185) and 
supported by retailers (ARA, sub. DR211). 
Overall, efforts to date appear to have been very effective in reducing the number of 
plastic retail carry bags used. Available estimates indicate that the number of HDPE 
retail carry bags provided to consumers fell by about 34 per cent from 2002 to 2005 
(figure  8.2). For supermarkets, an even greater reduction in HDPE bags has 
occurred, reflecting the current emphasis on supermarket bags. In particular, the 
major supermarket chains reduced the use of HDPE retail carry bags by 45 per cent 
from December 2002 to December 2005 (ANRA 2006).13 









































































Data source: Hyder Consulting (2006). 
However, the significant decline in the use of HDPE retail carry bags does not 
appear to have translated into a fall in overall plastic-bag litter. According to the 
National Litter Index survey, the average number of littered plastic ‘light-weight 
carry bags’ in each state grew by 17 per cent from November 2005 to May 2006 
                                              
13 The major supermarket chains have been criticised for not achieving a reduction target of 50 per 
cent by the end of 2005. However, that target was arbitrary, rather than being based on a 
thorough analysis of the costs and benefits to the community, and achieving it may have had 
little, if any, impact on plastic-bag litter, as indicated later in this section.     
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(McGregor Tan Research  2006a). That survey has only been conducted on a 
national basis since late 2005, and so longer-term data are unavailable for Australia 
as a whole. A longer time span is available from Clean Up Australia, which 
analyses a sample of the rubbish its volunteers collect each year. The number of 
‘supermarket/retail' plastic bags found in its sampled rubbish collections grew by 
40 per cent from 2002 to 2005. However, the share of such bags in total counted 
litter items grew less rapidly — from 2.0 per cent in 2002 to 2.2 per cent in 2005 
(Clean Up Australia 2005). 
There are various possible reasons why the large fall in the use of HDPE retail carry 
bags has not been reflected in litter statistics. These include: 
•  weaknesses in litter estimates14 
•  a significant increase in the rate at which plastic bags are littered 
•  most of the decline in HDPE-bag use has been for bags unlikely to be littered. 
Given the education and publicity campaigns of recent years, it is unlikely there has 
been a significant increase in the rate at which plastic bags are littered. It seems 
more plausible that there are weaknesses in litter statistics and/or much of the 
decline in the use of HDPE retail carry bags has been for bags unlikely to be 
littered. 
A major drawback of the National Litter Index survey is that results are so far only 
available for two points in time and these are only six months apart. In addition, 
there are large disparities in reported changes in plastic-bag litter between states, 
which raise doubts about the accuracy of the survey.15 Clean Up Australia’s 
sampling of its rubbish collections may not provide a representative measure of 
litter at locations other than its clean-up sites. A potential problem for all litter 
surveys is that plastic bags can persist in the environment for many years, and so 
some of the counted bags could have been littered before the use of HDPE retail 
carry bags began falling. This would be less of an issue if the same sites were 
surveyed each year.  
                                              
14 Litter estimates are not as robust as counts of plastic bags issued by retailers. The estimated fall 
in HDPE bags issued by major supermarket chains should be reasonably accurate because it was 
audited as part of their code of practice (ANRA 2006). 
15 According to the state-level results of the National Litter Index survey, the number of littered 
plastic light-weight carry bags grew by 12 per cent in New South Wales from November 2005 
to May 2006, compared to 103 per cent in Victoria, 36 per cent in Queensland, –9 per cent in 
South Australia, –34 per cent in Western Australia and –5 per cent in Tasmania. Additional data 
are available for South Australia, which show the count of littered light-weight carry bags 
declining by 39 per cent from August 2004 to May 2006 (KESAB 2005a, 2005b; McGregor 
Tan Research 2006b).     




Much of the recent decline in the use of HDPE retail carry bags appears to have 
been for bags unlikely to be littered. Available estimates indicate that supermarkets 
accounted for around 74 per cent of the fall in the use of HDPE retail carry bags 
during 2002–2005 (Hyder Consulting 2006).16 This reflects the current focus on 
supermarkets, which may seem appropriate because supermarkets are the largest 
single source of HDPE retail carry bags (figure 8.3).  
















a ANRA (2006) estimated the major supermarket chains now account for less than half of all HDPE retail carry 
bags, given that they reduced their supply of such bags by 45 per cent during 2003–2005. 
Data source: Hyder Consulting (2006). 
However, the likelihood of a supermarket bag being littered is probably very low 
because people mostly use them to carry goods to their homes. Bags supplied for 
away-from-home uses — such as takeaway food consumed in public places — 
could be much more likely to be littered. Clean Up Australia noted ‘most of the 
plastic bags that are coming in the litter stream are coming from the small retailers’ 
(trans., p. 796). Estimates by Nolan-ITU (2002) suggest that about 5 per cent of 
                                              
16 Hyder Consulting (2006) estimated that supermarkets issued 3.64 billion HDPE bags in 2002, 
out of a total national consumption of 5.95 billion HDPE bags, and issued 2.14 billion HDPE 
bags in 2005, out of a total national consumption of 3.92 billion HDPE bags. The authors 
stressed these estimates were derived from the views of bag manufacturers and were indicative 
only because there was no direct measurement of bag consumption from sources other than 
supermarkets.     
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plastic bags supplied for away-from-home uses are littered, compared to a 
negligible proportion of bags used to carry goods home.17  
Prospective policy developments 
The Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments are currently considering 
various policy options to achieve their goal of phasing out plastic bags by the end of 
2008. These include ‘a ban, a government levy, advance disposal fee and a retailer’s 
charge on bags’ (EPHC 2006, p. 2).18 The issues associated with these policies can 
be complex and governments have yet to demonstrate a strong case for any of the 
options. 
A per-unit charge on plastic retail carry bags could be imposed at the level of bag 
producers, retailers or consumers, and the resulting revenue could be kept by bag 
producers, retailers or governments. The outcomes from these various approaches 
may differ markedly in practice. Policy makers seem to prefer a charge imposed on 
consumers because this provides the most direct price signal to bag users, but there 
is little evidence it would deliver a net benefit to the community. 
Advocates of a per-unit charge on consumers often highlight Ireland’s experience 
with its plastic-bag levy. This was introduced in March 2002 at a rate of €0.15 per 
bag and is claimed to have reduced the proportion of litter that is plastic bags from 
5.0 per cent to 0.3 per cent (and reduced plastic-bag use by at least 90 per cent) 
(Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 2004). However, 
the claimed litter reduction appears to be exaggerated. A litter survey conducted for 
the Irish Government indicates that plastic shopping bags accounted for 0.75 per 
cent of litter items in the year before the levy was introduced, not 5.0 per cent  (TES 
Consulting Engineers 2002).  
                                              
17  This takes account of inadvertent littering of home-use bags at the waste disposal stage. 
Specifically, Nolan-ITU (2002) estimated that 20–30 million plastic bags (HDPE and LDPE) 
used to carry goods home were inadvertently littered during waste disposal, such as at landfills. 
This equated to roughly 0.3–0.5 per cent of the estimated 6.91 billion plastic bags consumed 
from all sources. Among plastic bags supplied for away-from-home uses, 30–50 million were 
estimated to be littered (both deliberately and inadvertently), which equated to 3.9–6.5 per cent 
of total plastic-bag consumption (the average of this range gives a littering rate of about 5 per 
cent). 
18 The latter three options differ because a government levy can be applied at either the wholesale 
or retail level, with the revenue going to government; an advance disposal fee is typically 
applied at the wholesale level (although retailers may pass the cost on to consumers) with the 
revenue going to an industry body to fund recycling and disposal initiatives; and a retailer’s 
charge is applied to consumers, with the revenue kept by retailers.     




The impact of the Irish levy on plastic-bag use appears to be waning. The Irish 
Government informed the Commission that per capita use of plastic bags has grown 
by roughly a third since the levy was introduced.19 Some have claimed that the levy 
has encouraged much greater use of paper bags, and these are more harmful to the 
environment than plastic bags (Cadman et al. 2005a, 2005b; CBC 2006b). There 
have also been claims that the levy encouraged increased theft at retail outlets, and 
that it has been difficult to monitor and enforce compliance by all retailers 
(CBC 2006a).  NARGA (sub. DR269)  claimed that UK exports of plastic-bag 
materials to Ireland have not fallen in recent years, which suggests that Irish 
consumers have replaced the plastic shopping bags they formerly reused (such as 
for bin liners) with other types of plastic bags. 
The Victorian Government recently announced a per-unit charge on consumers that, 
unlike the Irish levy, would be kept by retailers.20 In particular, retailers would be 
required to charge at least 10 cents per plastic bag at most points of sale from 
1 January 2009 (DSE 2006b). The enabling legislation would come into effect if 
plastic bags are not phased out by the end of 2008 under the foreshadowed national 
approach (Thwaites 2006b). The Victorian Government has not released a cost–
benefit analysis to support its proposed policy. 
A ban on plastic retail carry bags also raises a number of difficult issues. It would 
inconvenience consumers, such as when they forget to take reusable bags to the 
supermarket.21 Thus, reusable bags are not a perfect substitute for plastic bags. 
Furthermore, a ban could impose a financial cost on consumers: 
If plastic bags were replaced by alternatives, including degradable bags, the financial 
cost to the consumer would certainly increase. (EPHC 2002, p. 13) 
Past research indicates that a large proportion — possibly as high as 75 per cent — 
of plastic shopping bags are reused for purposes such as bin liners and general carry 
                                              
19 This estimate should be interpreted with caution. It is based on levy revenue received by the 
Irish Government and could be affected by (a) recent strengthening of enforcement that has 
probably increased levy revenue; and (b) time lags between when retailers collect the levy and 
when the money is forwarded to the Irish Government. Nevertheless, the Irish Government 
intends to soon raise the levy to €0.22 to address concerns about the levy’s waning impact. 
20 One of the reasons why the Victorian Government may have opted for a retailer’s charge is that 
constitutional constraints prevent it from imposing a government levy. 
21 A survey of SA residents in 2005 found that, among people who did not frequently use reusable 
shopping bags, 59 per cent left them at home, 23 per cent left them in the car, and 15 per cent 
preferred plastic bags because they could reuse them for other purposes like bin liners (Harrison 
Market Research 2005).     
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bags (EPHC 2002).22 Banning plastic retail carry bags would deny consumers this 
benefit. Instead, they are likely to purchase more plastic garbage bags, at additional 
financial cost to themselves. This could also counteract at least some of the 
anticipated environmental benefits from banning plastic retail carry bags. 
Preliminary survey research by the Australian Retailers Association (ARA, 
sub. DR271) suggests that many smaller retailers would switch to providing paper 
bags at checkouts if a ban was imposed on plastic bags. Again, this could lead to 
unintended environmental costs. For example, the greenhouse gases emitted in 
producing a paper bag have been estimated to be around five times greater than 
those from producing a plastic bag (Allen Consulting Group 2006a). 
A thorough assessment of a ban, or per-unit charge, would need to take into account 
the impact on consumers. As research for the Australian Government has noted, 
plastic bags provide a valuable service for shoppers: 
The current plastic shopping bag is well suited to its task — it is cheap, lightweight, 
resource efficient, functional, moisture resistant, allows for quick packing at the 
supermarket and is remarkably strong for its weight. 
… Plastic bags also currently perform an important task in product and food safety, 
keeping uncooked meat or cleaning products separate from other foods. 
(Nolan-ITU 2002, p. 4) 
While some surveys claim to show high levels of public support for the elimination 
of plastic bags (for example, McGregor Tan Research 2003), the actions of 
consumers are a more reliable indicator of their preferences. Despite the widespread 
availability and promotion of reusable bags, consumers still used 3.9 billion HDPE 
retail carry bags last year (Hyder Consulting 2006). 
A ban on plastic bags would also impose costs on retailers. These could include 
increased theft of goods and shopping trolleys, health and safety problems 
experienced by staff in handling contaminated and/or overladen reusable bags, and 
reduced operational efficiency at checkouts (which would also impose an increased 
cost on consumers in terms of queuing time) (ANRA, trans., pp. 808–9; 
NARGA, sub. DR194). 
A further complicating factor is that some exemptions would probably have to be 
provided under a ban or per-unit charge, as occurs in Ireland. For example, health 
considerations provide a strong case for retaining the use of plastic bags to package 
                                              
22 A survey of SA residents in 2003 found that 97 per cent had reused plastic bags recently, and 
that, on average, respondents had reused 75 per cent of their plastic bags. Around 87 per cent 
had reused plastic bags as bin liners, 75 per cent as general carry bags, 33 per cent as lunch 
bags, and 22 per cent for shopping (McGregor Tan Research 2003).     




meat. The Victorian Government has already suggested it will exempt ‘fresh 
produce’ under its proposed per-unit charge (Thwaites 2006b). It has also indicated 
that small retailers may be exempt, which could mean that bags with the highest 
likelihood of being littered — those issued for away-from-home purposes — escape 
the charge, thus significantly reducing the likely environmental benefit. 
Rather than a ban, some have suggested that biodegradable bags should replace 
current types of plastic bags. However, this is unlikely to reduce the rate at which 
bags are littered, and could even lead to worse environmental, social and financial 
outcomes:  
Currently a littered plastic bag can be removed from the litter stream in one piece (one 
action). A ‘degradable’ bag breaks down into many pieces and will be more difficult to 
recover and can, potentially, create more problems for land-based wildlife. 
At a practical level, the adoption of biodegradable bags will interfere with plastics 
recycling and, depending on the technology used, may not be up to the task of carrying 
wet or frozen products, or provide the right type of barrier properties when used to 
carry certain foods. Biodegradable bags also tend to require more energy to 
manufacture.  
A move to degradable bags will see an increase in the proportion of degradable 
material going to landfill, with implications for associated emissions … 
If degradable bags are introduced and promoted they would need to conform to a set of 
standards which would be beyond the average retailer to assess, leaving them, the 
public and the environment open to false claims of degradability. Degradable bags 
would also give government an enforcement problem. (NARGA, sub. DR269, p. 27) 
Similar concerns were expressed by Nolan-ITU (2002). It concluded that 
widespread use of biodegradable materials as an alternative to the current plastic 
retail carry bag may not deliver an overall environmental benefit. 
Quantification of costs and benefits 
At the time of writing this report, the RIS for the foreshadowed national approach 
on plastic bags was not publicly available. However, the EPHC had released a cost–
benefit study intended as an input to the RIS. That study — prepared by the Allen 
Consulting Group (2006a, 2006b) — considered eleven policy options and found all 
of them would impose a large net cost on the community (table 8.2). 
It could be argued that the Allen Consulting Group was too pessimistic in its 
assessment of cost increases. For example, a ban on plastic bags from the start of 
2009 was assumed to generate a one-off cost for retailers — largely due to 
increased theft and additional staff training — of $187 million, and extra ongoing 
costs — due to increased transaction times and administration — of $60 million per     
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annum. But retailers already train their staff and some have modified their 
checkouts to deal with the use of alternatives to plastic bags. Furthermore, there is 
little evidence on the extent to which retail theft increases as a result of constraints 
on plastic-bag use.  


















Ban HDPE retail carry bags from start of 2009  361  218  1057  –839 
Wider adoption of (ARA 2003) code of practicec  233 156 646  –490 
Escalating charged 418  266  1293  –1027 
Voluntary phase out to 2009, mandatory beyonde  422 271  1093  –823 
Advance disposal feef 301  181  768  –586 
Minimum price regulationg 361  218  1035  –817 
Government levyh 313  189  900  –711 
New code of practice with high retailer adoptioni 111  170    562  –392 
New code of practice with modest retailer adoptionj 102  154    430  –276 
Progressive target with high adoption by retailersk 148  93    799  –706 
Progressive target with modest adoption by retailersl 134  84    535  –450 
a Impacts are the cumulative effect over a 12-year period (2005–2016 inclusive) and are measured relative to 
a base case of ‘no further government action’ that includes retailers no longer following their (ARA 2003) code 
of practice. Financial estimates are expressed in net present value terms using a discount rate of 7 per cent. 
b Net impact may differ slightly from the benefits less costs shown in the table due to rounding. c All large 
retailers and 50 per cent of other retailers reduce HDPE retail carry bags by 50 per cent (relative to 2002). 
d A per-bag charge set at 5 cents from the start of 2007, increased to 15 cents in 2008 and 25 cents in 2009. 
e Voluntary phase out by the end of 2008 in accordance with a new agreement between retailers and the 
EPHC, and a mandatory ban for all retailers thereafter. f Regulated fee of 2 cents per HDPE retail carry bag 
on retailers from the start of 2009 to recover the cost of cleaning up 40 million littered retail carry bags per 
annum. g Retailers required to charge at least 25 cents per HDPE retail carry bag from the start of 2009. 
h A 10 cent charge per HDPE bag is paid by consumers at the point of sale from the start of 2009 (comprising 
a government levy of 7 cents per bag and explicit cost recovery by retailers of a further 3 cents per bag). 
i All retailers with an annual turnover of more than $5 million achieve a 50 per cent reduction in HDPE retail 
carry bags by the end of 2006 (relative to 2002), and switch to biodegradable material for remaining plastic 
bags thereafter. j Major retailers achieve a 50 per cent reduction in HDPE retail carry bags by the end of 2006 
(relative to 2002), and switch to biodegradable material for remaining plastic bags thereafter. In addition, 
25 per cent of other retailers match the actions of major retailers by the end of 2009. k All retailers with an 
annual turnover of more than $5 million achieve a 50 per cent reduction in HDPE retail carry bags by the end 
of 2006 (relative to 2002). In the following 5 years (2007–2011), they reduce HDPE retail carry bags at an 
annual rate of 10 per cent. HDPE retail carry bags are maintained at their 2011 level thereafter. l All major 
retailers and 25 per cent of other retailers achieve a 50 per cent reduction in HDPE retail carry bags by the 
end of 2006 (relative to 2002). In the following 5 years (2007–2011), they reduce HDPE retail carry bags at an 
annual rate of 10 per cent. They maintain their supply of HDPE retail carry bags at the 2011 level thereafter. 
Source: Allen Consulting Group (2006a, 2006b). 
However, any overstatement of costs is likely to be more than outweighed by an 
apparent overstatement of benefits. The Allen Consulting Group  (2006a,  p.  ix) 
acknowledged its results were based on a ‘generous treatment’ of environmental     




benefits. Specifically, it assumed the total environmental benefit from removing a 
plastic bag from the environment ($1.00 per bag) was fifty times greater than its 
own calculations indicated was the case ($0.02 per bag).23 It could be argued those 
calculations overlooked some benefits, but this is unlikely to justify an upward 
adjustment of fifty times. Thus, it appears the reported net impacts are overly 
optimistic, and the net cost of each policy option would actually be many times 
worse than indicated. 
The key reason why the policy options would not deliver a net benefit is that they 
are poorly targeted. They would penalise most uses of plastic retail carry bags, 
whereas the potential environmental benefit only comes from the less than 1 per 
cent of bags that are littered. 
In summary, plastic-bag litter is a complex issue. The current emphasis on reducing 
the largest source of HDPE retail carry bags (supermarkets) has led to a big 
reduction in the use of such bags, but seems to have had little impact on plastic-bag 
litter. This, combined with the small proportion of plastic bags that are littered, 
suggests a widely-applied ban or per-unit charge on plastic retail carry bags, with 
emphasis on larger retailers, would not deliver a net benefit to the community. The 
cost–benefit study commissioned by the Australian, State and Territory 
Governments confirms this, even when the environmental benefits are assumed to 
be fifty times greater than available evidence suggests. Nor is a shift to 
biodegradable bags likely to deliver a net benefit, since such bags tend to be more 
costly, do little to change littering behaviour, and can have worse environmental 
impacts than existing plastic bags. Governments should therefore consider a policy 
approach that more directly targets the littering problem, rather than seeking to 
eliminate plastic bags or substitute them with a biodegradable alternative. 
Based on the evidence available to the Commission, it appears that the Australian, 
State and Territory Governments do not have a sound case for proceeding with 
their proposed phase out of plastic retail carry bags. Similarly, there does not 
appear to be a sound basis for the Victorian Government’s proposed per-unit 
                                              
23 The $0.02 benefit per bag was derived by valuing the time that volunteers had contributed to 
removing plastic-bag litter during Clean Up Australia day in 2005 (based on average post-tax 
weekly earnings). The Allen Consulting Group (2006a) noted this measured the total 
environmental benefit on the assumption that clean-up volunteers were concerned about all 
impacts of plastic-bag litter. The alternative approach of asking people their willingness to pay 
for environmental improvements was considered unreliable because (a) there can be an 
expectation that governments will pay (or individuals will be charged), thus encouraging people 
to overstate (or understate) their willingness to pay, and (b) litter reduction can be a ‘public 
good’, providing an incentive for some to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others. 
FINDING 8.7     
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charge on plastic bags. A cost–benefit study commissioned by the Governments 
shows that the benefits of a phase out or a per-unit charge would be significantly 
outweighed by the costs. This is because the policies would penalise most uses of 
plastic retail carry bags, whereas the potential benefit would only come from the 
small proportion of bags that are littered. A more cost-effective approach would be 
to target littering directly. 
To help ensure governments adopt the best policy approach on plastic bags, the 
Environment Protection and Heritage Council should include the following in its 
forthcoming regulation impact statement: 
•  a clearly-specified objective to reduce plastic-bag litter in a way that 
maximises the net benefit to the community; 
•  a comprehensive review of evidence on the environmental impacts of plastic-
bag litter; 
•  a thorough evaluation of recent initiatives to reduce plastic bags in Australia, 
including consideration of why the large reduction in supermarket plastic 
carry bags in recent years appears not to have translated into an 
environmental improvement; 
•  assessment of an alternative policy approach that, rather than targeting 
supermarkets or most uses of plastic carry bags, involves a combination of: 
–  strengthened litter-reduction policies, such as education, enforcement of 
litter laws, and containment with litter traps and other infrastructure; and  
–  measures focused directly on away-from-home sources of plastic-bag litter, 
including measures that target plastic-bag litter entering marine and 
riverine environments. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.5     




     




9 Market-based  instruments 
 
Key points 
•  A wide range of market-based instruments has been utilised in waste management 
policy in Australia, including landfill levies, advance disposal and recycling fees, 
deposit-refund schemes, and subsidy schemes. 
•  Landfill levy schemes are one of the major instruments in waste management 
policy. Landfill levies are currently being used to pursue objectives such as landfill 
diversion targets and generating revenue to fund waste policies. This approach is 
likely to result in net costs to the community. 
•  The case for using landfill levies to address environmental externalities is weak. The 
residual externalities after complying with modern landfill regulation are small, 
limiting the scope for applying levies without duplicating regulation. Also, the 
externalities vary significantly according to waste type, location of disposal, and the 
type of landfill facility, making it difficult to set levies to suit individual circumstances. 
•  Most householders currently pay a flat annual waste disposal fee and, hence, 
receive only weak price signals about their waste disposal activities. Introduction of 
low-cost variable charging systems for municipal waste disposal and resource 
recovery should be considered. 
•  Advance disposal or recycling fees could promote more efficient disposal or 
recycling of some products. However, there are considerable difficulties in setting 
such fees at correct levels. The schemes may be justified for products associated 
with a high risk and cost of illegal disposal. 
•  Deposit-refund schemes are typically costly and can only be justified for products 
that have a high cost of illegal disposal. They are not warranted in the case of 
beverage containers. 
•  Subsidy schemes that directly address market failures in recycling, and research 
and development, are warranted where they result in a net benefit to the 
community. Subsidising consumer purchasing of goods with recycled content is not 
supported. 
•  It is currently not clear what purpose tradeable property rights mechanisms would 
serve in waste policy. Such mechanisms can be useful means of achieving targets 
cost-effectively. However, developing optimal waste disposal and resource recovery 
targets is practically impossible, and enforcing arbitrary targets can impose large 
costs on the community.        




This chapter examines the issues associated with the deployment of market-based 
instruments in waste management policy. Such instruments utilise market 
mechanisms to influence parties to act in ways that will help to achieve policy 
objectives, such as correcting externalities. The instruments can generally take one 
of two forms: 
1.  Financial incentives — these instruments internalise the externality by altering 
the prices faced by relevant parties. Financial incentive instruments can involve 
the use of levies, taxes or charges to target the external costs, or the use of 
subsidies to target the external benefits of certain actions. 
2.  Tradeable property rights — these instruments impose a quantitative limit on 
the level of a particular activity and apportion tradeable rights for the shares 
within that limit to individual parties.  
Historically, most of the focus of waste management policy in Australia and 
overseas has been on financial incentive instruments. More recently, there has been 
some interest in the application of tradeable property right instruments to waste 
management.  
9.1 Landfill  levies 
Levies on waste going to landfill are a widely-used policy instrument in Australia. 
All Australian mainland states, with the exception of Queensland, have introduced 
some form of levy on landfills, over and above the normal gate fee imposed by the 
landfill owner, although the levels of the levy vary significantly across jurisdictions 
(table 9.1).  
Table 9.1  Australian landfill levies in 2006 
Location Type  of  waste  NSW  VIC  WA  SA 
   $/tonne $/tonne $/tonne $/tonne 
Metropolitan Municipal  22.70 7 3  10.80 
  C&I and C&Da  22.70 11  1  10.80 
Rural Municipal  15  5  0  5.40 
  C&I and C&D  15  9  0  5.40 
a Commercial and industrial and construction and demolition waste.  
Sources: DEH (sub. 103); WMAA, NSW Branch (sub. DR150).  
In theory, the imposition of a levy on landfill can result in efficient outcomes. 
Where disposal of waste to landfill generates negative externalities, imposing a tax 
on disposal equal to the value of those externalities would force the landfill users to 
face the full cost of disposal. This would encourage a reduction in waste disposal to     




efficient levels. The size of the reduction would depend on the costs to landfill users 
of other options for dealing with the waste. The less costly it is to switch to 
alternatives to landfill disposal, the more responsive the demand for landfill will be 
to increases in price. Regardless of the degree of responsiveness, provided users 
face the correct price of landfill disposal, the resulting level of disposal will be one 
that maximises net benefit to the community. 
In practice, however, there are considerable challenges in implementing such a 
landfill levy scheme. These are discussed below. 
Setting an appropriate objective 
In order to address the market failure associated with landfills, a landfill levy should 
reflect the external costs that are imposed on the community from landfilling waste. 
No jurisdiction currently uses landfill levies explicitly to internalise those 
externalities. Internalising the externalities of disposal may have been the intention 
in the past in some jurisdictions, such as New South Wales. In that state levies were 
reset in 1997, apparently to reflect the external costs of landfill disposal (BDA 
Group and EconSearch 2004). However, that connection has been subsequently lost. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) observed: 
Economic arguments are often used to justify levies, but in practice tend to be the least 
important factor motivating the establishment and quantum of levies. (sub. 103, p. 50) 
Examination of various state policy documents as well as submissions received by 
the Commission reveals that levies are currently used primarily to achieve landfill 
diversion targets, and to generate revenue for government. 
Using levies to achieve waste diversion targets 
Most of the states have set targets for diverting waste from landfill (chapter 7). 
Following the introduction of a landfill levy in some states, the size of the levy has 
been calibrated with reference to progress in achieving waste diversion targets. For 
example, the WA Government (2005b, p. 6), in discussing a proposed increase in 
the levy, stated: 
Striking the right balance [in setting levies] is important if we are to achieve the targets 
set for reductions in waste to landfill …  
In Victoria, the decision to have a higher levy rate for commercial and industrial 
waste appears to have been driven by the objective of reducing the size of that waste 
stream (BDA Group and EconSearch 2004).      




Some jurisdictions have used landfill levies as a means of improving the relative 
financial attractiveness of other options for treating waste. For example, the 
Department of Environment and Conservation (New South Wales) (DEC) stated 
that the recent decision to increase the landfill levy from $22.70 to around $57 by 
2012: 
… was deliberately aimed to give a leg up to the kind of technologies that will help 
achieve the state’s waste targets … The amounts involved are very close to the amounts 
that industry had put to us that were necessary to overcome obstacles to the 
introduction of the technologies and the solutions the government wanted to see put in 
place. (trans., p. 444) 
Estimates prepared by the Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development 
(sub.  70) suggest that increasing the levy in New South Wales could provide a 
significant financial benefit to recycling operators ($120 million between 2006-07 
and 2010-11). 
The WA Government also supported the idea of using levies to encourage resource 
recovery: 
A levy set too low (as at present) fails to provide sufficient financial incentive to invest 
in waste avoidance and resource recovery activity. (2005b, p. 6) 
Using levies to generate revenue 
In Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, landfill levies are often justified 
as a mechanism for funding government waste management programs. For 
example, the Department of Environment (Western Australia) stated: 
… while a landfill levy may act as a moderate disincentive for disposal to landfill in 
some circumstances e.g. for Construction & Demolition waste, its main benefit is to 
raise revenue to support waste reduction initiatives. (sub. 101, p. 5) 
In New South Wales, the landfill levy is a non-trivial source of government 
revenue. In 2004-05, the NSW Government received $104 million from levy 
payments. The revenue is projected to grow significantly in the future, reaching 
$309 million in 2009-10 (NSW Treasury 2006).  
The DEH (sub. 103) stated that the reasons for introducing landfill levies include 
collection of funds to directly support recycling and contribute to the state’s general 
revenue.     




Consequences of setting the wrong objective 
The Commission considers that using levies to reach selected landfill targets, or to 
generate revenue, is incompatible with the desired objective of internalising the 
externalities of waste disposal to landfill.  
Using a levy to achieve a specific diversion target fails to take account of the 
relative benefits and costs of waste disposal to landfill, and of the various landfill 
diversion options. There is a strong risk that this approach would impose net costs 
on the community. Similarly, a levy that aims to bridge the cost differential between 
landfill and other disposal options, without a thorough assessment of the economic 
costs and benefits of the different options, is unlikely to generate a net community 
benefit. With regard to the increase in the New South Wales landfill levy, Collex 
argued: 
The level of the NSW waste levy now bears little relationship to the economic, social 
and environmental costs associated with waste management. It already generates more 
revenue than is spent on dealing with waste management issues. At the new rate, the 
surplus revenue will be substantial indeed. (sub. 80, p. 19) 
A further consequence of this approach may be the generation of some perverse 
outcomes. One of these is increased illegal disposal. Where the price of landfill is 
high (and increasing strongly), as in New South Wales, the incentive for illegal 
disposal would be substantial. The Business Roundtable on Sustainable 
Development (trans., p. 96) argued that increasing the levy in New South Wales to 
drive reductions in waste generation by the commercial and industrial sector (which 
has a low volume responsiveness to price) has resulted in increased illegal disposal. 
Peter Carroll (trans., pp. 1101-02) claimed that increases in the landfill levy in 
Victoria have resulted in significant growth in illegal disposal, particularly in rural 
areas. 
The risk of illegal disposal is greatest when landfilling is the only available option 
for waste generators and disposers. For example, asbestos is no longer produced or 
used in Australia, and it cannot be recycled. Hanson Landfill Services (sub. DR125) 
noted that the high levy imposed in Victoria on disposal of asbestos waste to landfill 
($26 per tonne) discourages decontamination of sites, and encourages disposers to 
illegally dump asbestos, or to hide it among other waste going to landfill.  
High levies could also encourage costly avoidance behaviour. The Waste 
Contractors and Recyclers Association of New South Wales (trans., pp. 913-14) 
gave an example of transfer stations and recycling centres in New South Wales 
transporting waste a considerable distance to unlicensed landfills that were not 
subject to the levy. The financial incentive also appears to be discouraging some 
recycling. The Australian Council of Recyclers (sub. 40, p.10) argued that the     




higher levies in metropolitan areas could make recycling of cars from rural areas 
financially unattractive compared to sending the car to a local unlicensed (and 
hence, unlevied) landfill. This would be because the shredder floc left after 
recovering materials from the car in Sydney, for example, attracts the landfill levy 
while disposal of the whole car to an unlicensed rural landfill attracts no levy. 
With regard to the revenue-raising objective of landfill levies, general 
revenue-raising mechanisms are likely to be less distortionary and less costly to 
administer. Further, if a levy exceeds the full external cost of waste disposal, as it 
almost certainly will in New South Wales, there will be equity concerns about 
taxing waste disposers to fund government activities.  
A number of participants supported landfill levies on the grounds that they could 
raise funds for waste management programs (for example, WMAA, New South 
Wales Branch, sub. DR150; Western Australia Waste Management Board, sub. 
DR208). However, there are unlikely to be any efficiency grounds for 
hypothecating (earmarking) the revenue from the landfill levy to waste programs. 
Hypothecation may be desirable if there is a close connection between the source of 
funds and their subsequent use, so that the levy effectively constitutes a payment for 
services received. One example is the funding of road repairs and maintenance from 
the fuel excise paid by truck operators. 
However, the link between a levy on landfill disposal and broader waste 
management programs run by governments is weak. If anything, the size of the levy 
should reflect the cost of landfill externalities, and not the funding requirements of 
broader waste-related policies. On the other hand, the funding allocated to particular 
government programs should reflect the community benefit of those programs and 
not the revenue generated by the landfill levy. The Commission considers that 
sourcing the funds for waste management policy programs from general revenue is 
likely to generate better outcomes.  
Challenges in setting the levy at the correct level 
There are significant practical difficulties in setting the levy to internalise the 
externalities of landfill disposal. A landfill levy is poorly suited to accounting for 
the variability in externalities arising from the different waste types and 
circumstances of disposal. The costs to the community of landfill disposal depend 
on the:  
•  geographic location of disposal 
•  type of landfill facility  
•  type of waste.     




In order to accurately reflect the externalities of disposal, the landfill levy would 
need to vary to account for the above factors.  
Currently, all of the jurisdictions charge different levy rates for landfill disposal in 
rural and urban areas. However, none have explicitly linked these differences to 
differences in externalities. In Victoria, the reason for this difference appears to be a 
lack of resource recovery options in rural areas (BDA Group and EconSearch 
2004).  
None of the jurisdictions vary their levy rates on the basis of the type of landfill 
facility. This disregards any differences in the technologies and practices adopted 
by different landfill operators, and the associated differences in the external costs of 
landfill disposal. Consequently, landfill operators receive no price signal with 
regard to the actual environmental performance of the landfill, and have little 
incentive to improve that performance. For example, Collex argued that their 
bioreactor landfill in New South Wales: 
… [is] less polluting and therefore particularly disadvantaged by the current levy 
arrangements … Higher gate fees associated with higher environmental standards, 
effectively internalise what might have been externalities in the past. The levy does not 
provide any incentive to improve environmental performance, but could even be 
considered to penalise it. (sub. 80, p. 9) 
Some of the schemes allow for limited variability in rates for different waste types. 
In Victoria, different levies apply to municipal and non-municipal, non-hazardous, 
solid waste. However, in that state, the levy for construction and demolition waste is 
greater than for municipal waste, despite the fact that construction and demolition 
waste is typically associated with lower disposal externalities (chapter 4). In 
Western Australia, different rates are charged for municipal and non-municipal 
waste, although the WA Government (2005b) has proposed to align those rates by 
2009. In contrast, New South Wales and South Australia charge a flat levy for all 
non-hazardous solid waste.  
Introducing substantial variability into the landfill levy to reflect externalities is 
likely to significantly increase administrative costs. Cost increases are likely to be 
exacerbated by information asymmetries between governments and waste 
generators or landfill operators. In particular, variable charging on the basis of 
waste type may be difficult to monitor, thus giving waste generators an incentive to 
misrepresent the nature of their waste to achieve the lowest cost disposal option. 
DEC commented about the tradeoffs involved with waste-specific levies: 
Our experience is that even ensuring consistent application of the levy in its simple 
form is not a simple business. It is very complicated. People don’t want fancy 
paperwork. The thing would be way open to rorting if it’s far too complicated. So ... we     




do think about the appropriate level of coarseness versus specificity and try to strike a 
practical balance for people so they can get on with their lives. (trans., p. 452) 
The failure to adequately account for variability in external costs of landfilling 
different types of waste means that relatively inert types of waste would be 
overtaxed compared to waste associated with higher disposal externalities.  
Linking the levy to waste generating activities 
In order for a landfill levy to be efficient, the correct price signals must reach the 
waste generator. In the case of most commercial and industrial, and construction 
and demolition waste generators, this link is generally present because they pay a 
charge based on the quantity of waste disposed. In the case of municipal waste, the 
landfill levy is passed on to local governments who provide the waste disposal 
service to households. Local governments recover their costs from households 
through local rate payments, which typically include a flat fee for the provision of 
the waste disposal service. A limited form of variable charging for waste disposal 
has been introduced by some local governments by charging an additional amount 
for provision of a larger than standard bin. However, generally, for householders 
there is a weak link between the quantity of the waste disposed and the cost of 
disposal.  
The cost for a household of generating an additional unit of waste is effectively zero 
(until the bin is full), hence there is little incentive to curb waste disposal. A study 
of landfill taxes in the United Kingdom (Martin and Scott  2003) indicates an 
insignificant impact on municipal waste disposal, despite a tax of £14 per tonne, but 
a large reduction in disposal of inert construction and demolition waste that was 
taxed at only £2 per tonne. The study concluded that one of the main reasons for 
this outcome was that householders did not receive a clear price signal about their 
waste disposal. 
SITA Environmental Solutions (sub. 42) argued that, even if households were not 
sensitive to changes in the landfill levy, local governments are very sensitive. 
Consequently, a landfill levy could drive local governments to seek other waste 
disposal methods. However, if the price signal reached them directly, households 
could, for example, decide to increase the reuse of their goods or generate less 
waste in response to an increase in the price of waste disposal. 
The issues associated with introducing quantity-based pricing of waste disposal are 
analysed in the next section. However, it should be noted that a landfill levy scheme 
that is not coupled with variable pricing for waste collection and disposal, is likely 
to be ineffective in fully achieving its objectives, and could impose net costs on the     




community. The costs are likely to be exacerbated if the levies are continuously 
increased to achieve selected waste diversion targets, and price signals are not 
reaching the relevant decision makers. 
Conclusions on the case for using landfill levies  
Landfill levies coexist with a suite of regulations governing landfill practices. These 
regulations can reduce the externality costs of landfill disposal to very modest levels 
(chapters 4 and 8). Consequently, the scope for applying a landfill levy without 
duplicating the effect of existing regulation is small. 
With regard to the small non greenhouse-related externalities of landfill disposal not 
addressed by regulation, there might still be a case for a weight-based tax on landfill 
disposal, if it could be shown that the weight of waste was the primary determinant 
of those externalities. However, other factors, such as the type of waste and location 
of disposal, are also likely to be important. It is difficult to design a practical landfill 
levy that reflects this variability. Even if the levy were set at a level that 
corresponded to the true average size of residual landfill externalities — as is 
claimed to be the case in Victoria (Victorian Government, sub. DR187) — levies 
would still be too blunt to send the correct price signals to landfill users and 
operators. Levies set in that manner would give no incentive to landfill operators to 
improve their practices, nor would they lead to efficient levels of disposal of 
particular types of waste.    
Finally, the current practices of using (and increasing) landfill levies to generate 
revenue, and pursue selected landfill diversion targets, are likely to impose net costs 
on the community. They also may have some perverse consequences, such as 
increased illegal disposal and costly evasion behaviour.  
Thus, on balance, the Commission does not favour the use of landfill levies in 
Australia. 
Governments should discontinue using landfill levies because: 
•  the externalities of disposal to a properly-located, engineered and managed 
landfill are typically small, and the scope for applying levies without 
duplicating the effect of existing regulation is very limited; 
•  residual disposal externalities vary significantly according to waste type, 
location of disposal and type of landfill facility, and it would be impractical to 
vary the levy to reflect that variability; and 
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•  using levies to achieve selected landfill diversion targets and revenue 
generation to fund environmental programs will not encourage outcomes 
which are in the best interests of the community, and may have perverse 
consequences, such as increases in illegal dumping and other forms of 
evasion. 
9.2  Unit pricing of waste disposal 
As noted previously, householders generally receive weak price signals on the costs 
of waste disposal, because the price paid does not vary greatly with the quantity of 
waste disposed. The DEH stated: 
The marginal private cost of waste disposal to a householder is … zero, or at best 
negligible (even though the marginal social cost is not) … there is no financial 
incentive for a householder … to reduce their generation of waste. (sub. 103, p. 30) 
A variable pricing system reflecting waste disposal costs would allow householders 
to make informed decisions about their waste generation and disposal. There is 
extensive international experience on the use of variable disposal fee systems (also 
known as ‘pay-as-you-throw’) for municipal waste collection. Pay-as-you-throw 
(PAYT) schemes have been used in the United States and some European countries. 
The schemes can take a number of forms (box 9.1). 
 
Box 9.1  Different types of household variable pricing schemes 
•  Variable frequency of collection — householders pay a rate based on their choice of 
frequency of waste collection. 
•  Variable bin volume — householders pay a rate based on their choice of bin size or 
number of bins. 
•  Pre-purchased garbage bags or bag tags  — householders can only dispose of 
waste by placing it in special bags that they purchase prior to disposal, or by 
attaching a pre-purchased tag to their garbage bag. 
•  Variable weight — householders pay a rate based on the weight of waste.   
A number of Australian local governments have also introduced various PAYT 
schemes. The potential costs and benefits, as well as the issues relevant to 
implementing a variable charging system, are discussed below.     




Reduced disposal of waste 
A large number of international studies conclude that the introduction of PAYT 
leads to reductions in waste disposal. In the United States, Van Houtven and Morris 
(1999) reported that a pre-purchased garbage bag charging system in Georgia 
resulted in a 36 per cent reduction in waste generation. Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1996) estimated that, in Virginia, a volume-based charging system resulted in a 
14 per cent reduction in the weight of waste disposed, although some of that was 
likely to have been diverted to illegal dumping. Dijkgraaf (2003) estimated that 
waste disposal in the Netherlands fell between 7 and 38 per cent depending on the 
type of PAYT scheme in operation. In South Korea, a nationwide introduction of a 
PAYT system resulted in an 18  per  cent reduction in waste disposal, while the 
service charges paid by households did not increase (Hong 1999). A number of US 
studies conclude that introducing unit pricing diverts some waste to recycling (for 
example Ferrara and Missios 2005). 
A study of Australian variable charging schemes by Atech (1999, quoted in BDA 
Group and EconSearch 2004) concluded that they have resulted in waste reductions 
of up to 50 per cent. However, the BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) argued that 
this was partly attributable to improved recycling services and education programs 
that accompanied the introduction of those schemes.  
Assessing the potential benefit to the community of introducing PAYT systems for 
municipal waste across Australia is difficult, because of the scarcity of data on the 
responsiveness of Australian householders to changes in the price of waste disposal. 
Porter (2002) used data from the studies on the operation of US PAYT schemes and 
estimated that, if such schemes were introduced across the United States, municipal 
waste disposal could fall by around 33 per cent, creating a gross national benefit 
(before counting the costs of implementing PAYT) of US $3.5 billion. 
Variable pricing for disposal and recycling 
In order to avoid distortions in waste disposal activities, PAYT schemes should 
ideally apply to all legal methods of disposal available to the household. Thus, 
where both a waste disposal service and a recyclables collection service are 
provided (as is the case in most parts of Australia), households might ideally be 
charged for the true costs to the community of supplying each service.1 This would 
involve a variable component that should reflect the marginal community costs.2 
                                              
1  These costs do not include the landfill levy. 
2  However, if the marginal community benefit of recycling were greater than its marginal cost, 
householders should be provided a refund reflecting the marginal community benefit created.     




This would enable households to make appropriate choices about which services to 
use. 
However, it appears that some local governments may be using their charging 
regimes to achieve particular waste disposal or resource recovery targets. For 
example, the City of Ryde allows householders to purchase additional or larger size 
bins for waste disposal and recycling. However, according to the City of Ryde 
(trans., p. 864), the relative costs of disposal and recycling bins are set purely to 
encourage greater resource recovery — an additional 240 litre garbage bin attracts a 
$410 per annum charge, while a 240 litre recycling bin attracts a $31 annual charge. 
The charges are not based on the costs to the community of providing the service 
and hence are unlikely to encourage efficient outcomes in waste generation, 
disposal or resource recovery.  
Issues in selecting the appropriate PAYT scheme 
Variable charging of waste disposal is likely to be associated with higher 
implementation and administrative costs for local government. These would vary 
depending on the complexity of the scheme. The costs of measurement and billing 
associated with sophisticated weight-based systems are likely to be substantial, 
potentially making them impractical to implement for households (particularly if the 
marginal costs of disposal are low). Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimated that 
the administrative costs of even a relatively simple pre-paid garbage bag tag scheme 
in the United States outweighed the benefits of the scheme.  
The effectiveness of PAYT schemes in reducing waste disposal depends on how 
clear the price signal is for households. Weight-based charging systems provide the 
clearest price signal to the household, and are likely to generate the greatest 
reduction (Dijkgraaf 2003). On the other hand, coarser PAYT schemes, like 
variable charging based on bin volume, are likely to be less effective. However, 
there is a clear tradeoff between the sophistication of the scheme and its 
administrative costs. 
Early experience in Australia shows that many local governments have adopted the 
simplest forms of PAYT. Typically, such schemes involve offering households 
multiple bin sizes at different prices, or providing them with a second bin for an 
additional charge. In some cases, frequency-based charging has also been adopted. 
For example, the Municipal Association of Victoria (sub. DR179) reported that in 
the City of Frankston, householders can receive a $20 rate reduction, and either a 
free worm farm or compost system, for accepting less frequent waste collections. 
The Commission is not aware of any municipal weight-based charging schemes 
currently in operation in Australia.      




Some inquiry participants argued that the adoption of more sophisticated forms of 
PAYT such as weight-based charging was not financially or technically feasible in 
most cases. The Municipal Waste Advisory Council (sub. 52) observed that a 
weight-based waste charging scheme had been trialled by one Western Australian 
council, but the technical difficulties and costs were prohibitive. The Municipal 
Association of Victoria (sub. 113) stated that the City of Melbourne ran a trial of a 
pay-by-weight system in the early 1990s and found the required modifications to 
existing systems were too costly at the time. It noted that while current technology 
is more affordable, it is still not cost effective. The Ipswich City Council 
(sub. DR198) also stated that a weight-based PAYT scheme was currently not cost 
effective for it. 
On the other hand, SITA Environmental Solutions observed that it and a number of 
other companies, already had the capacity to provide weight-based charging, and 
that weight-based charging of households could be implemented within two to three 
years (sub. DR143; trans., p. 840). The City of Ryde reported that it had started 
installing electronic chips on household bins that could allow it to charge for the 
weight of disposed waste in the future (sub. DR176), although others noted the 
difficulty of certifying the weighing equipment (discussed below). It appears that, 
currently, weight-based charging is better suited for commercial and industrial 
(rather than municipal) waste disposal. This would be because the costs of such 
charging per unit of waste are likely to be lower due to less frequent lifts and greater 
quantities of waste disposed per lift. 
There is no universally preferred form of PAYT scheme. The choice would depend 
on a large number of factors that could influence both the effectiveness and the 
administrative costs of the scheme, and would likely vary between different 
locations. For example, frequency-based PAYT schemes may be appropriate and 
cost-effective in Victoria (Municipal Association of Victoria, sub. DR179) but less 
so in warmer-climate states, where frequent disposal of putrescible waste may be 
necessary for community health reasons. A separate set of issues would arise in 
locations with high proportions of multi-unit dwellings, where it is typical for a 
number of households to use common waste bins. In such cases, effectively 
implementing most forms of PAYT would be difficult, and a scheme utilising 
pre-paid bags or bag tags (as is done in many European countries) may be the only 
practical option.  
The gains from using more sophisticated and precise forms of PAYT would be 
greater when the marginal cost of waste disposal is high. However, the marginal 
costs of waste disposal in Australia appear to be relatively low, and weight-based 
charging still appears to be significantly more expensive than other forms of PAYT. 
Thus, the current bias towards simpler forms of PAYT may be appropriate.     





A problem with variable pricing is that it increases incentives for illegal disposal. 
Evidence of this link is usually anecdotal. For example, the BDA Group and 
EconSearch (2004) stated that many South Australian local governments reported 
increased illegal disposal following the introduction of variable charging.  
Internationally, Fullerton and Kinnaman  (1996) estimated that, while the 
introduction of variable disposal pricing in one US state reduced waste disposal, 
illegal dumping amounted to around 30  per  cent of that reduction. On the other 
hand, Dijkgraaf (2003) estimated that introduction of PAYT in the Netherlands led 
to a four per cent increase in illegal disposal, and a displacement of five per cent of 
the waste to surrounding municipalities that had no variable pricing. Dijkgraaf 
concluded that the costs of increased illegal disposal would have to be very large — 
€750 per tonne of illegally disposed waste — to outweigh the benefits of a PAYT 
scheme. 
Surveys of US communities that operate variable disposal pricing typically show 
that the associated increase in illegal disposal is not a significant problem 
(Skumatz 1993). Skumatz also noted that the size of the shift to illegal disposal 
depended on the local circumstances, including the social characteristics of the 
community. The BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) observed that education and 
awareness raising programs could play an important role in reducing the shift to 
illegal disposal from the introduction of PAYT. 
The choice of pricing method can influence household behaviour with regard to 
minimising disposal costs. A number of studies show that PAYT systems based on 
waste volumes can lead to a significant increase in compaction of the waste by 
some households (for example, Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996). This can make it 
difficult to design a correct pricing signal on the basis of waste volumes, although 
Miranda, Bauer and Aldy (1996) argued that, over time, increasing knowledge 
about expected compaction rates can alleviate this problem. Further, if compaction 
behaviour is a substitute for illegal disposal, it may be a preferred outcome. 
Compaction may also create benefits if landfill disposal costs are related to waste 
volume rather than weight, as was claimed by some participants (for example, the 
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council, sub. DR155, p. 1).  
Potential barriers to implementing a PAYT scheme 
Some participants suggested that implementation of PAYT schemes could be 
hindered by existing legislation governing the operation of the waste services 
industry and local governments.      




SITA Environmental Solutions (sub. DR143; trans., pp. 840-841) argued that it was 
prevented from implementing weight-based charging by the requirement, under the 
National Measurement Regulations 1999, for all measuring equipment used for 
trade purposes to be certified by the National Measurement Institute. It suggested 
that existing weighing devices failed to achieve the accuracy required for 
certification. Examining the list of currently certified weighing devices, the 
Commission has not found any devices approved for weighing municipal waste 
bins. However, the National Measurement Institute has certified devices for 
measuring the weight of larger non-municipal waste bins (National Measurement 
Institute 2006). 
The operation of rate-setting provisions in local government could also hamper 
implementation of PAYT schemes. The Packaging Council of Australia argued: 
Councils are constrained in the way they can set charges, raise revenues and charge for 
services by the various Local Government Acts around Australia. As a general rule, 
these provisions prevent councils implementing fully commercial and flexible charging 
arrangements for waste services. These limit the flexibility of Councils to implement 
differential charges for garbage and recycling services … (sub. 67, p. 23) 
The Commission has examined this issue and concluded that there do not appear to 
be any substantial legislative barriers to local governments implementing PAYT 
schemes. Under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), local governments in that 
state are required to set an annual charge for provision of waste services (s. 496) 
and can only increase that charge between years up to a limit determined by the 
Minister for Local Government (ss. 507–510). However, DEC (trans., p. 891) stated 
that local governments were entitled to charge for provision of waste services as 
they wished, with no direct control from the Minister. It suggested that, while the 
Minister had the power to impose an upper limit on the charge, this was a reserve 
power that has never been exercised. Examination of the local government 
legislation of other Australian states and territories does not reveal any apparent 
barriers to the implementation of the more simple variable charging schemes for 
municipal waste disposal.  
FINDING 9.1 
Charges for household waste collection that vary with the amount of waste could 
promote more efficient outcomes, where they are cost effective and practical to 
introduce. This will depend on the implementation costs and any consequent 
increase in illegal disposal. Wider adoption of simple forms of variable charges, 
such as charging an additional fee for a larger than standard bin, would seem 
desirable, with more sophisticated ‘pay-as-you-throw’ approaches adopted if and 
when they become more cost effective and practical.     




9.3  Advance disposal and recycling fees 
Advance disposal and recycling fees (ADF and ARF) have received greater 
attention from policy makers as part of the general growth of product stewardship 
schemes. Under this policy instrument, a fee is levied on a new product to fund the 
costs of its future disposal or (in the case of ARF) recycling.  
In Australia, ADF and ARF schemes currently apply to ozone-depleting 
refrigerants, oil, mobile phones, agricultural chemical containers and some 
chemicals (box 9.2). A number of tyre retailers have also adopted advance charging 
for handling and disposal of used tyres, where consumers pay the fee as part of the 
purchase price of the new tyre (Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, 
sub. DR141). 
In theory, ADF and ARF schemes can lead to efficient outcomes. An ADF 
reflecting the external costs of disposal would internalise the externality, and lead to 
efficient levels of disposal. If recycling generates the greatest net benefit of all 
waste management options, an ARF set to reflect the external benefit of recycling 
would result in efficient outcomes.  
With both types of schemes, to the extent that the price signal reaches the producer, 
the producer would have an incentive to change the design of the product to reduce 
subsequent costs of disposal, or improve the product’s recyclability. 
Advance disposal or recycling fees could also be a preferable instrument to PAYT 
schemes for recovering costs from waste disposers, in cases where PAYT is likely 
to significantly increase illegal disposal. In contrast to a PAYT scheme, an ADF or 
ARF does not target waste disposal directly, and the corresponding incentive for 
illegal disposal would, therefore, be weaker. Thus, for products that are easy to litter 
or that carry high costs of improper disposal, an advance fee that covers both private 
and external costs of disposal or return for recycling, may be a better instrument 
than PAYT.  
In practice, there are limitations on the ability of ADF and ARF schemes to achieve 
efficient outcomes (as outlined below).     





Box 9.2  Advance disposal and recycling fee schemes in Australia 
Product Stewardship for Oil Program 
The Product Stewardship for Oil Program began in 2000 as a regulatory program to 
recycle used oil. Under the program, a levy of around 5.5 cents per litre (or kilogram for 
grease products) is charged on producers and importers of petroleum-based oils and 
their synthetic equivalents. The levy funds are distributed among recyclers largely on 
the basis of the level of incentive required to encourage production of particular 
recycled oil products. 
MobileMuster 
The MobileMuster program was initiated in 1999 as a voluntary industry program. 
Consumers and retailers can dispose of mobile phones free of charge through a 
network of over 1000 mobile phone retail outlets, government agencies and 
businesses. The program is funded by a sales levy paid by participating manufacturers 
(constituting 90 per cent of the market). Since 1999, over 330 tonnes of mobile phones 
have been recovered and recycled through the program. 
drumMUSTER 
The drumMUSTER program was launched in 1999 to collect empty agricultural 
chemical containers. Under the program, consumers pay a levy of four cents per litre or 
kilogram when purchasing applicable farm chemical products in non-returnable 
chemical containers over one litre, or one kilogram, in content. Consumers can then 
return the containers to dedicated collection centres for disposal. The funds are used 
to pay for infrastructure, and the operating and administrative costs of the program. 
Some funds are reserved for R&D projects to remove barriers to program 
implementation. 
ChemClear 
The ChemClear program was launched in 2004 to collect rural agricultural and 
veterinary chemicals. Under the program, consumers can return free of charge the 
registered chemicals that were produced by participating manufacturers. The program 
is funded by the levy collected under the drumMUSTER program.  
Sources: DEH (2005d); MobileMuster (2006); drumMUSTER (2006).   
Challenges in setting the fee at the correct rate 
The externalities of disposal or recycling would vary depending on the type of 
waste, location, method, and timing of disposal. Reflecting this variation with an 
ADF or ARF is difficult.     




Reflecting waste-type variability  
An ADF or ARF scheme is better able to reflect product-specific differences in 
external costs of disposal than a landfill levy. However, the scope for such schemes 
to reflect the characteristics of individual products is still somewhat limited. 
Typically, advance fee schemes involve a flat rate charge being levied on each 
product type without consideration of differences between models and brands.  
The Boomerang Alliance proposed a variable ADF scheme on packaging materials: 
The amount of the fee will be determined on the basis of mass, volume, likelihood of 
litter, ability to be recovered and recycled content … (sub. 54, att. 2, p. 3) 
However, there is a clear tradeoff between the sophistication of any ADF or ARF 
scheme and its administrative and compliance costs. For example, an ADF scheme 
for beverage containers operated in Florida from 1993 to 1995 by setting a flat fee 
on each container, and then providing a series of rebates and exemptions on the 
basis of the container’s recycled content. The scheme was criticised for imposing 
high administrative and compliance costs. The American Grocery Manufacturers 
Association (2005) claimed that the administrative costs to industry were US$0.14 
for every dollar collected in fees.  
The cost of varying the size of an ADF or ARF would be lower for products where 
disposal costs vary on the basis of a simple, easily verifiable characteristic. For 
example, in the case of an ADF for used tyres (that is currently being developed), 
varying the charge on the basis of tyre weight (which is the main determinant of 
disposal costs) is not considered to substantially increase administrative costs 
compared with a flat rate scheme (DEH 2001b). However, as the complexity of the 
product increases, so would the cost of setting the ADF to reflect its disposal costs. 
Reflecting location-specific variability 
An ADF will rarely reflect the regional variability in disposal costs. The location of 
the purchase of the product can differ significantly from the location of its disposal, 
and it would be hard, if not impossible, to anticipate the cost differences with an 
ADF. 
Further, adopting an ADF or ARF that varies by location may meet with 
constitutional difficulties. An ADF or ARF levied on specific products is likely to 
be classified as an excise.3 Section 90 of the Australian Constitution prohibits state 
                                              
3  A significant body of Common Law exists on the issue of what constitutes an excise. See, for 
example, Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 for a definition.     




jurisdictions from introducing duties of excise, leaving this power to the Australian 
Government. The Constitution also requires the Australian Government to impose 
taxes in a way that does not discriminate between states or parts of states (s. 51 (ii)). 
This appears to significantly constrain the ability of governments to impose an ADF 
or ARF that would vary by location. 
Timing of disposal issues 
There can be a significant difference in timing between the incidence of the ADF or 
ARF and actual disposal or recycling. This complicates any estimation of the true 
disposal or recycling costs. Adjusting the fee at the point of disposal for any initial 
over or undercharging could be administratively costly.  
The Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association observed: 
If the average working life of the product exceeds 10 years, as is the case with most 
domestic appliances and light fittings, post-consumer charges make more economic 
sense. Setting a fee to be collected at point of sale for a task to be performed in ten 
years’ time to environmental standards not yet defined is unrealistic. (sub. 59, p. 20) 
An ADF or ARF is, therefore, better suited to products with a relatively short and 
predictable working life. WM Waste Management Services (sub. DR140) suggested 
that this could include some electronic appliances such as computers, video players 
and DVD players.  
Another timing issue concerns the disconnect between the revenue generation to 
fund disposal, and expenditure on actual disposal. It is likely that the revenue 
generated from new product sales would be used to fund current disposal activity. 
The OECD (2001a) noted that there are likely to be cases where the patterns of 
revenue generation are different from expenditure patterns. This could exacerbate 
the administrative difficulties of adjusting the disposal fee at the point of disposal. 
Impact on product design 
A common argument in favour of advance fee schemes is that they give 
manufacturers an incentive to change product design to reduce the costs of disposal 
or improve recyclability. However, a number of factors can limit the impact of an 
ADF or ARF on product design. 
First, as discussed above, it is costly to introduce significant variability in the ADF 
on the basis of individual product characteristics. Advance fees that do not reflect 
differences in design between different product models and brands would generate 
weak price signals for manufacturers to change product design. Therefore, the     




ability of an ADF scheme to influence product design could be constrained by the 
administrative costs of the scheme. 
Second, the impact of an ADF scheme will largely depend on the responsiveness of 
the manufacturer to the signal. In Australia, a significant proportion of 
manufactured goods are imported. For example, most televisions (for which an 
ADF scheme is currently in development) are produced overseas (DEH, sub. 103; 
trans., p. 621). To the extent that Australia constitutes a small proportion of the 
world market, an ADF is unlikely to significantly alter manufacturers’ production 
decisions. The DEH noted that: ‘In terms of driving change, there’s no doubt we’re 
a small voice in the global sense’ (trans., p. 621). 
Conclusions on advance disposal and recycling fees 
Advance disposal or recycling fee schemes could, in theory, deliver several benefits 
over schemes that charge for disposal or recycling at the end of the product’s life. 
These benefits include: a more accurate reflection of product-specific disposal and 
recycling costs; a more direct signal to manufacturers to incorporate disposal and 
recycling cost considerations in product design; and lower incentives for illegal 
disposal. However, drawbacks include: potentially high administrative costs; 
difficulties in reflecting location-specific costs of disposal; and difficulties in 
predicting future disposal costs when the timing of disposal is uncertain. Generally, 
such schemes would only be justified as a means of recycling or correctly disposing 
products that have a high risk and cost of illegal disposal. 
The scope for applying advance, rather than end-of-life, charging for disposal and 
recycling is limited by the difficulties in setting the fee at the correct rate and the 
high administrative cost of such schemes. Advance disposal and recycling schemes 
are only likely to be justified for products carrying a high risk and cost of illegal 
disposal. 
9.4 Deposit-refund  schemes 
Deposit-refund schemes operate by charging consumers a deposit when they 
purchase a particular item and returning the deposit, or a part of it, when the item is 
returned to a specified waste collection or treatment facility.  
In theory, a deposit-refund scheme can generate efficient outcomes. The deposit 
operates similarly to an ADF by imposing a tax at the consumption stage. The 
FINDING 9.2     




refund operates as a subsidy to reduce the negative externalities of littering and 
landfill disposal.  
A number of studies argue that the fact that deposit-refund schemes target 
waste-related decisions at two ends of the chain means that particular waste 
diversion levels can be achieved at lower levels of intervention. For example, 
Palmer, Sigman and Walls (1997) estimate that to achieve a 10 per cent reduction in 
waste disposal in the United States would require an ADF of $85 per tonne, or a 
recycling subsidy of $98 per tonne, but only a $45 per tonne deposit-refund scheme. 
In practice, however, deposit-refund schemes tend to have high operating costs, 
which can frequently outweigh the benefits. This can be illustrated by the analysis 
of the most common type of deposit-refund scheme — container deposit legislation. 
Container deposit legislation 
Container deposit legislation (CDL) has been operating in South Australia for 
around 30 years (box 9.3). Recently, the WA Government  signalled its intention to 
introduce CDL and initiated an investigation into the different models for 
implementing the scheme (Department of Environment WA, sub. 101). Other states 
have also commissioned studies on the potential for introducing CDL, and it has 
been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. 
 
Box 9.3  Container deposit legislation in South Australia 
Container deposit legislation (CDL) has operated in South Australia since 1976. 
Following expansion of the scheme in 2003, it now covers most soft drink, beer and 
water containers, and containers of juices and flavoured milk of up to one litre in 
volume (but not wine containers).  
Beverage manufacturers pay a five cent deposit and an agreed handling fee (usually 
three cents) to a collection coordinator. These funds are retained by the collection 
coordinator until the container is returned to a recycling depot for recycling. When 
consumers return containers to a recycling depot they receive a refund of the five cent 
deposit.  
The recycling depot sorts the containers by material and by responsible collection 
coordinator, and sends the containers to the relevant collection coordinator.  
The collection coordinator pays the recycling depot back the five cent deposit (which 
the depot paid consumers for return of the containers) and the handling fee. 
The containers collected are subsequently sold to recyclers. 
Sources: SA Government (sub. DR217); ISF (2001).       




Every state and territory in Australia currently runs a kerbside collection scheme. 
Thus, any new CDL scheme would operate alongside an existing kerbside recycling 
scheme.  
The arguments in favour of CDL usually focus on its potential to promote two 
objectives: 
•  increased recovery and recycling rates 
•  reduced littering. 
These are analysed below.  
Impact on recovery and recycling 
Most of the studies of existing CDL schemes find that CDL significantly increases 
recovery rates of containers. For example, Fullerton and Wolverton (1997) reported 
that container return rates in US states that ran CDL varied between 77 and 
93 per cent. Beck (2001) found that the average recovery rate of containers in US 
states with CDL was 72 per cent, compared with 28 per cent in non-deposit states. 
Experience with CDL in South Australia indicates that it leads to greater container 
recovery rates. KESAB Environmental Solutions stated: 
Our beverage container return rates are: aluminium 85 per cent; PET [polyethylene 
terephthalate] 72 per cent; glass 82 per cent; liquid paperboard 38 per cent … I would 
suggest that there would be no other state within 20 per cent of any of those figures. 
(trans. p. 231) 
With regard to the impact of CDL on the recovery rates of all recyclable materials, 
US studies consistently find that CDL increases overall recovery rates. In Australia, 
data from Hyder Consulting (DEH, sub. 103, att. A) showed that in 2002-03 South 
Australia had the highest recovery rate for non-organic municipal solid waste of all 
states. However, the impact of CDL on overall recovery rates is unlikely to be great 
because beverage containers make a relatively minor contribution to the municipal 
waste stream. The Packaging Council of Australia (sub. 67) claimed that beverage 
containers only made up around four per cent of the municipal waste stream. The 
ISF (2001, vol. 3) estimated that if CDL schemes were applied in New South 
Wales, and achieved the same container recovery rates as in South Australia, they 
would only reduce the municipal waste stream by between four and eight per cent.     




Impact on littering 
Most international studies conclude that CDL reduces the incidence of container 
litter. For example, Fullerton and Wolverton (1997) reported that CDL reduced 
container litter by 80 per cent in the United States, and cited other studies that 
arrived at similar estimates. It is also generally accepted that CDL has reduced 
beverage container litter in South Australia.  
However, the significance of this outcome in the context of general litter reduction 
is the subject of debate. Analysis of Keep Australia Beautiful litter count data 
(McGregor Tan Research 2006a) shows that, if bottle tops were excluded,4 
beverage containers made up 10 per cent of the litter stream in South Australia by 
volume. In contrast, in other states, beverage containers accounted for between 19 
and 39 per cent of the litter stream by volume. Some participants (for example, the 
Boomerang Alliance, sub.  54, sub.  DR183; South Australian Government, sub. 
DR217) argued that volume was an appropriate measure when considering the costs 
of beverage container litter. Consequently, they argued that overall costs of litter 
could be significantly reduced by a beverage container-specific scheme. On the 
other hand, if items in the litter stream were counted by number, Keep Australia 
Beautiful data (McGregor Tan Research 2006a) show that, excluding bottle tops, 
beverage containers made up one per cent of the litter stream in South Australia and 
between two and nine per cent in other states. Consequently, some participants (for 
example, the Packaging Council of Australia, sub. 67) argued that any reductions in 
the entire litter stream from CDL were likely to be small.  
One approach to estimating the litter reduction benefits of CDL is to focus on the 
cost of removing beverage containers from the litter stream in the absence of CDL. 
The ISF (2001, vol. 2) estimated that a CDL scheme in New South Wales would 
reduce litter collection and management costs by five per cent or $4.5 million per 
annum. It attributed the low estimate to the fact that a large proportion of 
litter-management costs is fixed and costs would not decrease linearly in proportion 
to reductions in litter. 
Cost of introducing a CDL scheme 
The costs of introducing a CDL scheme include: 
•  costs of establishing infrastructure for collection and processing of containers 
•  operational costs of running the scheme including: 
–  householder transport and labour costs of returning the containers  
                                              
4  Bottle tops are not required to be returned to receive a refund.     




–  the cost of handling and processing returns  
–  government costs of administering and monitoring the scheme. 
KESAB Environmental Solutions (trans.,  p.  231) and the SA Government 
(sub. DR217) commented that when CDL operated alongside a kerbside recycling 
scheme, there was significant potential for the use of common infrastructure. The 
SA Government further argued that CDL reduced the cost of kerbside recycling in 
South Australia by removing a large proportion of glass from the kerbside recycling 
stream. They suggested that this increases the ability to compact the loads collected 
at kerbside without the risk of broken glass contaminating other materials. 
However, CDL in South Australia does not target all of the glass containers 
generated by households — for example, wine bottles are excluded, as are all 
non-beverage glass containers. Further, the Australian Food and Grocery Council 
argued: 
… if you look at the South Australian model, one of the arguments is that the hand 
sorting and removing the glass through CDL produces cleaner paper, for example, and 
therefore it’s more valuable. In fact the publishers and the paper industry will tell you 
that South Australia’s paper is actually consistently worse because they don’t have a 
comprehensive recycling system that’s on the scale or on the efficiency of what we see 
in New South Wales, Victoria and elsewhere. (trans., p. 511) 
A number of participants argued that if a CDL scheme were introduced in addition 
to a well-established kerbside recycling scheme, this would result in duplication of 
infrastructure costs and limited potential for the use of common infrastructure 
(PCA, sub. 67; Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub. 93). They also suggested 
that the additional costs of establishing infrastructure for a CDL scheme were likely 
to be substantial. 
Australian studies on the potential for implementing CDL schemes suggest that the 
financial costs of such schemes could be substantial. The ISF (2001) found that the 
financial costs (and benefits) of CDL could vary significantly depending on the 
design of the scheme – particularly the number and location of container collection 
centres. It estimated the net financial costs (exclusive of household labour costs) of 
introducing and running CDL in New  South Wales to be between $72 and 
$107 million per annum compared to the net financial cost of kerbside recycling of 
$41 million. The institute’s separate estimates of the cost of household labour 
ranged from $335 to $385 million per annum for CDL compared to $285 million for 
kerbside recycling.5 
                                              
5  In reporting these numbers, the ISF (2001) stated that they were only rough estimates and could 
be in error by a factor of two or more.      




A review by Perchards of the report on the financial costs of implementing CDL in 
Victoria estimated the additional costs of introducing and running CDL at between 
$73 and $81 per household per annum for the three case study regions, compared to 
the average net annual cost of kerbside recycling of $29 per household 
(EPA Victoria 2003).6  
Can the costs of CDL be reduced by program design? 
The costs of running a CDL scheme will, to some degree, depend on program 
design. For example, the South Australian CDL scheme is generally seen as being 
relatively expensive, because it relies on manual sorting of beverage containers and 
their separation by brand (Phillip Hudson Consulting 2000).  
The Boomerang Alliance (sub. 54) argued that a CDL scheme that did not require 
the sorting of containers by brand would have a significantly lower cost. 
Beck (2001) found that adoption of this approach by the Californian CDL system 
reduced the operating costs of the program (excluding householder costs) by over 
60 per cent relative to traditional CDL programs that relied on manual sorting in 
other US states. However, Beck warned against projecting any of the cost estimates 
in that study to any new CDL schemes. The study suggested that the cost of the 
Californian CDL system may have been reduced by the availability of old container 
collection infrastructure, that pre-dated the current CDL scheme, and was unique to 
California.  
Further, a subsequent critique of the study by Northbridge Environmental 
Consultants (2002) concluded that the study ignored a significant proportion of 
administrative, collection, and processing costs of the scheme. According to the 
critique, this resulted in an underestimation of the operating costs of the Californian 
CDL program by over 30 per cent. Northbridge Environmental Consultants (2002) 
also suggested that the low cost of Californian CDL was partly attributable to the 
narrow range of containers that were originally targeted. It argued that when the 
program expanded to cover non-carbonated beverage containers in 2000 (a change 
not analysed in the Beck report), program costs increased significantly.  
The Boomerang Alliance (sub. 54) also argued that new technology, particularly the 
use of reverse vending machines, could significantly reduce the costs of container 
recovery. Reverse vending machines are commonly used in most European 
                                              
6  The original report by Nolan-ITU (EPA Victoria 2003) estimated the costs to be significantly 
greater, but contained a significant error in methodology in valuing unredeemed deposits by 
households as a net economic cost.     




countries that have CDL. Using such machines to collect and process container 
returns would reduce labour costs.  
Beck (2001) found that the operating costs of CDL (excluding household costs) in 
US states that utilised reverse vending machines were nearly 40 per cent lower than 
the cost of traditional CDL schemes. However, Northbridge Environmental 
Consultants (2002) concluded that the study ignored the costs of space occupied by 
reverse vending machines and the returned containers, as well as the labour costs 
involved in emptying the machines. This resulted in the true operating costs 
(excluding household costs) being underestimated by over 20 per cent. 
A study of the impacts of implementing CDL in the ACT estimated that the capital 
and operating costs of running CDL using reverse vending machines were 
comparable to the cost of running the ACT kerbside recycling system (Centre for 
Environmental Solutions 2002).  
Cost-effectiveness in achieving resource recovery and litter objectives 
A number of studies have found that, while CDL increased resource recovery, costs 
were higher than for kerbside recycling. The cost of sorting and counting containers 
under CDL makes it a more expensive method of resource recovery (Phillip Hudson 
Consulting 2000). 
Beck (2001) compared the cost-effectiveness of CDL in achieving resource 
recovery to other instruments across all US states. He found that the states that 
introduced CDL recovered 490 containers per person, while the states without CDL 
recovered 191 containers per person. The average cost of increasing the recovery 
rate through CDL, net of the value of recovered materials, was 1.71 US cents per 
container. Porter interpreted these numbers to mean that recovering one tonne of 
beverage containers would have a net financial cost of US$889 (OECD 2004a). 
Beck’s separate estimates of net recovery costs for the Californian CDL scheme and 
CDL schemes utilising reverse vending machines were US$118 and US$293 per 
tonne respectively. However, if the additional costs of those schemes identified by 
Northbridge Environmental Consultants (2002) are included, net recovery costs 
would increase to US$275 per tonne for the Californian CDL scheme and US$510 
per tonne for CDL schemes that utilised reverse vending machines. 
Further, the costs included in those studies exclude the transport and labour costs of 
households, so the calculations are likely to significantly underestimate the costs of 
material recovery under CDL. 
The Perchards review of the report on the financial costs of implementing CDL in 
Victoria estimated the gross costs of recovering an additional tonne of beverage     




containers through CDL to be in the range of $1159 to $2219 (EPA Victoria 2003). 
This compared to the market price of used beverage containers that ranged between 
$72 per tonne for glass and $1100 per tonne for aluminium. 
A number of commentators have argued that CDL and kerbside recycling are rival 
schemes (OECD 2004a). To the extent that CDL would divert some materials from 
kerbside recovery, the economies of scale from kerbside collection of recyclables 
would be reduced. The PCA (sub. 67) argued that the economies of scale in 
kerbside collection are significant with two thirds of the total costs being fixed. The 
Australian Food and Grocery Council argued: 
Given the advanced development of waste management, recycling and litter 
management programs in Australia, the introduction of CDL would create an additional 
system that would undercut recycling programs by creating competing systems and 
increase the costs of implementing both approaches. (sub. 93, p. 18) 
Relatively little research exists on the cost-effectiveness of CDL as a litter control 
mechanism. The PCA (sub. 67) argued that litter is a behavioural problem not 
confined to a particular product in the litter stream. Consequently, it argued that 
policy instruments that targeted litter in general, rather than a small component of 
the litter stream, were likely to be more cost-effective. Litter count data from Keep 
Australia Beautiful (McGregor Tan Research 2006a) indicate that CDL in South 
Australia may only be affecting littering behaviour in relation to items that attract a 
refund. For example, the proportion of bottle tops (which are not required to be 
returned to receive a refund) in the litter stream in South Australia is the second 
highest of all states (McGregor Tan Research 2006a).  
In an interim review of the EC Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, 
Perchards commented: 
Given the extremely heterogeneous nature of litter, it is doubtful whether market 
restrictions, taxes or mandatory deposits on particular types of packaging will have 
much effect on the overall litter problem. Litter is a behavioural issue which needs to 
be addressed holistically … (2004, p. 153) 
Perchards further stated: 
It would be fairer, and more effective, to take measures that tackle all of litter, not just a 
small proportion. (p. 154) 
A study by Syrek (2003) concluded that CDL was a very costly litter control 
mechanism in the United States. It found that without CDL only 1 in 164 containers 
sold ended up in the litter stream. The cost of receiving and processing 164 
containers (US$3.42) was spent on controlling one item of container litter. In 
comparison, Syrek estimated that targeted advertising cost US 1.3 cents to eliminate     




one item of litter, comprehensive programs aimed at preventing litter cost 
US 14.2 cents, and litter pick-up programs cost US$1.41 per item of litter.  
Conclusions on CDL 
The case for introducing CDL in addition to existing kerbside collection schemes on 
resource recovery grounds is weak. CDL achieves improved recovery of beverage 
containers. However, it does so at the cost of introducing an additional collection 
system that competes with existing kerbside collection schemes for resources, and is 
likely to reduce the economies of scale of kerbside collection. Resource recovery 
under CDL is also likely to be significantly more costly than under kerbside 
recycling.  
With regard to litter reduction, CDL reduces beverage container litter, but there is 
little evidence that it affects other littering behaviour. The litter-reduction benefits 
(measured as reduced costs of litter collection) are likely to be marginal. This is due 
to the fact that beverage containers make up a relatively small component of the 
litter stream and most of the litter collection costs are fixed. The costs of achieving 
the benefits are likely to be high. CDL does not target the littering behaviour 
directly nor, by focusing on one component of the litter stream, does it do so 
comprehensively. 
The high operating costs typically associated with CDL suggest that the benefits of 
a consumer deposit-refund scheme would need to be very substantial to justify its 
implementation. Thus, a deposit-refund scheme might only be warranted for 
products with a disproportionately high cost of illegal disposal. 
Deposit-refund schemes are typically costly and would only be justified for products 
that have a very high cost of illegal disposal. Container deposit legislation is 
unlikely to be the most cost-effective mechanism for achieving its objectives of 
recovering resources and reducing litter. Kerbside recycling is a less costly option 
for recovering resources, while general anti-litter programs are likely to be a more 
cost-effective way of pursuing overall litter reduction. 
9.5 Subsidies 
Subsidy schemes have been a popular instrument in waste management policy in all 
Australian states. A subsidy can result in a net community benefit if it internalises 
FINDING 9.3     




the external benefit of a particular activity. To do that, a subsidy would need to be 
set to equal the external benefit (or the external costs avoided) of the action. 
In waste management policy, subsidies could be used to reduce the negative 
externalities of waste disposal and littering, or to assist actions that generate positive 
externalities in knowledge or information dissemination. Financial assistance for 
research and development, or for projects with significant demonstration effects, 
may fit within this category.  
Subsidising diversion of waste from landfills 
Subsidising kerbside recycling 
Kerbside recycling schemes are run in all states and are often subsidised by state 
governments. For example, the Victorian Best Practice Kerbside Recycling Program 
provided grants to local governments to adopt a recycling system with particular 
configurations of recycling bins (box 9.4). In South Australia, the Kerbside 
Performance Incentives scheme provides assistance for local governments that 
introduce or upgrade kerbside recycling systems. A further three programs are run 
in South Australia to distribute financial grants for the establishment and upgrade of 
infrastructure for resource recovery. The WA Government runs a Resource Rebate 
Recovery scheme that subsidises local government collection of recyclables from 
households. 
 
Box 9.4  Subsidies for kerbside recycling in Victoria 
The Best Practice Kerbside Recycling Program has operated in Victoria since 2000, by 
providing grants to local governments for adopting a particular kerbside recycling 
system. The requirements placed on local governments include providing specific 
recycling bin configurations to households and employing contractors accredited by 
EcoRecycle Victoria. Since the program’s inception, over $9 million has been allocated 
to 34 local governments. 
A review of the program in 2002 showed that recycling yields in local governments that 
received the subsidy increased by 20 per cent for a 9 per cent increase in the cost of 
collection. 
Source: EcoRecycle Victoria (2002, 2005a).   
Kerbside recycling can be associated with a number of benefits. These include, for 
some products and regions, the financial benefits of recycling and a possible 
reduction in illegal disposal. Kerbside recycling may also have some upstream     




environmental benefits. However, as argued in chapter 5, these could be more 
effectively and efficiently tackled through direct upstream instruments.  
To maximise their benefit to the community, subsidies should be linked to the value 
of the externalities from the subsidised activity. There appears to have been little 
explicit effort made to set subsidies in this way, and little evaluation of existing 
subsidy programs.  
The one evaluation that has come to the Commission’s attention — that of the 
Victorian Best Practice Kerbside Recycling program (EcoRecycle   
Victoria 2002) — referred to net community benefit in the context of the Nolan-ITU 
and SKM Economics (2001) study of kerbside recycling. However, the Commission 
considers that study to have significantly overstated the benefits of kerbside 
recycling (chapter 4). 
Earlier discussion in this report (chapter 4) concluded that the avoided landfill 
externalities from kerbside recycling (the major policy-relevant externality in 
subsidising recycling) are small, because kerbside recyclables are typically inert. 
Thus, the net benefit to the community of subsidising kerbside recycling may not be 
great, particularly in view of the administrative costs that a subsidy scheme would 
entail. 
Subsidising alternative waste technology facilities  
The private costs of waste disposal using alternative waste technologies are 
significantly higher than those of landfill disposal (chapter 4). Several participants 
(for example, WMAA, New South Wales, AWT Working Group, sub.  30) 
suggested that governments should subsidise alternative waste technology (AWT) 
facilities to encourage diversion of waste disposal from landfills. SITA 
Environmental Solutions (sub. 42) estimated that a subsidy of $53 million 
per  annum was required for AWT infrastructure to achieve NSW Government 
targets on reducing landfill disposal of municipal solid waste. 
Consolidated data on current levels of direct and indirect financial assistance 
provided to AWT facilities are generally unavailable. Assistance is provided from a 
variety of sources and in a number of forms. In some cases assistance may be 
substantial. For example, examination of local government documents relating to 
the establishment of an AWT facility in the Western Region of Melbourne (Melton 
Shire Council 2006) shows that the following government grants are anticipated: 
•  $2 million from the Sustainability Victoria Renewable Energy Support Fund 
•  $6 per tonne subsidy for green organics from Sustainability Victoria     




•  $21 million from the Victorian Sustainability Fund. 
The signatories to the agreement estimated that the above grants would reduce the 
cost of waste disposal to the new facility from $81 to $55 per tonne for the first five 
years of its operation (although, in the absence of significant landfill levy increases, 
landfill disposal was still expected to be a less costly option) (Melton Shire Council 
2006).  
In addition to direct subsidies, AWT operators are indirectly subsidised by the 
setting of levies on landfill disposal. As discussed earlier, some jurisdictions (in 
particular, New South Wales) use levies as a means of improving the 
competitiveness of other disposal and resource recovery options. SITA 
Environmental Solutions (sub. 42) suggested a high landfill levy could effectively 
replace direct financial assistance to AWT operators. 
However, providing financial and other forms of assistance to AWT operators to 
achieve particular landfill diversion targets, is unlikely to result in the most 
beneficial outcomes for the community (chapter 7). In theory, subsidies to 
encourage establishment of AWT facilities to replace the existing methods of 
disposal may be warranted to the extent this would create external benefits for the 
community. The size of the subsidies should reflect the size of those benefits. 
However, the external benefits of an AWT facility over a properly located, 
engineered and managed landfill that incorporated a gas management system with 
electricity generation, are likely to be small (chapter 4). This means that a subsidy 
reflecting the true external benefits of an AWT is unlikely to bridge the cost 
differential between AWTs and compliant landfills. Thus the Commission sees little 
justification for applying subsidy schemes to AWT facilities. 
Subsidising recyclers directly  
Some government programs provide financial assistance to recyclers. For example, 
the Product Stewardship for Oil Program distributes the funds collected from an 
ARF to recyclers. The size of the subsidy varies for different end-products. The 
subsidy differential is based on an assessment of the level of incentive required to 
encourage a particular recycling activity, as well as a view that recycling to recreate 
a refined grade of oil (‘lube-to-lube’) is the most desirable outcome. The largest 
subsidy paid for re-refined base oil is, at 50 cents per litre, five times greater than 
the second largest subsidy. DEH (sub. DR214) stated that this reflected the level of 
incentive required to develop a re-refining industry, when no markets existed for the 
product. The proposed national scheme for tyres would also distribute the funds 
collected from an advance fee to recyclers (JWGT 2005).     




The Victorian Market Development program provided funds to a wide range of 
industry projects that used recycled materials, or increased recovery rates of 
recyclables (box 9.5). 
 
Box 9.5  Examples of projects supported by the Victorian Market 
Development program 
•  Recycled Plastic Pipes Pty Ltd — a subsidy was given to a company that produced 
irrigation pipes from kerbside recycled plastic bottles. The subsidy was used to 
develop a prototype sintering/casting machine to produce the pipes. 
•  Visy Recycling — a subsidy was given to Visy Recycling to develop sorting and 
recovery technologies for PET bottles, and to assess the impact of incorporating 
high performance PET barrier bottles into conventional collection and recovery 
systems.  
•  Rofin Pty Ltd — a subsidy was given to a company producing optical equipment for 
sorting kerbside plastics. The funding was used to test the sorting equipment in a 
materials recovery facility.  
Source: EcoRecycle Victoria (2005c).   
The grounds for subsidising recyclers directly are, in principle, similar to those for 
subsidising kerbside recycling. Again, it is important that the subsidy is linked to 
the right objective. It is unclear that this has always been the case. For example, the 
decision to heavily subsidise lube-to-lube recycling under the Product Stewardship 
for Oil Program appears to have been driven partly by waste hierarchy-suggested 
priorities, and partly by the objective of assisting an infant industry. Similar 
objectives may have driven parts of the Victorian Market Development program. 
This approach is unlikely to produce net benefits to the community. Subsidising 
recyclers on the basis of the incentive required to encourage the recycling activity 
uses the wrong criterion to determine the level of assistance, and is also unlikely to 
generate efficient results. The size of the subsidy should be guided by the policy-
relevant externalities. 
Another important consideration is cost-effectiveness. In order to ensure that the 
projects with the greatest community benefit are chosen, it is essential to have 
contestability in subsidy allocation. This could be done by choosing projects 
through a tender scheme. The tender criteria should be clear, transparent and based 
on the net benefit of the project. 
Incentives for purchasing goods with minimum recycled content 
Some participants (for example, WMAA, Compost Australia Division, sub. 55) also 
advocated the use of financial incentives for consumers to purchase products with     




recycled content. One example was the sales tax exemption for 100  per cent 
recycled paper products that operated in Australia from 1990 to 1995. More 
recently, the WA Government (2005c) proposed to introduce a scheme of rebates 
for purchases of products with a minimum level of recycled content. 
The Commission does not support this type of policy. First, subsidies for the 
purchase of goods with recycled content are an indirect instrument, relying on a 
strong connection between the sale of a recycled content product, and some positive 
environmental externality. However, this link is not always present. For example, if 
the product or the recycled materials used in its manufacture were imported, the 
rebate would effectively be subsidising the activities of overseas recyclers, meaning 
that little, if any benefit, would accrue to Australia. 
Second, such subsidies would be likely to create market distortions. Implementing a 
sliding scale of incentives for products with different levels of recycled content is 
likely to be administratively expensive, and the only practical option may be to set a 
single threshold that would trigger a rebate or a discount.  
Third, monitoring of compliance by manufacturers is likely to be difficult because 
of information asymmetries between governments and producers, and the clear 
incentive for producers to misrepresent the nature of their product. The monitoring 
costs are likely to be particularly high in markets with many small producers and/or 
a significant proportion of imports. 
In assessing the sales tax exemption on recycled paper in Australia, the Industry 
Commission (IC 1991) recommended its abolition, largely on the above grounds. 
The Commission considers that, where assistance for recycling is likely to result in 
a net benefit to the community, subsidies that directly target the relevant recycling 
activity should be preferred over provision of incentives for purchasing goods with 
recycled content. 
Subsidising R&D and demonstration projects 
Australian governments currently operate a framework of general policies 
supporting research and development (R&D) that include maintaining an 
intellectual property rights system, tax concessions, competitive grants, and 
concessional loans for R&D. 
In addition, a number of states provide financial incentives specifically for research 
into waste management. For example, New South Wales operates the 
Environmental Trust to distribute grants to research projects on topics that can 
include waste management. In South Australia, the Research and Market     




Development Incentives Scheme distributes financial assistance to research projects 
that focus on promoting markets for recyclable materials. In Victoria, the EPA 
Sustainability Fund provides grants for innovative projects that improve 
sustainability (including through reduced waste generation). In addition, some of 
the grants distributed under the Victorian Market Development scheme appear to 
have been motivated by the objective of generating demonstration effects for 
industry. 
The Australian Government has also supported waste management R&D through 
the Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Waste and Pollution Control that 
operated between 1991 and 2002 (box 9.6). In addition, a CRC for Contamination 
Assessment and Remediation of the Environment was established in 2006. The 
CRC will produce research on various aspects of environmental contamination 
including: risk-based assessment of contamination costs; development of 
technologies to prevent and remediate contamination; and analysis of the associated 
social, economic, political and legal issues (CRC CARE 2006). 
When the benefits of research can be sufficiently appropriated by those undertaking 
it, the need for government assistance is reduced. A significant volume of private 
research in waste management is done by firms for that reason. However, some of 
the benefits arising from research cannot be fully appropriated by those undertaking 
it. To the extent that this may discourage socially beneficial research, there may be 
a role for government subsidising the activity.7 The assistance should be linked to 
the value of the external benefits.  
The rationale for subsidising demonstration projects is similar to that of subsidising 
R&D. Industry projects generating significant external demonstration effects may 
be underprovided by private firms because those undertaking the project cannot 
appropriate its full benefit. However, when there are significant private incentives to 
engage in projects that inevitably, though unintentionally, create a demonstration 
effect, the case for government assistance would be weak.  
                                              
7  There is also a case for providing government assistance to research aimed at informing policy 
makers. The Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (sub. 70, p. 17) observed that 
currently there is an over-reliance on ‘overseas research, with little investigation of its 
applicability to Australia’s circumstances — our geology, hydrology, soils, and climate’. The 
WMAA, Queensland Division (sub. 91) suggested that governments should support applied 
research into the cultural and social barriers impeding the uptake by Australian consumers of 
products made from recycled materials. The Commission has also identified a need for 
governments to provide or assist research into the effect of current regulations on the external 
costs of landfill disposal (chapter 8).     





Box 9.6  Cooperative Research Centre for Waste and Pollution Control 
The Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Waste and Pollution Control operated 
between 1991 and 2002. 
The CRC engaged in research on life-cycle assessment and impact analysis, waste 
management systems, biological water treatment and toxic waste immobilisation. 
Research priorities were determined collaboratively by waste facility operators, 
regulators and industry participants in the program. Input was also received from 
several Australian universities and government laboratories that also undertook some 
of the applied research. Over the life of the program, the Australian Government 
invested $45 million in the CRC’s research and development projects. In 1992, a 
private company — Waste Technologies of Australia — was established as the 
commercialisation arm of the CRC. The company was subsequently sold to Zeolite 
Australia Pty Ltd — an environmental technology company — for $20 million. 
Source: Waste Technologies of Australia (2002).   
Evidence on the performance of the above schemes is scarce. The DEH (sub. 103) 
argued that demonstration projects for industry were generally a relatively 
ineffective instrument in environmental policy. The DEH attributed this to (among 
other things): 
•  the incentive for those hosting the demonstration project to retain the 
competitive advantage and hinder the diffusion of information; and 
•  the generally slow rate of diffusion of information on demonstrated best 
practices due to organisational barriers within and between firms. 
However, the Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (sub. 70) argued 
that in some cases subsidising demonstration projects could create a benefit to the 
community. For example, it suggested that demonstration projects to disseminate 
information about the benefits and potential uses of compost, would assist the 
development of the market for compost. 
No formal evaluations of the CRC for Waste and Pollution Control were 
undertaken. However, a general evaluation of all CRC programs noted that the CRC 
for Waste and Pollution Control was one of the most effective among the 
environmental CRC’s in terms of generating international patents (Howard 
Partners 2003). Various press releases issued over the life of the CRC (for example 
CSIRO 1998) also claim that a number of commercially profitable research projects 
were undertaken. This suggests that the CRC may have been privately cost-
effective, although it would be difficult to assess whether government subsidies 
resulted in a net benefit to the community. When research output can be protected 
through the patenting system, and the research is privately cost effective, there is 
generally no case for governments to further intervene.     




The Commission considers that there may be a case for provision of government 
assistance in R&D and demonstration projects in waste management. Assessment 
criteria for allocating funding should be based on whether the projects are likely to 
result in a net benefit to the community, and whether government assistance is 
necessary for the projects to be undertaken.  
However, it is unclear why R&D assistance programs that focus specifically on 
waste management are required in addition to the general forms of R&D assistance 
currently provided by the Australian, state and territory governments. Subsidising 
R&D and demonstration projects in waste management through a broad R&D 
competitive grants scheme may be a more effective and efficient way of addressing 
the relevant market failures. First, this approach is more likely to result in a 
consistent allocation of funds across different fields of R&D. Second, this approach 
may be less costly for governments, due to economies of scale from administering a 
uniform R&D policy regime. Finally, this approach would minimise the potential 
for ‘double dipping’. Having assistance programs that focus specifically on waste 
management R&D and demonstration projects would only be warranted if those 
activities resulted in benefits that could not be adequately considered within a broad 
assistance scheme.  
9.6  Tradeable property rights 
Tradeable property right (TPR) mechanisms in environment policy work by setting 
a quota on the aggregate level of a particular activity, and allocating tradeable 
property rights to shares of that quota to those undertaking the activity.  
One prominent example of a TPR mechanism is the Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading Scheme that has emerged in Europe as a result of the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by European Union Member States. However, this type of 
instrument is relatively new in waste management policy. Two schemes are 
currently in operation, both in the United Kingdom.  
The Packaging Waste Recovery Notes (PRN) mechanism has operated in the United 
Kingdom since 1997, as part of the EC Directive on Packaging and Packaging 
Waste. Under the scheme, manufacturers with a turnover greater than £2 million 
and handling over 50 tonnes of packaging per annum are obliged to pay for 
recovery and recycling of a certain quantity of packaging waste. This can be done 
by purchasing volume-based packaging waste recovery notes from approved 
domestic recyclers, or by purchasing equivalent certificates from overseas recyclers. 
The UK Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) commenced in 2005. The 
scheme sets a cap on the total volume of biodegradable municipal waste sent to     




landfill. Entitlements to a share of the total cap are allocated to local government 
bodies responsible for handling municipal waste. Trading in entitlements between 
these government bodies is permitted under the scheme (box 9.7). 
 
Box 9.7  UK Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme 
The UK Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme commenced in April 2005, as part of the 
implementation of the EC Landfill Directive. The Directive set targets for the total 
volume of landfilled biodegradable waste (relative to its 1995 level) of 75 per cent by 
2010, 50 per cent by 2013, and 35 per cent by 2020.  
Under the scheme, landfill allowances have been allocated to waste disposal 
authorities on the basis of historic landfill volumes. Allowances can be traded, and the 
government operates a web-based bulletin board to facilitate the transactions. 
Authorities are permitted to ‘bank’ any surplus entitlements for future use, but not in 
target years. A credit of five per cent of entitlements out of next year’s allowance is also 
permitted, but not in target years. The penalty for non-compliance is fixed at 
£150 per tonne. There are no other constraints on the price of entitlements. 
Source: DEFRA (2006).   
Advantages of using tradeable property right instruments  
Greater certainty of achieving targets 
A key feature of mechanisms, such as the LATS and the PRN scheme, is the 
imposition of a cap on activities like landfill disposal or recycling. If this cap is 
underpinned by adequate monitoring of compliance and severe penalties for 
non-compliance (£150 per tonne under LATS, for example), TPRs would 
effectively guarantee that the target is reached.  
Experience with the PRN scheme indicates that it has achieved a substantial 
increase in recovery rates of packaging materials. Recovery rates rose from 
27 per cent in 1997 to over 55 per cent in 2004, and are likely to be close to meeting 
the 2006 target of 66 per cent.  
This contrasts with financial incentive mechanisms that are commonly criticised for 
their inherent uncertainty in achieving particular targets, such as tonnes of landfill 
disposal or recycling.     




Cost-effectiveness in achieving targets 
The tradeable aspect of TPR instruments increases the likelihood that the target 
would be achieved at the lowest cost, particularly if the market has many 
participants and the costs of trading are low. In the case of LATS, those for whom 
diversion from landfill is relatively costly have an incentive to purchase additional 
entitlements from those for whom diversion is less costly. Thus, actual diversion 
should be undertaken at the lowest available cost. Government provision of a 
web-based bulletin board to facilitate trading improves the cost-effectiveness of the 
scheme by reducing transaction costs. 
In addition, allowing the banking and crediting of allowances between periods, as 
was done in the LATS, provides flexibility that should help to reduce compliance 
costs over the longer term. 
Allowing trading in property rights under a quantity cap offers advantages in 
cost-effectiveness over instruments that set simple prescriptive targets. A study by 
researchers at the Technical University of Berlin concluded that the UK PRN 
scheme allowed the United Kingdom to achieve EU targets on recovery of 
packaging waste at a significantly lower cost than that of the German Green Dot 
System (Ewers, Tegner and Shatz  2002, quoted in Letsrecycle.com 2002). The 
study found that the tradeable property right aspect of the PRN scheme was one of 
the reasons for this outcome. It is generally accepted that the compliance costs of 
the PRN scheme are lower than those of instruments that aim to achieve the target 
by allocating fixed non-tradeable quotas to the parties (McGlade 2004).  
Disadvantages of using tradeable property right instruments 
Efficiency depends on the ability to set correct targets 
While TPR instruments may lead to the achievement of particular targets at the least 
cost, implementing a waste TPR scheme that results in a net benefit to the 
community would be extremely difficult. The efficiency of TPR mechanisms 
depends on the ability of governments to set appropriate targets. Setting optimal 
waste disposal or resource recovery targets is very difficult because of fundamental 
uncertainties about the costs and benefits of reaching those targets (chapter 7). 
Further, the external costs of waste disposal vary depending on the location of 
disposal, type of waste and type of landfill facility and it would be difficult to 
reflect this variability in a broad waste disposal or resource recovery target.     




Australian experience on the use of targets in waste management policy indicates 
that targets have generally not been underpinned by adequate consideration of the 
costs and benefits of achieving them (chapter 7). In the case of the LATS and PRN 
schemes, the targets were set to comply with EU legislation rather than any   
cost–benefit assessments. 
Setting a hard target without considering the associated costs and benefits could 
impose substantial costs on the community (even if the tradeable aspect of the TPR 
mechanism allows to minimise those costs for the given target). Compliance costs 
under the PRN scheme and the LATS appear to be significant. Harding (2005) 
reported that, between 1999 and 2003, the total value of packaging waste recovery 
notes purchased by UK manufacturers was £300 million, and that administrative 
costs incurred by firms to comply with the scheme would have been more than this. 
The prices of entitlements under the UK LATS are kept confidential. However, 
prior to the introduction of the scheme, the UK Local Government Association 
(2004) estimated that the price of allowances would reach £100 per tonne. 
The difficulties in setting an efficient target, and the potentially high cost of setting 
the wrong target, suggest it might be better to use ‘soft’ quotas. Having low 
penalties for underachieving the target, or releasing new entitlements into the 
market once a particular price ceiling is reached, would reduce the risk of imposing 
high compliance costs. However, the BDA Group and EconSearch (2004, p. 79) 
noted that this would essentially transform the TPR into a financial incentive 
mechanism with little benefit over existing levy approaches. 
Potentially high implementation and administration costs 
Development and implementation of a tradeable property rights instrument could 
require significant additional government expenditure. The BDA Group and 
McLennan Magasanic Associates (2003) presented case studies on introducing a 
tradeable certificate scheme and a tradeable landfill allowance scheme in Australia. 
It concluded that administrative costs were likely to be greater than for financial 
incentive mechanisms. For example, in the case of a tradeable certificate scheme 
similar to the PRN scheme they stated: 
The regulator would have a number of responsibilities including calculating the 
certificate liability, accrediting recyclers, creating and registering certificates, 
registering certificate sales, monitoring and auditing compliance, reporting on the 
system, setting penalty levels, invoking penalties and receiving surrendered certificates. 
There would need to be sound certification, tracking, auditing and reporting systems. 
(BDA Group and McLennan Magasanic Associates 2003, pp. 57-58)     




To the extent that the costs of compliance are not controlled and may be greater in 
tradeable property right instruments, the incentives for illegal disposal and rorting 
of the scheme would also be greater. The BDA Group and McLennan Magasanic 
Associates (2003) noted that illegal dumping was a major policy concern in 
considering a tradeable landfill allowance scheme. A recent investigation into the 
UK PRN scheme (DEFRA 2004) found that some reprocessors and recyclers were 
incorrectly issuing compliance documentation that made it appear that they were 
recycling more packaging waste than they were. Thus, around 10 per cent of notes 
for plastic packaging waste were issued illegally in 2002 and 20 per cent in 2003. 
It is currently not clear what purpose tradeable property rights mechanisms would 
serve in Australian waste policy. Such mechanisms can be useful means of 
achieving targets cost effectively. However, developing meaningful waste disposal 
and resource recovery targets is practically impossible, and enforcing arbitrary 
targets can impose large costs on the community.  
 
FINDING 9.4     
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•  Governments have urged industries to introduce extended producer responsibility or 
product stewardship schemes for numerous products. 
•  Such pressure has already led to various schemes — such as for packaging and 
mobile phones — and detailed proposals for others, including computers, 
televisions and tyres. 
•  Governments plan to encourage industries to develop more schemes by introducing 
a national system of regulation that prevents any firm from ‘free riding’ on the efforts 
of others. 
•  It is doubtful such a mandatory approach is justified for some of the products 
targeted by governments because: 
–  the benefit from curtailing waste from the targeted products may be relatively small; 
and 
–  mandatory arrangements tend to be costly, particularly when there are many firms 
in the industry that can rapidly enter and exit the market, and it is difficult to 
measure and enforce compliance. 
•  Case studies of existing and foreshadowed schemes show that governments have 
participated in — and sometimes demanded — the development of schemes 
without first providing a thoroughly-researched and clearly-articulated case for such 
intervention. 
•  To deal with this problem, the Commission recommends two reforms: 
–  objectives should be reformulated to focus on reducing to acceptable levels the 
risks to human health, the environment and social amenity from waste (objects that 
detract from this focus, such as those relating to resource conservation and 
upstream environmental protection, should be removed); and 
–  introduce a requirement that, before intervening, policy makers consider the findings 
of an independent review of scientific evidence on a product’s alleged 
environmental and public health impacts, and a preliminary assessment of the likely 
costs and benefits of intervening. 
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In recent years, the focus of waste management policy has expanded beyond waste 
disposal to also include waste avoidance and materials recovery (chapter 3).  
This shift has led to a new generation of policies that target those not directly 
involved in waste disposal. The broad concept underlying such policies has come to 
be known as either: 
•  extended producer responsibility (EPR), when the focus is on changing producer 
behaviour; or 
•  product stewardship (PS), when a wider range of parties are targeted. 
This chapter reviews the case for EPR and PS, outlines how they are implemented, 
considers when their use is appropriate, and evaluates specific Australian examples. 
10.1  What are EPR and PS? 
Swedish academic Thomas Lindhqvist devised the term EPR in the early 1990s 
(AFGC 2003; Lindhqvist 2000; ISF 2001). While Lindhqvist and others 
subsequently worked on clarifying its meaning, the most widely accepted definition 
of EPR now appears to be one developed by the OECD:  
OECD defines EPR as an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s 
responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life 
cycle. There are two related features of EPR policy: 
1.  the shifting of responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully or partially) 
upstream toward the producer and away from municipalities; and  
2.  to provide incentives to producers to incorporate environmental considerations in 
the design of their products. (OECD 2001a, p. 9) 
Thus, EPR is not a specific policy instrument, but rather a generic term for 
initiatives that make producers (at least partially) responsible for waste treatment 
and/or disposal of their products (Lindhqvist 2000; Tojo 2004). The responsibility 
assigned to producers does not have to be a requirement to physically take back 
products and process or dispose of them. Instead, producers could be made 
responsible for financing such activities by others. 
Many local governments favour EPR, possibly because it shifts (at least some of) 
the financial and/or physical responsibility for waste management from councils to 
producers (Local Government Association of South Australia, sub. 102; Local 
Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales, sub. 98;  Municipal 
Association of Victoria, sub. 113; WALGA 2004).     
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Others have questioned the efficiency of just targeting producers, given that many 
parties are involved in a product’s life cycle (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, sub. DR214; Packaging Council of Australia, sub. 67; National Packaging 
Covenant Industry Association, sub. 92; van Rijswijk 2001). This has led to interest 
in the broader concept of stewardship. 
There are many definitions of PS, but they are often vague statements about 
responsibility being shared among all parties. One of the more useful definitions 
was developed by the Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC), which 
defined PS as: 
An approach which recognises shared responsibility for the environmental impacts of a 
product throughout its full life cycle, including end of life management, and seeks to 
reduce adverse impacts and internalise unavoidable costs within the product price, 
through action at the point(s) in the supply chain where this can be most effectively and 
efficiently achieved. (EPHC 2004, p. 18) 
Thus, PS can be interpreted as targeting those who can most effectively and 
efficiently manage an environmental problem (Wright  2002).1 This raises the 
question of who are those parties. 
10.2  Why not just target final consumers? 
If there is a market failure associated with waste disposal, ideally this should be 
addressed by targeting final consumers, since they decide when a product is 
discarded and whether it is collected for recycling or reuse. Providing a signal 
directly to final consumers to curtail waste and recycle more should also feed into 
their purchasing decisions, and so encourage suppliers to provide goods with less 
end-of-life waste. 
This approach would be consistent with the property rights assigned to consumers 
when they buy products. Once a product is sold to a consumer, they become 
responsible for it (IC 1991). If product owners were not made responsible for their 
possessions, a potential source of market failure known as ‘split incentives’ could 
arise — when owners do not bear the full consequences of their actions, they have 
little incentive to dispose of waste appropriately. 
Nevertheless, many have argued that, in practice, just targeting final consumers is 
not an efficient or effective way of dealing with waste disposal (Calcott and 
                                              
1  A similar approach was advocated by the IC (1991). Namely, liability for waste disposal should 
rest where the costs to the community of disposal are lowest, rather than at an arbitrary stage in 
the production or consumption process.      
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Walls  2000; OECD 2001a, 2005a; Palmer and Walls 1999; Porter 2002; 
Walls 2003; Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. 103; Tasmanian 
Government, sub. DR164). They attribute this to the following sources of market 
failure: 
•  inability to set cost-reflective prices — it is not feasible to set disposal fees that 
vary between every single product according to its social cost of disposal, or pay 
for recyclable materials according to the value of the recoverable materials;  
•  imperfect information — consumers rarely know the likely end-of-life disposal 
cost or recycling benefit of goods they purchase, and so any signal sent to 
consumers to curtail waste may only be weakly transmitted upstream to 
suppliers; 
•  possibility of illegal dumping — it is difficult to make consumers always bear 
the total cost on the community of their waste disposal (by, for example, 
imposing a disposal fee) because it is relatively easy for them to illegally dump 
waste; and 
•  limited competition between producers — some have claimed that, even if a 
signal to curtail waste reaches producers, there may be few improvements in 
product designs, because producers face little competitive pressure to do so. 
Thus, there can be difficulties in getting price signals to final consumers and in 
relaying those signals to producers to encourage product design changes that reduce 
end-of-life waste.  
EPR and PS schemes are seen by their supporters as a way of overcoming such 
problems, because their effectiveness is less dependent on consumers changing their 
behaviour and on signals being transmitted through market transactions.  
However, an EPR or PS approach should only be adopted if it would deliver a net 
benefit, and other policy options would not provide a greater net benefit. The 
circumstances where this is more likely to occur are considered later in this chapter, 
after first outlining how EPR and PS schemes are implemented. 
10.3  Potential models for implementing EPR and PS 
There are many different ways in which the broad concepts of EPR and PS could be 
implemented. This section summarises the potential administrative structures and 
policy instruments that could be used.     
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Administrative structure 
There are four different models that can be used to structure an EPR or PS scheme: 
1.  voluntary industry initiative — firms participate on a voluntary basis and there is 
no direct government involvement (albeit there is often some coercion or strong 
encouragement); 
2.  voluntary industry–government agreement — both firms and governments are 
involved, but individual firms can choose not to participate; 
3.  industry–government co-regulation — a combination of industry self regulation 
and supporting government regulation, with the latter being used to ensure, 
among other things, no firm can ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others; and 
4.  government regulation — governments are solely responsible for setting and 
enforcing the rules. 
Australian examples of these different models are given in table 10.1. There are also 
many examples in other countries. European countries in particular have been 
pioneers in developing EPR and PS schemes (Palmer and Walls 2002). One of the 
earliest and most well known examples is an ordinance Germany introduced in the 
early 1990s requiring producers to take back and recycle used packaging 
(Muenk 2001). 
The self-regulation component of co-regulation is often described as voluntary (for 
example, National Packaging Covenant Industry Association, sub. 92; NPCC 2005). 
This is misleading, because the only other option for individual firms is to 
‘volunteer’ for government regulation. In addition, industries have often adopted 
self-regulation in response to government coercion, rather than on a voluntary basis 
(section 10.4). The Commission considers EPR and PS schemes to be mandatory 
when they are based on co-regulation, since parties cannot free ride. 
Voluntary versus mandatory approaches 
Some inquiry participants were concerned that voluntary EPR and PS schemes 
enable firms to free ride on the efforts of others (for example, Australian Tyre 
Recyclers Association, sub. 51). Similarly, some have questioned whether a 
voluntary approach is effective, given that firms are expected to voluntarily bear the 
cost of addressing a market failure without being able to capture the resulting 
benefits to society (for example, Palmer and Walls 2002; Department of the 
Environment and Heritage, sub. 103; Product Stewardship Australia and Consumer 
Electronics Suppliers Association, sub. 66).     
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Table 10.1  Australian examples of EPR and PS schemes, by administrative 
structure 
Administrative structure/product Scheme 
Voluntary industry initiatives 
Athletic shoes  Reuse-A-Shoea 
Office equipment  Cartridge Recycling Programb 
Voluntary industry–government agreements 
Mobile phones  MobileMusterc 
Newsprint National  Environmental Sustainability Plan (Newspapers)d 
PVC products (excluding packaging)  Product Stewardship Commitmente 
Chemical containers  DrumMusterf 
Rural chemicals  ChemClearf 
HDPE plastic bags  Code of Practice for the Management of Plastic Bagsg 
Industry–government co-regulation 
Consumer packaging  National Packaging Covenant and supporting regulationh 
Ozone-depleting refrigerants  Refrigerant Reclaimi 
Government regulation 
Oil  Product Stewardship for Oil programj 
Beverage containers (SA)  Container deposit legislationk 
a Operated by Nike Australia (2006) in conjunction with its US parent company. b Operated by Fuji Xerox. 
c  Operated by the Australian Mobile Telecommunication Association. This scheme was recently revised 
following government pressure to include firmer targets (DEC 2006b). d Developed by the Newsprint Producer 
and Publisher Group (2005) — comprising Norske Skog Australasia and the Publishers National Environment 
Bureau — and endorsed by governments through the EPHC. e Made by the Vinyl Council of Australia (2002). 
f Both DrumMuster and ChemClear are managed by Agsafe. g This code of practice operated from October 
2003 to December 2005 and was developed by the Australian Retailers’ Association (ARA 2003) in 
conjunction with the EPHC. h The National Packaging Covenant is the self-regulation component of the 
scheme and is managed by the National Packaging Covenant Council (NPCC 2005). Parties that do not adopt 
the Covenant must comply with the supporting regulation component of the scheme, which is specified in the 
National Environment Protection (Used Packaging Materials) Measure and is implemented by individual states 
and territories. i Managed by Refrigerant Reclaim Australia and underpinned by the Ozone Protection and 
Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989 (Cwlth). Individual firms can nominate an alternative to the 
Refrigerant Reclaim scheme, but so far none have done so. j Established under the Product Stewardship (Oil) 
Act 2000 (Cwlth) and other legislation, and is administered by the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage. k Prescribed in the Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA). 
However, the cost borne by firms in changing a product or how it is managed may 
be negligible in some cases. Recently, for example, a PET (polyethylene 
terephthalate) bottle was produced with a PVC (polyvinyl chloride) sleeve label 
which created contamination problems during recycling. It was comparatively easy 
for the label material to be changed to avoid this problem. Producers could overlook 
such opportunities, not because they are costly, but because markets do not send a 
clear price signal about the benefits to the community. A voluntary EPR or PS 
approach could prompt producers to take action in such cases. 
There are many examples of effective voluntary schemes, such as Fuji Xerox’s 
take-back scheme for photocopier cartridges, Nike’s Reuse-A-Shoe program for 
recycling athletic shoes into sporting surfaces, and the Cartridges-4-Planet-Ark     
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scheme sponsored by various printer manufacturers and retailers (OECD  2001a; 
Planet Ark 2005; Schwartz and Gattuso 2002). 
A major attraction of voluntary schemes is they tend to have lower administration 
and compliance costs than mandatory approaches. For example, voluntary schemes 
do not require the costly monitoring and enforcement measures associated with 
mandatory approaches. The typically lower cost of voluntary schemes could be 
important, since the potential benefit from reducing non-hazardous waste disposal 
may be small (chapter 4 and appendix B). 
If the external benefit from addressing a non-hazardous waste disposal problem is 
considerable, it may be unrealistic to expect firms to voluntarily bear the (possibly 
large) associated cost. In such rare cases, a mandatory approach — involving either 
industry–government co-regulation or government regulation — may be the most 
appropriate option, provided the associated cost does not exceed the benefit. Costs 
and benefits are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Policy instruments 
As noted previously, EPR and PS are broad principles rather than specific policy 
instruments. Indeed, there are many different policy instruments that could be used 
to turn the principles of EPR and PS into practice (examples are listed in box 10.1). 
Furthermore, a given EPR or PS scheme could use several of those instruments in 
combination to raise its efficiency and effectiveness (OECD 2001a). 
It is, therefore, difficult to make general statements about the policy instruments 
used in an EPR or PS scheme. However, a scheme will usually be based on one of 
the following (table 10.2 lists examples): 
•  take-back requirements 
•  deposit refunds 
•  product leases 
•  performance targets 
•  advance disposal or recycling fees. 
Mandatory take-back requirements in place overseas have proven to be very costly 
and not necessarily more effective than other policy options (chapter 8; National 
Packaging Covenant Industry Association, sub. 92). For example, the OECD (1998, 
p. 33) found that, under Germany’s take-back scheme for packaging (Green Dot), 
the cost of recycling a tonne of used packaging that would otherwise have gone to 
final disposal ‘effectively approach[ed] the costs of handling a tonne of hazardous     
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waste’. Take-back requirements are not widely used in Australia and nor should 
they be, given their high cost and questionable effectiveness. 
 
Box 10.1  Potential policy instruments for EPR and PS schemes 
The policy instruments that could be used for an EPR or PS scheme include: 
•  take-back requirements — producers are required to take their products back from 
final consumers for the purpose of resource recovery and/or disposal; 
•  product leases — consumers lease the product and must eventually return it to the 
producer so that materials recovery and recycling can be undertaken; 
•  advance disposal or recycling fees — a fee is levied on a new product to (at least 
partially) subsidise the cost of its future disposal or recycling; 
•  deposit refunds — consumers pay a deposit when they buy a product and this is 
refunded when the product is returned to an approved dealer or specialised 
treatment facility; 
•  tradeable recycling credits — producers must obtain a certain number of recycling 
credits for every product they supply, either by earning them through their own 
recycling efforts or by purchasing them from others who recycle; 
•  tradeable landfill diversion credits — producers must obtain a certain number of 
landfill diversion credits for every product they supply, either by earning them 
through their own efforts to divert waste from landfill or by purchasing credits from 
others who do so; 
•  education and awareness-raising — information provision on how to dispose of a 
product or participate in a specific EPR or PS scheme; 
•  labelling  — a product is labelled so that consumers have information on its 
environmental performance and/or how it can be recycled or disposed of;  
•  targets — producers must achieve specific outcomes, such as a minimum amount 
of recycled content per product; and/or 
•  compliance measures — such as penalties for non-compliance, bans on specific 
materials, and restrictions on disposal to landfill or a waste treatment facility. 
Source: Adapted from DEC (2004d). 
 
Similarly, deposit refund systems are rarely used in Australia and there is not a 
strong case for adopting them, particularly because they would tend to duplicate 
collection systems already operated by councils (chapter 9). 
Product leasing seems to be best suited to machine parts, like photocopier 
cartridges, that are replaced after short periods of service and are very cost effective 
to reuse. It also appears to be more relevant to voluntary schemes run by individual 
suppliers. Leasing has little relevance to products that are not suitable for reuse, 
such as most packaging. It also has limited applicability to consumer durables, like     
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televisions, since they are typically retained by householders to the point where 
obsolescence and general wear and tear means there is little scope for reuse.  
Table 10.2  Examples of EPR and PS schemes, by key policy instrument 
Key policy instrument /product  Scheme 
Take-back requirement 
Packaging (Germany)  Packaging ordinance 
Deposit refund 
Beverage containers (South Australia)  Container deposit legislation 
Product lease 
Office equipment  Fuji Xerox 
Performance target 
Consumer packaging (Australia)  National Packaging Covenant and supporting regulation 
HDPE plastic bags  Code of Practice for the Management of Plastic Bags 
Newsprint National  Environmental  Sustainability Plan (Newspapers) 
Advance disposal or recycling fee 
Oil  Product Stewardship for Oil program 
Mobile phones  MobileMuster 
Ozone-depleting refrigerants  Refrigerant Reclaim 
Rural chemicals  ChemClear 
Chemical containers  DrumMuster 
Performance targets specify the desired outcome but not how you get there. An 
advantage of this approach is that firms can use their in-house expertise to find the 
lowest-cost way of achieving the outcome. A major disadvantage is that targets are 
often arbitrary goals, set with little apparent consideration of the tradeoff between a 
target’s benefits and costs. An example of this problem — the National Packaging 
Covenant — is discussed later in this chapter. 
Advance disposal and recycling fees are popular policy instruments for EPR and PS 
schemes. Not only are they common among existing schemes (table 10.2), they are 
also expected to be the basis of forthcoming stewardship arrangements for 
televisions and tyres (JWGT 2005; Product Stewardship Australia and Consumer 
Electronics Suppliers Association, sub. 66; URS 2005). 
Ideally, an advance fee would be set so as to bridge the gap between the total cost to 
the community of disposal/recycling and the financial cost firms and consumers 
otherwise bear. Firms and consumers would then have a signal about the total cost 
of their actions. However, as noted in section 10.2, it may be difficult to implement 
such pricing signals. 
In practice, advance fees are usually set as a flat charge per product and are used to 
fund the financial (rather than the total) cost of disposal and recycling activities     
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firms have agreed to facilitate. Thus, an advance fee is often used in combination 
with a commitment to use a particular waste disposal method or to meet a specific 
recycling target. 
10.4  Recent policy developments 
In recent years, the NSW, Victorian and WA Governments have adopted generic 
policies that could be used to underpin co-regulation or government regulation for 
specific EPR or PS schemes.2 
To date, these generic policies have only been applied to a limited degree. However, 
their existence has been used to pressure numerous industries to introduce EPR or 
PS schemes. Most notably, governments have published lists of products for which 
they expect firms to take action. 
Government pressure on industries 
In 2004, the NSW Government identified 16 types of waste that it considered 
suitable for management by an EPR scheme (DEC 2004b). The WA 
Government (2004) noted this list was also a useful basis for its policies. 
The NSW Government has since revised its list of targeted products to cover 17 
products (table 10.3). Some of these are already subject to an EPR or PS scheme, 
but were listed because the Government considered the existing scheme ‘needs to 
more clearly demonstrate that it is delivering’ (DEC 2006b, p. 3). The NSW 
Government has given greatest priority to ensuring action on computers, mobile 
phones, office paper, paint, plastic bags, televisions and tyres. Similarly, the WA 
Government has given priority to polypropylene, paint, computers, tyres, concrete 
and mobile phones (WMB 2006). 
As part of its most recent announcement of priority products, the NSW Government 
judged what progress individual industries had made in establishing effective EPR 
arrangements (DEC 2006b).3 The statement warned the relevant industries they 
could be subject to government regulation in the future if they did not ‘deliver real 
results’. Various industry associations noted they were being pressured by the NSW 
                                              
2  In New South Wales, the policy was specified in the Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery 
Act 2001.  Victoria established its policy in 2001 by amending the Environment Protection 
Act 1970. Western Australia’s arrangements were announced in a policy statement in June 2005 
(WA Government 2005a) and further details were provided in a draft bill and explanatory notes 
in August 2006 (WA Government 2006a, 2006b). 
3  The NSW Government published a similar evaluation in 2004 (DEC 2004b).     
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Government (for example, Australasian Paper Industry Association, trans., p. 1049; 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association, trans., p. 1010). 
The WA Government (2006a) plans to take a similar approach. 
Table 10.3  Products targeted under the NSW Government’s EPR policy 
1. Agricultural/veterinary chemicals  10. Packaging 
2. Agricultural/veterinary chemical containers  11. Painta 
3. Batteries  12. Plastic bagsa 
4. Cigarette butts  13. Polyvinyl chloride 
5. Computersa  14. Televisionsa 
6. End-of-life vehicle residuals  15. Treated timber 
7. Mobile phonesa 16.  Tyresa 
8. Office papera  17. Used oils and lubricants 
9. Other electrical products 
a Identified by the NSW Government as a priority during 2006 because it considered the existing EPR scheme 
needs to more clearly demonstrate that it is delivering; or there is currently no EPR scheme and one is 
urgently needed due to high volumes of waste and/or low levels of recycling. 
Source: DEC (2006b). 
The Victorian Government  (2005) has indicated it wants to see stewardship 
arrangements established for televisions, computers and information-technology 
equipment, other electrical and electronic products, tyres, consumer packaging 
(including plastic bags), paint, mercury-containing lamps, batteries, motor vehicles, 
treated timber, and domestic chemicals and related packaging. 
Listing products of concern is not the only way in which governments have applied 
pressure to industries. Governments have, via the EPHC (2005a), publicly warned 
that regulation is an option for the computer industry if it fails to establish a 
self-regulation scheme that covers most computer waste. When the EPHC’s 
member governments decided that insufficient mobile phones were being collected 
under an existing take-back scheme, they ‘commenced negotiations’ with the 
mobile phone industry to strengthen it (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, sub. 103, p. 60). For plastic bags, the Australian Retailers’ Association 
noted it was subject to ‘strong government pressure’ prior to developing its code of 
practice (ARA 2006). 
Selection criteria used by governments 
The Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments have acknowledged that not 
every product is suitable for an EPR or  PS  scheme  (DEC 2004b, 2006b;     
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EPHC 2004;  WA Government 2005a). To help them identify which products to 
target, the Governments have developed selection criteria (box 10.2).4 
However, the Governments’ criteria tend to be unfocused and are potentially 
inconsistent. For example, the NSW Government lists community concern about a 
waste as one of its criteria, but such concern may not reflect the waste’s actual 
impact, which is another criterion used by the Government. There is little indication 
of the weight given to different criteria when such inconsistencies arise, or whether 
specific criteria take precedence over others. In addition, the NSW Government’s 
criteria seem to imply that waste avoidance and resource recovery always deliver a 
net benefit to the community (in particular, the third and fourth criteria listed in 
box 10.2). 
 
Box 10.2  Criteria that governments use for EPR and PS schemes 
The NSW Government has identified priority wastes for future EPR schemes based on: 
•  detrimental environmental and/or public health impacts resulting from the recovery 
and/or disposal of the product; 
•  total volume of the waste requiring disposal and/or the percentage of the waste 
stream it comprises; 
•  potential for waste avoidance, reuse or beneficial resource recovery; 
•  potential to contaminate waste streams and limit opportunities for resource 
recovery; 
•  likelihood of illegal disposal through dumping or littering; 
•  level of community concern about the waste; and 
•  extent to which EPR is the appropriate tool for managing the waste. 
The WA Government has also adopted these criteria, but with the extra condition that 
producers have the capacity to take action or to influence all of the supply chain. 
The Victorian Government has identified priority products for stewardship schemes on 
the basis of: 
•  quantities of waste disposed to landfill now and predictions for the future; 
•  adequacy of current systems for recycling; 
•  environmental impacts arising from disposal (including toxicity); 
 (Continued on next page) 
 
                                              
4  Box 10.2 mentions the EPHC’s threshold criteria for co-regulatory schemes. These should not 
be confused with the EPHC’s National Waste Framework (DEH, sub. 103, appendix E), which 
the Commission considers to be sound in most respects (chapter 6).     
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Box 10.2  (continued) 
•  cost to the community and recycling industry of managing discarded products and 
opportunities for improved management; 
•  adequacy of current systems not only for recycling, but also in managing 
environmental impacts from production through to consumption; 
•  environmental and health impacts (including toxicity) from disposal, as well as 
production and other stages of the life cycle; and 
•  existing federal and state jurisdictional priorities.  
The EPHC nominated eight ‘threshold criteria’ for PS schemes involving co-regulation. 
These included clearly-identified costs and benefits, commitment and participation by 
most firms in the industry, a national approach, and a clear case that regulation is 
needed to ensure the scheme is effective. 
Sources: DEC (2004b, 2004d, 2006b); EPHC (2004); EPR Expert Reference Group (2005); Victorian 
Government (2005); WA Government (2005a). 
 
 
A better approach would be for governments to focus on the following two 
requirements for any proposed EPR or PS scheme: 
•  it delivers a net benefit to the community 
•  other policy options would not provide a greater net benefit. 
The conditions under which an EPR or PS scheme is more likely to deliver a net 
benefit is considered in section 10.5 of this chapter.  
Governments’ preferred administrative structure 
Various governments have expressed a preference for co-regulation (DEC 2006b; 
Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. DR214; Victorian Government 
2005; WA Department of Environment, sub. 101; WA Government 2005a, 2005b). 
This may be because co-regulation is seen as more flexible and less costly than a 
system based solely on government regulation (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, sub. 103). In this regard, the Department of the Environment and Heritage 
(DEH) noted: 
While achieving a necessary environmental outcome, companies are free [under 
industry–government co-regulation] to choose the response that is most appropriate to 
their products and their businesses and the timing of particular initiatives. Flexible co-
regulatory schemes on matters of national significance are therefore likely to be more 
efficient for individual firms ... (sub. DR214, p. 12)     
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Major cost differences between co-regulation and government regulation are 
evident from European countries’ experiences with packaging waste. Germany’s 
regulation requiring producers to take back and recycle packaging is widely viewed 
as having been very costly, because it duplicates municipal collection and recycling 
systems (Hanisch 2000; Porter 2002; Schwartz and Gattuso 2002; Packaging 
Council of Australia, sub. 67). In contrast, the Government of the Netherlands 
negotiated a co-regulation approach with industry. The self-regulation component 
was implemented in 1991 as a packaging covenant between government and 
industry (OECD 2001a). This approach has been far less costly than the German 
regulation (Schwartz and Gattuso 2002). 
Governments might also prefer co-regulation because it enables some of the costs of 
administering a scheme to be transferred to industry. Furthermore, co-regulation 
might reduce industry resistance to having an EPR or PS scheme by creating the 
impression that firms designed it and volunteered to be subject to it. 
Proposed national approach 
The prospect of individual Australian states and territories introducing their own 
EPR or PS schemes has raised concerns about regulatory inconsistency between 
jurisdictions, given that many products are traded nationally. In addition, it is 
doubtful that individual states (or territories) could legally enforce some EPR and 
PS policy instruments, such as advance disposal fees and product take-back 
requirements, due to constitutional and other legal constraints (DEH, sub.  103; 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development, sub. 70; chapter 9). State (and 
Territory) Governments are therefore working together with the Commonwealth 
Government to develop a national approach that, like the state-based policies 
already in place, favours co-regulation. 
The proposed national approach would involve the introduction of general-purpose 
regulation — specified in a National Environment Protection Measure (NEPM) — 
that could be used as part of any co-regulatory scheme (EPHC 2005f). It is 
envisaged that product-specific schedules will be attached to the NEPM. Products 
under consideration for incorporation in the NEPM include computers, televisions 
and tyres (DEH, sub. 103).  
The EPHC (2006) has announced that a regulation impact statement (RIS) for the 
NEPM will be released in late 2006, as required under the regulatory principles 
adopted by COAG (2004). This would also be consistent with the recommendation 
of the Regulation Taskforce (2006) — which has been adopted by the Australian 
Government (2006) — that further analysis be undertaken to assess the merits of a 
generic product stewardship NEPM.     
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Various firms and industry associations have publicly supported national co-
regulation (for example, Australian Tyre Recyclers Association, sub. DR169; 
Canmakers Institute of Australia and the Steel Can Recycling Council, sub. 115; 
Joint Working Group Tyres, sub. 75; National Packaging Covenant Industry 
Association, sub. 92; Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association, sub. DR203). 
However, the Commission is concerned this may be largely because industries fear 
the apparent alternatives — a system of inconsistent state-based schemes or 
mandatory regulation over which they have less influence. The DEH conceded this 
had been a rationale for the National Packaging Covenant: 
The counterfactual position was that jurisdictions were determined to act to reduce 
packaging, so this would inevitably have risked an array of onerous, inefficient and 
inconsistent schemes.  
… many in industry prefer the National Packaging Covenant due to the national 
consistency it offers. (sub. DR214, pp. 8–13) 
Some of the industries targeted by governments have cited evidence suggesting an 
EPR or PS scheme is not justified for their product (section 10.6 provides 
examples). However, getting governments to consider such evidence is likely to be 
difficult for an industry, since it is often contrary to popular perceptions and can 
easily be dismissed as self-interested lobbying. In such circumstances, it is 
understandable that industries facing pressure from governments and environmental 
groups to introduce an EPR or PS scheme would conclude the ‘least-worst’ option 
is to support a national approach. Their support can then be presented to the public 
as a case of firms supporting a national scheme.  
The Commission, therefore, considers that industry support for an EPR or PS 
scheme has to be viewed in the context of the pressure applied to the industry, and 
public perceptions about its products. Some firms may also support an EPR or PS 
scheme because they believe their costs would increase by less than those of 
existing and potential competitors (discussed further in the next section). 
10.5  When is EPR or PS likely to deliver a net benefit? 
This section considers the potential benefits and costs from an EPR or PS scheme, 
and under what conditions there is likely to be a net benefit. To illustrate the points 
being made, the analysis draws on case studies of three Australian schemes — for 
newsprint, waste oil and consumer packaging — detailed in appendix C.     
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What are the benefits? 
The benefits resulting from an EPR or PS scheme will depend on two factors: 
•  the scale of the market failures being addressed 
•  how effective the scheme is in addressing those market failures. 
Scale of the market failures 
For many products, it appears unlikely that waste-related market failures impose a 
significant cost on the community (chapter 4 and appendix B). Thus, the potential 
benefit from an EPR or PS scheme is probably small in most cases.  
The Commission does not claim to have comprehensively reviewed scientific 
evidence on the impacts of products targeted for EPR and PS schemes. It is up to 
policy makers to demonstrate that a product has adverse environmental or public 
health impacts if they want to address such impacts with an EPR or PS scheme. To 
date, advocates of EPR and PS schemes have tended to highlight potential impacts 
in broad terms, with little specific evidence for Australia (discussed further in 
sections 10.6 and 10.7). In addition, they rarely explain why research results that do 
not support the case for government intervention can be dismissed. An example of 
such contrary research is provided by Planet Ark, which found the external cost 
from depositing computer equipment in Australian landfills is unlikely to be 
significant:5 
Planet Ark research has indicated that: 
•  Much of the concern regarding e-waste relates to its composition and the potential for 
materials making up these products to leach from landfill into the wider environment. 
•  While e-waste contains a variety of materials that are considered hazardous or 
potentially environmentally damaging — lead in CRT [cathode-ray tube] screens and 
solder, flame retardants in plastic and other metals and chemicals — their 
environmental impact in a landfill context depends on a wide range of factors, 
including the composition/scale of the remainder of the waste stream, the manner in 
which the landfill is managed (particularly leachate controls) and its design and 
construction. 
•  While computer CRT monitors contain substantial quantities of lead (between 0.5 and 
3 kilograms dependant on size), this is mostly contained within the glass structure and 
is not generally available to rapid extraction by leachate … 
•  In recent years greater attention has been paid to the location, design, construction and 
management of landfills (and leachate), which suggests that the potential for adverse 
                                              
5   Gattuso (2005) reached a similar conclusion for the United States, based on a review of 
scientific studies on the impacts of landfilling electronic equipment.     
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impact of computer and related equipment disposal has been reduced. (AIIA and Planet 
Ark 2005, p. 32) 
Planet Ark has also concluded that the test often used to demonstrate problems with 
landfilling cathode-ray tube (CRT) monitors is misleading:  
The test commonly used to determine leachability … involves crushing the glass to be 
tested into particles that can pass through a 9.5 millimetre sieve (and smaller), digesting 
this material with an acidic solvent and analysing it for lead. While a proportion of 
computer CRT monitors (and televisions) that have been landfilled are likely to be 
broken by compaction equipment, the glass is unlikely to be reduced to such small 
particle size. The relevance of this test method is therefore questioned, particularly as 
the rate of lead leaching into the landfill is critically dependent on the particle size of 
CRT glass — it is surface area dependent. (AIIA and Planet Ark 2005, p. 33) 
Nevertheless, the Victorian Government (2006) recently announced that it would 
make a pilot computer recycling trial in Melbourne — known as Byteback — 
permanent and, subject to assistance from the computer industry, expand the 
scheme across Melbourne and regional Victoria. 
To illustrate the potential for misguided EPR and PS schemes, Planet Ark noted the 
European Union’s directive for nickel cadmium (NiCad) batteries: 
The current debate regarding computer recycling brings to mind rationales provided for 
the recycling of NiCad batteries, again widely practiced in Europe under their Battery 
Directive. 
The most quoted reason relates to the toxic nature of cadmium and its ability to 
accumulate in the food chain. 
A study completed for the European Commission … states that the risks associated 
with the use/life cycle of NiCad batteries is extremely small: ‘Under the worst case 
scenarios, NiCad batteries contribute less than 1 per cent of the anthropogenic emission 
sources’ (the majority of the other 99 per cent comes from fertiliser — usually applied 
directly to crops, including food crops). (AIIA and Planet Ark 2005, p. 34) 
In Australia, a stewardship scheme for consumer packaging — the National 
Packaging Covenant and supporting regulation — applies to a product that does not 
appear to involve significant waste-related market failures. In particular, it is 
essentially a non-hazardous waste. There appears to be little evidence of a problem 
that justifies such an elaborate and costly scheme, other than that consumers receive 
little or no price signal about the cost of disposal (discussed further in section 10.6). 
In contrast, the potential payoff for some hazardous wastes could be significant. 
Indeed, some participants argued that EPR and PS schemes should be limited 
primarily to hazardous or difficult-to-manage products, because they are the only 
products where the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs (Australian Electrical     
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and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association, sub. 59; Australian Food and Grocery 
Council, sub. 93). 
An example of a potentially hazardous product is waste oil, which is subject to the 
Product Stewardship for Oil (PSO) Program (appendix C). This scheme addresses a 
clearly-identified and potentially-significant problem. Namely, market failures 
leading to the disposal of a hazardous product in a way that could have adverse 
impacts on human health and the environment (Allen Consulting Group  2004; 
DEH 2005e). 
Effectiveness in addressing market failures 
The effectiveness of an EPR or PS scheme will depend on the extent to which any 
resulting change in behaviour addresses the market failures. This will be a function 
of a range of factors, including the extent of non-participation or free riding; how 
important the Australian market is to producers; how orphaned and existing 
products are dealt with; the extent to which a scheme’s administration is centralised; 
and the ability to target the most appropriate parties. These factors are discussed 
below. 
Free riding 
Free riding by targeted firms is less likely if: 
•  the cost of participating in the scheme is low; 
•  the relevant firms can be readily identified and made accountable, and they will 
remain in the industry over the long term; 
•  it is easy to measure whether the desired changes in behaviour occur; and 
•  there is a readily enforceable deterrent to free riding, such as a financial penalty. 
An example of where free riding would be hard to prevent is personal computers. 
This product is often supplied by small businesses that can rapidly enter and exit the 
industry, making it difficult to detect and penalise non-compliance, and to prevent 
suppliers from leaving a legacy of ‘orphaned’ products for others to deal with.  
The NSW Government has estimated that up to 40 per cent of computers sold in 
Australia are ‘white-box’ (unbranded) products supplied by small businesses 
(DEC 2006b). Nevertheless, the NSW, Victorian and WA Governments have given 
priority to establishing stewardship schemes for computers (DEC 2006b; Victorian 
Government 2005;  WA Government 2004). The Australian Information Industry 
Association (AIIA) responded to such pressure in 2005 by proposing a stewardship     
 
EPR AND PS  277
 
scheme for the computers supplied by its members, but this was rejected by 
governments because it only covered about half of all computers sold in Australia 
(EPHC 2005a). The AIIA is now developing an alternative proposal that seeks to 
capture all producers (discussed further in section 10.6). 
In contrast, there are relatively few firms involved in producing or using newsprint 
for newspapers and magazines. In the early 1990s, those firms successfully 
negotiated between themselves to establish a stewardship scheme for newsprint that 
appears to be effective (appendix C). This scheme continues to operate, with an 
updated agreement made between the parties in October 2005 (Newsprint Producer 
and Publisher Group 2005). 
Relative importance of Australian market to producers 
One of the key benefits attributed to EPR and PS schemes is that they cause 
producers to shift to less wasteful product designs. However, this is unlikely to 
occur when Australia is a small market for the producer, as is the case for many 
manufactured goods. 
Thus, recent government efforts to establish stewardship schemes for computers and 
televisions — products that are mostly imported into Australia — may not lead to 
major changes in product designs.  
The DEH (sub. 103) acknowledged this constraint, but concluded Australian 
policies are more likely to be effective when similar EPR or PS schemes exist 
overseas. While it seems pointless for Australia to independently attempt to make 
policy in areas where it has little influence, there may be a role for Australian 
policies to complement those of other countries, if it limits the importation of highly 
problematic or difficult to recycle products. 
Orphaned and existing products 
Orphaned and existing products can be a significant constraint on an EPR or PS 
scheme’s efficiency and effectiveness. The OECD defined such products as follows:  
Orphaned products are those subject to EPR requirements whose producer has 
disappeared due to bankruptcy or for other reasons.  
Existing products are those designed and/or introduced on the market before EPR 
requirements were established. (OECD 2001a, p. 87) 
The problem of orphaned products is more likely to arise when there is a high level 
of turnover of firms in the industry, possibly because it is relatively easy to enter 
and exit the market. As noted previously, this is the case for personal computers.     
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Existing products can be a problem because they were designed without 
consideration of the requirements of a future EPR or PS scheme, and so may be 
very costly to manage at the post-consumer stage. This will tend to be a more 
significant issue for durable goods — such as televisions and motor vehicles — 
because it takes many years for the nation’s stock of such goods to be replaced.  
AIIA and Planet Ark (2005) estimated it would cost $156 million to $1161 million 
to collect and recycle existing personal computers (including those no longer in 
working order). The wide range of estimates was largely due to uncertainty about 
the volume of computers that could potentially be involved. 
The Australian Tyre Recyclers Association (sub. 51) claimed orphaned products 
were not a significant problem in the case of tyres. It asserted existing stockpiles of 
old tyres could be dealt with at ‘moderate’ cost. 
Some have argued for a ‘pay-as-you-go’ approach to funding the treatment of 
orphaned and existing products (for example, Veerman 2004). This would involve a 
fee on new products to fund the disposal or recycling of similar products already at 
the post-consumer stage. A drawback of this approach is that it weakens the link 
between the disposal or recycling fee and the actual cost of disposal or recycling 
(OECD 2001a). It also raises equity concerns about today’s consumers being forced 
to pay for products that others bought in the past, and were designed without 
considering the requirements of a future EPR or PS scheme. 
Centralised administration and flat charges 
Some aspects of an EPR or PS scheme — such as waste collection and the levying 
of an advance recycling fee — are often undertaken by a collective industry body or 
government organisation.  
While this approach can reduce the administrative and compliance costs of a 
scheme, it may also limit the scheme’s effectiveness. This is because centralised 
administration tends to dilute the signal producers are given to make waste-reducing 
changes to their products. In particular, it is common for an administrative body to 
levy a flat per-unit charge on firms for its services, rather than attempt to set charges 
according to the cost of collecting and disposing or recycling specific models and 
brands (chapter 9). 
Flat charges are used because their administrative simplicity is seen to outweigh the 
case for cost-reflective charges that reward individual producers for supplying 
goods that are easier to dispose or recycle. For example, Product Stewardship 
Australia (sub. 66) noted the most likely approach for televisions would be a flat 
advance recycling fee on each product regardless of screen size, type of display or     
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brand. However, this will tend to penalise producers whose goods are less costly to 
dispose or recycle (OECD 2005a). 
Targeting the most appropriate parties 
Another constraint on effectiveness is the difficulty in identifying which stage in a 
product’s life cycle is the most efficient to target, and what responsibilities should 
be assigned to the relevant firms. There are many possibilities, including designers, 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers.  
The OECD (2001a) argued those with greatest control over materials selection and 
product design should be targeted. However, this will be impractical if such parties 
do not have a physical presence in Australia or have ceased operations. A better 
approach would be to target the point in a product’s life cycle where it is least costly 
to address the environmental problem (IC 1991; chapter 6). 
What are the costs? 
There are many potential costs associated with an EPR or PS scheme, particularly a 
mandatory one. This section discusses some of the more significant costs. 
Establishment and administration costs 
The cost of establishing and then administering an EPR or PS scheme will tend to 
be lower for the same reasons it is more likely to be effective. That is, if there are a 
small number of firms to target, they remain in the industry over the long term, and 
it is straightforward to measure and enforce their compliance.  
The DEH (sub. 103) acknowledged that significant resources can be required to 
establish a stewardship scheme. It observed that negotiations began in 1999 to 
establish schemes for televisions and tyres and they have yet to reach a conclusion. 
The DEH also noted there had been a ‘very long lead-up’ to the establishment of a 
stewardship scheme for consumer packaging in the late 1990s (trans., p. 629).  
The Commission considers the computer industry will also pose difficulties, since 
there are a large number of small producers, making it difficult for governments to 
negotiate their preferred model of co-regulation. Furthermore, the large number of 
small businesses will make it costly to measure and enforce compliance, as noted by 
AIIA and Planet Ark: 
The fragmented and variable nature of the market, together with the high percentage of 
orphan or unbranded products amongst historical material makes it difficult to design     
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and enforce the implementation of a scheme that is equitable and competition-neutral 
and that covers the cost of the recovery of this material (which is as yet unknown). 
(AIIA and Planet Ark 2005, p. 8) 
Protracted negotiations over an EPR or PS scheme are not only costly in their own 
right, but also because of the uncertainty they create. Such uncertainty will tend to 
discourage firms from useful activities like investing and launching new products. 
Compliance costs 
The costs firms incur in complying with an EPR or PS scheme will have a major 
bearing on whether it delivers a net benefit. 
The DEH claimed there is a tradeoff between compliance costs and effectiveness, 
and its preferred model of co-regulation provides the best compromise between the 
two: 
There is always a trade-off to be made between the costs of compliance (including 
costs of reporting and monitoring) and the effectiveness of the policy. Co-regulation 
provides a good compromise between high cost, inflexible policy options (such as 
mandatory EPR schemes) and less costly but less effective or potentially unworkable 
options (such as voluntary product stewardship agreements). (sub. DR214, p. 13) 
However, there is little robust evidence available on the costs to Australian firms of 
complying with existing EPR and PS schemes. For example, the compliance costs 
of the National Packaging Covenant are probably high, since firms have to develop 
action plans and report detailed data annually. However, the RIS prepared for the 
Covenant (Nolan-ITU 2005) only considered compliance costs in a very superficial 
way, and the methodology probably biased the results towards significantly 
underestimating costs (section 10.6). 
A more thorough analysis of the stewardship scheme for waste oil has been 
undertaken, although still with limited quantitative information. The most recent 
evaluation of the oil scheme indicated the administrative arrangements were 
complex — and hence potentially costly — because of their reliance on the excise 
and customs arrangements (Allen Consulting Group 2004).  
The Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association (AEEMA) 
noted that firms have an incentive to reduce the cost of complying with 
environmental regulations, and have done so: 
… data from the OECD and other global bodies would indicate that the costs of 
addressing environmental regulations (either EPR models or the more blunt legislative 
approach) can be minimised and even eliminated through innovation that delivers other 
benefits. Voluntary agreements between industry and government (EPR or other     
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product stewardship models) can be useful policy tools to promote innovation. 
Companies will innovate in response to tighter waste regulations — they will change 
products and processes so that they generate less waste, and in so doing they save 
money (from better processes) and then find an opportunity to market that better 
product at a premium. (sub. DR182, pp. 2–3) 
However, firms can be expected to seek to reduce their compliance costs regardless 
of whether a regulation is appropriate or not. Policy makers need to take a broader 
perspective by asking themselves what is the net impact on the whole community 
relative to other policy approaches (including no intervention). 
Schemes that are genuinely voluntary — in the sense they allow free riding and are 
not created in response to government coercion — may have the lowest compliance 
costs. The arrangements for recycling newsprint could be an example of this 
(appendix C). However, as noted previously, voluntary schemes are unlikely to be 
effective unless most of the benefits can be captured by participating firms. 
Regulatory gaming and anticompetitive effects 
Where an industry has more than a handful of firms, governments have sought to 
negotiate co-regulation arrangements with an industry association. For example, 
governments have been negotiating with the AIIA over a stewardship scheme for 
computers. In principle, dealing with an industry association can reduce the 
establishment costs for both governments and firms.  
Similarly, firms have sometimes sought to reduce the cost of complying with an 
EPR or PS scheme by establishing a producer responsibility organisation (PRO) to 
act on their behalf. For example, Germany’s packaging ordinance led to the 
establishment of an industry body — Duales System Deutschland — that licenses 
its Green Dot logo to firms to fund collective industry efforts to gather and recycle 
packaging (Hanisch 2000; Palmer and Walls 2002). The alternative of each 
producer setting up its own collection and recycling systems would have 
significantly increased the cost of the regulation.  
A local example is Product Stewardship Australia (PSA). This organisation was 
established largely through the efforts of the Consumer Electronics Suppliers’ 
Association (CESA) to negotiate and implement stewardship schemes for consumer 
electronics, with initial emphasis on televisions (PSA and CESA, sub. 66). Thus, 
PSA aims to be the PRO for such products, and to take a leading role in negotiating 
the details of the co-regulation it would implement. 
A major risk with industry associations and PROs taking a leading role is they can 
be dominated by a handful of firms whose interests do not necessarily coincide with     
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those of other parties in the industry or consumers. Thus, there is potential for some 
firms to ‘game’ the system by ensuring the introduction of rules that increase 
competitors’ costs relative to their own. However, Agsafe (sub. DR168) noted it 
managed two stewardship schemes on an industrywide basis — DrumMuster and 
ChemClear — and these had been authorised by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC 2005).6 
Nevertheless, it is notable that industry associations and firms involved in 
negotiating stewardship schemes typically express the view that such schemes must 
prevent any firm from free riding (for example, Australian Tyre Recyclers 
Association, sub. 51; PSA and CESA, sub. 66). In defence of this view, AEEMA 
observed: 
It is a truism that any stewardship scheme must ensure all industry players are treated 
the same way — allowing free riders merely undermines the integrity of the scheme 
and promotes anticompetitive behaviour. This is the reason why associations will 
always be adamant that rules must apply equally to all parties — it is not a case of 
creating rules that favour one over the other, but quite the opposite. (sub. DR182, 
pp. 4–5) 
However, it is unlikely that a given set of rules will have the same impact on all 
firms. Some are likely to benefit (or lose) more than others, and it is in the interests 
of firms to influence a scheme to their own advantage: 
… being in a situation where we think we are doing the right thing, we’re not afraid of 
additional regulatory requirements coming in [that], you know, perhaps puts us in a 
better position being a large company than some of the smaller players who might in 
fact find it more difficult to meet some of these requirements. (AEEMA, trans., 
p. 1013) 
The Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (BRSD, sub. 70) claimed 
that anticompetitive behaviour was evident in the recycling market for lead-acid 
batteries. It noted there were only two recyclers operating in Australia’s larger 
cities, and referred to (unsuccessful) legal action one of those firms had taken to 
                                              
6   The DrumMuster and ChemClear schemes are managed by Agsafe on behalf of CropLife 
Australia, Animal Health Alliance (Australia), the National Farmers’ Federation, the Veterinary 
Manufacturers and Distributors Association, and the Australian Local Government Association. 
The schemes are funded by a per-unit levy imposed on chemical manufacturers. 
 The  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwlth) prohibits certain forms of anti-competitive agreements, 
including agreements between competitors that limit their ability to deal with whom they choose 
or on the terms they choose (including price). Authorisation provides immunity from court 
action under the Act arising from such agreements but can only be granted where the ACCC is 
satisfied that the public benefit flowing from the conduct outweighs any public detriment.     
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prevent its competitor from transporting used batteries to a processing plant in New 
Zealand:7 
Evidence presented at the legal proceedings cited, pointed to less than complete 
collection of used batteries as well as competition policy issues, in the highly 
concentrated used-battery/lead-scrap market in Australia.  
In this latter respect, industry concentration (two companies) in the ULAB [used-lead 
acid battery] recycling market has allowed strategic and anticompetitive behaviour that 
appears to be reducing or resulting in incomplete collection of ULABs. (BRSD, 
sub. 70, support document 7, p. 58) 
The DEH acknowledged that restricted competition may be an unintended outcome 
of stewardship schemes but: 
If it is part of a co-regulatory agreement, the regulatory requirements are no different 
from any other regulation and would be subject to cost–benefit analysis and a 
regulatory impact statement. The fact that the product stewardship agreement provides 
flexibility (within a co-regulatory framework) means that it is less likely to act as a 
barrier to entry than would a straight regulatory approach. (sub. 103, p. 61) 
Given the poor quality of some cost–benefit analyses — especially for the National 
Packaging Covenant (section 10.6) — it is doubtful such analyses discourage all 
anticompetitive impacts. It is also doubtful the so-called flexibility of co-regulation 
is a barrier to possible anticompetitive impacts. 
The DEH also asserted: 
The risk of industry capture can be minimised by designing the [stewardship] scheme 
in such a way that: 
•  the desired environmental outcomes are clearly specified; 
•  the operation of the scheme is transparent, so that companies can be held accountable 
for their performance; 
•  sanctions for non-participation or non-compliance are available and enforced; and 
•  third parties such as non-government organisations have the opportunity to participate 
in the scheme’s ongoing development and monitoring. 
These concerns were addressed in the negotiation of the second National Packaging 
Covenant. (sub. DR214, p. 13) 
While these may be desirable features for a stewardship scheme, it is not clear why 
they would necessarily prevent regulatory gaming and anticompetitive effects. 
Furthermore, the Commission does not consider the National Packaging Covenant 
                                              
7  Australian Refined Alloys Pty Limited and the Minister for the Environment and Heritage and 
Anor [2003] AATA 247 (17 March 2003).     
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to be an example of good regulatory practice (detailed further in section 10.6 and 
appendix C). 
Distorting the market in favour of particular products 
Some EPR and PS schemes involve the collection of an advance fee on new 
products to fund disposal or recycling. A problem with this approach is it can be 
used to ‘pick winners’.  
For example, Australia’s stewardship scheme for waste oil uses an advance 
recycling fee to partially offset the cost of recycling the product. The recycling 
subsidies now established provide a significant preference in favour of re-refined 
base oil, sometimes referred to as ‘lube-to-lube’ (appendix C). A formal evaluation 
of the scheme concluded this distortion is not warranted on environmental or 
economic grounds, and recommended the disparity in subsidy rates between 
different products be reduced (Allen Consulting Group 2004).  
The Cement Industry Federation expressed similar concerns about the subsidy rates 
for recycled oil: 
The PSO has introduced market inequities by providing disproportionate support for 
technologies with similar environmental outcomes. For example, the PSO provides a 
benefit of 50c/litre for lube-to-lube oil recycling compared to 3c/litre for the cement 
kilns that recover energy. (sub. 71, p. 8) 
In contrast, Australia’s only operator of a used oil refinery (Southern Oil Refineries, 
sub.  DR192) and the DEH (sub. DR214) disputed the findings of the PSO 
evaluation, and cited more recent evidence to support the current subsidy rates 
(appendix C). The Commission has not made a finding or recommendation on this 
matter because it is beyond the terms of reference for this inquiry, but notes the 
subsidies should be based on the externalities avoided, not ‘infant-industry’ 
arguments or favouring particular industries in a manner suggested by the waste 
hierarchy. 
Tradeoffs with other objectives 
Imposing waste-related EPR or PS requirements on firms may come at the cost of 
compromising other objectives, such as product safety and energy efficiency. For 
example, with respect to appliances, AEEMA noted: 
… in addition to waste management, the design of electrical products is influenced by 
other areas of public policy, intended to achieve desirable outcomes for our 
community. Principal areas are safety and energy efficiency, both of which are the 
subject of regulation in a number of jurisdictions. Often the aims in the different policy     
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areas are in conflict as they influence the design of products. For example, the 
increased use of foam insulation in fridges and water heaters (in order to achieve the 
mandated improvements in energy efficiency) has the potential to cause an increase in 
the volume of shredder floc created when the product reaches its end of life. Likewise, 
improvements in appliance design aimed at achieving the safety outcomes required by 
regulation can increase the amount of waste generated. It is important that the correct 
balance is struck between all areas of public policy having an impact on the design and 
manufacture of electrical products. (sub. DR182, pp. 1–2) 
It is also possible for one waste-related stewardship scheme to conflict with another. 
For example, the Cement Industry Federation claimed that Australia’s oil recycling 
scheme undermines the viability of the ChemClear scheme for rural chemicals: 
… the majority of the chemicals collected through the ChemClear program end up in 
cement kilns as a blend component of a liquid kiln fuel, thereby providing an eminently 
suitable recovery method. The ChemClear program owes its success to the viability of 
this downstream energy-from-waste recovery operation. Quite perversely, the Product 
Stewardship for Oil Program, another PS scheme, through its differentiation of subsidy 
rates is impacting another critical blend component of the same kiln fuel — waste oil, 
effectively threatening the ongoing viability of the ChemClear program. (sub. DR174, 
p. 3)  
Is there a net benefit to the community? 
The above analysis indicates the benefits and costs of an EPR or PS scheme are 
very dependent on the characteristics of the relevant product and industry, as well as 
the chosen administrative structure and policy instruments. Thus, the existence of a 
net community benefit from an EPR or PS scheme should never be taken for 
granted. Such schemes should only be adopted after very careful consideration of 
what is the problem and what is the cost of doing something about it. 
While it is not possible to reach a general conclusion on whether EPR and PS 
schemes have a net community benefit, there are certain characteristics that provide 
a strong indication of the likely outcome. From the above analysis, it is clear that 
important indicators will be how hazardous the waste is; the administrative structure 
and policy instruments used; how difficult it is to measure and enforce compliance; 
and the ease with which relevant firms can be identified and made accountable, and 
their likelihood of remaining in the industry. 
Recent government activity suggests that policy makers are currently interested in a 
number of mandatory co-regulatory schemes for products that are not prescribed as 
being hazardous. As noted previously, governments are currently developing a 
national policy framework along such lines.      
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The Commission considers that mandatory co-regulatory schemes for many of the 
products targeted by governments are likely to have a net cost. The above analysis 
indicates the cost of mandatory requirements tends to be high, particularly when it 
is difficult to identify relevant firms; they can rapidly enter and exit the market; and 
it is difficult to monitor and enforce compliance. In contrast, the benefit from 
curtailing waste from the targeted products may be small (chapter 4 and 
appendix B).  
Schemes that are genuinely voluntary — in the sense they allow free riding and are 
not created in response to government coercion — will tend to impose lower costs 
than mandatory ones. However, the ability of firms to opt out of voluntary 
arrangements can reduce the benefits. Nevertheless, there are examples of effective 
voluntary schemes for non-hazardous wastes. These include arrangements adopted 
by individual manufacturers of office equipment (Fuji Xerox) and athletic shoes 
(Nike), as well as Australia’s stewardship scheme for newsprint. 
Various participants supported the view that stewardship and EPR schemes are only 
likely to deliver a net benefit in a narrow range of circumstances (for example, 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, sub.  DR141; Product Stewardship 
Council, sub. DR161; Shoalhaven City Council, sub. DR189). However, there were 
also many parties that had a contrary view. For example, the DEH claimed: 
… product stewardship approaches, developed according to best practice policy 
guidelines, can deliver economic and environmental benefits in a wider range of 
circumstances [than claimed by the Commission]. (sub. DR214, p. 2) 
To support its argument, the DEH cited the positive experience of a single 
manufacturer under the National Packaging Covenant, the expected benefits from 
computer and tyre schemes that are still being formulated, and the positive 
outcomes from Australia’s stewardship scheme for newsprint. The Commission is 
not convinced these examples adequately support the DEH’s argument:  
•  While some firms may have benefited from the National Packaging Covenant, 
the Commission’s overall assessment is that the Covenant has major deficiencies 
(discussed further in section 10.6 and appendix C). 
•  The anticipated stewardship schemes for computers and tyres have yet to be 
finalised, and in any case it appears that advocates of those schemes have tended 
to overstate the benefits of keeping computers and tyres out of landfills (as noted 
above and in section 10.6). 
•  The stewardship scheme for newsprint is essentially a private arrangement 
entered into by a handful of large firms, and so is unlikely to be representative of 
the co-regulation approach that the DEH advocates.     
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The DEH (sub. DR214) also stressed that its favoured model for stewardship 
schemes — a system of nationally uniform co-regulation — would deliver benefits 
relative to the likely alternative of states and territories introducing different 
schemes for the same product. The Commission accepts the latter is a possibility, 
but the likelihood of it occurring may be constrained by the inability of states and 
territories to legally enforce policy instruments such as advance disposal fees and 
take-back requirements (DEH, sub. 103; BRSD, sub. 70). In any case, a sounder 
approach for the Australian Government would be to take a leadership role in 
encouraging states and territories to base their actions on clear objectives and sound 
evidence, as well as cost–benefit analysis, rather than facilitating what may be 
inappropriate policies. This issue is discussed further later in this chapter (and in 
chapter 14). 
The SA Government was also critical of the Commission’s conclusion: 
In finding that mandatory product stewardship and product responsibility schemes are 
largely unlikely to deliver net benefits, the Commission does not mention 
environmental benefits of such schemes and therefore the whole point of such schemes 
must necessarily be undervalued in the Commission’s approach. In general, the 
Commission’s view regarding extended producer responsibility (EPR) and product 
stewardship seems to be inconsistent with contemporary international experience and 
has little regard to the resource impact of landfill disposal of these materials. 
(sub. DR217, p. 6) 
However, the points made by the SA Government misrepresent the Commission’s 
analysis: 
•  The Commission has considered environmental benefits, as mentioned earlier in 
this section. 
•  The Commission has noted international experience in this chapter, and found 
much of this experience reinforces the concern that, in many cases, the cost of an 
EPR or PS scheme would outweigh the benefits (for example, Germany’s Green 
Dot scheme for packaging and the European Union’s directive for NiCad 
batteries). 
•  The Commission has taken account of the impact on all resources of landfill 
disposal versus other options, such as recycling and energy-from-waste 
(chapter 4 and appendix B). This is in contrast to the partial approach advocated 
by some, where the focus is on a subset of all resources, particularly physical 
materials, at the expense of other resources. 
The SA Government also noted: 
… given the growing international acceptance of EPR schemes, businesses may be 
subject to these requirements through the import and export of their goods. 
(sub. DR217, p. 6)     
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The Commission accepts that other countries’ schemes could affect firms operating 
in Australia. However, this does not justify Australian governments automatically 
adopting similar schemes. In the first instance, the decision to follow the 
requirements of other countries should be left to individual firms to judge. If other 
countries’ policies would not benefit Australia, as seems likely in many cases, they 
should not be adopted by Australian governments. 
Mandatory extended producer responsibility and product stewardship schemes — 
involving either industry–government co-regulation or government regulation — 
tend to be costly. They are unlikely to deliver a net benefit unless: 
•  there are considerable benefits to the community from avoiding the product’s 
inappropriate disposal, for example because it is hazardous; 
•  the relevant parties can be readily identified and held accountable; and 
•  compliance with the requirements can be readily measured and enforced. 
The Commission is not convinced that many of the products currently being 
targeted by governments — including office paper, packaging, tyres, computers, 
televisions and other electrical appliances — satisfy all of these requirements. 
10.6  Problems with specific schemes 
The Commission considers that policy makers have not made a convincing case for 
Australia’s stewardship scheme for consumer packaging. Nor have they 
substantiated the case for new schemes on many of the products they have targeted, 
such as office paper; computers, televisions and other electrical appliances; and 
tyres. 
Consumer packaging 
Australia’s stewardship scheme for consumer packaging is based on co-regulation 
and thus has two elements:  
•  The National Packaging Covenant — an agreement between governments and 
firms — specifies the self-regulation component of the scheme.  
•  The National Environment Protection (Used Packaging Materials) Measure 
(NEPM) specifies the supporting government regulation, which is implemented 
by individual states and territories.  
FINDING 10.1     
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The National Packaging Covenant stipulates three ‘overarching targets’ (box 10.3). 
Each signatory of the Covenant has to produce an action plan outlining how they 
intend to contribute to achieving these targets. The Covenant specifies a long list of 
performance indicators that signatories must report on annually to demonstrate they 
are meeting their commitments (details provided in appendix C). Among other 
things, firms have to report the weight of packaging sold, energy and water used to 
produce packaging, and what proportion of packaging is manufactured from 
recycled content. 
 
Box 10.3  The National Packaging Covenant’s overarching targets 
The National Packaging Covenant specifies three overarching targets that signatories are 
expected to work together to achieve: 
1. Recycle 65 per cent of post-consumer packaging by 2010. Sub-targets are also set for 
specific materials (paper and cardboard 70–80 per cent, glass 50–60 per cent, steel 60–65 
per cent, aluminium 70–75 per cent, and plastics 30–35 per cent). 
2. By 2010, recycle 25 per cent of plastics coded (4) to (7) and ‘nonrecyclable’ paper and 
cardboard packaging. 
3. No increase in packaging going to landfill, compared to the 2003 level. 
Source: NPCC (2005). 
 
 
The supporting NEPM requires parties that are not Covenant signatories to ensure 
the collection of their packaging and its reuse, recycling and/or energy recovery. 
The extent to which this is required is supposed to reflect the material-specific 
targets in the Covenant. Individual jurisdictions have the option of recovering 
collection costs from non-signatories, who have to keep detailed records of their 
activities. The NEPM also requires local governments to provide data on their 
recovery activities, including the weight of recyclable materials collected. 
Why is a stewardship scheme needed? 
Reports of Australia’s growing volume of packaging waste and lower recycling rate 
than other countries are regarded by some people as evidence that action is needed. 
However, growing waste volumes and relatively low recycling rates do not 
necessarily justify a scheme as elaborate as the Covenant and supporting NEPM.  
The National Packaging Covenant Industry Association (NPCIA, sub. 92) noted the 
disposal of used packaging in modern, well-regulated landfills probably has few 
adverse impacts. The upstream benefits of recycling — such as from using fewer 
virgin resources — appear to have been significantly overstated, especially in the     
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widely-quoted study by Nolan-ITU  and SKM Economics (2001) (chapter  4 and 
appendix B). The case for waste avoidance — such as requiring suppliers to use less 
packaging — is also questionable, as it could lead to problems such as increased 
losses, contamination and in-transit damage of goods. In any case, firms have a 
commercial incentive to economise on packaging use, balanced against marketing 
and other objectives. Consumers also have the option to refuse products they 
believe are excessively packaged. 
Nevertheless, the Covenant and associated NEPM strive to increase recycling and 
encourage waste avoidance: 
The objective of the Covenant is to reduce environmental degradation arising from the 
disposal of used packaging and conserve resources through better product design and 
production and the re-use and recycling of used packaging materials. (NPCC 2005, 
p. 15)8 
The Covenant also refers to the waste hierarchy, claiming wastes should be 
managed in the following order of preference: avoidance, re-use, recycling, energy 
recovery, and disposal. This is not an appropriate basis for policy as it ignores the 
real-world tradeoffs between benefits and costs that can arise between different 
waste management options (chapter 7). 
A sounder basis for curtailing packaging waste would be that consumers do not face 
cost-reflective disposal charges. Consumers can typically put an extra item of 
packaging in their bin at zero additional cost to themselves, due to the flat disposal 
fees usually imposed by local governments. This is likely to lead to an inefficiently 
high amount of waste, since additional disposal is not costless from the perspective 
of the community as a whole (chapter 9). 
In formulating Australia’s stewardship scheme for consumer packaging, it appears 
other policy options, such as cost-reflective disposal fees and advance disposal fees, 
were not adequately considered. Such options were mentioned in the RIS for the 
Covenant but their consideration was inadequate (discussed further below). 
Kimberly-Clark Australia (sub. DR263) questioned the basis for including resource 
conservation as a goal in the Covenant and NEPM. It noted the objects clause of the 
enabling legislation mentions protecting people from air, water, soil and noise 
pollution, but not conserving resources.9 However, the NEPM does refer to another 
part of the legislation that enables an environment protection measure to be made in 
                                              
8   A similar objective is specified in s.6 of the National Environment Protection (Used Packaging 
Materials) Measure. 
9  National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cwlth), s.3.     
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relation to ‘the re-use and recycling of used materials’.10 If packaging re-use and 
recycling protects people from litter-related pollution, as seems possible, it could be 
argued that the Covenant and NEPM are consistent with the objectives of the 
relevant Act. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for explicitly aligning the 
objectives of the Covenant and NEPM with the enabling Act. In particular, the 
Covenant and NEPM should not include resource conservation as a goal, since it 
appears to be beyond the scope of the enabling legislation. It is also an inappropriate 
objective for government intervention, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
The objectives of the National Packaging Covenant and National Environment 
Protection (Used Packaging Materials) Measure should be amended so they are 
consistent with the objects clause of the National Environment Protection 
Council Act 2004. This should include removing the goal of resource 
conservation as a reason for government intervention. 
Is there a net benefit? 
Prior to implementing the current National Packaging Covenant, a cost–benefit 
analysis was provided in a draft RIS released for community consultation 
(Nolan-ITU 2005). Unfortunately, this consultation RIS had major deficiencies and 
so provided little insight into whether the Covenant would deliver a net benefit to 
the community (some specific criticisms are outlined in box 10.4). Similarly, an 
impact statement was released for the supporting NEPM (NEPC 2005a) that, in the 
Commission’s view, had an inadequate analysis of benefits and costs. 
                                              
10 National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cwlth), s.14(1)(f). 
RECOMMENDATION 10.1     
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Box 10.4  The consultation RIS for the National Packaging Covenant 
Prior to the adoption of the current National Packaging Covenant in July 2005, a 
consultation RIS was prepared by Nolan-ITU (2005) to document the likely impacts. 
There were numerous deficiencies in the RIS, some of which are listed below. 
•  Inadequate consideration of other policy options — Policy options other than 
the Covenant were dismissed on the basis of a ranking technique that is not 
objective and does not recognise that some criteria are more important than others 
(Access Economics 2005). 
•  No consideration of compliance methods — Nolan-ITU just assumed that any 
target specified in the Covenant would be achieved. The implementation steps and 
practical constraints on achieving targets were ignored, despite their significant 
bearing on the resulting benefits and costs (NPCIA, sub. 92; PACIA, sub. 120). 
•  Inflated estimate of environmental benefits — Environmental benefits were 
based on those estimated by Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) in an earlier 
study of kerbside recycling. Gerard van Rijswijk (sub. DR191) criticised that study 
for having numerous deficiencies, including the overestimation of collection yields 
and underestimation of collection costs. He concluded the ‘study suggests recycling 
is good and more recycling is better — this contradicts other studies and economic 
theory which suggests an optimum level should exist for each material — this level 
may well be zero for some materials’ (Gerard van Rijswijk, sub. DR191, p.  29). 
Similarly, the Commission has concluded on the basis of its own analysis that the 
study by Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) significantly overstated the benefits 
of recycling (appendix B). 
•  Understatement of kerbside recycling costs — It was claimed that kerbside 
recycling costs would fall by $16–$55 million per annum despite collecting more 
material. It was also claimed the Covenant would lead to an efficiency gain of up to 
$3 million per annum in kerbside recycling systems. The assumptions used to 
derive such estimates were very speculative, being based on little or no evidence, 
and tended to bias the results towards understating the costs to the community as a 
whole. For example, avoided landfill levies were treated as a benefit (rather than as 
a transfer from one level of government to another), the marginal cost of collecting 
more material was claimed to be zero, and it was assumed the additional materials 
collected would be more valuable than average. 
•  Understatement of costs to firms — It was claimed that firms’ annual 
administration costs from complying with the Covenant would only rise by 
$1–2 million in aggregate. The Commission considers this to be an implausibly low 
figure, given the onerous data reporting requirements of the Covenant. More 
broadly, the estimated impacts on the private sector were largely based on 
discussions Nolan-ITU had with just ten firms. Nolan-ITU acknowledged this small 
sample was biased in favour of firms that were relatively big, and tended to report 
large benefits from the Covenant. 
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In late 2006, the Office of Best Practice Regulation (formerly the Office of 
Regulation Review) will, as part of its annual reporting function, reveal its overall 
assessments of the RIS and impact statement. It should be noted the Office is an 
advisory body and its assessments would not have prevented the Covenant and 
supporting NEPM from being implemented under the regulatory requirements 
applying at the time. 
The NPCIA and the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (PACIA) also 
raised major concerns with the RIS: 
… the setting of targets [in the Covenant] and the consideration of the social, 
environmental and economic impacts were not linked to business-specific actions. 
Accordingly, a robust and rigorous cost–benefit analysis, as required under the RIS 
process, was not undertaken. The targets were set based on inaccurate and shallow (at 
best) investigation into the actual impacts on business. (sub. 92, p. 9; sub. 120, p. 15) 
In a report for the NPCIA, Access Economics (2005) noted some of the problems 
with the RIS, but nevertheless considered it a ‘prudent evolution’ to impose detailed 
reporting requirements on firms. It argued this would enable a more robust 
evaluation of the Covenant in the future: 
Access Economics reaches this conclusion partly because of the difficulty of evaluating 
the current performance of the NPC [National Packaging Covenant], and sees merit in 
the recommended option partly as an improved data-gathering process facilitating 
better quantitative evaluation of the performance of the NPC in future. (Access 
Economics 2005, p. 2) 
This is not a sufficient basis for the Covenant’s detailed data-reporting 
requirements. Those requirements involve a large number of indicators that will be 
costly for firms to collect data on; may overburden municipal staff, particularly in 
small regional councils; and could overwhelm interested parties with information. 
The requirements also include a number of qualitative indicators that do not appear 
to be particularly meaningful. Furthermore, the data are being collected primarily to 
measure the Covenant’s effectiveness in achieving its targets, which will do little to 
inform policy makers about whether those targets are justified on net community 
benefit grounds. 
The targets specified in the Covenant can only be described as arbitrary. Many 
participants in this inquiry — including supporters of the Covenant — conceded the 
likely costs and benefits of different target levels were not thoroughly considered 
(for example, Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub.  93; DEH, trans., 
pp.  627–8; NPCIA, sub.  92; PACIA, sub.  120; Packaging Council of Australia, 
sub. 67).      
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There is also considerable doubt about the accuracy of the benchmarks against 
which performance will supposedly be measured (Access Economics 2005; 
Nolan-ITU 2005). The Packaging Council of Australia (PCA) noted: 
Australia has no reliable, national system for measuring what is happening now. Some 
States collect some packaging data but these are incomplete and there is no 
consolidated data on the amounts of empty or filled packaging imported. How do you 
set appropriate targets if you do not have a reliable national measure of where we stand 
at the moment. And if you cannot measure it, how do you enforce it? (sub. 67, p. 27) 
In 2008, the body responsible for administering the Covenant — the National 
Packaging Covenant Council — is due to report on how effective the Covenant has 
been in reaching its targets. Amcor (sub. DR167) was concerned that, if the review 
found the targets had not been achieved, this could be used to justify more 
draconian regulation. Such a policy response would be inappropriate, given that the 
targets are arbitrary and the case for existing arrangements has yet to be 
substantiated in a robust cost–benefit study. 
The Commission considers the nature of the 2008 review should be changed to one 
that focuses on whether sufficient evidence exists to justify the Covenant and 
supporting NEPM. Such a review should be independent, draw on objective and 
scientific evidence about the consequences of landfilling or creating energy from 
packaging waste, and consider all costs and benefits.  
The DEH (sub. DR214) questioned whether this was feasible, since a decision to 
change the nature of the 2008 review would have to be made by consensus by 
members of the National Packaging Covenant Council. However, the DEH later 
conceded (trans., p. 996) this was not an insurmountable problem, particularly if the 
Australian Government was willing to fund a broadening of the 2008 review. 
The terms of reference for the scheduled 2008 review of the National Packaging 
Covenant should be expanded by the Australian Government beyond an 
assessment of effectiveness. An independent review should consider all relevant 
evidence about whether the Covenant (and supporting regulation) delivers a net 
benefit to the community. 
Office paper 
In March 2006, the NSW Government nominated office paper — defined as 
printing and writing-grade paper — as a priority for its EPR policies and demanded 
action from industry within months. The Government based its decision on there 
currently being a low level of recycling and high rate of disposal:  
RECOMMENDATION 10.2     
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The Minister for the Environment has instructed the DEC [Department of Environment 
and Conservation] to elevate ‘office paper’ to a high priority on the basis of its 
continued low recycling and high disposal rate which represents a significant waste of a 
high quality resource.  
The Minister has sought from the office paper sector a draft product stewardship 
concept by 23 June 2006 and a detailed product stewardship plan by October 2006 … 
The office paper sector has also been requested to provide annual reports commencing 
from the end of FY2005-06, on the industry’s initiatives to ‘close the loop’ through 
increased production or importation or use of paper with recycled content and the 
establishment and expansion of other markets for post consumer office paper. 
(DEC 2006b, p. 11) 
To support its decision, the Government cited an estimate showing a low rate of 
office paper recycling in New South Wales: 
Consumption [of office paper] in New South Wales in 2003 was 620 000 tonnes, with 
about 83 000 tonnes or 13.4 per cent recovered. In comparison, 17 per cent of printing 
and writing paper is recovered in Victoria. (DEC 2006b, p. 10) 
However, the Australasian Paper Industry Association (APIA, sub. DR199) claimed 
the NSW Government had significantly underestimated the rate of recycling. It 
observed that A4 copy paper makes up the bulk of office paper usage, and estimated 
that NSW offices consume about 70 000 tonnes of this product each year. To reach 
the NSW Government’s estimate of total office paper usage (620  000 tonnes) 
would, on APIA’s calculations, therefore require use of other office paper to be 
550 000 tonnes, or almost eight times the use of A4 copy paper: 
We simply cannot agree that in any office, for every carton of copy paper used, there’s 
8 times the volume of some combination of other paper grades consumed. 
Aside from the factual error, this incorrect reporting causes massive distortion to the 
recycling percentages. The priority statement reports that there was 83 000 tonnes of 
office paper recovered in New South Wales. That number looks very significant when 
considered in conjunction with realistic usage numbers. (APIA, sub. DR199, p. 11) 
But Australian Paper noted: 
… the NSW figures are office papers inclusive of the print that’s made, so an annual 
report, a quarterly report, a magazine produced by an office is included in those figures 
and they’re not too far off the mark if you add both office and print paper together. 
(trans., p. 1155) 
In any case, the NSW Government has not provided clear evidence that increasing 
the rate of office paper recycling is in the community’s interest. There are costs 
associated with recycling, as well as benefits. Furthermore, the NSW Government 
has acknowledged that an EPR scheme cannot be justified on other grounds:     
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This product [office paper] is not toxic or hazardous; is not generally illegally dumped 
or littered; and is not currently the subject of significant community concern. 
(DEC 2004b, p. 13) 
The Commission considers that the NSW Government needs to review its rationale 
for pushing for an office paper EPR scheme. If the Government chooses to maintain 
its current policy, it should clearly articulate a soundly-based case for a scheme 
before demanding action from industry. Similarly, the EPHC and Australian 
Government should resist any exhortations to establish a national scheme for office 
paper without a substantive case for doing so. 
Computers, televisions and other electrical appliances 
The computer, television and other electrical appliances industries are currently 
considering product stewardship schemes. As noted previously, governments have 
been pressuring these industries to introduce schemes, and computers and 
televisions may be incorporated in the proposed national approach for product 
stewardship (DEH, sub. 103). 
Governments have cited various reasons why electrical products should be subject 
to EPR or PS schemes. These include concerns about potentially hazardous 
components, the use of non-renewable resources, illegal dumping, and 
contamination of other waste streams. For example, the Australian and NSW 
Governments have noted the following about televisions: 
Televisions contain potentially-hazardous materials including lead in cathode-ray tubes, 
mercury and cadmium in printed circuit boards and brominated flame retardants in 
plastics. While there is some scientific uncertainty about the impacts of these 
substances in landfill and beyond, the weight of evidence from international research is 
that the disposal of electrical and electronic appliances poses significant environmental 
risks (for example, Nordic Council of Ministers 1995; Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency 1995; European Commission 2000b; Five Winds International 2001; 
AEA Technology 2004). (DEH, sub. DR214, pp. 26–7) 
Circuit boards, standby batteries and the glass in cathode-ray tubes [CRT] contain 
hazardous materials, such as lead, cadmium, mercury and chromates, that may have an 
adverse impact on human health and the environment when televisions are disposed of, 
or limit opportunities to recover and recycle materials. The average CRT television 
screen contains two kilograms of lead (although this is decreasing) and this could 
contribute to leakage of heavy metals from poorly managed landfills. Brominated flame 
retardants are commonly used in the plastics and on printed circuit boards.  
The rapid obsolescence of televisions is inefficient, as is the use in their manufacture of 
nonrenewable resources that cannot be readily reused or recycled. (DEC 2004d, p. 34)     
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However, a frequent message from some participants in this inquiry was that 
governments need to present a more thoroughly-researched and clearly-articulated 
case for having EPR or PS schemes for electrical products. For example, the 
industry body established to negotiate and implement PS schemes for televisions 
and other appliances observed: 
[The current policy debate] … seems to lack a scientifically-robust justification as to 
why certain types of electrical and electronic products should be recovered, processed 
and recycled at EoL [end of life] … The actual scientific research that should underpin 
or substantiate … waste priorities (and the required actions) is generally absent which 
subsequently provides a weak foundation for ongoing policy development, as well as 
industry responses and solutions. (PSA and CESA, sub. 66, p. 6) 
Governments have tended to express their concerns about electrical products in 
broad terms, with little specific evidence of actual or likely harm to the Australian 
community from not currently having an EPR or PS scheme. In addition, the 
governments’ stated concerns often imply that waste avoidance and resource 
recovery will always deliver a net benefit to the community. These activities have 
costs that may outweigh the benefits. 
Another example of the approach currently used to justify schemes is the NSW 
Government’s stated concerns about computers: 
Computer components, such as lead, cadmium and flame retardants, can have adverse 
impacts on human health and the environment. For example, mercury can leach out 
when circuit breakers are destroyed and metallic mercury is able to vaporise, adding to 
air emissions. Lead in waste computers can dissolve in acidic ground water and 
contribute to heavy metal leakage from poorly managed landfills. Despite collection 
and treatment of leachate at controlled landfills, contaminated sludge is still being 
landfilled. Hazardous components … can also limit opportunities for material recycling 
and waste treatment.  
The rapid obsolescence of electronic equipment is inefficient, as is the use in their 
manufacture of non-renewable resources that cannot be readily reused or recycled. 
There is some illegal dumping of obsolete computers. (DEC 2004d, p. 28) 
Similarly, Western Australia’s Waste Management Board commented: 
Computers are complex products made in most instances from non-renewable 
resources. The average computer contains more than 700 substances including 
hazardous materials such as lead, cadmium, mercury, hexavalent chromium and 
brominated flame retardants. (WMB 2006, p. 10) 
However, as noted previously, Planet Ark has argued that concerns about hazardous 
materials in computers tend to be overstated, and the test often used to demonstrate 
problems with landfilling CRT monitors is misleading (AIIA and Planet Ark 2005). 
Similarly, a peer-reviewed US study found that disposal of CRT monitors would 
make the community better off than recycling or bans on disposal:     
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We find that the benefits of avoiding the health effects associated with CRT disposal 
appear far outweighed by the costs for a wide range of policies. For the stock of 
monitors disposed of in the United States in 1998, we find that policies restricting or 
banning some popular disposal options would increase disposal costs from about $1 per 
monitor to between $3 and $20 per monitor. Policies to promote a modest amount of 
recycling of monitor parts, including lead, can be less expensive. In all cases, however, 
the costs of the policies exceed the value of the avoided health effects of CRT disposal. 
(Macauley, Palmer and Shih 2002, p. 13) 
Governments have also tended to express their concerns about other electrical 
appliances, including whitegoods, in broad terms with little apparent consideration 
of the costs of resource recovery: 
About 70 per cent of white goods are collected for recycling, mainly because of the 
value of the ferrous metals in these products. However, a significant amount of 
shredder floc, which contains a number of hazardous substances and glass, plastics, 
foam, rubber, circuit boards and other materials, is left over from the recycling process. 
Shredder floc is disposed of in landfills. 
Very few consumer electronics and lighting products are recovered for recycling. Some 
consumer electronics contain a number of hazardous substances, including lead, 
mercury and cadmium. Some electronic products, such as cordless phones, shavers, 
handheld vacuums, power tools and toys are a significant source of Nickel Cadmium 
(NiCad) batteries. Lighting products may contain toxic substances, such as mercury, 
polychlorinated biphenyls and phosphors. An average fluorescent tube contains 
30  milligrams of mercury. Emergency lighting products use NiCad batteries. 
(DEC 2006b, p. 23) 
In contrast, AEEMA (sub. 59) claimed a large body of scientific research indicates 
relatively minor environmental impacts from landfilling electrical and electronic 
equipment waste. With respect to ‘major appliances’, it questioned the NSW 
Government’s basis for targeting the product: 
AEEMA … has concluded that the problem as perceived [by the NSW Government] … 
is one or a combination of the following three factors: 
•  Too many appliances are going to landfill without pre-processing. 
•  Shredder floc from major appliances contain unacceptably high levels of substances 
deemed to be hazardous. 
•  The weight/volume of shredder floc going to landfill is unacceptably high … 
Anecdotal evidence available to AEEMA suggests that very few appliances go straight 
to landfill … 
Based on their own records, manufacturers of major appliances believe that the 
hazardous content of appliance shredder floc is likely to be lower than that from items 
from any other mechanical or electrical sector. The industry has generally set about 
eliminating substances shown to be hazardous without the need for compelling 
legislation.     
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If the issue is an unacceptable weight/volume of shredder floc going to landfill, action 
should focus on investigating viable ways to reduce it … Experience … has shown that 
while various levels of dismantling may increase the price for better segregated 
recovered metals, most of the remainder still has to be dumped … If … alternatives 
[such as energy-from-waste] are not acceptable, it may be that the present quantity 
going to landfill will need to be accepted. (AEEMA, sub. DR258, p. 3)  
AEEMA (sub. DR258) also questioned how the NSW Government could justify its 
demand for the major-appliances industry to take action, given there is very little 
evidence available about current practices, including the rate of recycling. AEEMA 
has written to the NSW Government proposing the terms of reference for a study, 
co-funded by industry and government, to establish the facts: 
While there have been a number of studies into the life cycle, recycling and waste 
disposal of e-waste — including major appliances — in Australia, there remains a lack 
of hard data regarding the real environmental impact of disposal of major appliances. 
The percentage of these recovered for recycling is not known. It is generally assumed 
that 70 per cent of major appliances are recycled … 
AEEMA considers that before any decision can be made on what actions need to be 
taken, a rigorous study of current practices and options should be undertaken. It is 
expected that the study will provide the basis for sound decisions. (AEEMA, 
sub. DR258, p. 8) 
It is of considerable concern that the NSW Government has not done or published 
any such research on its own initiative before making firm demands on industry to 
take action. 
Another issue that does not appear to have been adequately considered by 
governments is how the characteristics of the computer and television industries 
tend to reduce the likelihood of a net benefit from a mandatory stewardship scheme.  
Most televisions and computer components are imported and so Australia will have 
little influence over the resources used to produce them. Furthermore, the 
dominance of imports suggests the low-skill and labour-intensive task of 
disassembling televisions and computers to recover resources would not be viable in 
Australia without substantial financial support. The option of exporting such 
products to a low labour-cost country for resource recovery is made very difficult 
by restrictions associated with the Basel Convention (chapter 12).  
In addition, computers are often assembled by small businesses that can rapidly 
enter and exit the industry, making it difficult to detect and penalise non-
compliance, and to prevent suppliers from leaving a legacy of orphaned products for 
others to deal with. Governments have not clearly articulated why they are so     
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certain these problems can be overcome at reasonable cost, or conversely, why the 
benefits or risks are so high as to justify the considerable costs likely to be involved. 
The AIIA is currently developing a recycling scheme for computers in conjunction 
with governments (Campbell 2006). Details of this scheme have yet to be finalised. 
In broad terms, the AIIA has proposed that, in order to prevent firms from free 
riding, all imported computers and components would be listed on a national 
register that is matched against customs registration data. When an item is recycled, 
the cost would be apportioned back to the relevant importer. The Commission is 
concerned that such an arrangement would be costly to administer, and difficult to 
enforce down to the level of individual computer components. 
Tyres 
Negotiations to establish a tyre recycling scheme started in 1999, and are expected 
to lead to a proposal that could be part of the foreshadowed national approach for 
product stewardship (DEH, sub. 103). As noted previously, tyres are also one of the 
priority products targeted by the NSW and WA Governments. 
In 2001, a report for the Australian Government concluded that increased tyre 
recycling could address various problems — including tyres floating to the surface 
in landfills and becoming a breeding ground for mosquitoes — but the key benefit 
was reduced risk of uncontrolled burning: 
Waste tyres contain a number of organic toxic materials as well as metals, but these are 
bound (at least in the medium term) in a stable matrix. In the absence of results from 
very long-term testing, the broad view is that waste tyres pose little direct threat to the 
environment. Certain past applications have been implicated in several problems such 
as accelerated stream bank erosion, disturbance of marine ecology (artificial reefs) and 
visual impacts. 
However, by far the greatest environmental threats come from uncontrolled burning of 
tyres which liberates large volumes of toxic and unsightly emissions. The runoff from 
fighting tyre fires pollutes local waterways and soil. Waste tyres can also provide 
breeding grounds for mosquitoes and vermin. (Atech Group 2001, p. xiii) 
The Australian Tyre Importers’ Group (ATIG, sub. DR270) noted that regulation 
has now reduced the risk of uncontrolled burning to a level where it is probably no 
longer the most significant externality: 
Regulation has reduced the risk of [tyre] fire around Australia, and the externalities of 
landfills themselves, so that the major external costs are probably now related to legacy 
and transitional sites and illegal dumping and storage. (ATIG, sub. DR270, p. 5)     
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Similarly, regulation has reduced the likelihood of tyres floating to the surface of 
landfills. In particular, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia 
require tyres to be shredded before being placed in a landfill (URS 2006). 
Recent research commissioned by the Australian Government suggests the largest 
externality associated with used tyres now comes from illegal disposal and 
stockpiling. It was estimated that 9 per cent of used tyres are illegally dumped each 
year and the cost of cleaning them up would be over $4 million per annum 
(URS 2006).11 The cost would roughly double (in net present value terms over a 
ten-year period) if illegally-stockpiled tyres were also cleaned up. Nevertheless, the 
estimates indicate that externalities associated with used tyres are not enormous, 
especially after taking account of how regulation has reduced the risk of 
uncontrolled burning. Consistent with this view, ATIG  (sub.  DR270) and 
URS (2006) suggested the case for further government intervention may be based 
largely on three other sources of market failure: 
•  poorly-informed market participants 
•  ‘public-good’ aspects of research and development 
•  an inability for existing markets to provide ‘collective goods’. 
The Commission is not convinced these issues are a sound basis for government 
intervention in tyre markets, particularly if it involves an EPR or PS scheme (in-
principle concerns are outlined in box 10.5). URS (2006) claimed that consumers 
would lose up to $280 million over a ten-year period (in net present value terms) if 
the issues were not addressed. However, this overstates the case for government 
intervention. It was derived by comparing current tyre-disposal fees paid by 
consumers with an alternative (and much smaller) advance recycling fee designed to 
ensure most tyres are recycled.12 Shifting to the latter would involve a loss of 
revenue for retailers, and so the net gain to the community as a whole would be 
much less than $280 million (that is, most of the $280 million would be a transfer 
                                              
11 The 9 per cent estimate was derived by converting different types of dumped tyres into a 
standard unit of measurement based on weight (termed an ‘equivalent passenger unit’). This 
provides a better indicator of externalities than an unadjusted count of tyres, since the latter 
would overstate the significance of an illegally-dumped small tyre relative to a large tyre. 
12 URS (2005, p. 103) noted that ‘generally speaking a cost of $2.50 [per equivalent passenger 
(tyre) unit] is charged to consumers by tyre retailers to dispose of their end-of-life tyres’. In 
comparison, an advance recycling fee of $0.85 per equivalent passenger (tyre) unit was 
estimated to be sufficient to ensure 90 per cent of used tyres were recycled.     
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from one group to another).13 Indeed, recycling most tyres could impose a net cost 
on the community, since recycling has costs as well as benefits.14  
Furthermore, it is not clear that the three alleged sources of market failure have led 
to the disparity between current disposal fees and the advance recycling fee 
URS  (2006) considered appropriate. The most plausible explanation for the 
disparity — assuming URS’s estimate of the advance fee is accurate — is that 
(well-informed) consumer demand is largely insensitive to the size of a disposal or 
recycling fee, given it is a relatively small part of the cost of replacing a tyre, and 
this has enabled retailers to incorporate a profit margin into the fee they charge. 
There may be a potential efficiency gain from driving down this profit margin, but it 
would not be large. 
Nevertheless, there is a legitimate concern that current arrangements could enable a 
disposal fee to be charged even when the relevant tyres are illegally dumped. This 
possibility arises because it is difficult for consumers and retailers to monitor the 
actions of tyre collectors, who could find it more financially rewarding to illegally 
dump tyres than to take them to a landfill or recycler. There are various possible 
means of addressing this issue, including stricter licensing of tyre collectors and 
strengthened enforcement of regulations on dumping. This would probably be less 
costly and would more directly address the key remaining problem with used tyres 
— illegal dumping and stockpiling — than an EPR or PS scheme designed to 
recycle virtually all tyres.  
                                              
13 The economics underlying this point is somewhat complex, but is broadly as follows. If a lower 
fee did not change the consumption of replacement tyres, the revenue lost by retailers would 
equal the amount gained by consumers (termed a ‘transfer’). Hence, there would be no net gain 
to market participants (retailers and consumers) combined. A net gain would have to come from 
the additional demand stimulated by a lower fee (after subtracting the cost of the additional 
tyres). However, consumption of replacement tyres is unlikely to grow much in response to a 
lower fee, since current disposal fees already tend to be a relatively small part of the cost of 
replacing a tyre. The net gain to the community is, therefore, likely to be very small compared 
to the transfer of existing benefits to consumers. The argument would be more complex if the 
advance recycling fee caused recyclers to become more efficient. However, modelling by URS 
(2005) did not anticipate such efficiency improvements, and in any case the broad conclusion 
about the $280 million estimate is likely to remain valid. 
14 URS (2005) predicted a relatively small net benefit from adopting the advance recycling fee 
($7 million over a ten-year period in net present value terms), which would probably turn into a 
net loss with a slight change in assumptions.     
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Box 10.5  Claims about other tyre-related market failures 
ATIG (sub. DR270) and URS (2006) claimed that, in addition to externalities, 
government intervention in markets for tyre-derived products may be justified because 
market participants are poorly-informed, there are ‘public-good’ aspects of research 
and development, and ‘collective goods’ are undersupplied. The Commission is not 
convinced that these other alleged problems justify an EPR or PS scheme for tyres. 
Poorly-informed market participants 
With respect to information, ATIG noted: 
Consultancy reports for the DEH and the tyre industry have indicated that [tyre] collectors 
are not well informed about market opportunities … The frequent entry and exit of collectors 
means that they tend to be inexperienced in the markets for used tyres, and potential sellers 
and buyers do not know each other well ... This makes it difficult for reprocessors to access 
supplies of tyres and particularly for specialised markets to develop. (sub. DR270, p. 6) 
This is not a sound basis for intervention. In a market economy such as Australia’s, 
price signals provide the primary means of communicating information to market 
participants. If used tyres are being transformed into profitable products, it should be 
evident in the prices offered to used-tyre collectors and the prices achieved by 
producers of tyre-derived products (assuming there is no anticompetitive behaviour 
that needs to be addressed by competition regulation). Furthermore, there are 
probably many experienced parties in tyre-related industries who can make reasonably 
well-informed judgements about developing new markets. 
URS (2006) noted that some consumers may not be aware of the tyre-disposal fee 
retailers typically charge. However, this fee is relatively small — around $2.50 per 
passenger-vehicle tyre in metropolitan areas (URS 2005) — and so making it more 
transparent is unlikely to markedly change consumer behaviour, and thus is unlikely to 
drive major efficiency improvements in tyre collection and processing.  
Public-good aspects of research and development 
ATIG claimed that tyre recyclers were unable to protect their intellectual property, and 
URS (2006) provided a specific example: 
The Australian tyre industry is aware of a number of examples where inability to protect 
intellectual property has been a disincentive to [the] introduction of innovative uses of used 
tyres or tyre-derived products. (sub. DR270, p. 7) 
For example, a company developed the technology to create rubberised trays for mining 
trucks using tyre-derived products. It decided not to launch the product, despite the time and 
money invested, as it was concerned that its idea would be copied by competitors. 
(URS 2006, p. 4-6) 
This issue is not unique to tyre recycling. Australia has a well-developed system for 
protecting intellectual property that innovative tyre recyclers could use to capture a 
large proportion of the benefits of their inventions. 
(Continued on next page) 
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Box 10.5  (continued) 
Collective goods 
ATIG defined collective goods and provided examples: 
Collective goods are a special form of public goods, where the benefits accrue to the group, 
rather than the public as a whole … Well established industries often provide a range of 
collective goods, such as statistics and quality standards, for themselves. The tyre-derived 
products industry is relatively new and immature, and is not yet in a position to provide such 
services.  
The lack of industry statistics affects the development of all uses of used tyres. Information 
is inadequate about potential supplies to would-be users, and about potential uses 
themselves. Such information is vital to the development of markets … 
The lack of independent quality standards is impeding acceptance of tyre-derived products 
as substitutes for virgin materials. An example is the difficulty producers of rubberised 
asphalts have had in gaining acceptance of their products by certain state road authorities. 
(sub. DR270, p. 7) 
However, industry statistics are costly to collect and are not a prerequisite for 
developing or improving the efficiency of markets. Price signals provide the key means 
of communicating information to participants in existing markets, and there is probably 
sufficient experience in tyre-related industries to develop new markets. 
There may be a case for intervening to ensure standards — such as those for road 
construction — recognise the benefits of tyre-derived products. However, it would be 
less costly to do this directly — such as by revising the procurement standards used by 
road-construction authorities (chapter 12) — rather than via an EPR or PS scheme. 
URS claimed that generic marketing of tyre-derived products was another type of 
collective good that would be underprovided without intervention: 
One major area where transformers do not currently cooperate, but where they thought it 
would be beneficial to all players, is in the generic marketing and advertising of tyre-derived 
products to potential users and the broader population. Individual producers would not be 
able to appropriate the benefits of such generic services, so in the absence of collective 
action they will be underprovided. (URS 2006, p. 4-7) 




Full details of the foreshadowed tyre-recycling scheme have yet to be announced, 
but reports commissioned by the tyre industry and Australian Government suggest it 
would involve: 
•  an advance recycling fee applied to new tyres, with the revenue used to 
subsidise consumption of tyre-derived products; 
•  the fee would be set so as to achieve a recycling target of 90 per cent; and      
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•  the fee would be applied for a period of about eight years, to enable markets for 
tyre-derived products to mature, and would then cease (URS 2005, 2006). 
Governments and industry appear to be using an ‘infant-industry’ rationale for the 
foreshadowed scheme by suggesting the advance recycling fee is a short-term 
measure that would cease once markets for tyre-derived products have matured. 
Such a rationale has long been discredited in the area of industry policy and is 
unlikely to be any more valid in the case of tyre recycling. 
The Australian Tyre Recyclers Association (sub. DR169) noted a recycling target of 
90 per cent was being considered because industry research indicated it was 
‘achievable’. This is not the same as choosing a target that maximises net benefit to 
the community, which may be less than 90 per cent, given that recycling has costs 
as well as benefits. ATIG (sub. DR270) claimed the 90 per cent was not a target. 
However, the modelling it commissioned on the scheme (in conjunction with 
government and other industry groups) suggests otherwise: 
The [government and industry] Roundtable has a strong preference for a defined 
scheme that … will achieve at least 90 per cent utilisation of used tyres for approved 
end uses. (JWGT 2005, p. 8) 
The ARF [advance recycling fee] was set to achieve target numbers that recover 90 per 
cent of end-of-life tyres ten years into the scheme. (URS 2005, p. 84)  
The DEH (sub. DR214, p. 27) claimed the tyre-recycling scheme would ‘deliver to 
the Australian consumer a saving of $130 million over the 10-year life of the 
scheme and eliminate ongoing costs associated with tyre disposal’. However, that 
estimate was generated by URS (2005) using a similar methodology to its 
previously-mentioned quantification of market failures ($280 million). Thus, it is 
also likely to significantly overstate the case for government intervention. Indeed, 
this is evident from URS’s overall assessment of the tyre-recycling scheme — it 
estimated the scheme would only generate a net benefit of $7 million over a ten-
year period (in net present value terms). This borderline result is based on many 
heroic assumptions, and so there could be a net loss in practice. 
The Cement Industry Federation (trans.,  pp.  71–2) suggested its members were 
interested in using more tyres in their cement kilns, irrespective of whether there 
was a tyre-recycling scheme. However, uncertainty associated with the lengthy 
negotiations for the foreshadowed tyre-recycling scheme had discouraged the 
necessary investment in plant. 
The DEH (sub. DR214, p.  27) asserted the forthcoming scheme had ‘the full 
support of the representatives of the tyre industry and other key product stewards in 
the value chain of a tyre, including governments, tyre dealers, tyre recyclers and     
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users of tyre derived products’. However, the Federal Chamber of Automotive 
Industries (FCAI) — representing motor vehicle manufacturers — disagreed: 
FCAI holds significant reservations about the proposed tyres product stewardship 
agreement and the associated proposal to introduce an advance recycling fee, levied on 
tyre importers and manufacturers. 
FCAI notes that the proposed agreement establishes a target to divert 90 per cent of 
used tyres to ‘approved end markets’ within ten years. This target has been arbitrarily 
determined and there is no evidence that we are aware of to indicate that it represents 
an optimal balance between disposal and alternative uses for ‘end-of-life’ tyres … 
If it can be demonstrated that more significant negative externalities are likely to be 
associated with illegal dumping of used tyres, then it would be our view that 
appropriate efforts to minimise this type of behaviour should be the first priority of any 
proposed intervention. (sub. DR141, pp. 1–2) 
In any case, the industry’s support for the proposed scheme has to be viewed in the 
context of the pressure applied to the tyre industry over many years, and public 
perceptions about its products. Some firms may also support the proposed scheme 
because they believe their costs would increase by less than those of existing and 
potential competitors. 
In summary, if there is to be further government intervention on used tyres, it 
should focus on directly addressing the externalities associated with illegal dumping 
and stockpiles, rather than seeking to recycle virtually all tyres, as is envisaged 
under the foreshadowed stewardship scheme. Most claims about tyre-related market 
failures other than externalities are dubious, and their magnitude has been 
significantly overstated. 
10.7  Reforming the policy-making process 
The above case studies illustrate how governments have participated in — and 
sometimes demanded — the development of an EPR or PS scheme without first 
providing a thoroughly-researched and clearly-articulated case for such 
intervention. This approach is likely to lead to a proliferation of poorly-justified 
schemes, given that some state governments are currently pressuring numerous 
industries.  
The most prominent example of inappropriate intervention is in New South Wales, 
where the state government publishes annual EPR priority statements demanding 
action from industries. As noted previously, the Commission has in-principle 
concerns about the criteria the NSW Government uses to select products. 
Furthermore, it appears the NSW Government has been less than thorough in 
applying its own selection criteria (box 10.6).     
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Box 10.6  The NSW Government’s selection of products for its EPR 
priority statements 
The NSW Government’s EPR priority statements (and supporting documents) show 
little evidence the Government has: 
•  thoroughly reviewed scientific evidence on a product’s environmental and public 
health impacts, including the reasons why research results contrary to the 
government’s case can be dismissed (for example, contrary evidence from 
Macauley, Palmer and Shih (2002) on computers); 
•  considered how a lack of supporting data and research weakens the case for 
targeting a product (for example, concerns mentioned by APIA (sub. DR199) for 
office paper, and by AEEMA (sub. DR258) for appliances); and 
•  investigated potentially less-costly policy options before pushing for an EPR or PS 
scheme (such as pay-as-you-throw disposal charges to discourage packaging 
waste). 
As a result, the NSW Government rarely provides specific details about the problems it 
is seeking to address, or why an EPR approach is superior to other options. Instead, its 
priority statements tend to make broad statements about, for example, waste volumes, 
the materials used in a product and their recyclability (specific examples were provided 
in section 10.6). 
There are also questions about transparency and accountability. In particular, there is 
no clearly-defined process for industries to get off the NSW Government’s EPR priority 
list after responding to its concerns. 
Reflecting the above-mentioned deficiencies, targeted industries have expressed 
uncertainty about the precise problems they are supposed to be addressing and how 
they will satisfy the NSW Government’s demands (for example, APIA, sub. DR199; 
AEEMA, sub. DR258; Treated Timber Products Stewardship Group, sub. DR262). 
Some have felt it necessary to write to the NSW Government calling for greater clarity 
and offering to co-fund research to assist the Government in clearly defining the 
problem. 
Sources: DEC (2004b, 2004d, 2006b); EPA NSW (2003a); EPR Expert Reference Group (2005). 
 
 
The Product Stewardship Council also noted deficiencies in the NSW 
Government’s approach, and attributed this to various factors, including a lack of 
clear objectives in the relevant legislation and inadequate resourcing: 
We have advised New South Wales that we see their EPR priority statements as 
reflecting neither EPR nor prioritisation, this is especially problematic in that New 
South Wales is seen as a leader on EPR and has been copied directly by Western 
Australia … 
We believe that many of the difficulties in New South Wales result from a clear lack of 
objectives [in] the underpinning legislation, a lack of independent objective information 
on products and impacts as well as an apparent lack of resources to effectively evaluate     
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and develop product stewardship schemes has resulted in politics exerting undue 
influence in New South Wales calls for EPR on a broad range of products. These facts 
also make the program especially difficult to implement for government and for 
affected industries. (trans., p. 901) 
The Commission has reviewed the objectives that governments across Australia 
have set for their EPR and PS policies, and concluded they are often inappropriate 
and unclear. The overall objective should be to manage waste so as to reduce risks 
to human health, the environment and social amenity to acceptable levels (that is, 
where the expected benefits of further reducing the risk are less than the costs of 
doing so) (chapter 6). Waste avoidance and resource recovery may be outcomes of 
achieving this goal, but they are not objectives justifying government intervention 
in themselves.  
Another factor contributing to the problems in New South Wales and elsewhere 
may be the government’s source of advice. The NSW Government has appointed an 
Expert Reference Group to advise it on which products to target, the adequacy of 
proposed schemes, the effectiveness of existing industry actions, and whether 
regulation is required (DEC 2006a). However, the membership of this group may 
not be a totally independent and objective source. For example, some members are 
employed in the recycling industry. Another is currently campaigning for an 
alternative computer recycling scheme to the one being developed by the industry, 
which the Expert Reference Group may be called on to assess in the future 
(Lebihan 2006).  The Commission notes that computer manufacturers (and other 
targeted producers) are not represented on the Expert Reference Group. A further 
weakness in the Group’s composition appears to be limited experience in 
conducting scientific research on the targeted products’ environmental and health 
impacts. It appears that the WA Government intends to follow the NSW approach 
by appointing a ‘technical reference panel’ to advise it on product stewardship 
matters (WMB 2006). 
The Commission has concluded that governments, and particularly the NSW 
Government, should be taking a far more considered approach than they have, given 
significant uncertainty in the data and research necessary to justify EPR and PS 
schemes on many of the targeted products. The level of potential threat to the 
environment and humans from traditional disposal methods for most of these 
products does not appear to justify the costly and risk-averse approach taken by 
governments. In addition, governments should adopt clearer objectives and establish 
transparent procedures for how industries can be removed from any EPR priority 
list. It is of concern that the WA Government (2006a, 2006b) has modelled its 
foreshadowed EPR policy on the flawed approach used in New South Wales.     
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The approach used in New South Wales is symptomatic of an apparent tendency 
among policy makers across Australia to accept arguments in favour of an EPR or 
PS scheme at face value, and devote most of their efforts to designing and 
implementing a scheme. This was clearly the case for packaging, and it appears to 
be being repeated with foreshadowed schemes for computers and tyres. 
The Product Stewardship Council noted that governments seem to be motivated by 
‘policy envy’ that causes them to copy policies from other jurisdictions without 
questioning their suitability for local circumstances or even studying their cost 
effectiveness from overseas experience: 
It is unfortunate that a number of Australian jurisdictions have sought to mandate the 
introduction of EPR schemes without clear policy objectives and without full 
consideration of costs, benefits and risks of such schemes. All too often, there seems to 
be ‘policy envy’ in wanting to copy programs from other jurisdictions, including other 
countries, without fully understanding the implications of introducing those policies in 
a local context. (sub. DR161, p. 1) 
Ideally, the RIS process should, by providing decision makers with sound advice, 
help prevent poorly-justified schemes from being adopted. However, not all 
schemes are subject to a RIS cost–benefit study — particularly when no regulation 
is involved — even though they may be significantly influenced by governments. 
For those that are subject to RIS requirements, this has not been an insurmountable 
barrier to inappropriate schemes. The National Packaging Covenant was adopted 
despite having a RIS that is widely acknowledged as being inadequate. 
The Australian Government (2006) recently announced measures to strengthen its 
RIS process. However, there is still a risk that inappropriate EPR and PS schemes 
will be adopted, particularly if they are not subject to the Australian Government’s 
strengthened RIS requirements and/or there is pressure for a scheme from vocal 
community groups.  
Another reason why inappropriate schemes may still be adopted is that, by the time 
a proposal for an EPR or PS scheme has been finalised, considerable momentum 
has built up to implement the scheme. It is not unusual for a proposal to be the 
result of several years of negotiation and much effort from industry, community 
groups and government. Understandably, the parties are reluctant to see this 
investment come to nothing at the final stage. In practice, this has meant that, once a 
proposed scheme has been developed, it is too late to be testing whether there is a 
real problem justifying government intervention. 
To deal with the above-mentioned issues, there needs to be a greater onus on 
governments to demonstrate the problem an EPR or PS scheme might address, and     
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for them to do this before intervening to either design or encourage a scheme. This 
would require the: 
•  articulation of a specific and clearly-defined environmental and/or public health 
problem to be addressed;  
•  provision of supporting evidence from a thorough review of scientific research 
relevant to local conditions, including why contrary evidence is dismissed; and 
•  a preliminary assessment of whether the level of risk involved could justify the 
likely cost of government intervention. 
Ideally, the NSW Government’s EPR priority statements would provide such an up-
front identification of the problem. In practice, they have failed to do so. The NSW 
experience demonstrates the pitfalls of unclear objectives, a less-than-thorough 
approach, and a reliance on advice that is unlikely to be objective, independent or 
informed by the necessary scientific expertise.  
Thoroughly investigating a product’s alleged environmental and public health 
problems requires specialist scientific expertise. It is not a task that policy makers or 
representatives from industry and community groups are necessarily qualified to 
undertake. The Commission, therefore, proposes that governments assign the task of 
investigating a product’s alleged problems to independent panels of scientists, 
formed on an ad hoc basis as required, who have a history of peer-reviewed 
research that is objective and relevant. It would be desirable for such investigations 
to be transparent and to provide an opportunity for the community (including other 
scientists and the targeted industry) to have an input. 
The Commission considers that the Australian Government could play a key 
leadership role in this regard. Constitutional and other constraints appear to be a 
major barrier to the states implementing EPR and PS schemes without the 
Australian Government’s assistance. The Australian Government could therefore 
use its position and leadership role to insist on clear objectives and that a thorough 
up-front identification of the problem precedes the development or encouragement 
of an EPR or PS scheme. This would complement the measures it has already taken 
to strengthen the RIS process. It would also be a more appropriate approach than the 
current strategy of facilitating national EPR and PS schemes largely because it 
avoids the worse alternative of state-based schemes. 
In summary, government actions on EPR and PS have rarely followed one of the 
fundamental principles of good policy making — clearly articulate the problem you 
are seeking to address before you develop and then implement a new policy. To 
make matters worse, governments have been pressuring industries to cooperate in 
this flawed policy process, or face the prospect of more draconian government     
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intervention and/or inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions. When industries 
buckle under such pressure, or seek to minimise the costs by advocating a national 
approach, it tends to be presented to the public as a case of firms ‘voluntarily’ 
supporting and helping to design a scheme. 
The Commission has concluded that urgent reform of the policy-making process is 
required to prevent an imminent proliferation of poorly-justified schemes. In 
particular, there should be a greater onus on governments to justify their 
interventions, since EPR and PS schemes can be costly and are only likely to deliver 
a net benefit in limited circumstances (section 10.4). The proposed reform involves 
the use of independent specialists to confirm there is an environmental, public 
health or social amenity problem, and the risks are likely to be sufficient to justify 
the likely costs of government intervention, before governments design or 
encourage an EPR or PS scheme. 
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council, and its member 
Governments, should adopt the following two reforms to their product 
stewardship and extended producer responsibility policies. 
First, the objective should be reformulated to focus on reducing risks — to 
human health, the environment and social amenity — from waste to acceptable 
levels (that is, where the expected benefits of further reducing the risk are less 
than the costs of doing so). Objects that detract from this focus, such as those 
relating to resource conservation and upstream environmental protection, should 
be removed. 
Second, adopt a prerequisite that, before intervening, governments must consider 
the findings of a thorough review of scientific evidence on a product’s alleged 
environmental and public health impacts. Such reviews should: 
•  be conducted by independent panels of scientists, formed on an ad hoc basis as 
required, who have a history of peer-reviewed research in respected academic 
journals that is objective and relevant; 
•  consider public and relevant industry comment before being finalised; and 
•  make a preliminary assessment of the level of risk compared to the likely costs 
of intervention (informed by relevant economic and financial expertise).  
Such a panel should answer the questions ‘Does a comprehensive review of all 
relevant scientific research indicate that the product’s existing or anticipated 
production process, reuse, recycling and disposal in Australia has the potential to 
cause significant harm to the community and/or the environment? If so, define 
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exactly what the problem is, attempt to quantify its magnitude, and describe what 
actions might address the problem, and at what likely cost’.  
A panel’s report should always be completed and published before the relevant 
government(s) begins to design or encourage a product stewardship or extended 
producer responsibility scheme. 
     




11  Government information provision 
and procurement practices 
 
Key points 
•  Governments have a legitimate role in using education and moral suasion to 
encourage the adoption of better waste management practices. 
•  Government provision of general information and education programs can improve 
waste management practices, provided the information is accurate and relevant, 
would not otherwise be supplied by private markets, and there is a reasonable 
prospect of the information producing net benefits to the community. 
•  Effective recycling labels are difficult to design and implement. Mandatory labelling 
schemes are likely to be costly, and effective only when complemented by 
government and industry-supplied awareness raising and information programs. 
•  The case for government support of web-based waste exchanges, as a means of 
reducing transaction costs and assisting the development of recycling markets, is 
weak. This intermediary role is best left to private markets. 
•  The case for governments to provide information specific to firms about decreasing 
waste and increasing recycling is weak. Firms already have an incentive to obtain 
information about improved practices where such practices are likely to be privately 
cost effective.  
•  Programs that rely on moral suasion, or use moral suasion as a complement to 
other policy instruments, can be effective in influencing waste generation and 
disposal practices. But such programs should focus on major policy objectives, and 
be based on sound assessments of the costs and benefits of the course of action 
being promoted. 
•  The Australian, State and Territory Governments at times use procurement policy to 
pursue waste minimisation and resource recovery objectives. This may create a 
small demonstration effect for the broader community and assist the development of 
markets for recovered materials. However, such policies are an indirect and, most 
likely, relatively ineffective way of pursuing those objectives. 
 
 
Government involvement in waste disposal and resource recovery markets has not 
been limited to the use of regulatory and market-based instruments. Historically, 
governments have played an active role in providing information and community 
education programs. More recently, governments have also sought to align their    




activities and, particularly, their procurement practices, with broader waste policy 
objectives. 
This chapter analyses some of the issues associated with utilising information 
programs and government procurement practices in waste management policy. 
11.1  Information and moral suasion instruments 
Markets require information to work efficiently. Markets underperform when firms, 
investors and consumers have insufficient, or inadequate, information about such 
matters as the price, quality and availability of goods and services to make informed 
decisions (chapter 5). An example of imperfect information in waste management is 
when consumers are unaware of how to properly dispose of hazardous items, and 
instead dispose of them in ways that lead to adverse environmental outcomes. 
There may be a role for governments to provide information to address a market 
failure if: 
•  the information has public good characteristics (and therefore there is little 
incentive for the market to provide it); 
•  information asymmetries exist in the market; or  
•  there are potential positive demonstration effects for others from making this 
information available (chapters 5 and 9). 
Governments may also decide to educate and persuade firms and consumers to 
change behaviour they consider detrimental to the community. Persuasive 
information campaigns, or moral suasion, might be used by governments to 
complement other measures, such as regulation, or be used in their own right. 
Each of the different levels of government have particular strengths in providing 
information about their core responsibilities and services. Responsibility for the 
provision of information, education and moral suasion programs should reflect these 
strengths where it is efficient and effective. For example, because local 
governments have responsibility for the collection of waste and recyclable 
materials, they are naturally best placed to inform the public about the frequency 
and features of their collection services. They could also provide households with 
more explicit information on the cost effectiveness of these services (chapter 13). 
However, local governments are not well placed to advise on the environmental 
costs and benefits of different waste management options. This role would be best 
left to a higher level of government.     




Provision of general information 
General information includes any knowledge that is not specific to the activities of a 
particular firm or industry. It includes information about how the waste 
management system works, what the waste management options are, and the size 
and characteristics of the costs and benefits of each option to the community. 
Should governments provide general information? 
Governments often supply general information to the community about waste 
generation, disposal and resource recovery because it has public good 
characteristics and would, therefore, be underprovided by the market (chapter 5). 
Firms will have a reduced incentive to provide such information at a cost to 
themselves if they cannot capture the full benefits of its provision and it benefits 
other firms. 
Most state and territory governments run programs that provide information to the 
community about how to reduce waste and the operation of kerbside recycling. For 
example, the New South Wales Government provides free online guidelines for 
reducing waste in office buildings and runs the Murfy recycling education program 
(in partnership with local councils and industry) to inform householders about the 
operation of the kerbside recycling system.  
Some state governments, such as those of South Australia and Western Australia, 
also provide fact sheets on ways to reduce or recycle different types of waste. Some 
also run online directories of recyclers and recycling services (for example, 
Zero Waste SA 2006;  Zero Waste WA 2006). In Victoria, the Sustainability 
Victoria website contains an extensive range of advice for householders, firms, local 
governments and schools on waste reduction and recycling. 
Firms and industry groups often engage in community education initiatives for 
corporate reputation and other commercial reasons. For example, Visy Recycling 
operates a free email inquiry service for students on packaging and recycling issues 
(Visy Industries 2006). Similarly, the Packaging Council of Australia (sub. 67) has 
recruited an education officer to communicate with schools and the wider 
community on packaging issues. 
Though some firms and industry groups provide general information, it is unlikely 
that it will be sufficient to meet the community’s needs. Governments may provide 
general information at a lower cost where they have greater economies of scale or 
scope. In addition, governments may be seen to be a more credible source of some    




information than private providers. Private firms may have, or be perceived to have, 
a biased viewpoint.  
Governments, despite perceptions, are not always a source of accurate or complete 
information. For example, much of the current state and territory government 
provision of general information is underpinned by an undue emphasis on the waste 
hierarchy. The waste hierarchy does not always accurately reflect the net benefits to 
the community of the different waste management options (chapter 7). For 
information on waste disposal and resource recovery to benefit the community, it 
must be based on correct information about the relative costs and benefits of the 
various options. 
Governments have a role in providing credible and appropriately validated 
information to the community regarding the social and environmental externalities 
of waste disposal and recycling (chapter 4). This information is unlikely to be 
provided by market participants (due to its public good characteristics) and is 
important for informing policy makers and the general community. 
Improved information could also address popular community misconceptions about 
waste management issues. A number of such misperceptions have been identified in 
this inquiry, including: 
•  support for policy priorities based on the waste hierarchy; 
•  negative perceptions of the environmental and social costs of disposal to 
properly-located, engineered and managed landfills; and 
•  opposition to the recovery of energy from waste. 
The Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association (PACIA) argued: 
… one of the major hindrances to the increased use of EfW [energy from waste] in 
Australia is a lack of understanding of EfW which has led to concern and a negative 
attitude toward the technology by the general public. This has been, in some instances, 
further fuelled by the activities of some environmental advocates. The government at 
all levels has a key role in supporting the legitimacy of alternatives and in educating all 
parts of the community of the benefits of applying complementary alternatives such as 
EfW. (sub. 120, p. 18) 
The Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development also called for the 
community to be better informed about waste issues:  
Currently, little effort is being made to correct popular misconceptions about waste 
management ... Sensationalising waste issues also misinforms the community and does 
not contribute to rational debate. This practice of misinforming or under-informing the 
community about waste issues should cease. (sub. 70, pp. 17-8)     




Are general information programs effective? 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH, sub. 103) observed that 
general information programs were relatively ineffective in changing the behaviour 
of individuals and firms. On the other hand, several participants argued that 
information programs were important in improving the general awareness of the 
community about waste-related issues and could drive changes in behaviour (for 
example, Green Planet Environmentals, sub. 89; Municipal Association of Victoria, 
sub. 113). 
KESAB Environmental Solutions (sub. 20) argued that the effectiveness of 
information programs depended to a large extent on whether the information was 
presented in an accessible way and on the method of its delivery. It observed that, in 
South Australia, waste-related information materials were commonly only available 
online. But surveys show that only 26  per  cent of householders sourced their 
information about waste disposal and recycling from the internet, compared to 
78 per cent doing so from their local councils. The Local Government Association 
of the Northern Territory (sub.  19) observed that education programs should be 
locally adapted to reflect special training needs and cultural considerations. 
The DEH observed that the effectiveness of information programs aimed at firms 
could be jeopardised by negative perceptions about the agency providing the advice:  
Most programs have been sponsored and/or delivered by or on behalf of environmental 
agencies. Given that these agencies are primarily viewed as regulators, well-intended 
advice may not be accepted and acted upon by the regulated firms. (sub. 103, p. 51) 
To overcome perceptions of bias, there may be a role for partnerships between 
governments and industry, community groups, or other non-government 
organisations to deliver general information programs. 
General information programs might not change behaviour substantially in the short 
term, but may still be justified if they lead to longer-term behavioural change and 
can be delivered cost effectively. 
Conclusion 
There is a role for governments to provide general information on waste 
management issues, providing that this information accurately reflects the net 
benefits to the community of the different waste management options and is likely 
to be undersupplied by the market. 
Each of the different levels of government have particular strengths in providing 
information about their core responsibilities and services. Responsibility for the    




provision of information should reflect these strengths, providing it is cost effective 
to do so. For local governments, this includes information about the availability of 
waste management services in their area. For state and territory governments, this is 
likely to cover information about the regulatory requirements of waste operators. 
For the Australian Government, this includes facilitating the development of 
soundly based information on the level and characteristics of national waste 
disposal and resource recovery activity, and research into disposal externalities. 
This information would help policy makers and the community to assess the costs 
and benefits of different waste management options and make sounder decisions. 
All levels of government have a responsibility to ensure that the information they 
provide is not only factual and impartial, but relevant to the policy issues of concern 
to the community. Currently, much of the debate about policy options is 
characterised by misinformation about the environmental and social impacts of 
some waste management options. Identifying and directly addressing some of the 
major concerns — such as the notion that energy-from-waste options are inherently 
harmful, or that electronic waste in landfills necessarily causes major problems — 
would encourage more informed debate. 
Australian governments should identify any major misunderstandings the 
community may have about the risks, costs and benefits of waste management 
issues and address these by ensuring the supply of factually accurate, relevant 
and accessible information to the public.  
Waste exchange services 
Some inquiry participants called for governments to establish waste exchanges to 
facilitate markets for recovered resources (Municipal Association of Victoria, 
sub. 113; PACIA, sub. 120). They were concerned that the high search costs faced 
by buyers and sellers limited market development, and that these search costs may 
be reduced through government intervention. 
In response to these concerns, governments might provide, or assist in providing, 
online directories on what products can be recycled in a particular location, and 
waste exchanges to directly facilitate markets for recovered resources. Whereas 
online directories provide consumers with the address and contact information of 
recyclers in their area, waste exchanges offer a consolidated catalogue of recovered 
materials offered for sale or wanted by potential purchasers. Government-run waste 
exchanges currently operate in Victoria and Tasmania. 
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Should governments provide waste exchange services? 
A number of participants argued that governments should provide a waste exchange 
service in recycling markets. For example, PACIA noted:  
Web-based exchanges provide a very time and cost-efficient way of matching waste 
with solutions, or materials with processors. PACIA sees government as having a 
long-term role, initially through providing assistance in the design and setup of the data 
base, and subsequently playing the role of ‘honest broker’, thus ensuring that the 
unavoidable monopolies associated with some wastes and treatment processes do not 
adversely affect the fairness, efficiency and viability of the process. (sub. 120, p. 6) 
The Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) also noted: 
There is a clear need for a national approach to resource exchange, which ‘the market’ 
has failed to establish. The Australian and State Governments need to provide 
leadership in this area to help facilitate, where feasible and practicable, the exchange of 
waste resources. (sub. 113, p. 7) 
On the other hand, the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association (WCRA) of 
New South Wales contended: 
•  Government should leave the market place to sort out web-based waste exchanges. 
•  WCRA is of the view that web-based exchanges are more of a feel-good tool than a 
significant answer to the issues facing the waste management industry. (sub. 15, p. 2) 
It is not clear that governments have a comparative advantage in the provision of 
intermediary services. Private markets can and do provide these services to facilitate 
markets when there are strong incentives, such as profit, for markets to work. Some 
examples are the broad range of privately-provided online and print-based 
classifieds services that are available in Australia. 
If a private exchange cannot operate profitably, it may be because there are other 
impediments to the development of markets for recovered resources (chapter 5). 
This may include distances between waste generators and recyclers (which affect 
costs and profit margins), low (or falling) market prices for recovered materials, or 
unnecessarily restrictive government regulations. 
Also, web exchanges are not the only medium for exchanging information. Firms 
may work directly between themselves to facilitate the reuse and recycling of 
recovered resources. A case in point is the work of the Kwinana Industries Council 
to facilitate the development of a market among its members for the reuse of their 
industrial wastes (Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development, sub.  70; 
Kwinana Industries Council, sub. DR166) (chapter 4).    




There is no clear evidence that government provision of waste-exchange services 
will lead to significant development in the market for recovered resources. In 
reference to the Victorian Waste Exchange Database, the MAV stated: 
It is unclear how widely this database is used, however only a limited number of 
material sources were listed at the time of writing. (sub. 113, p. 7) 
There is also little evidence of government-sponsored waste exchanges having been 
successful overseas. The OECD (2005d) reported that an evaluation of the waste 
exchange scheme that operated in Chicago showed that the scheme failed to 
generate significant trading in recovered resources. It also noted that many 
government-run waste exchanges in other OECD countries have closed. 
Conclusion 
The case for governments to provide waste exchanges is weak. Private markets can 
and do provide this service to facilitate markets where there are strong incentives 
for markets to work. Search and transaction costs influence the operation of all 
markets, not just the market for recovered resources. Such costs may be higher in 
recycling markets due to the dispersed nature of waste generation and recycling 
activities in many areas and the heterogeneity of the waste. But this is not a reason 
for government intervention. 
Governments should leave the provision of waste-exchange services to private 
markets. 
Recycling labels 
Some inquiry participants called for the introduction of packaging recycling labels 
to increase resource recovery rates (Australian Local Government Association, 
sub. 77, p. 2; the Local Government Association of South Australia, sub. 102, p. 2). 
Labels that indicate whether a container is recyclable aim to overcome an 
information barrier by informing consumers about what is recyclable, and assisting 
recyclers with sorting. 
Should governments mandate the labelling of products? 
There may be a role for governments to introduce product labelling schemes for 
recycling where this information is not being provided, there is little private 
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incentive for firms to provide it (they are not the main beneficiary of the recycling 
effort), and it is likely to result in net benefits to the community. 
Firms, however, already provide some information about the ability of products to 
be recycled. Many packaging products use the internationally-consistent three 
chasing arrows, known as the mobius loop, to indicate that they can, potentially, be 
recycled. An example is the plastics industry’s incorporation of the mobius loop 
symbol into its plastics identification code system (box 11.1). This coding system 
identifies what a product is made of, and while it was not intended to be an 
environmental label, is often used by local governments to inform people about 
which items can be placed in municipal recycling bins (PACIA 2003). 
Even where recycling labels have not been used, most recyclable containers — such 
as aluminium cans and glass bottles — are identifiable by their size, shape and 
colour, so a recycling label might not be necessary for such products. In the case of 
plastics, a US survey found that most containers tend to be sorted by appearance 
because, by the time the containers reach the sorting line, they may be squashed, 
and the coding symbol may be difficult to see (PACIA 2001a).  
Firms, also, may be able to gain a marketing advantage from making such 
information available to consumers. The Australian Environmental Labelling 
Association awards special eco-labels to products that meet or exceed voluntary 
international standards for environmental performance (ISO 14024). The label is 
awarded to, for example, plastic containers that contain a recycled content of more 
than 30 per cent (AELA 2005). 
While the case for compulsory recycling labelling of containers is weak, there may 
be a better case for labelling products that have the potential to contaminate or 
otherwise cause problems in the waste stream. In this case, the label could provide 
the contact details of an information service — for example, a telephone hotline — 
that would allow consumers to find out how to appropriately recycle or dispose of 
particular waste not accepted in the kerbside collection system. Labels may, 
thereby, facilitate a reduction in risks for collectors and landfill operators if they led 
to hazardous waste being correctly disposed or recycled, and not contaminating the 
kerbside system.    





Box 11.1  The plastics identification code 
The plastics identification code is a series of symbols that identify the most common 
plastic material used in the manufacture of a product or packaging. The symbols are 
usually embossed or otherwise imprinted on to the bottom surface of plastic containers. 
Each symbol in the plastics coding system consists of a mobius loop with a number 
from 1 to 7, as shown below. 
 
Code Material  Common  applications 
 
Polyethylene terephthalate  Beverage bottles, food packaging. 
 
High density polyethylene  Milk bottles, freezer bags, milk 
crates. 
 
Polyvinyl chloride  Plumbing pipe, cordial bottles. 
 
Low density polyethylene  Water tanks, squeeze bottles, 
bread bags. 
 
Polypropylene Microwave  ware, automotive parts, 
plant pots, compost bins. 
 
Polystyrene  Safety helmets, shock absorbers, 
fresh-food boxes, drinking cups. 
 
Includes: polyurethane, 
polycarbonate, nylon, degradables. 
Airbags, seatbelts, computer 
cases. 
The coding system was first developed by the Society of the Plastics Industry in the 
United States in 1988. The system is now mandatory in most US states, and has since 
been adopted by the European Union, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia.  
The scheme was introduced in Australia in 1990. The Plastics and Chemicals 
Industries Association (PACIA) manages the voluntary coding system. In 2001, PACIA 
conducted a review that resulted in a revised Code of Practice about the use of the 
coding symbols. For example, the revised Code of Practice recommends that 
containers intended for the carriage of dangerous goods do not carry the Plastics 
Coding System, and instead, should be labelled with instructions for decontamination 
and disposal (PACIA 2001b). In this regard, when deciding whether to affix the codes 
to containers, manufacturers should consult with recyclers as to whether their particular 
containers would contaminate the recycling stream. 
The coding system appears to have contributed to the large increase in recycling over 
the past 10 years. The amount of plastics recycled more than tripled from 59 kilotonnes 
in 1992 to 189 kilotonnes in 2003. 
Sources: EcoRecycle Victoria (nd); PACIA (2001a, 2001b).     




Are labelling schemes effective? 
Labelling needs to be complemented by other information-provision programs in 
order to be effective. Consumers could be misled by general recycling labels into 
thinking that some containers are recyclable when there is no infrastructure for 
recycling to occur. While there are seven common types of recyclable plastics that 
bear the mobius loop symbol, historically only three types of plastics (codes 1, 2 
and 3) have been widely recycled in Australia. The Packaging Council of 
Australia  (sub. 67) supported packaging recycling labels, but noted it would be 
helpful for consumers to know both that the packaging is recyclable and that a 
system for recycling exists. 
Given this potential for confusion, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC 1995) has ruled that the plastics coding system should not be 
used by manufacturers as an environmental claim. In addition, PACIA (2003, p. 2) 
stated that the ‘code is not intended to be a guarantee of recycling or to provide 
companies with a platform for environmental claims’. However, consumers may 
misinterpret the information and incorrectly think that all material bearing a plastics 
identification code is recyclable. In this regard, the Local Government Association 
of South Australia (sub. 102, p. 3) stated that the labelling of all plastics will mean 
that consumers ‘infer recyclability, although this may not be the case’. 
Labelling may be ineffective if important information is not disclosed. In particular, 
single-attribute environmental claims on containers may cause problems if the 
container contained hazardous material. For example, clear plastic containers that 
had contained, and perhaps absorbed, products such as poisons should not be 
marked with a plastics identification code under the PACIA (2001b) code of 
practice used in Australia. 
The costs of labelling some products should also be considered. Where labels can 
be printed on the product (such as paper and cardboard), the costs would be low. 
However, where labelling requires changes to product tooling, as might be the case 
for some products made from aluminium, steel and plastic, costs could be more 
substantial.  
A voluntary, self-regulated scheme is likely to be the least costly regulatory form 
for a labelling scheme (chapter 8). However, if industry coverage were important, as 
in the case of labelling hazardous products, then co-regulated and 
explicitly-regulated schemes may need to be considered. Such schemes would 
impose extra costs, including the cost to government for the program development 
and administration.     




Ultimately, any form of recycling labelling scheme would need to be supported by a 
comprehensive cost–benefit analysis. It is also important that recycling labelling 
presents information that is accurate and relevant and does not mislead users. 
There are significant practical difficulties in designing and implementing an 
effective system of labelling for recycling, and any mandatory scheme would need to 
be supported by a comprehensive cost–benefit analysis. Where labelling schemes 
are adopted, they should be complemented with government and industry-supplied 
awareness-raising programs and information hotlines. 
Industry best-practice programs 
Governments provide a range of information and advisory services to firms to 
encourage them to reduce their generation of waste, and increase their reuse and 
recovery of resources. This information includes best-practice guidelines, self-audit 
and certification schemes, advisory services, and the publication of case studies. 
Many governments also provide subsidies or grants for research and development 
into better practices and technologies (chapter 9). 
The New South Wales, Victorian, and Queensland Governments all provide 
best-practice guidelines to firms in specific sectors. For example, Sustainability 
Victoria (2006) provides guidance specific to firms in the construction and 
demolition, and hospitality industries, as well as to organisers of public events. 
Sustainability Victoria (2006) and EPA Queensland (2006a) also operate 
certification programs for firms that have shown a commitment to minimise waste 
and increase resource recovery. The Waste Wise program in Victoria and the 
EcoBiz Waste Wise program in Queensland aim to support the implementation of 
waste-minimisation and resource-recovery action plans for firms. The sponsoring 
agencies also provide advisory services to help participants plan for and meet their 
waste-reduction and resource-recovery goals. 
Governments have also used case studies of firms that have successfully reduced 
their generation of waste, increased resource recovery, and/or used more recovered 
resources to convince other firms that these measures are privately cost effective. 
Should governments directly advise on industry best practice? 
Firms use a variety of resources and generate waste in the production and supply of 
goods and services. In a competitive market, firms are constantly looking for new 
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opportunities to reduce costs (including by reducing the waste they generate and/or 
the amount of resources they use) and improve the quality of their outputs. They can 
also be expected to look out for ways to cost-effectively meet any government 
requirements, such as environmental regulations. 
However, the DEH (sub. 103, sub. DR214) argued that firms may not implement 
measures to reduce waste generation or increase recycling, even where measures are 
privately cost effective:  
Awareness by industrial and commercial waste generators of even the direct costs of 
their wastes may be limited by the fact that such costs are often not clearly identified in 
their accounts. Because waste management costs often constitute only a small 
percentage of a business’s overall costs, they tend to be bulked in with other 
‘overheads’. This is despite the fact that (as various case studies have shown) the 
potential savings through waste reduction may significantly increase marginal 
profitability … (sub. 103, p. 34)  
The DEH also argued that there are ‘institutional barriers to waste reduction and 
recycling such as a resistance to change, a lack of expertise and capacity and 
competing business priorities’ (sub. DR214, p. 18). 
However, the identification of an unrealised waste management opportunity does 
not provide strong grounds for government intervention. Nor does it necessarily 
mean that a firm’s managers have misplaced priorities (chapter 5). Instead, it may 
mean that they are using their limited resources to pursue more promising 
opportunities for the firm. 
As discussed earlier, governments can have a role in providing general information 
to firms (and consumers) where there is little private incentive for it to be provided 
(it is a public good), and its provision is likely to create net benefits for the 
community. Some of the information provided to firms by governments may fit this 
criteria, especially where it assists firms to meet their regulatory requirements. EPA 
NSW (2006), for example, provides guidance material to firms in a range of sectors 
on how to properly store, recycle and dispose of potentially hazardous materials. 
This information may not only help firms to meet their regulatory requirements but 
also reduce monitoring and enforcement costs for the regulator. 
It is, however, not clear that governments have a role in providing advisory and 
certification schemes for firms on reducing waste generation, increasing recycling 
and using more recovered materials. These services are already provided by private 
environmental consultants and accreditation services. Where the cost savings, or 
marketing advantages, from improved practices are significant, it is likely that firms 
will seek out these services themselves. Just because firms do not address these    




issues does not necessarily make it a market failure requiring government 
intervention (chapter 5). 
The MAV also suggested that governments could establish an information exchange 
(or library) of ways for firms and governments to improve their waste and recycling 
practices: 
Information exchanges and databases on waste minimisation and resource recovery for 
consumers, industry, business and governments can be an effective means to share 
ideas and ‘lessons learnt’. Local government has identified a clear need for a 
web-based information exchange to share case studies, best-practice examples of new 
implementations of waste management systems and ‘lessons learnt’ ... However, 
exchanges require significant resources to establish and maintain, which requires 
assistance from the Australian and State Governments. (sub. 113, p. 7) 
But while such an exchange might offer some advantage to local (and perhaps state 
and territory) governments, it is not clear that this would apply to the private sector. 
Firms (and industries) already have an array of incentives to conduct their own 
research into best-practice processes and have an incentive not to release the 
particulars of this (proprietary) information to their competitors (chapter 9).  
Even where governments publish case studies of particular firms’ research and 
process innovations, it is unlikely that the information provided would be 
sufficiently detailed to significantly benefit other firms in the industry. 
Conclusion 
The identification of an unrealised waste management opportunity does not provide 
strong grounds for government intervention. Nor does it mean that firm managers’ 
priorities are misplaced. For many firms, waste management is only a small part of 
their total costs, and the benefits of introducing new waste management practices 
are likely to be small.  
While governments may have a legitimate role in providing general information to 
firms, it is not clear that they have a role in providing more specific information 
such as advisory and certification services, or an information-sharing database.  
Moral suasion 
Government information programs can also have an element of moral suasion. That 
is, they aim to change people’s behaviour by influencing their values and 
preferences. Community awareness-raising campaigns and school-based education     




programs to reduce waste generation and littering, and increase resource recovery 
efforts, have elements of moral suasion in them.  
Moral suasion programs in waste policy take a number of forms that utilise many 
different information delivery mechanisms — provision of brochures to 
householders, display of posters and signage in public places, presentations at 
schools, businesses and community centres. Advertising in the media has also been 
commonly used.  
Should governments conduct moral suasion programs? 
Moral suasion programs may be introduced where particular behaviours result in 
outcomes detrimental to the community (such as social or environmental harm) and 
other measures are less cost effective. They may also be used to complement other 
measures, such as government regulation, to increase compliance, and reduce 
enforcement costs. Moral suasion may be especially useful where it is difficult to 
link problems with the individual(s) or group(s) that created them, and thus 
financial incentives, or criminal sanctions, are difficult to apply. In the case of litter, 
for example, although littering fines are in place throughout Australia, it is simply 
not possible to catch all the litterers. 
Are moral suasion programs effective? 
The DEH claimed that moral suasion programs were relatively ineffective in 
changing business behaviour: 
… surveys repeatedly show that many business owners do not see their businesses as 
having a considerable impact on the environment, and therefore are not susceptible to 
environmental messages. (sub. 103, p. 51) 
In contrast, some programs aimed at the general public seem to have had a positive 
impact. A community survey on the impacts of the ‘Don’t Be a Tosser’ campaign 
that was run during 2000–03 in New South Wales to discourage littering behaviour, 
found: 
•  over 90 per cent of people understood its key anti-littering messages; 
•  greater concern about the effect of litter on the environment and increased 
awareness of the social unacceptability of littering; and 
•  growing awareness that personal actions were needed to reduce littering (New 
South Wales Government, sub. 95).    




The program’s predecessor — the ‘Do the Right Thing’ awareness-raising 
campaign that ran during 1978–90 — was credited by EPA NSW (1996a) with 
reducing littering in public places by 70 per cent. 
US experience also indicates that moral suasion programs have an effect on littering 
behaviour (FCSHWM 1997; Syrek 2003).  
Moral suasion, however, is not sufficient on its own to deal with many of the 
problems to which it is targeted. In the case of litter, other intervention may be 
required: 
… the management of litter is complex. It’s not a straightforward, ‘Do A and you get 
B.’ We understand that generally the management of litter requires at least three things: 
education, infrastructure and enforcement, not necessarily in equal parts. (PACIA, 
trans., p. 1119) 
The prevalence of littering behaviour in particular areas is the result of a range of 
factors (BIEC 2004). These include not only whether anti-littering education 
campaigns are in place, but also whether the area in question had appropriate waste 
disposal facilities, and was well-maintained. It is not just in litter prevention that 
governments complement moral suasion with other measures. For example, 
education and moral suasion, regulation and enforcement all operate hand-in-hand 
to enforce speed limits, the wearing of seatbelts in cars, and to encourage people not 
to smoke cigarettes. 
Conclusion 
Government programs that rely on persuasion can be effective in addressing waste 
policy objectives where they complement other regulation and education initiatives. 
However, such programs should focus on major policy objectives and be based on 
sound assessments of the costs and benefits of the course of action being promoted. 
11.2  Government procurement programs 
The general aim of government procurement policy is to obtain value for money. 
However, Australian governments have, to varying degrees, also required that 
government purchasing decisions take into consideration objectives to minimise 
waste, recover resources and purchase recycled products. The New South Wales, 
Victorian, and South Australian governments have adopted specific procurement 
policies or programs to achieve these objectives. In other states and territories, 
waste management considerations are incorporated into a general procurement 
policy, most commonly as a separate environmental sustainability criterion.     




Australian Government procurement policies are less explicit with respect to waste 
management and recycling issues (box 11.2). 
Government agencies are typically required to consider the life-cycle cost of their 
purchases, including the private and social costs of disposal and potential for 
resource recovery. 
 
Box 11.2  Australian Government green procurement policies 
The Australian Government does not have mandatory environmental procurement 
requirements for products and services, with the exception being for energy efficiency. 
Chief executive officers are given some latitude as to how procurement is conducted in 
their agencies, provided it is consistent with requirements established under the 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines and Best Practice Guidance. Key requirements are that 
procurement follow the principles of value for money, and that it is conducted in 
accordance with relevant government policies. 
Some of the environmental policies officials and agencies need to consider in their 
purchasing decisions include: 
•  the National Greenhouse Strategy and Measures for Improving Energy Efficiency in 
Commonwealth Operations; 
•  Government fleet targets; 
•  the National Government Waste Reduction and Purchasing Guidelines; 
•  the National Packaging Covenant Commonwealth Action Plan; and  
•  the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. 
Only the greenhouse and energy efficiency measures are mandatory for Australian 
Government agencies. The DEH does, however, provide voluntary checklists to 
agencies to encourage them to incorporate environmental considerations into their 
procurement decisions. 
Sources: AELA (2004); ANAO (2005); DOFA (2004). 
 
 
At the local government level, procurement policies can also be influenced by 
waste-reduction objectives. Two local government schemes that have this effect are 
currently in operation — ECO-Buy in Victoria (box 11.3) and the Buy Recycled 
Alliance in New South Wales. 
    




Box 11.3 ECO-Buy 
The ECO-Buy program was established in 2000 as a joint initiative between the MAV 
and EcoRecycle Victoria to implement ‘green purchasing’ practices by Victorian local 
governments. Green purchasing refers to giving preference to products that have a 
lower effect on human health and the environment on the basis of characteristics that 
include the source of raw materials, the potential for reuse and recycling, and the costs 
of disposal.  
In 2004, 58 Victorian councils (73 per cent) were members of the program. Members 
are required to adopt a green purchasing policy, develop an action plan, monitor the 
purchasing of green products, and report on progress every 12 months.  
The ECO-Buy website contains various guidelines and advice on implementing a green 
purchasing policy as well as a continually updated database of over 500 suppliers and 
their products that meet the definition of a green product.  
The program also initiated a national ECO-Alliance of local governments committed to 
establishing a green purchasing program. Members include the local government 
associations of New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland. 
In 2004, local governments in New South Wales established a similar program called 
the Buy Recycled Alliance.  
Source: AELA (2004). 
 
 
Should governments use procurement policies to meet their waste 
reduction and recycling objectives? 
Government procurement policy can influence the market in the following ways: 
•  It can directly assist market development through purchases of particular 
products. When governments constitute a significant proportion of the market 
for a particular product, their purchasing behaviour has implications for the 
development of that market.  
•  It can provide a demonstration effect for others. Government purchasing 
behaviour may provide information to the community about the quality and cost 
effectiveness of particular products or services. 
Several participants emphasised the importance of government procurement activity 
on waste management in Australia. For example, the National Packaging Covenant 
Industry Association claimed: 
Government and business procurement are equally fundamental to creating stable 
demand for recovered materials and to demonstrating leadership by example. 
(sub. 92, p. 11)     




The Australian Tyre Recyclers Association (sub. 51) noted that increased 
government procurement of recycled tyre products could play a significant market 
development role, as well as create a strong demonstration effect for private 
industry. Green Planet Environmentals (sub. 89) and the Product Stewardship 
Australia and Consumer Electronics Suppliers Association (sub. 66) also advocated 
greater use of government procurement practices to achieve waste policy objectives. 
There is little evidence about the effectiveness of government procurement policies 
in reducing waste generation and increasing resource recovery. An evaluation of the 
performance of the New South Wales Waste Reduction and Purchasing Policy in 
the period from 2003 to 2005 (DEC 2006c) showed that the policy had some 
influence on the purchasing behaviour of government agencies. However, results 
varied significantly between product types, and there were reductions in purchases 
of a number of products targeted by the policy. The ECO-Buy program reported 
that Victorian local government expenditure on green products increased from 
$5.9  million in 2001 to $36.9 million  (representing  around 2 per cent of total 
expenditure on materials and contracts) in 2004 (ECO-Buy 2004). 
A number of participants argued that current government procurement policies were 
ineffective in promoting waste-related policy goals. The ACT Department of Urban 
Services observed: 
… attempts to utilise ‘value for money’ principles that integrate environmental criteria 
have had little impact on changing procurement outcomes. While much work has gone 
into sustainable procurement initiatives they are yet to become mainstream or effective. 
(sub. 36, p. 6) 
The Australian Environmental Labelling Association (AELA 2004), in a report on 
‘green’ procurement in Australia, also concluded that government procurement 
practices were largely ineffective in achieving their objectives.  
For procurement policy to have significant demonstration effects to the broader 
community, these purchasing decisions need to also be privately cost effective. To 
the extent that government procurement policy is guided by including unpriced 
environmental or social benefits of waste reduction and resource recovery, the 
incentives for individuals and firms to adopt similar practices are likely to be 
reduced. 
Purchasing decisions by individuals and firms could create a stronger demonstration 
effect than government procurement policy because those purchasing decisions may 
provide a more credible signal about private cost effectiveness. That information 
may also be more relevant for other individuals and firms. Thus, publicising success 
stories from current industry and household practices may be a more effective 
demonstration policy. Though, as discussed earlier (and in chapter 5), unless a    




significant market failure were identified regarding the availability of information to 
the firm, government intervention is unlikely to be warranted. 
Barriers to using government procurement to advance waste policy 
There appear to be significant limitations on the effectiveness of procurement policy 
in promoting waste-related policy goals. Some of the problems are summarised 
below. 
Time and expertise constraints of purchasing officers  
‘Green’ procurement adds to the complexity of purchasing decisions. The limited 
ability of purchasing officers to cope with the complex information requirements 
involved in ‘green’ purchasing was a common problem identified in a survey of 
green procurement policies in Australia (AELA 2004).  
Incorporating considerations of life-cycle environmental costs into the purchasing 
decision is difficult, and the tradeoffs between financial and environmental costs are 
not well understood, even by those who specialise in these areas. Yet most of the 
small order purchasing by government agencies is highly devolved to a large 
number of procurement officers, for whom purchasing constitutes only a part of 
their job (AELA 2004). Strategic Initiatives (sub. 58, p. 4) observed that 
‘Devolution has the effect of lowering the expertise available for consideration of 
new technology’. While training of purchasing officers may address the problem to 
some extent, it is likely to be expensive and difficult, given the large number of 
purchasing officers (AELA 2004). 
Information asymmetries 
There are likely to be significant information asymmetries between purchasing 
officers and suppliers about the environmental characteristics of a product. This 
problem is likely to be exacerbated by the time constraints, and lack of appropriate 
expertise of procurement officers. Suppliers would have a strong incentive to 
exploit this information advantage if it increased the likelihood of their product 
being purchased (as in the case of procurement policies that explicitly favour a 
particular product characteristic). AELA (2004) claimed that ‘greenwashing’ of 
products, where suppliers misrepresented the environmental characteristics of their 
products to obtain a government contract has been a significant problem for 
procurement officers in a number of states including Victoria, Queensland and 
South Australia.      




Conflict with other objectives 
Incorporating waste reduction and resource conservation objectives in procurement 
policies is likely to clash with other objectives of government agencies. Most 
significantly, all public sector agencies are budget constrained, and have strong 
incentives to minimise the cost of their purchases. This may limit the purchase of 
products containing recycled materials, because they are often more expensive than 
their virgin material equivalents. Budgetary and internal constraints were also 
identified as a barrier to ‘green’ procurement in a recent audit of Australian 
Government purchasing (ANAO 2005). And as the Local Government and Shires 
Association of New South Wales commented: 
The dilemma for government and the private sector alike is that … [purchasing 
recycled materials] often represents an increased financial commitment. Put simply, 
recycled mulch, roadbase, bitumen, [and] paper often cannot compete with the cost of 
producing virgin materials. (sub. 98, p. 12) 
Some recycled products, such as paper, are also of lower quality than their virgin 
substitutes, and thus their attractiveness to government agencies may be limited: 
People want to use brighter, smoother papers that require virgin pulp. There's some 
exceptions but essentially the more secondary fibre you put in the sheet, the lower the 
brightness and the lower the tear values. Commercially, most mills have had the same 
experience, that it costs more generally to produce product with higher recyclable 
content and the end product isn’t quite as good. So from the point of view of trying to 
sell these products … it is not a very good sell for the converting industry. 
(Australasian Paper Industries Association, trans., p. 1059) 
The time taken to consider and verify disposal and resource recovery characteristics 
of different products also imposes additional administrative costs on government 
agencies.  
Another potential problem is that there can be tradeoffs between different 
environmental objectives often found in procurement policies. Prioritising between 
water, energy and virgin material-saving features would be difficult for purchasing 
officers. For example, AELA (2004) noted the potential difficulty involved in 
choosing between 100 per cent recycled chlorine-bleached paper and 50 per cent 
recycled non-bleached paper. 
A number of participants (for example Resourceco, sub. 46) noted considerable 
frustration that government procurement policies and related standards sometimes 
discriminated against recycled materials in favour of virgin raw materials, without 
consideration of relative performance. As discussed in chapter 12, this is 
inappropriate and governments at all levels should ensure product standards do not 
impair the development of markets for recycled products in this manner.    





The Commission considers that the scope for applying government procurement to 
cost-effectively promote waste policy goals is limited. It is not clear that such policy 
is likely to deliver a significant demonstration effect to individuals and firms. Other 
more direct policies, such as information provision and subsidising some research, 
development and demonstration projects are likely to deliver stronger demonstration 
effects (chapter 9). Further, the many procurement officers involved in small-order 
purchasing have limited time with which to assess such complex cost, performance 
and environmental tradeoffs. 
With regard to the market development effect of procurement practices, the 
Commission considers that without a strong requirement for cost effectiveness, such 
practices are unlikely to lead to efficient outcomes. This approach is likely to distort 
markets by favouring firms that would not be sustainable without government 
support, and lead to rent-seeking behaviour by firms (of which ‘greenwashing’ is 
one example).  
Even if market development were a valid objective, procurement policy is unlikely 
to be the best instrument. The problems identified above, including decentralised 
purchasing by officers with limited time, information asymmetries and conflicting 
objectives, are likely to significantly hinder the effectiveness of government 
procurement policy in developing recycling markets. Other instruments, such as in 
some cases directly subsidising the recycling activity are likely to be more effective. 
Using government procurement practices to create demonstration effects for the 
broader community and assist the development of markets for recovered materials 
is an indirect and, most likely, relatively ineffective way of pursuing those waste 
policy objectives. 
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12  Institutional and regulatory 
impediments to waste management 
 
Key points 
•  Local governments face conflicts of interest in setting landfill charges. State and 
Territory Governments should ensure that all government landfills charge users the 
full costs of waste disposal. 
•  Some local governments are finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil their waste 
management responsibilities. State and Territory Governments should consider: 
–  making land-use planning and development approvals for major waste disposal and 
resource recovery facilities matters of regional or even state significance, and the 
responsibility of the minister, where this is not already the case; and 
– shifting the responsibilities for waste disposal and resource recovery to 
appropriately-constituted regional waste authorities, particularly in those larger 
urban centres in cases where local governments do not have sufficient scale or 
resources to efficiently and effectively handle such roles. 
•  Different approaches to defining, classifying and regulating wastes are leading to 
ambiguity and confusion. The processes for exempting some recyclables from 
regulation are unclear and inefficient. As a result, some firms are experiencing 
increased costs in complying with these requirements and when seeking relevant 
exemptions.  
•  The Australian Government should work with State and Territory Governments to 
improve existing definitions, classifications and exemption processes for 
recyclables. They should also explore ways to achieve greater consistency in 
regulatory standards for waste. 
•  Product standards that specify the use of virgin materials can frustrate the 
development of markets for recovered resources. Australian governments should 
review all product standards that potentially obstruct the use of recycled products 
and/or call for the use of virgin materials, with a view to replacing them with 
performance-based equivalents where this is feasible. 
•  Australian firms are required under the Basel Convention to obtain permits to export 
hazardous resources for recycling. Current processes, however, can impede such 
exports. The Australian Government should ensure that permits are issued 
expeditiously, and commence from the day the Minister grants approval rather than 
from the date of application unless the applicant requests otherwise. 
 
     




The terms of reference for this inquiry required the Commission to examine the 
institutional and regulatory factors that impede the efficient use of resources and the 
development of markets for recovered resources. The focus of this chapter is on a 
range of institutional and regulatory arrangements that can impede the efficient 
operation of the waste management industry.  
12.1  Are governance arrangements adequate? 
Governance arrangements are the authority and systems used by ministers and 
government agencies to control and supervise public organisations (PC 2005a). A 
feature of good governance is that it should minimise the opportunities for conflicts 
of interest to emerge.  
There are a number of government agencies in each jurisdiction involved in 
environmental protection and waste management that undertake: 
•  policy making and planning 
•  regulation and approvals 
•  provision and contracting of waste management services. 
Conflicts of interest can arise when an agency performs more than one role, such as 
policy making and regulatory enforcement. Conflicts of interest can also be present 
where policy development and regulation are not separate from the operation of 
commercial entities. Government trading enterprises operate (primarily) on 
commercial objectives that can be inconsistent with other policy objectives of 
government (PC 2005a). If the conflicts of interest are sufficiently large or not well 
managed, the objectives of governments and their agencies become blurred and, as 
a result, the efficacy of government policy is diminished.  
Separation of environmental policy making and regulation 
A number of inquiry participants and commentators pointed to the apparent 
conflicts of interest within some state and territory environment departments. For 
example, the NSW Department of Environment and Conservation is both the 
environmental policy maker and regulator. The Waste Management Association of 
Australia (WMAA), Tasmanian Branch argued that there is a conflict inherent in the 
structure of the Tasmanian Department of Tourism, Arts and the Environment 
(formerly, the Department of Primary Industry, Water and the Environment): 
The current structure of the Environment Division has been discussed formally and 
informally for many years. Regulation and enforcement go ‘hand in hand’ and need to     





be separated from the policy maker in any organisation because they come into conflict 
with each other at some stage. 
We believe the challenge faced by individual officers of the department is to advise a 
client on policy on one occasion but then to be involved in a potential conflict situation 
when issuing an Environmental Protection Notice … on the next. (WMAA, Tasmanian 
Branch, sub. 29, p. 24) 
The Commission notes these concerns but observes that there can be offsetting 
considerations for some jurisdictions. Having a single department can reduce costs 
by sharing overheads and can allow for the sharing of expertise. These factors are 
likely to be important in the smaller jurisdictions. Moreover, environmental 
regulators should have their roles and responsibilities well defined in legislation. 
Such legislation, if properly observed and, wherever practical complemented by 
administrative separation, should adequately address these conflicts. 
Government ownership of commercial entities 
A number of inquiry participants pointed to problems caused by state, territory and 
local government ownership of commercial waste management operations.  
State and territory governments 
Collex (trans. pp. 321–2) claimed that the NSW Government’s ownership of WSN 
Environmental Solutions is a competitive neutrality issue. Collex (sub.  80,  p.  5) 
noted: 
The operations of government-owned waste management enterprises are also a concern 
where they enjoy a privileged position vis-à-vis the private sector. Competitive 
neutrality should be built into the operation of government-owned enterprises.  
Collex (sub. 80) argued that the NSW Government favoured WSN Environmental 
Solutions by imposing restrictions on the volume of waste that Collex’s landfill at 
Woodlawn can take. Visy Industries (sub. 53) also observed that restrictions were 
placed on Collex’s landfill at Woodlawn. 
Collex’s facility at Woodlawn is not the only landfill subject to a regulatory 
constraint on the amount of waste it can accept. The NSW Department of 
Environment and Conservation said: 
There’s a limitation on what all landfills can take … Putrescibles landfills all have 
limitations on their planned capacity … That’s actually determined at the planning 
approval process, taking into account the impacts that will arise in operation. (trans., 
p. 460)     




Collex (sub. 80) and Visy Industries (sub. 53) also alleged that WSN Environmental 
Solutions engaged in pricing practices that would not be justifiable for normal 
commercial operators. The alleged practices are consistent with violations of 
competitive neutrality. 
WSN Environmental Solutions argued that it is operating in accordance with the 
NSW government guidelines: 
•  WSN operates profitably and in accordance with the NSW Government’s Guidelines 
for Competitive Neutrality. 
•  All of WSN’s business is fully contestable, it receives no funding from NSW taxpayers 
and pays dividends and tax equivalent payments to the NSW Government. (sub. 104, 
p. 3) 
It is not the place of this inquiry to test the veracity of these claims. Firms that 
believe competitive neutrality is a problem should take their complaint to the 
appropriate forum, which in the case of New South Wales, is the responsibility of 
the NSW Treasury.  
Local governments and landfill pricing 
Some inquiry participants argued that local governments face conflicts of interest in 
setting landfill gate fees. As the WMAA, Tasmanian Branch noted: 
The conflict of interest local government has to deal with, when reviewing landfill 
charges, [is] to allow for true cost recovery, as opposed to satisfying the potential 
political backlash from ratepayers when fees and charges are increased. (sub. 29, p. 14) 
Several commentators and inquiry participants observed that many local 
governments were undercharging for their landfill operations (GRD Limited, 
sub. 41;  PAEC 2004;  WMAA,  Tasmanian Branch, sub.  29). As the Local 
Government Association of South Australia noted: 
Historically, regional councils in particular have not accounted [for] costs of disposal in 
their own landfills and landfills have either been left open for the public or charged a 
minimal fee. (sub. 102, p. 2) 
Local governments may find it difficult to comply with their landfill licence 
conditions if they underprice their services — since they will have insufficient 
revenue to spend on compliance. Underpricing also diminishes the incentives for 
resource recovery itself and for new operators to enter the disposal and resource 
recovery markets and reduces the incentive for innovation in these markets.      





Underpricing can also lead to cost shifting onto future generations who might have 
to pay for the aftercare costs of landfills (Local Government Association of South 
Australia, sub. 102). The Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tasmania) noted: 
Local government operates most landfills in Tasmania and there are strong suggestions 
of subsidisation by ratepayers in some circumstances. This may become even more 
apparent at the end of the life of the landfill site where ratepayers may bear substantial 
rehabilitation costs at or near the end of the revenue raising life of a landfill. 
(sub. 114, p. 3) 
State and Territory Governments should ensure that local governments charge users 
for the full costs of operating municipal landfills. SITA Environmental Solutions 
(sub.  DR143) said that this would require State and Territory Governments to 
specify the method of full cost accounting for landfill operations — including how 
to provide post-closure remediation costs in the balance sheet of the operating 
company and the gate price. 
Local governments may be reluctant to implement full cost recovery where they are 
concerned about illegal dumping or disadvantaging particular groups in the 
community (Municipal Association of Victoria, sub.  DR179). In general, illegal 
dumping should be addressed directly through an adequate enforcement effort. If 
the purpose of underpricing is to provide financial relief to particular disadvantaged 
groups, explicitly funded community service obligations are a preferable and more 
transparent approach (IC 1997).  
State and Territory Governments should ensure that all government-operated 
landfills charge users the full costs of waste disposal. 
12.2  Who should be responsible for waste 
management? 
Local governments are normally responsible for land-use planning and development 
approvals within their boundaries. They are also responsible for the collection and 
disposal of municipal solid waste. Some inquiry participants were concerned about 
the appropriate level of government at which waste management land-use planning 
and waste disposal services should be undertaken within Australia (for example, 
Alex Fraser Group, sub. 42; SITA Environmental Solutions, sub. DR143). 
A generally accepted rule for apportioning responsibilities for providing public 
services among the different tiers of government, called the subsidiarity principle, is 
that decisions whose impact is restricted to a local area should be made at the local 
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level. If the impact of waste management responsibilities goes beyond local 
government boundaries — for example, because of scale economies — there is a 
case for assigning these responsibilities to a higher level of government. 
Land-use planning and development approvals 
A number of inquiry participants expressed concern over the difficulty of finding 
and getting approval for suitable locations for major waste disposal and resource 
recovery facilities in urban areas (box 12.1).1 Although many participants and most 
communities appear to support resource recovery and waste minimisation, they 
seem reluctant to have them located nearby. Yet close proximity to services and 
markets can be crucial to keeping costs of transportation low and ensuring the 
viability of resource recovery, particularly where low value and dense materials, 
such as concrete, are concerned. 
These tensions are creating real problems for local governments. The Local 
Government Association of Tasmania (sub. 60) noted that siting issues had become 
divisive for local governments. The Municipal Waste Advisory Council observed: 
As awareness of a number of popular waste issues increase, local governments are 
increasingly subjected to significant scrutiny, pressure and criticism for their waste 
management responses. Community outcry against landfills, recycling plants, 
composting operations and incinerators, is typically directed against local governments. 
(sub. 52, p. 31) 
Local governments are also subject to various state and territory land-use planning 
requirements. In most states and territories, the planning minister has the authority 
to declare certain types of projects to be of regional or state significance.2 In some 
jurisdictions, local governments are also required to prepare waste management 
plans to identify future waste management and resource recycling facilities for their 
area (chapter 3). 
Local government land-use planning and approvals processes are intended to 
address local issues. In cases where the costs and benefits of a proposal accrue to 
the local community, its local government is the appropriate authority to make 
planning decisions. 
                                              
1 Major waste disposal and resource recovery facilities could be defined as those that typically 
serve more than one local government area. These facilities would not normally include transfer 
stations or material recycling facilities that only serve one municipality. 
2 For example, in New South Wales, major infrastructure projects, including waste and resource 
recovery facilities, can be deemed to be of regional or state significance (s. 775A, Environment 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)). 
     






Box 12.1  Participants’ views on siting waste disposal and resource 
recovery facilities 
A number of inquiry participants argued that finding suitably located land was important 
for their waste disposal and resource recovery operations. This issue is particularly 
important for construction and demolition recyclers who, for freight-cost reasons, prefer 
to locate as close as possible to demolition sites and their customers. The Alex Fraser 
Group noted: 
The future of C&D [construction and demolition] recycling is dependent on the ability to 
locate facilities within close proximity of the feedstock and market area. It is absolutely 
critical to the future direction of reprocessing and recycling operations that they be located in 
mainstream well planned out precincts and not isolated at the farthest boundaries of a 
metropolis. (sub. 27, p. 14) 
Many inquiry participants noted that community pressure was one of the greatest 
barriers to the development of new waste management facilities (Australian Council of 
Recyclers, sub.  50; SITA Environmental Solutions, sub.  42). As the WMAA, NSW 
Alternative Waste Treatment Working Group observed: 
The siting and approval of waste and resource recovery infrastructure has been and still is 
seen by industry as one of the greatest barriers to the delivery of (essentially environmental) 
services ... (sub. 30, p. 14) 
Community concerns also extend to existing waste disposal and resource recovery 
facilities. Resourceco observed: 
Often as the venture develops and other business[es] locate along side … the venture[,] it is 
only a matter of time before the venture is pushed out of the area as was the case with the 
Jeffries group in Adelaide. (sub. 46, p. 20) 
Several inquiry participants argued that opposition to facilities by local communities will 
raise the cost of waste disposal and resource recovery. The Waste Contractors and 
Recyclers Association of New South Wales noted: 
The community needs to be made to better understand that if they continue to maintain ‘a 
not-in-my-backyard attitude’ to the siting of waste facilities — then there will be greater 
transport costs which will result in higher waste management fees. In some cases there 
even may be … reductions in recycling rates as it will … become uneconomical to travel 
long distances to recycling centres. (sub. 15, p. 5) 
 
 
It would seem, however, that often today, the scale economies of many modern 
waste disposal and resource recovery facilities benefit a wider region but many of 
the external costs (such as noise, dust, odour, traffic congestion and litter) are 
directly experienced in the local government area where such facilities are located. 
As a result, planning laws that only take into account local issues could lead to 
development applications for such major facilities being rejected even if they were 
to bring net benefits to the wider region.      




What are the alternatives? 
State and Territory Governments recognise this problem and have been adopting 
policies to address it. In some jurisdictions, local governments have retained 
responsibility for land-use planning and approving development applications for 
waste disposal and resource recovery facilities, but are required to take into account 
the provisions of a state or regional waste management plan or policy, as in 
Victoria. 
While this approach can give waste disposal and resource recovery facilities greater 
certainty, it fails to fully address the underlying problem. Even if every local 
council is required to take into account an overarching plan or agreement, it would 
still be possible for each of them to reject a major development application. Local 
government councillors are still accountable to their rate payers and may not always 
give adequate regard to the broader regional interests, even though the local 
government is an instrument of the jurisdiction. For example, the Southern Sydney 
Regional Organisation of Councils (trans., pp. 350–1) pointed to the difficulties of 
getting waste management facilities approved in the region even though its councils 
agreed to locate a facility somewhere within it. 
Some inquiry participants argued that waste disposal and resource recovery 
facilities should be declared to be of regional or state significance (for example, 
SITA Environmental Solutions, sub. 42). As the Alex Fraser Group noted: 
The siting of these [resource recovery] facilities should be recognised as an ‘issue of 
state significance’, as indeed are quarries and landfills. (sub. 27, p. 14) 
Declaring major waste disposal and resource recovery facilities to be of regional or 
state significance allows for a range of non-local factors to be included in the 
planning and approval of the facility — thereby preventing the likelihood of a major 
project being blocked by local interests. But the WMAA, NSW Branch contended 
that it should not be necessary to require ministerial involvement in planning and 
approving facilities: 
…  we should be able to get waste infrastructure built through normal planning 
mechanisms rather than having to go to the State Minister for a call-in and that applies 
everywhere … we really need some framework for waste planning; for waste zones 
where it’s a permissible use; tonnages where it’s a permissible use; and that we don’t 
necessarily have to go through the kind of hurdles with local government that we have 
at the moment. (trans. p. 851)  
Depending on the breadth of these impacts, major waste disposal and resource 
recovery facilities might be of regional or even state significance. Where they are 
regional in nature and not of state significance, the experience in England provides 
a useful perspective of regional planning and approvals (box 12.2).       






Box 12.2  Examples of regional land-use planning and approval 
arrangements 
England 
England’s nine regional assemblies are responsible for setting out regional land-use 
plans (regional spatial strategies) for their region (Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act 2004 (UK)) (PCPA 2004).  
In the rural parts of England, about 50 county councils are responsible for planning and 
development approvals of waste disposal and resource recovery facilities in their area, 
in accordance with the regional plans. The 284 non-metropolitan district councils in 
these counties do not have any role in planning and approving waste disposal and 
resource recovery facilities (s. 16, PCPA 2004).  
There are about 68 metropolitan district councils in England. While many are 
responsible for land-use planning and development approvals, in a number of cases, 
these responsibilities are taken up by specially constituted authorities that represent 
more than one metropolitan district council. 
Western Australia 
The Planning Commission, a statutory authority established under the Planning 
Development Act 2005 (WA), is responsible for: 
•  preparing Statements of Planning Policies — with the approval of the Minister; 
•  preparing regional planning schemes for the metropolitan and nine non-metropolitan 
regions in the State;3 and 
•  approving regional developments in accordance with the regional plans. 
South Australia 
The SA Government is responsible for preparing regional planning strategies — one 
for metropolitan Adelaide, the other for the rest of the state. Local governments then 
prepare local development plans in accordance with the Government’s strategies. The 
Development Assessment Commission, a statutory authority established under the 
Development Act 1993 (SA), is responsible for approving waste management facilities 
in accordance with the relevant local development plan (Planning SA 2002). 
Northern Territory 
The NT Government is responsible for determining the Northern Territory Planning 
Scheme and the planning schemes for each of the Territory’s seven divisions. The 
Development Consent Authority, a statutory authority established under the Planning 
Act 1999 (NT), is responsible for approving development applications covered by each 
of the seven schemes. The authority is also responsible for conducting hearings to 
amend planning schemes and for reporting to the minister (DIP nd). 
 
                                              
3   The non-metropolitan regions include the Gascoyne, Goldfields–Esperance, Great Southern, 
Kimberley, Mid West, Peel, Pilbara, South West and Wheat Belt regions.     




Elements of regional planning and/or approvals can also be seen in some Australian 
jurisdictions. In South Australia, the Development Assessment Commission is 
responsible for approving development applications for waste disposal and resource 
recovery facilities. In Western Australia, the Planning Commission can develop 
regional plans and approve certain regional projects — but not for general waste 
facilities. In the Northern Territory, the Development Consent Authority is 
responsible for approving development applications for waste facilities in 
accordance with the relevant regional land-use plan. 
Whether major waste disposal and resource recovery facilities are treated as matters 
of regional or state significance, there is a strong case for ensuring that the 
associated land-use planning and development approval processes are transparent, 
efficient, timely and accountable to the electorate of the area. Such processes will 
also need to be capable of effectively and efficiently resolving the inevitable 
conflicts surrounding the location of these facilities and lead to net benefits to the 
wider community. The waste management industry and the community need greater 
clarity and certainty in waste-related land-use planning processes in order to deliver 
net community benefits. 
The operational capacity of local government 
Local governments are responsible for the kerbside collection of waste and 
recyclables, and waste disposal. Some participants questioned their capacity to 
undertake these tasks. For example, the Packaging Council of Australia noted: 
While local government has played an important role in establishing and evolving 
waste recycling and recovery, the efficient and environmentally optimal provision of 
this service is beyond its operational and statutory capacities. Local government 
authorities have an important role to play in enhancing the welfare and quality of life of 
local communities. Managing utilities should not be part of this role. (sub. 67, p. 23) 
Other participants in this inquiry questioned the capacity of local governments to 
adequately deal with tendering practices for major waste disposal and resource 
recovery contracts (Paper Round, sub.  DR178; SITA Environmental Solutions, 
sub. 42; Victorian Waste Management Association, sub. DR170; Waste Contractors 
and Recyclers Association of New South Wales, sub.  15; WMAA, NSW 
Alternative Waste Treatment Working Group, sub. 30). Not surprisingly, some local 
governments had different views about these issues (ACT NOWaste, sub. DR139; 
City of Ryde, sub. DR176).     





Waste disposal and resource recovery are becoming increasingly complex 
Technical and regulatory developments are resulting in larger, more sophisticated, 
recovery and disposal facilities and this is making it more difficult for local 
governments to efficiently supply waste management services. These developments 
are also making it harder for smaller local governments to assess major waste 
management technologies and negotiate contracts. 
Part of the problem appears to be one of resourcing and expertise. In the case of 
rural councils, the Municipal Association of Victoria noted: 
The difficulty in attracting and retaining professional staff increases … the greater [the] 
distance from metropolitan areas. While traditional civil engineers have been equipped 
to deal with landfill disposal, many require professional development and training in 
newer resource recovery approaches and behaviour change tools. (sub. 113, p. 11) 
Some larger urban councils did not feel that they lacked the necessary resourcing or 
expertise. Ipswich City Council (sub. DR198) argued that it had sufficient expertise 
and planning resources. ACT NOWaste4 noted: 
The ACT Government is confident that it is the right body to be managing the 
Territory’s waste given its role in service provision, the scale of the volume of waste 
generated in the Territory and its responsibilities and capacities in planning, siting and 
technical issues. (sub. DR139, p. 25) 
ACT NOWaste (sub. DR139) noted, however, that it was not able to obtain the 
scale economies necessary for recovering certain resources such as tyres. 
While economies of scale and access to technical expertise are making waste 
disposal and resource recovery difficult for some (and in particular, smaller) local 
governments to deal with, waste collection appears to be more manageable. While 
waste collection is a natural monopoly, in the sense that it is cheaper for a single 
provider to supply a level of service to all households in a particular street or 
municipality, there seems to be limited benefits in scaling the collection services up 
to a regional level. Collection appears to be best provided by local government 
(chapter  5). The Australian Services Union (sub.  DR157) contended that local 
governments were best placed to deliver waste collection services. The City of Ryde 
noted: 
Removal of the waste [collection] responsibility from local government to a state level 
may create difficulties in maintaining service levels and addressing service issues 
amongst the public if the new body did not possess detailed local knowledge of the area 
                                              
4  The ACT Government is a member of the Australian Local Government Association since it 
undertakes local government functions as well as its territory functions.     




being serviced. This lack of familiarity would make resolving any service level issues 
more difficult. (sub. DR176, p. 4) 
Partnerships have provided benefits 
To overcome their resourcing problems and to take advantage of the economies of 
scale of major waste disposal and resource recovery facilities, many local 
governments have entered into formal and informal partnerships to share existing 
facilities and negotiate contracts. The WMAA, National Landfill Division observed 
that the pooling of resources has been occurring for years: 
Local government operated landfill sites in large urban areas are usually managed in a 
regional context. Local governments have been operating regional sites for years and 
pool resources and expertise to meet the same [environmental-performance] standards 
as major privately owned sites. (sub. DR159, p. 2) 
Where partnerships are used to negotiate waste contracts, local councils usually 
retain the responsibility for entering into the contract with the tenderer. Examples of 
such partnerships include the regional organisations of councils in New South 
Wales, and regional waste management groups in Victoria.  
A number of inquiry participants provided evidence of the benefits of partnerships 
(City of Whitehorse, sub.  26; Municipal Association of Victoria, sub.  113 and 
sub.  DR179; Resourceco, sub.  46; Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of 
Councils, sub. 84). The NSW Government reported that collaboration among local 
governments contributed: 
… to infrastructure improvements and consolidation, reduced environmental impacts, 
collection service efficiencies and savings through cost sharing, stabilised pricing and 
the provision of price certainty over the period of a contract, and increased processing 
capacity and capability. (sub. DR195, p. 3) 
But partnerships have limits 
Partnerships, however, do not always overcome the contracting problems of local 
governments. Some partnerships are simply not large enough and the infrequent 
nature of major contracts means that it is hard to justify retaining the necessary 
expertise in-house. For example, in describing a proposed alternative waste 
technology (AWT) contract for the former Western Regional Waste Management 
Group in Victoria, Councillor Dick Gross, City of Port Phillip, noted: 
This is a huge contract for the region. It’s a 20-year, $400 million contract. The rule of 
thumb is that you have to spend about one per cent of the value of a contract assessing 
a contract and we are completely out of our league. It’s incredibly exciting for us, but it 
is very challenging. Assessing the technology is beyond us. (trans., p. 100)     





Partners can also find it difficult to agree to a single strategy for the entire region. 
The Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council contended that partnerships: 
… are too loose to withstand any tension that might arise between member councils. To 
reduce these tensions, the groups then shy away from addressing difficult issues, 
rendering them of limited effectiveness. (sub. DR155, p. 8) 
The looseness of partnerships also poses a risk to tenderers, who will be less willing 
to enter into contracts with multiple councils if there is a possibility that any of them 
might pull out of the contract. The Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council noted: 
A loose grouping undermines the ability for a tenderer to be sure that it will get the 
critical mass it seeks to provide the prices sought. This places an extraordinary amount 
of risk on the tenderer. (sub. DR155, p. 8) 
These risks are particularly acute for some AWT investments that can involve large 
upfront costs and payback periods of 20 years or more. GRD Limited (trans., 
p.  780) argued that local governments were unfamiliar and uncomfortable with 
entering into long-term contracts that required them to share some of the project 
risk. 
What are the alternatives? 
There appear to be two broad approaches to address concerns over the operational 
capacity of local governments and partnerships. One is for state and territory 
governments to ensure that local governments and regional partnerships can access 
the necessary technical and contracting expertise. State and territory governments 
could: 
•  Provide financial assistance so that local governments and partnerships can buy 
in the necessary expertise.  
•  Provide the expertise directly to local governments and partnerships. GRD 
Limited (trans., p.  779) said that in the UK Government assists groups of 
councils to negotiate and prepare waste management contracts. 
•  Ensure that partnerships are of sufficient size so that they can provide their own 
expertise. 
In an example of the last approach, the Victorian Government announced the 
formation of the Melbourne Metropolitan Waste Management Group in July 2006. 
The group is a statutory authority that brings together the previous four 
metropolitan regional waste management groups. The group is chaired by a board 
comprising both member councillors and waste management experts. Its 
responsibilities include: 
•  waste management planning; and     




•  assisting local councils to procure multi-council waste management and resource 
recovery services (box 12.3). 
 
Box 12.3  Metropolitan Waste Management Group  
In July 2006, the Victorian Parliament passed legislation establishing the Metropolitan 
Waste Management Group which replaced the earlier four metropolitan regional waste 
management groups (Environment Protection (Amendment) Act 2006 (Vic)). 
The group is a statutory authority comprising an eight-member board (half of whom are 
councillors nominated from the member councils, and half are skills-based nominees of 
the Minister for Environment). It will be funded from landfill levy distributions previously 
allocated to regional waste management groups. 
A key function of the group is to assist its thirty metropolitan councils to procure 
multi-council regional waste services. The group will identify waste disposal and 
resource recovery services and undertake plans. Each of the thirty metropolitan 
councils will continue to be responsible for the waste management of their local 
community. They will retain responsibility for determining the option that best meets 
their needs and circumstances. 
According to the Minister for Environment, procurement direction and/or guidelines will 
be developed by the Victorian Government to manage the risks associated with waste 
management contracting. 
Sources: DSE (2005); Government of Victoria (sub. DR187); Thwaites (2006a). 
 
 
However, addressing the shortfall of technical and contracting expertise alone will 
not address the problem of a group of local governments failing to agree to a 
binding long-term waste disposal and resource recovery contract. For example, even 
though the Melbourne Metropolitan Waste Management Group is likely to provide 
the critical mass necessary for it to maintain a pool of expertise (GRD Limited, 
trans. p.  781), it is still a partnership, thus doing little to improve contractual 
certainty.  
The second approach is to transfer the responsibility for waste disposal and resource 
recovery to a fully constituted and appropriately capitalised regional body to deliver 
these services. In Western Australia, regional bodies constituted by local 
governments have the power to enter into waste management contracts, and to own 
and operate commercial waste management facilities (box 12.4). For example, the 
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council owns and operates the Red Hill landfill and 
transfer stations (Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council, trans. p.  743). The 
group’s member councils are the shareholders of the commercial entity. Similar 
provisions exist in South Australia, where fully constituted regional bodies are 
responsible for waste disposal in Adelaide (SA Government, sub. DR217).     





Under the Western Australian model, the commercial entity has the authority to 
enter into waste disposal and resource recovery contracts. The regional council’s 
members do not have to use the facilities but, as the entity’s shareholders, would 
presumably choose to support them. The arrangement in effect aligns the interests 
of member councils with the region’s interests. The Eastern Metropolitan Regional 
Council noted: 
The member councils aren’t obliged to use the facility, but that risk is borne by us and 
they own us, so it’s sort of in their interests to be part of it. (trans. p. 738) 
The consequence of the Western Australian model is that it helps to manage better 
the risk faced by tenderers. According to the Eastern Metropolitan Regional 
Council: 
The Western Australian structure for regional councils is, we believe, an exemplary 
model. By making the regional council an entity in itself which is controlled by 
member councils, the risk for tenderers is better partitioned, and the council is able to 
provide better service to its member councils. Rather than being a talk-fest where 
action is eschewed, it can take on the difficult waste management problems that the 
individual member councils do not have the personnel or financial resources to manage. 
(sub. DR155, p. 8) 
Moreover, regional councils entering into long-term contracts can also be 
underwritten by their member councils, further reducing the risk to a private 
tenderer. 
However, not all local governments are in a position to own and operate waste 
disposal and resource recovery facilities. An alternative solution can be found in 
England. The responsibility for waste management in England is divided between 
two entities. In rural areas, county councils are responsible for managing the waste 
collected by their member district councils. In larger urban areas, specially 
constituted waste disposal authorities are responsible for managing the waste 
collected by their member district and borough councils (box 12.4). County councils 
and waste disposal authorities charge their member councils the costs of managing 
waste, and member councils in turn charge their rate payers. 
Assigning the responsibility to a regional body for waste disposal and resource 
recovery offers some advantages over partnerships because: 
•  it lowers the tenderer’s counterparty risk because the regional body will have the 
responsibility of negotiating a binding contract on behalf of its member councils; 
•  if adequately capitalised, it helps provide more financial security that the 
regional body will be able to honour its side of the contract;  
•  only a single waste disposal contract needs to be negotiated, which reduces 
transaction costs; and     




•  it should improve access to resources which can provide appropriate technical 
and contracting expertise. 
 
Box 12.4  Regional waste management groups 
Western Australian regional local governments 
Western Australian regional local governments were first formed in the early 1980s in 
response to the need to improve their waste management services. Their roles and 
responsibilities are defined in the Local Government Act 1995 (WA). Regional local 
governments are statutory authorities and have the power to enter into waste 
management contracts. 
A regional council comprises councillors from its member councils. Local councils can 
refer any number of powers to regional local councils (such as the authority to make 
by-laws). The regional council can enter into contracts under its own name, though its 
members bear any liabilities incurred by the regional council. 
South Australian regional subsidiaries 
Under the Local Government Act 1999 (SA), two or more local governments have the 
authority to form regional subsidiaries to provide, among other things, waste collection 
and disposal services. The subsidiaries can own and operate assets, and have their 
roles and responsibilities defined in legislation. 
English local government and waste disposal authorities 
Rural counties in England traditionally have a two-tier local government structure. The 
county council is concerned with providing, among other things, waste disposal 
services. In Lancashire, the county council serves a population of 1.1 million. District 
councils are responsible for providing waste collection services, among other services 
(Environment Agency (UK) nd). Each Lancashire district council serves almost 100 000 
people on average. 
Towns and cities only have one tier of local government. In larger metropolitan areas, 
such as Merseyside, Greater Manchester and London, a specially constituted waste 
disposal authority is responsible for providing waste disposal services for several 
borough councils. For example, waste disposal in the Greater Manchester area is 
managed by the Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority. It serves a population 
of about 1.9 million people. Each of its borough councils are responsible for waste 
collection services for about 200 000 people on average.  
The boards of county councils and waste disposal authorities comprise district and 
borough councillors. County councils and waste disposal authorities have the power to 
enter into waste disposal contracts. District and borough councils can contract for the 
collection of waste but that waste must then be disposed by the county council or 
waste disposal authority. County councils charge the district council for their waste 
disposal services (ss. 30(2) and 48, Environment Protection Act 1990 (UK)). District 
councils cannot bypass their county council or waste disposal authority to dispose of 
their waste. 
 
     






The case for assigning the responsibility for waste disposal and resource recovery to 
a properly constituted regional waste authority in most large urban centres seems 
compelling. This approach would provide the necessary technical and contracting 
expertise, as well as the governance structure to manage the risks associated with 
long-term contracting.  
State and Territory Governments should consider options for transferring the 
responsibility for waste disposal and resource recovery to such an authority where 
they have not already done so. It should be governed by its member councils. 
Member local councils could choose to retain responsibility for providing waste 
collection services. Such an approach would be most applicable in large urban 
centres where the majority of relevant local governments do not now have the scale 
or resources to efficiently and effectively handle waste disposal and resource 
recovery. However, a few local governments in Australia, such as Brisbane City 
Council and the ACT Government, might well be exceptions since they may already 
have the appropriate scale and resources to handle these roles efficiently and 
effectively themselves. 
The idea of regional authorities might also be entertained for some rural areas — 
although the benefits of increased scale economies and pooling of resources would 
be offset by the higher freight costs in these areas. State and Territory Governments 
should consider the feasibility of grouping rural authorities on a case-by-case basis, 
but in any case, should continue providing technical and other advisory services to 
these areas. 
State and Territory Governments should also consider declaring major waste 
disposal and resource recovery facilities to be projects of regional or even state 
significance for waste management land-use planning, where this is appropriate. 
The Commission notes that this is already the case for a number of jurisdictions. 
The processes adopted would need to be transparent and accountable to the 
electorate of the area. 
State and Territory Governments should: 
•  consider making land-use planning and development approvals for major 
waste disposal and resource recovery facilities matters of regional or even state 
significance, and the responsibility of the relevant minister, where this is not 
already the case; 
•  ensure that land-use planning and development approvals for major waste 
disposal and resource recovery facilities are handled efficiently and effectively, 
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providing transparency and consultation for the relevant communities but also 
clarity and certainty for the waste management industry; and 
•  consider shifting the responsibility for waste disposal and resource recovery 
from local government to appropriately-constituted regional waste authorities, 
particularly in those larger urban centres in circumstances where the relevant 
local governments do not have sufficient scale or resources to efficiently and 
effectively handle these roles. 
12.3   Improving waste definitions and classifications 
The environment protection legislation of each jurisdiction defines which materials 
are considered to be wastes, how they are classified for the purpose of regulation, 
and how they should be managed to minimise their effects on the environment and 
human health. Differences between jurisdictions in these areas can lead to increased 
compliance costs for waste management firms operating in more than one 
jurisdiction, and reduce the scope for resource recovery. 
Differences in waste definitions and classification systems 
There are differences between states and territories in the way waste is defined in 
legislation (box 12.5). There are also differences in how wastes are classified. In 
New South Wales and Victoria, environmental regulators have comprehensive 
classification systems for waste, although they differ between the two jurisdictions 
(box  12.6). In other states and territories, only hazardous waste is formally 
classified and the remainder are regarded as general waste. 
There are also a number of wastes that are classified as hazardous in some 
jurisdictions but not in others. For example, fly ash is listed as a hazardous waste in 
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia. It is not a hazardous waste in South 
Australia. In most jurisdictions, whole used tyres are hazardous wastes and cannot 
be landfilled, but are not hazardous if they are shredded (see for example, EPA 
SA 2003).5 
A number of inquiry participants commented on the lack of consistency in waste 
definitions and classification systems throughout Australia. For example, the 
CSIRO  (sub. 24,  p. 4)  noted  that there are ‘a variety of waste 
                                              
5 Despite these differences, there is a degree of consistency in the way most hazardous wastes are 
classified. This is achieved through the 1994 National Strategy for the Management of Scheduled 
Waste and the National Environment Protection (Movement of Controlled Wastes between States 
and Territories) Measure (NEPC 2004)     





classifications  …  presently used in Australia’ and that ‘waste definitions are 
inconsistently used in the absence of nationally agreed waste classification 
standards’. The Alex Fraser Group noted: 
All Federal, State and Local legislation has different interpretations for the terms 
relating to waste, recycling and resource recovery. (sub. 27, p. 9)  
 
Box 12.5  The definition of waste 
In environmental protection legislation in Australia, waste is generally defined to 
include any material that is discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned by its 
owner — whether of value or not, whether intended for sale or not, and whether or not 
intended for recycling, reprocessing, recovery or purification by a separate operation 
from that which produced the substance (for example, s.  4, Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW)).  
However, there are some exceptions: 
•  in Queensland, waste does not include material that is deemed to have a beneficial 
reuse, such as that intended for recycling (s. 13, Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld)); 
•  in Western Australia, waste includes any matter ‘whether useful or useless, which is 
discharged into the environment’ (s. 3, Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)); 
and 




Differences in definitions and classification systems can lead to marked differences 
in how similar (hazardous and non-hazardous) waste is managed. According to 
SITA Environmental Solutions: 
The same waste can be classified differently and therefore have different costs of 
disposal depending on which state it is in. For example in Victoria quarantine waste 
goes to deep burial whereas in other states it must be treated in an autoclave. In 
Western Australia some classes of medical waste can still be disposed … to landfill. 
(sub. 42, p. 29) 
Classification and regulatory differences lead to ambiguity and confusion, and raise 
the compliance costs of firms operating in more than one jurisdiction. The Cement 
Industry Federation (CIF) argued: 
…  significant regulatory differences exist between jurisdictions in areas including 
waste definitions and classification systems; transport, storage and handling 
requirements; as well as planning and licensing requirements. These differences result 
in duplication of effort by our member companies in undertaking resource efficiency 
programs  —  particularly those involving the use of secondary materials. The costs     




involved are incurred by duplication of management effort, in some cases   
unnecessary duplication of monitoring and/or evaluation trial effort. (sub. 71, p. 9) 
 
Box 12.6  Classification of hazardous and other waste in New South 
Wales and Victoria 
In New South Wales, the classification has a bearing on the way that the waste is 
generated, transported, stored and disposed. There are four broad classifications: 
•  hazardous — any waste that meets the requirements of the Australian Code for the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (for example, flammables and 
explosives); pharmaceuticals and poisons; clinical waste; cytotoxic waste; sharps 
waste; certain radioactive waste; and quarantine waste; 
•  industrial — includes stabilised asbestos in bonded sheets; asbestos fibre and dust 
waste; and certain non-liquid radioactive waste; 
•  solid — includes household domestic waste; certain forms of biosolid waste; waste 
contaminated with lead; drained and mechanically-crushed oil filters; cleaned 
pesticide, herbicide, biocide or fungicide containers; disposable nappies, pads and 
sanitary napkins; food waste; vegetative waste generated from agriculture or 
horticulture; and other non-chemical waste generated from manufacturing; and 
•  inert — includes virgin excavated natural material; building and demolition waste; 
asphalt waste; certain biosolid waste; used, rejected or unwanted tyres; and office 
and packaging waste not mixed in with other waste. 
In Victoria, solid waste is classified into five categories to determine Environment 
Protection Authority requirements and to choose an appropriate management option: 
•  prescribed waste (non-soil) — listed in the prescribed waste regulations, which 
includes general and industrial waste;  
•  prescribed waste (soils) — includes both low-level and high-level contaminated 
soils; 
•  putrescibles — includes domestic garbage, commercial waste, vegetables, 
supermarket processing, delicatessen and butcher waste, garden clippings and 
prunings; 
•  solid inert — includes demolition material, concrete, bricks, timber, plastic, glass, 
metals, bitumen, trees and shredded tyres; and 
•  fill material — includes soil (sand, clay and silt), gravel and rock contaminated at 
levels less than for prescribed waste (soils). 
Sources: DEC (1999); EPA Victoria (2004a, 2005c). 
 
 
The Ash Development Association of Australia (ADAA) noted: 
What is costly from the current fragmented state-based system is the range of 
classification systems which result in various jurisdictions and differing laboratory test 
procedures, multiplying the costs of analysis, interpretation and reporting, as well as 
industry management time. (sub. DR149, p. 4)     





Is there a case for greater consistency of definitions and classifications? 
Some inquiry participants argued there is a case for greater consistency in the 
definition and classification of waste between states and territories (ADAA, 
sub. DR149; SITA Environmental Solutions, sub. DR143). The Alex Fraser Group 
noted: 
To remove the ambiguity, confusion and lack of consistency of the terms it is essential 
that the Federal Government provide the framework and clarity for state legislation and 
local bylaws to be developed. (sub. 27, p. 9) 
There is likely to be an upfront cost in developing a common definition of waste 
and a national waste classification system. However, the CIF contended that the 
cost was likely to be small: 
The existence of a number of classification systems within the areas of both virgin 
materials and wastes, and within government regulatory circles and standards 
organisations would, to us, suggest that development of a classification system might 
not be costly. (sub. DR174, p. 3) 
There is also likely to be some cost to states and territories as they will need to 
modify their environment protection legislation and regulations to ensure that their 
definitions and lists of scheduled wastes conform to the agreed definitions and 
classifications.  
The Commission notes that there are likely to be offsetting benefits. Since common 
definitions and standards ensure that there is a common understanding of the 
hazards that each type of waste poses, the main benefit is the reduction in ambiguity 
and confusion that currently surrounds how different wastes should be regarded. 
This would reduce the compliance costs faced by firms active in more than one 
jurisdiction.  
The Commission also notes that the availability of waste data and its comparability 
between jurisdictions depends to some extent on regulatory reporting requirements. 
A national waste classification system that is the basis for regulatory reporting 
would improve the accuracy and comparability of waste data reported by each 
jurisdiction (chapters 2 and 13). 
Is there a case for more consistent regulatory standards? 
A common definition of waste and a national classification system would not, 
however, address the ambiguity and confusion that arises from differences in 
regulatory standards. It is entirely conceivable that, should governments agree to a 
common understanding of the hazards posed by a category of waste, they could still     




adopt different regulatory responses. This in turn would raise the compliance costs 
of firms active in more than one jurisdiction.  
The Commission notes that interjurisdictional differences, theoretically, should only 
reflect differences in what is genuinely appropriate for that jurisdiction, but in 
practice they are often simply due to the uncoordinated development of approaches. 
Several inquiry participants supported more harmonised regulatory standards. The 
CIF (sub. DR174, p. 3) noted that they hoped, over time, ‘regulatory approaches 
might also converge’. The ADAA contended: 
We strongly support the goal to develop a national classification system that is both 
‘low cost’, and balances the needs of state jurisdictions thus leading towards, over time, 
regulatory convergence. (sub. DR149, p. 4) 
Greater consistency in regulatory standards could be achieved by any number of 
approaches — from mutual recognition on the one hand to strict uniformity on the 
other. Each approach offers its own costs and benefits. Under any approach, one of 
the costs is the effort to modify existing standards. Another is the transition costs of 
firms complying with the new standards.  
Another perceived cost is the reduction in the freedom of State and Territory 
Governments to develop standards that they believe best suit their needs. The extent 
of this problem, however, may not be as large as it seems. Environmental planning 
can be used by regulators to tailor the licence conditions of waste facility operators 
to account for the needs of different environments. For example, Ipswich City 
Council (trans., p.  928) pointed to the Queensland Environmental Protection 
Agency’s efforts to tailor landfill licences to suit local conditions. 
More consistent regulatory standards will, over time, yield benefits to firms, 
particularly those operating in more than one jurisdiction. Greater consistency in 
environmental standards is already a feature of national environmental policy. The 
purpose of the National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cwlth), for 
example, through the use of national environment protection measures, is to offer 
people throughout Australia the benefit of equivalent protection from pollution and 
to reduce any distortions to firms and markets from differences between states and 
territories in their environment protection measures (s. 3, NEPCA 1994; chapter 3).  
The Commission considers that it is not in a position to draw a firm conclusion as to 
how far regulatory standards should be made consistent — due to inadequate 
information on the net benefits and the variety of possible approaches. There is, 
however, a good prima facie case for the Australian Government to work with the 
states and territories to review whether and how environmental regulatory standards     





could be made more nationally consistent to the benefit of the Australian 
community. 
Improving existing exemption procedures  
A concern put to the Commission is that environmental protection legislation can 
impede resource recovery or impose additional costly requirements because it can 
misclassify recoverable resources as waste. As the Alex Fraser Group noted: 
Construction and demolition materials should not be regarded as a waste as they have a 
sustainable and real secondary value. Legislation treats this material stream as a waste 
and, as such, places significant legislative and financial pressure on the industry. 
(sub. 27, p. 13) 
Resourceco reported: 
We have some sites in Adelaide that require waste management licences because they 
receive ‘waste’ that is clearly not a waste for example cardboard bailing facilities. 
(sub. 46, p. 11) 
The CIF also claimed that Queensland regulations have poorly transposed the Basel 
definition of hazardous waste with the effect that fly ash was misclassified in 
Queensland as hazardous even though it did not possess hazardous characteristics. 
The introduction of the new Environmental Protection Regulations in Queensland in 
1998 used the then current Basel Convention to nominate materials to a 
new  …  classification of ‘Regulated Wastes’ …  [for] restrictions on … tracking etc. 
Although fly ash is conditioned within the Basel convention as being an Article 1 
hazardous waste only where hazardous characteristics are displayed, such caveats did 
not transfer to the Environmental Protection Regulation [in Queensland], which 
provided no exemption where named materials did not in fact exhibit hazardous 
properties. 
The Queensland ash industry has well established that fly ash generated from 
black-coal fired power stations is indeed non-hazardous, but has suffered from being 
branded as an industry dealing in a regulated waste — in practice exempted from 
prosecution only by a non-legally binding policy statement. 
The fly ash industry is one of the most significant recycling industries in Australia and, 
as a supplementary cementitious material, saves almost an equivalent tonnage of 
carbon dioxide emissions as is used in blended cements. (sub. 71, p. 4) 
These concerns arise for two reasons. First, environment protection legislation in 
general tends to define any byproduct material that is surplus to requirements as 
waste, even if can be sold to a recycler (box 12.5). The CIF noted: 
The majority of relevant Australian legislation that currently exists takes the approach 
of classifying virtually anything deemed to be no longer useful by some party and then 
consigns those wastes to the scrap heap of landfill …     




The end result is a regulatory approach which classifies materials as wastes regardless 
of any realisable or latent value and then takes a simple prohibition approach to their 
subsequent management. (trans., p. 62) 
Second, waste classification systems are mostly prescriptive in nature rather than 
risk or performance based. Materials are listed according to their constituent 
contaminants or the waste stream from which they were sourced. For example, any 
potentially recyclable material sourced from a household waste stream is deemed to 
pose some degree of risk because household waste normally contains some 
putrescible waste.6  
The Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (BRSD) contended: 
… inappropriate  labelling  of  resources as a waste, [is] leading to the impost of 
environment protection regulations that would not otherwise be warranted if a 
risk-based approach had been adopted with that resource and competing resources. 
(sub. 70, p. 10) 
State and Territory Governments provide for exemptions 
Most states and territories attempt to address this problem by allowing recoverable 
resources to be exempted from regulatory controls. For example, the Queensland 
exemption process requires applicants to demonstrate that there is a beneficial reuse 
for the recovered resource7 — that is, there is a productive use for the recovered 
resource that does not also pose an unacceptable risk to the environment or human 
health.  
While these changes allow for materials to be reclassified, impediments still remain. 
Several inquiry participants argued that the processes and criteria required of 
applicants remain unclear and that this is leading to excessive testing requirements 
(box 12.7). 
                                              
6 There are some exceptions to the prescriptive approach of classifying waste. In New South 
Wales, a waste can be classified as hazardous if it demonstrates certain characteristics such as 
being explosive or flammable. An unknown waste (a waste that has yet to be prescribed) must 
undergo tests of the concentration levels of its contaminants to determine its degree of hazard 
(DEC 1999). Similarly, in Victoria, once a material is prescribed to be hazardous, it is then tested 
to determine its degree of hazard (EPA Victoria 2005c). 
7 s. 13,  Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld); r.  66E, Environmental Protection (Waste 
Management) Regulation 2000 (Qld).     






Box 12.7  Participants’ views about processes for gaining regulatory 
exemption for recovered resources 
In some cases, the criteria by which a byproduct can be exempted from regulatory 
controls are unclear. The Kwinana Industries Council (KIC) noted: 
The KIC is currently liaising with the Western Australian Government to address this 
important issue and highlight the current barriers that can prevent the diversion of … 
products to useful applications. This includes the lack of [a] clear framework which can raise 
concerns amongst generators and users when trying to demonstrate a project’s 
implementation value from both an environmental and economic risk perspective. 
(sub. DR166, p. 1) 
With regard to used asphalt, the Australian Environment Business Network noted: 
Again there is a regulatory vacuum in environmental criteria for use of wastes in asphalt, 
portland cement and other civil works projects. The NSW Department of Environment and 
Conservation has not been able to define a set of criteria for what is equivalent to virgin 
excavated material. (sub. DR138, pp. 7–8) 
The absence of clear regulatory arrangements can lead to excessive testing 
requirements, that can exceed those applying to virgin materials. The Eastern 
Metropolitan Regional Council noted: 
Requirements to test recycled product [are] far in excess of what would be required of virgin 
product, even though the virgin product is just as likely to be contaminated. This is 
exemplified and particularly damaging in markets for recycled aggregate and soil, where the 
margins are thin and excessive testing can make a business unviable. (sub. DR155, p. 5) 
The Ash Development Association of Australia noted that the regulatory problems one 
developer experienced in attempting to use coal combustion product for fill material 
perversely led it to use virgin material instead. 
To illustrate our view of an inappropriate application of regulation, during early 2005 a very 
large development project in close proximity to a fly ash source site required some 
500 000 tonnes of engineering fill. The design engineers agreed that fly ash met the physical 
and chemical properties of the project. Regardless, additional testing requirements at some 
considerable additional cost, were called for from the local regulator. These additional 
requirements were above and beyond that required of virgin materials. These additional test 
requirements were met. Subsequently the regulator deemed and required that ‘landfill levies’ 
were payable if the prescribed waste material was to be used as the project required more 
than 20 000 tonnes. The resulting levy impost made the proposed use of … coal combustion 
products … commercially unviable resulting in the use of traditional quarried and virgin 
excavated natural materials. (sub. DR149, p. 3) 
The NSW Department of Environment and Conservation (trans., p. 886) noted that it is 
in the process of simplifying its regulations to allow, for example, greater use of certain 
industrial residues as fill, fertiliser and fuel. 
 
     




The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) listed a number of 
factors that inhibited the application of industrial residues (and products derived 
from them) to land: 
These include the absence of clear guidance on what information is needed to 
determine if industrial residues are fit for reuse, the potential for chemical contaminants 
to have adverse effects on the environment, agriculture and human health, limited 
research and lack of knowledge in this area, economic drivers such as transport and 
storage costs, and public concerns. (EPHC 2005b, p. 7) 
An example of the shortcomings of exemption processes was also evident in the 
way that certain materials were exempted in Victoria, but were not recognised in 
Queensland. The CIF said: 
… the Victorian EPA had made a decision that because all of the wastes that were 
coming to Geocycle8 were … [being processed] to a specification, they no longer 
deemed that to be a waste of any type. They considered it as a fuel and it was not 
subject to any tracking, any other transport requirements. So we had this situation 
where the material that was coming out of Victoria as a fuel, when it crossed the border 
into Queensland, it suddenly became a regulated waste again. 
… under the memorandum of understanding between the states, the state of origin was 
[required] to initiate the tracking process. So we had a situation where Victoria, which 
didn’t even consider this to be a waste, had to initiate a tracking process for the waste 
so it could be accepted into Queensland. (trans., p. 77) 
What are the alternatives? 
The cement industry Strategic Industry Leaders Group, an advisory body to the 
Australian Government comprising representatives from the Australian cement 
industry, government and scientific experts, argued that the states and territories 
need to standardise and coordinate their procedures for exempting potential 
recyclable cementitious material. 
There is a need for exchange of information and cooperation between different 
regulatory authorities, and mutual recognition of the scientific and technical evaluations 
that have been undertaken, to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’ and to expedite approvals. 
All licensing authorities should have standard procedures for dealing with proposed 
process changes to non-traditional materials as a means of providing certainty for 
companies seeking to innovate and take advantage of new opportunities. (SILG 2006, 
p. 48) 
Another approach would be to adopt a more risk or performance-based approach to 
classifying waste. As noted, current waste classification systems are mostly 
                                              
8 Geocycle SBF Pty Ltd (formerly Teris Aust Pty Ltd) produces alternative fuels for cement kilns 
(SILG 2006).     





prescriptive-based. If a material were to be classified on the basis of the risk it 
posed to the environment or community, it would reduce the reliance on a separate 
exemption system and would lessen the likelihood of waste being misclassified. It 
would also assist in making transparent the testing requirements to be used in any 
exemption application. 
The downside of such an approach is that it may be more expensive for firms and 
regulators to demonstrate compliance with the standards. Prescriptive-based 
standards are often relatively straightforward and may only require certification of 
the type or source of the waste. 
A combination of these two approaches seems warranted. A risk-based framework 
would provide a mechanism for classifying waste and improved procedures would 
allow for a more efficient exemption process for recoverable resources.  
The Australian Government should work with the State and Territory 
Governments to: 
•  develop and implement a national definition of waste and a national waste 
classification system; 
•  review the appropriate balance between prescriptive and risk-based 
classifications of waste; 
•  standardise, coordinate and improve the efficiency of current processes for 
granting exemptions to recoverable resources from irrelevant environmental 
controls; and 
•  explore opportunities to achieve further consistency in regulatory standards 
applying to waste. 
12.4  Other regulatory impediments 
There are several other government regulatory requirements that can impede the 
efficient recovery of resources. Some of the issues identified by inquiry participants 
include: 
•  skip bin policies in metropolitan areas 
•  specification of product standards 
•  adverse outcomes of certain regulations. 
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Skip bin policies  
Waste management operators are subject to a variety of government policies 
governing skip waste bins, especially in metropolitan areas. The Waste Contractors 
and Recyclers Association (WCRA) of New South Wales noted: 
•  Within the Sydney Metropolitan Area there are approximately 40 local councils. 
•  Each of these councils invariably has a different skip waste policy that involves 
different deposits, bonds, application fees, durations, forms, number of skips etc.  
•  Recently Roads and Traffic Authority came up [with] another variation and even more 
recently WorkCover … [has] … announced to us that they intend to issue their own 
Code.  
•  This variety of Regulations and Codes is very confusing for the industry, it is an 
administrative and financial burden and needs to be centralised into one policy. 
(sub. 15, pp. 6–7). 
Not only can the inconsistencies between policies can raise the compliance costs of 
waste contractors, they can also result in duplication, which require the contractor to 
make a separate permit application every time they supply a skip waste bin. 
The inconsistencies between the various policies have been largely addressed in 
Victoria. VicRoads (2001), in consultation with other parties, has developed a 
voluntary code of practice for the licensing and placement of skip waste bins. The 
code specifies the permitting requirements, placement and visibility of skip waste 
bins. For example, the code provides a standard application form to be used in all 
licensing applications. However, the code only contains guidelines that are common 
to all municipalities. Local governments may choose to provide additional policies 
(VicRoads 2001) or even not adopt the code.  
WCRA (trans., p. 916) noted that a common policy has not arisen in New South 
Wales. The City of Ryde (trans. p. 868) contended that for this to happen, the NSW 
Government would need to produce a model code and either regulate or strongly 
encourage councils to adopt it.  
But common guidelines, such as the VicRoad code, will not address problems of 
duplication. Waste contractors still need to apply for a permit for every skip bin. 
Another approach would be to allow waste contractors to be formally accredited.9 
Under such a scheme, a contractor would pay a bond on accreditation, but would be 
exempted from applying for a local government permit every time a bin is 
delivered. 
                                              
9 Under the VicRoads code, some councils may require skip bin suppliers to be accredited, that is, 
to demonstrate they have a minimum of $5 million of public liability insurance (VicRoads 2001).     





The current approaches to skip bin policies are raising the costs of waste collection. 
These costs could be overcome by developing a uniform skip bin policy to reduce 
inconsistencies between local governments, and introducing a system for 
accrediting waste contractors to reduce the need for multiple permitting 
applications. 
State and Territory Governments should direct their agencies and local 
governments to develop uniform skip bin policies, and to augment current 
permitting processes with an accreditation system for skip bin suppliers to reduce 
the need for multiple permitting applications. 
Specification of product standards 
Various government bodies are responsible for setting the standards for a range of 
products in order to meet other objectives, such as product and food safety. 
According to the Office of Regulation Review, two ways in which product 
standards can be specified include: 
•  prescriptive-based standards — which specify the technical means for attaining 
the specified outcome; and 
•  performance-based standards — which specify the desired outcome in precise 
terms and allow individual organisations to determine how to achieve the 
outcome (ORR 1998). 
Some inquiry participants argued that the use of prescriptive-based standards is an 
impediment to the development of markets for some recovered building and 
construction materials, and post-consumer food packaging materials. 
Building and construction 
In a number of jurisdictions, the standards for building and construction materials 
are specified in terms of their performance. For example, Transport SA allows a 
range of materials to be used in the construction of road pavement, provided they 
meet performance based standards (Transport SA 2006).  
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In other cases, standards are specified on the basis of the source of the material — 
that is, in prescriptive terms. For example, Resourceco reported that the SA 
Department of Administrative and Information Services has a requirement that 
building and construction work for the Department of Education, Training and 
Employment must use quarried material (sub. 46, p. 11).10 
Specifying product standards in terms of the source of the material, rather than the 
product’s performance, can prevent the use of recovered resources. The Australian 
Council of Recyclers argued: 
Recovered resources are often discriminated against on the basis of being ‘recycled’, 
rather than being assessed on their performance. This is a significant barrier to local 
market growth. (sub. 40, p. 13) 
Concrete recycling companies were particularly concerned about the use of 
prescriptive-based standards for road base in main roads construction (Alex Fraser 
Group, sub. 27). C&D Recycling noted: 
Many specifications for road construction require quarried products, thereby precluding 
any RCA [recycled concrete aggregate]. (sub. 44, p. 12) 
A number of participants argued that virgin quarried material is favoured over 
recycled material, despite evidence suggesting that recycled material can match, or 
be demonstrably superior to, virgin material (for example, C&D Recycling, sub. 44; 
Resourceco, sub.  46). For example, the Alex Fraser Group argued that recycled 
concrete aggregate can: 
… outperform competing domestic and imported resources, but is not chosen because 
of ‘waste’ connotations. All materials should be selected on their ability to conform to a 
performance specification. (sub. 27, p. 13) 
Concrete recycling companies called for performance-based standards to be used in 
the specifications for road bases. The Alex Fraser Group recommended that there is 
a need to ‘identify and review regulations and/or product specifications that inhibit 
the use of recycled materials’ (sub. 27, p. 17). 
Packaging standards for food safety 
Prescriptive-based standards governing the use of packaging (to protect the health 
of consumers) can impede the market for recovered resources. Food Standards 
Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ) is the statutory body that specifies the 
standards for a range of food packaging materials to minimise the risk of food 
                                              
10 These standards are defined in DAIS (2000).     





contamination. For Australia, FSANZ’s standards relating to the hygienic packaging 
of food are described in Australian Standards 2070–1999 (FSANZ nd).  
FSANZ’s standards clearly state that ‘post-consumer recycled material shall not be 
used in direct contact with food’ (section 4.2.1, AS  2070–1999; Standards 
Australia nd). 
M2W2 Professional Services noted that FSANZ did not regard recycled plastic as a 
suitable food packaging material because of the possibility of contamination of the 
plastic feedstock: 
… the use of recycled consumer packaging materials, other than metals and glass, is 
potentially a problem because of contamination, since there are no controls on the 
treatment procedures or the uses to which these materials are put. It is inevitable that 
some recycled materials would not be acceptable for use in many food packaging 
applications. (sub. 49, p. 15) 
However, Visy Industries was granted an exemption to use post-consumer recycled 
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastic in 2001 (Porter 2001). The exemption was 
granted by FSANZ on the grounds that an objective of the Australian standard is to 
achieve harmonisation with the US Food and Drug Administration’s standards 
(Preface AS 2070–1999). The relevant US standard is performance-based (21 US 
Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 170–199). It stipulates how packaging must 
perform when comes into contact with food. By convincing the US Food and Drug 
Administration that its use of recycled PET plastic was safe for food packaging, 
Visy Industries was able to gain exemption from the Australian standards. 
By being harmonised with the US Food and Drug Administration’s standards, 
Australia’s standards are in effect also performance-based. However, this is not 
immediately obvious from section  4.2 (AS 2070–1999). Greater clarity in this 
regard would be helpful. 
Conclusion 
There is scope to improve the efficient recovery of resources by moving to 
performance-based standards for a range of materials, including those used in 
building and construction. Some advantages of using performance rather than 
prescriptive based standards include: 
•  flexibility — firms have more flexibility in meeting their requirements if they 
can use any material that complies with the performance requirement; 
•  innovation — firms have more freedom to innovate and use new solutions that 
meet the performance requirements if they are not constrained to comply with a 
single prescribed solution; and     




•  cost savings — firms can reduce their costs if they can choose how best to meet 
the performance requirement (PC 2004). 
As noted, the downside of performance-based standards is that it may be more 
expensive for materials suppliers to demonstrate compliance (section  12.3). A 
combination of performance-based standards and deemed-to-satisfy provisions 
would address these concerns. Where there are existing provisions to grant 
exemptions to prescriptive-based standards on the basis of performance, these 
exemptions should be clearly stated. 
Governments responsible for specifying the use of materials for products, 
including building and construction materials, should review all product 
standards that unjustifiably frustrate the use of recycled products and/or call for 
the use of virgin materials, with a view to replacing them with performance-based 
equivalents where this is feasible. 
Implications of other regulations 
Government regulations outside of waste management or Australia can have 
adverse (and sometimes perverse) consequences for the markets for recovered 
resources. Some areas of concern raised by inquiry participants include: 
•  the European Union WEEE and RoHS directives 
•  occupational health and safety regulations 
•  fuel efficiency labelling schemes 
•  energy efficiency standards. 
European Union WEEE and RoHS directives 
The European Union (EU) directives relating to the use of hazardous materials in 
electrical and electronic equipment illustrate how well-intended regulation can lead 
to perverse environmental outcomes. In 2003, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union issued directives on Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (Directive 2002/96/EC) (‘the WEEE directive’) and the Restriction of 
the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(Directive 2002/95/EC) (‘the RoHS directive’).  
The directives limit the use of certain hazardous materials in electrical and 
electronic equipment, to improve the environmental performance of their waste 
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(NetRegs  nd). An effect of the directives is to ban the use of lead solder in 
consumer electronic equipment.  
Although lead can give rise to environmental and human health problems, it is not 
clear that a ban on the use of lead solder will lead to environmental improvements 
because alternatives to lead solder (such as tin and silver) are not as reliable. It was 
alleged that the adoption of lead-free solder in Japan led to higher rates of 
equipment failure, which in turn led to an increase in the amount of waste — 
contrary to the objectives of the directive (Australian Electrical and Electronic 
Manufacturers’ Association, trans., p. 468; BRSD, sub. 70).  
Occupational health and safety regulations 
Occupational health and safety (OH&S) regulations have had a significant impact 
on the operations of the waste disposal and resource recovery industry. Some work 
practices are labour-intensive and prone to injuring workers. Over time, regulations 
in this industry were gradually tightened and led to changes in work practices. For 
example, the OH&S risks associated with manual lifting in part led to the 
replacement of 55 litre garbage bins with ‘wheelie bins’ between the 1970s and 
1980s (Packaging Council of Australia, sub. 67). 
OH&S regulations have also influenced the range of services offered by the 
industry. For example, Collex observed: 
It is accepted that many councils have elected to pursue commingling of different 
recyclables to minimise collection cost[s] and to address OH&S issues. (sub. 80, p. 13) 
The comingling of recyclables has tended to increase the amount of recyclables 
collected, as households undertake less sorting, but has tended to increase 
contamination. It is difficult to determine the net effect on the recovery of kerbside 
recyclables from pursuing OH&S objectives. 
Fuel efficiency labelling schemes 
The Australian Government’s Fuel Consumption Labelling Scheme provides 
consumers with information about the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles as a means 
of promoting fuel efficiency. Growing public awareness and a range of other factors 
(most notably, increasing fuel prices) have created a demand for more fuel efficient 
motor vehicles.  
It is likely that such schemes, and other factors, have affected the level of resource 
recovery. To achieve improved fuel efficiencies, automotive manufacturers have, 
among other things, substituted heavier metal components, which were generally     




cost effective to recycle, with lightweight materials such as plastics. When such 
materials are reduced to shredder floc, they are costly to recycle and are currently 
landfilled (although they are a good candidate for energy-from-waste). 
Energy efficiency standards 
The Australian, State and Territory Governments have implemented, and are 
considering strengthening, a range of energy efficiency standards for household 
appliances, industrial equipment and housing construction (PC 2005b). An objective 
of these standards is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by conserving energy. 
The Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association (AEEMA) 
(trans., p. 473) said that improved energy efficiency standards for refrigerators have 
resulted in an increased use of insulation material. AEEMA noted that this: 
… can result in increased quantities of insulation. Thus in order to comply with one 
government compliance regime, an industry may be adding to shredder floc. 
(sub. 59, p. 6) 
The adoption of tighter national energy efficiency standards for housing is also 
favouring the adoption of concrete slab floors over suspended wooden floors 
(PC 2005b). But this means that more earth needs to be removed to level the site, 
particularly when the site is sloping, which is likely to be disposed to landfill. 
Conclusion 
Government regulations and standards that address other policy objectives, such as 
energy efficiency standards, can have unintended consequences on markets for 
recovered resources. When governments are considering a policy proposal (such as 
in a non-waste related area), they should assess the overall net benefits to the 
community. This would reveal if there might be any (unintended) adverse 
consequences (chapter 6). 
12.5 International  agreements 
The terms of reference require the Commission to examine the effects of 
international trade agreements on the level and disposal of waste in Australia. There 
are two types of agreements that can influence the waste management industry: 
•  the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989) (‘the Basel Convention’); and     





•  international trade agreements, such as Article XX on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 
The Basel Convention 
The Basel Convention is a multilateral environmental agreement, the objective of 
which is to prevent the uncontrolled movement of hazardous and municipal solid 
waste. As at August 2005, there were 168 signatory countries to the agreement, 
including Australia.  
The Basel Convention is given force within Australia through the Hazardous Waste 
(Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989 (Cwlth) (HWA  1989) and its 
regulations (such as the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) 
(OECD Decision) Regulations 1996) (HWR  1996). They are enforced by the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH). 
The objective of the HWA 1989 is to control the trade (the export, import and 
transit) of hazardous waste (including municipal solid waste) in an environmentally 
sound manner so as to protect people and the environment.11  
Generally, Australian firms are prohibited from exporting hazardous waste for final 
disposal, except in exceptional circumstances (DEH  2001a). Australian firms 
wishing to export hazardous waste to a signatory country for resource recovery 
must apply for a permit — although export permits are not required for certain 
electronic recyclables going to OECD countries (DEH nd).  
The relevant Australian Minister will grant a permit to export hazardous waste for 
resource recovery if, among other things, the Minister is satisfied that the material 
will be exported in an environmentally sound manner and the relevant authority 
overseas has granted its written consent.12 The HWA 1989 and HWR 1996 set time 
frames on how soon the Minister must respond to an application, but the actual time 
taken in part reflects how quickly overseas authorities can respond to requests from 
Australia.13 
The DEH (sub. 103) noted that 20 kilotonnes (or 20 per cent) of lead acid batteries 
had been exported under the HWA 1989, and that approximately two million used 
                                              
11 s.  3(1),  Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989 (Cwlth) (HWA 1989). 
12 s.  17, HWA  1989; r.  16 Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) (OECD 
  Decision) Regulations 1996, (HWR 1996). 
13  ss. 15A–16, HWA 1989; rr. 12–15, HWR 1996.     




computers were exported each year, about half of which are obsolete models sold 
for scrap. 
Are current exemption processes too onerous? 
Some participants were concerned that the procedures for gaining exemptions to the 
Act might be too onerous. Examination of the DEH’s guidelines regarding the 
export of used electronic equipment suggests that the requirements placed on firms 
are relatively clear and easily accessible (box 12.8).  
 
Box 12.8  Hazardous waste criteria for exporting electronic equipment 
The criteria used by the DEH in its guidelines as to whether electronic equipment can 
be exported, include: 
•  Is the equipment waste? The guidelines define waste to mean any item intended for 
recycling or disposal. Used equipment that is still working (intended for direct reuse 
or upgrading) is not waste and not covered by the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of 
Exports and Imports) Act 1989 (Cwlth). The guidelines also describe in detail the 
types of faults the equipment would need to make them waste. For example, a 
computer is considered to be waste if it does not power up, perform internal set-up 
routines or if its self-check fails. 
•  Is the waste hazardous? The guidelines describe the components and assemblies 
of electronic equipment that are regarded to be hazardous and subject to the Act. 
For example, assemblies that contain accumulators, mercury-switchers, or glass 
from cathode ray tubes are considered to be hazardous. 
•  Where is the waste being sent? The guidelines state that exporters of electronic 
scrap (such as printed circuit boards) and reclaimed electronic components do not 
require an export permit if the material is to be sent to an OECD country for 
resource recovery — though they would need transit permits if the material were 
being shipped via third countries.  
Sources: DEH (2001a, nd) 
 
 
The DEH contended that any failure of a firm to obtain an export permit may 
simply reflect unwillingness to meet the application requirements: 
… it is difficult to say whether exports have not gone ahead because of an exporter’s 
lack of determination to do so — for example, unwillingness to meet the application 
requirements — or for some other reason. (sub. DR214, p. 25) 
However, comments from other participants suggest the problem is that permits are 
issued for too short a period given the time that it takes for exporters and the 
relevant authorities to submit and consider them. The problem arises from the way 
in which permits are granted and then take effect. In the majority of cases, an export     





permit will be issued for a relatively short period of time from the date of 
application. (In the case of exports to the OECD, permits are usually issued for up 
to a year).14 But a firm can only commence exporting once the Minister is satisfied 
that all the regulatory requirements are met. Given that the Minister needs to receive 
written consent from all the relevant authorities in each of the transit and destination 
countries, this process can take many months, and the timing of which is uncertain. 
As a result, permits are only useable for a short time (and in many cases, only a few 
months) before a firm has to apply for a renewal. 
It is possible for a firm to request, at the time of application, for the permit to be 
granted at some later date.15 However, this might not be clear to firms unfamiliar 
with the process of applying for a permit. It might also be possible for firms to 
apply for permits back-to-back, but this means that both exporters and the relevant 
authorities will be caught in a cycle of renewing and processing the same permit 
every few months.  
The effort arising from the application process can discourage firms from exporting 
recoverable resources. SITA Environmental Solutions noted: 
SITA could recycle batteries and electronics more easily if it did not have to comply 
with the administrative burden of Basel. (sub. DR143, p. 22) 
SITA Environmental Solutions (trans., p. 846) also noted that they can avoid the 
administrative burden by exporting their product via a third party that has already 
obtained an authorisation from the DEH. 
Though the current exemption processes can be improved, many of the constraints 
faced by Australian exporters are beyond the Australian Government’s immediate 
control, such as the time it takes foreign authorities to respond to Australian 
requests. There is limited scope to change the duration of permits as these are set 
out in the Basel Convention. There appears to be, however, scope to make sure that 
export and other permits are issued from the date the Minister grants approval not 
from the date of application. 
The Australian Government should ensure that export, import and transit permits 
granted under the Hazardous Waste Act 1989 (Cwlth) are issued expeditiously 
and commence from the day the Minister grants approval, rather than from the 
date of application, unless the applicant requests otherwise. 
                                              
14  rr. 17(1)(a) and (2)(b), HWR 1996. 
15  r. 17(1)(b), HWR 1996. 
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International trade agreements 
Australia is a signatory to a number of international multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. The most notable is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Australia is also a signatory to four bilateral trade agreements: 
•  the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and the 
associated Australian and New Zealand Government Procurement Agreement; 
•  the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement;  
•  the Singapore–Australia Free Trade Agreement; and 
•  the Thailand–Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
International trade agreements have the potential to influence Australian waste 
management policies in two ways: by placing limits on how Australia can 
implement an extended producer responsibility scheme; and by limiting how 
Australian governments can exercise their procurement policies. 
Implications for extended producer responsibility schemes 
The GATT is one of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements that lay out 
the international rules for the use of trade restrictions. When a country accedes to 
the WTO, it agrees to trade with other countries on terms set out in the GATT. 
Generally, this means that parties are not permitted to restrict trade, except in 
accordance with the principles in the agreement (Oxley 1997). 
The GATT is relevant for the management of extended producer responsibility 
schemes. Australia is not permitted to restrict imports from another country that is a 
signatory to the GATT, on the grounds that its environmental policies do not accord 
with Australia’s policies. However, under Article XX of the GATT, Australia is 
only permitted to restrict imports from another country to protect the public health 
or environment of Australia. Australia can impose trade restrictions on the basis of 
the technical specifications of imported goods provided: 
•  like products are treated as like products 
•  they are not unduly trade restricting. 
International trade agreements do not appear to impede the adoption of extended 
producer responsibility schemes provided that the same restrictions (such as taxes 
and levies) apply to imports and their equivalent domestic goods, and the least 
trade restricting measures are used.     





Implications for government procurement 
Australia’s international bilateral trade agreements with New Zealand, the United 
States, Singapore and Thailand contain provisions regarding government 
procurement (DOFA 2005). Australia is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement, though it is an observer.  
These bilateral trade agreements limit the use of government procurement to 
discriminate against importers — since government procurement policies can be 
used to protect domestic producers against foreign competition. (In the case of the 
Thailand–Australia Free Trade Agreement, there has yet to be resolution of the 
provisions regarding government procurement.)  
A concern is whether bilateral trade agreements can limit the ability of 
Australian governments to use purchasing policies for environmental purposes. A 
review of the bilateral agreements reveals that Australian governments can use 
preferential purchasing — provided they do not discriminate against firms of the 
bilateral trading partner. Australia’s trade agreements do not prevent Australian 
governments from using government procurement to promote environmental 
objectives. However, government procurement policies are not recommended as a 
means of promoting markets for recovered resources, due to their lack of 
cost-effectiveness (chapter 11). 
     




     




13 Performance  measurement 
 
Key points 
•  Performance indicators can be effective ways of determining whether objectives are 
being met, but are not an end in themselves. They are only as good as the policies 
or practices they are evaluating and the data used to enumerate them. 
•  Indicators of amounts of waste provide no information on the costs and benefits of 
various waste management options and are, therefore, not good measures of 
whether a policy achieves net benefits for the community. 
•  Indicators that focus on downstream issues, such as the externalities of waste 
disposal, are likely to provide the most useful information. 
•  Indicators of cost effectiveness may assist policy makers in assessing waste 
management options and managing community expectations. 
•  Simply collecting more waste data is likely to be costly, for doubtful benefit. 
Collecting data for use in developing policy that focuses on particular demonstrated 
or potential problems may, however, be warranted. 
•  There may be benefit in State and Territory Governments developing a set of 
uniform definitions of waste that would result in improved national data with low 




The terms of reference ask the Commission to examine the ‘effectiveness of 
performance indicators to measure efficiency of resource recovery practices’. Most 
inquiry participants interpreted this as being about performance against the targets 
of reducing waste to landfill and/or increasing resource recovery. This chapter 
outlines what performance indicators are and how they are currently being used in 
waste management policy. It goes on to describe some measures that might be 
useful for waste management policy and the issues surrounding data collection. 
13.1  What are performance indicators? 
Performance indicators are a device used in performance measurement. They are 
used to help measure how well organisations meet their objectives, given the 
external constraints and resource limitations placed on them, and whether they are     




operating efficiently and effectively. Their uses can include: governments 
measuring their performance in delivering services and undertaking regulatory 
activities; companies measuring their performance in creating value for owners; and 
contracting parties measuring whether outcomes are being achieved. Performance 
indicators are also used for establishing baseline levels of performance and 
monitoring changes over time. 
Performance indicators are often used in policy review, including for demonstrating 
compliance. For example, the Australian Government’s regulation impact statement 
process includes the requirement to outline ‘how the preferred [regulatory] option 
will be monitored to assess its progress in achieving its objectives’ (ORR 1998, 
p.  D17). Good policy making also requires clear lines of accountability for 
achieving objectives and setting out consequences for non-compliance.  
In order to be a useful evaluation tool, performance indicators need to reflect 
properly justified objectives and outcomes, and be comprehensive, transparent, 
meaningful and cost-effective (box 13.1). They can be used as evidence of the need 
to improve performance.  
Performance indicators are not the same as benchmarks or targets, although they 
can be useful in determining whether benchmarks or targets are being met, and can, 
in some cases, be used to set these benchmarks or targets. Performance indicators 
can also be used in measuring comparative performance between organisations or 
jurisdictions. This can provide useful information on the outcomes being achieved 
by others, and having regard to relevant differences, what alternative approaches 
might improve performance. This process can be especially useful where there is no 
competitive market pressure on an organisation and there is limited information 
available to those deciding what services to supply. This often occurs in the waste 
industry, particularly at the collection stage, which tends to be a natural monopoly 
at the local level (chapter 5).     





Box 13.1  Features of good performance indicators 
Performance indicators are most useful when they provide a concise, measurable 
indication of whether properly justified objectives have been met. Indicators that 
provide a quantifiable measure are preferable, although there is sometimes a place for 
qualitative indicators. In the absence of reliable data on direct measures, proxies may 
be useful.  
Good performance indicators are generally: 
•  Objectives/outcomes focused — given external constraints, performance 
indicators should reflect whether suitable, measurable, clearly defined and 
achievable outcomes are being met.  
•  Comprehensive but concise — a set of performance indicators should reflect all 
important objectives to demonstrate different aspects of overall performance, while 
not overwhelming users with information.  
•  Transparent — performance indicators should be accompanied by explanatory 
material with the limitations and qualifications outlined, including those of the data. 
Where possible, comparable data should be used to illustrate performance based 
on consistent definitions, both over time and across jurisdictions. However, there 
may be a tradeoff between the comparability of the data and its cost. 
•  Meaningful to stakeholders — there are a number of groups that use information 
provided in performance indicators in waste management. Governments use them 
in evidence based policy making and resource allocation, waste management firms 
and other firms use them in business decision making and to demonstrate 
compliance, and environmental groups and the community use them for monitoring 
outcomes and performance. Indicators should provide sufficient information for the 
target audience to make assessments about performance (and take into account 
the special needs of particular target audiences). It is also useful if data used for 
performance indicators can be disaggregated, so stakeholders can examine levels 
of detail relevant to them. The results should also be unambiguous in their 
interpretation. 
•  Timely and cost effective — there are practical considerations when developing 
performance indicators. Data used for performance indicators should be relevant for 
decision making and, therefore, need to be promptly available. There may be a 
tradeoff between timeliness and accuracy of data. The cost of data collection should 
not exceed the benefit. 
 
     




13.2  Performance indicators for waste management 
policy 
Current performance indicator exercises 
There are a number of recent or current exercises being undertaken that involve 
using performance indicators for waste management.  
•  In 2004, the OECD Working Group on Waste Prevention and Recycling and the 
Working Group on Environmental Information and Outlooks finalised a set of 
performance indicators based on the Pressure-State-Response1 framework 
(box 13.2). 
•  The Australian Government, and most State and Territory Governments publish 
regular ‘State of the Environment’ reports that include indicators such as solid 
waste disposed to landfill, participation in recycling and amounts of waste 
recycled. There are gaps in the data used to report against these indicators. 
•  The revised National Packaging Covenant (NPC) incorporates 29 performance 
indicators that signatories are required to report against. Each performance 
indicator relates to one of five Covenant Environmental Performance Goals. The 
indicators range from measures of volume of material sold and recovered to 
qualitative information on systems and practices.  
•  Performance indicators are often incorporated into contracts between local 
governments and agents contracting for waste management services such as 
collection and materials recovery. Performance indicators, such as waste 
contamination rates, can assist in determining whether contractual requirements 
are being met. 
•  Local governments use performance indicators to monitor their performance 
over time. To the extent that these are comparable, these can be used to compare 
performance between local governments in a state or territory. For example, the 
NSW Department of Local Government produces annual comparative 
information against four performance indicators for waste management relating 
to charges for, and costs of, domestic services, and amounts of domestic waste 
and recyclables collected. 
                                              
1  The Pressure-State-Response model is a framework for environmental indicators and indicators of 
sustainable development. It was developed by the OECD to ‘differentiate indicators which respectively 
relate to human pressures on the environment, actual states of the environment, and the response which 
may be undertaken to alleviate environmental damage.’ (Newton et al. 1998, p. 19)     




Some of the performance indicators used in the schemes outlined above do not meet 
all the criteria for good performance indicators. Some examples include: 
•  the OECD scheme contains three ‘indexes’ that appear fairly complex in their 
generation and may not be particularly transparent or meaningful to stakeholders 
(box 13.2); 
•  the NPC scheme contains a large number of indicators that will be costly for 
firms to collect data against, may overburden municipal staff (particularly in 
regional councils) and may overwhelm stakeholders with information. The 
scheme also includes a number of qualitative indicators that do not appear to be 
particularly meaningful (appendix C); and 
•  ‘State of the Environment’ indicators of amounts of waste disposed to landfill 
measure progress against a stated objective of diverting waste from landfill, but 
does not provide any information on the impact of waste in landfills on the 
environment, which is the policy issue that the Commission considers to be of 
primary importance. 
Indicators of amounts of waste 
Many performance indicators focus on amounts of waste going to, or being diverted 
from, landfill and amounts of materials being recycled. This reflects: 
•  policies based on the waste hierarchy, or particular targets of waste landfilled or 
recovered; and 
•  the relative ease of collecting data on quantities of waste. 
As noted in chapter 7, the Commission considers that policies based on the waste 
hierarchy are likely to have resulted in net costs to the community. Performance 
indicators are only as good as the policies they are being used to evaluate. If a 
landfill diversion target has been set without rigorous analysis of the costs and 
benefits, its achievement is likely to impose net costs on the community. The 
amount of waste going to landfill, or being recovered, may be a suitable 
performance indicator for policies based on the waste hierarchy, but it does not 
provide information on the financial and environmental costs of achieving the 
objectives of such policies. Depending on the circumstances, such as the size and 
location of a landfill, the costs of diverting some types of waste may be greater than 
the benefits.     





Box 13.2  OECD waste prevention performance indicators 
The OECD indicators for waste prevention include: 
•  Municipal waste generation (tonnes per year) — municipal waste generation per 
person, and  municipal waste generation per unit of private final consumption 
expenditure for municipal waste and its components. 
•  Generation of construction and demolition waste (tonnes per year) — 
generation of construction and demolition waste per unit of gross domestic product. 
•  Generation of non-hazardous industrial waste (tonnes per year) — generation of 
non-hazardous industrial waste per unit of gross domestic product. 
•  Number of companies with a certified environmental management system — 
total number, per person, or per unit of GDP. 
•  Consumption of virgin material and (collection for) recycling of the material — 
for selected materials only, for example, glass, paper and metals.  
•  ‘No thanks’ stickers for unsolicited mail handed out — in percentage of total 
households or by type of household (single-family, multi-family, other).  
•  Existence of a national waste prevention plan or strategy (yes/no) — a 
qualitative indicator that shows the extent to which extended producer responsibility 
(EPR) schemes are implemented. In this case, a relevant indicator could be a list of 
products and/or product groups targeted by EPR nationally or regionally.  
•  Households with variable-rate pricing for waste collection — in total or as a 
share of the total number of households. 
•  Hidden flow index — domestic hidden flows/total material input describes the 
changes in material effectiveness especially in the branches of primary production 
and construction. 
•  Waste disposal index — waste disposed of/net additions to stock reflects the 
efficiency of the use of materials in, and recovery of, the waste from the production 
and consumption processes. 
•  Manure utilisation index — Dissipative use of manure/total generation of manure 
describes the magnitude and development of waste utilisation in agriculture leading 
to productive use of high amounts of waste. 
Source: OECD (2004c). 
 
 
A number of participants noted the limitations of measures that focused on the 
amount of waste diverted. For example, Collex noted: 
KPIs [key performance indicators] should take into account the value of resource 
recovery including energy and the toxicity avoided. This involves a recognition that 
tonnage is a very limited KPI. A tonne of paper contaminated by food scraps and glass 
has nowhere near the recycling value of good quality sorted paper. (sub. 80, p. 8)     




Performance indicators can be useful for comparing the performance of different 
jurisdictions or countries. But such comparisons of volumes of waste generated and 
diverted from landfill need to be made with caution (discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2). This is because: 
•  there are significant data comparability issues in domestic and international 
waste data; and 
•  there are also geographic, social and economic differences between countries 
and jurisdictions that would be expected to result in different optimal waste 
management outcomes.  
These issues were raised by the Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ 
Association (AEEMA): 
AEEMA is wary of direct comparisons with other countries without a full 
understanding of the comparability of data sets. Unfortunately, this can only be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. For example, even in Europe, where EU Directives 
are intended to promote harmonisation, legislation and implementation of the 
Directives in EU member states can vary significantly due to different geography, 
demographics, economic circumstances, enforcement priorities and technical 
difficulties as well as lack of clear product definitions to distinguish product groups. 
(sub. 59, p. 11)  
Moreover, the PCA noted: 
A number of jurisdictions prefer to report quantities early in the recycling process as 
the reported yields are higher. For example Germany reports a recycling rate of 82 per 
cent, but in Europe ‘recycling’ only means delivery to a recycler. There may be a 
difference of 30 per cent between what is collected and what is recovered. While the 
German DSD [Duales System Deutschland] … means a wide range of materials are 
collected, there is a high level of missorting and limited markets for a number of 
materials. Consequently about a quarter of the material delivered is rejected by the 
recycler and sent for disposal by other means. (sub. 67, p. 30) 
Using amounts of waste as a performance indicator to set targets or benchmarks can 
result in policies that result in net costs to the community. Measures of amounts of 
waste may be useful information for the policy debate — in this regard, more 
accurate data may be warranted (discussed in section 13.3) — but their usefulness 
as performance indicators of the levels of community wellbeing achieved is 
questionable. They provide no information on the net benefits to the community of 
the various options for waste management. 
     




Performance indicators of the amounts of waste being disposed to landfill or 
recovered have limited value because they do not provide any information on the 
costs and benefits of these options.  
Indicators of externalities 
The Commission considers that waste management policy should focus primarily 
on waste disposal externalities. To the extent that these are internalised, for 
example, through the costs of compliance with regulation, markets will tend to 
achieve the right balance between disposal and recycling. To this end, performance 
indicators relating to the externalities arising from waste management and resource 
recovery may be useful. The most important externalities associated with landfilling 
are groundwater and surface water contamination, greenhouse gas emissions and 
loss of amenity.  
Performance indicators could be used to determine whether the objectives of landfill 
policy were being met. For example, landfill operators could be required to publicly 
report measures such as contamination levels in groundwater due to leachate, 
greenhouse gas emissions, complaints about loss of amenity from nearby residents, 
and strategies for site rehabilitation as part of licensing requirements. This 
information could then be used by regulatory authorities, local residents or 
environmental groups to require landfill operators to bring sites to an acceptable 
standard, or to close sites, through enforcement of licensing conditions or 
application of political pressure.  
Licensing of landfills has for some years been the responsibility of state and 
territory environmental protection agencies (EPAs), although the approach varies 
across jurisdictions. EPAs are also accountable for ensuring that landfills comply 
with licensing requirements. In an environment where regulation appears to offer 
the best policy response to externalities, non-compliance not only imposes 
significant risks to the environment, but also bestows a competitive advantage on 
non-compliers, distorting price signals and leading to sub-optimal outcomes. For 
example, non-complying landfill operators may be able to operate at a lower cost. 
This would provide a competitive disadvantage not only to compliant landfills, but 
also to operators of compliant alternative waste technology, energy-from-waste and 
recycling facilities.  
While EPA licensing requirements for landfills appear to be largely adequate for 
addressing policy-relevant externalities, their effectiveness depends on the degree to 
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which they are complied with (section 8.5). In this regard, performance indicators, 
such as the proportion of landfills that meet their EPA’s licensing requirements, 
could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of EPA programs. 
This approach was supported by SITA Environmental Solutions, which noted: 
The EPAs do not report systematically on compliance with licence conditions and only 
some undertake ad hoc landfill audits to assess compliance. This situation is clearly 
inadequate. 
Regulations and licence conditions should be rigorously enforced and reported upon 
publicly. A register of landfill compliance to … minimum operating standards should 
be developed and reported upon by each EPA. (sub. DR143, p. 23) 
Performance indicators relating to compliance with licence conditions at landfill 
sites may be useful in revealing the extent of externalities, and whether further 
policy intervention is needed. 
Indicators of cost effectiveness 
Community expectations have played an important part in shaping waste 
management policy. The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) 
noted: 
States are under increasing pressure from the community to introduce zero waste 
policies and to make producers responsible for the waste impacts of their products. 
(trans., p. 605) 
While recognising that it is important  for policy makers to respond to community 
expectations, it is also important that the community is well informed about all costs 
and benefits of different waste policy options. Uninformed community expectations 
are not a good basis for policy development. Providing sound, relevant information 
to the community is crucial to informing the policy debate, especially as community 
perceptions of the problem sometimes drive the choice of solution. As the Business 
Roundtable on Sustainable Development (BRSD) noted: 
For sensible input to waste management policy, the BRSD believes that the aspirations 
of the community must be well informed. And those expectations must be determined 
properly, not just assumed and asserted, particularly by vested interests.  
Leadership and effective consultation by government and business is required to 
appropriately inform the community, to provide the lines of logic and to establish the 
evidence base that will inform the community and allow sensible aspirations to evolve. 
(sub. 70, p. 18) 
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One way in which the community can be given more information is through the use 
of soundly based cost-effectiveness indicators, such as the cost of achieving higher 
rates of recycling or lower rates of disposal to landfill. Improved information on 
cost-effectiveness would be beneficial to policy makers at all levels of government 
and to the community in assessing the costs of different waste management options. 
Moreover, cost-effectiveness indicators would assist in ensuring preferred waste 
management options are implemented at least cost. As Porter (2002, p. 262) noted: 
Cost-effectiveness avoids the tough issues [of how much waste the US should be 
generating each year] and tries to minimise costs with respect to the more readily 
controlled variables. Where life and fairness and justice are involved, as in many waste 
decisions, it may be impossible to decide what overall policy is optimal, but there are 
always parts of the problem that can be examined for cost-effectiveness. Whatever we 
do, we should always do it at least cost.  
Chapter 4 noted that the total (private and external) net benefits of some recycling 
are likely to be small or even negative, and that alternative waste technologies are 
likely to result in greater net costs to the community than landfilling. Part of the task 
for policy makers is to inform the community of the costs involved in diverting 
waste from landfill, compared with other waste management options. 
This suggests that information, such as that produced by the NSW Department of 
Local Government on the comparative performance of local governments in New 
South Wales, could be useful (NSW DLG 2005). For example, the indicator ‘cost 
per service for domestic waste collection’ across councils could indicate the 
variation in costs of different types of services used by different local governments 
(for example, hard waste collection, green waste collection and kerbside recycling).  
Similarly, net cost per tonne of the kerbside collection system could indicate the 
variation across local governments in the net costs of different kerbside collection 
systems. Such indicators could be used by local governments to communicate to the 
community that there are costs involved with recycling and to identify councils with 
low costs. This may facilitate information sharing between local governments about 
strategies to reduce costs and undertake kerbside recycling at least net cost. Use of 
such indicators would need to have regard to the various factors affecting kerbside 
collection costs, such as population density and distance to resource recovery 
facilities.  
Performance indicators of cost effectiveness can have a role to play in measuring 
the cost of achieving social and environmental objectives in waste management, 
and in benchmarking performances of local governments in providing kerbside 
collection services.  
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13.3  Improved data collection  
Good quality data are important for a number of reasons. As noted by the DEH: 
… good quality data assist sound policy development processes and enable industry to 
more effectively participate in markets for recoverables or otherwise manage waste. 
However, to justify the costs of its collection there must be a clear benefit from 
obtaining the data, whether it is at the national, state or local level, or related to market 
sectors or products. Moreover, the impact on individual businesses should be 
minimised. 
The nature of policy or business decisions varies across these levels/sectors, and data 
should be relevant to those levels. (sub. 103, p. 52) 
Data on amounts of waste generated, recycled and disposed in Australia, and some 
of the issues relating to the quality of these data, are discussed in chapter 2. There is 
a range of other data that would be useful for waste policy and industry 
development, including environmental impacts, consumption, exports and imports, 
and recovery rates of recyclables. However, data collection is not costless, and 
depending on the policy objectives set, the cost of collecting waste data could be 
substantial.  
The adequacy of data on waste 
There are a range of difficulties in collecting data on waste. The Packaging Council 
of Australia (PCA) (sub. 67) observed: 
•  some jurisdictions do not have an annualised minimum data set and tend to only 
conduct one-off data collection exercises; 
•  some landfills do not have weighbridges; 
•  there is significant seasonal variation in waste and recycling rates, with events 
such as Christmas, Easter and long weekends having a significant impact on set 
out rates; 
•  reliably determining the composition of general waste can only be done by 
regular and detailed bin audits, which is a costly activity; 
•  reliable information on resource recovery is best obtained by audits of recycling 
facilities to measure quantities delivered, sorted and recovered; and 
•  audits need to be underpinned by comprehensive, independent and validated 
systems of reporting from landfills and recycling facilities.     




There were numerous comments from participants about the inadequacy of data on 
waste and how this was limiting the policy debate. The Local Government 
Association of Tasmania noted: 
More reliable data on consumption, recycling and disposal and the environmental 
impacts of those things would greatly assist in establishing clear priorities and 
measuring policy outcomes and there is a need for intervention to facilitate 
improvements in this area. (sub. 60, p.5) 
The PCA also noted: 
Forming effective and efficient policy in the absence of reliable and comprehensive 
data is at best risky and at worse irresponsible. Consistent, independent and accurate 
data is essential to forming good policy. (sub. 67, p. 29) 
Resourceco noted: 
At the time of writing this document there was minimal reporting of waste streams in 
and out of all facilities with a majority of the documentation supplied being in support 
of the collection of the levies. This was done at the gate of the landfill so much of the 
data collection is anecdotal based on what companies want to report.  
Given the nature of the waste industry this information would be either exaggerated or 
understated dependant on what suited the company at the time. (sub. 46, p. 5) 
Other participants claimed there was already sufficient data in the area of waste 
generation. For example, the Cement Industry Federation noted: 
While the cement industry believes that good data is important in making good 
management decisions, we do not believe that insufficient data exists in the area of 
waste generation and resource efficiency to make a case for delaying early action in 
this area. The cement industry collects data on all materials used by the industry as well 
as secondary materials utilised. (sub. 71, p. 4) 
Good quality data can assist policy makers in managing community expectations. 
The DEH noted the role of the OECD data on waste generation in motivating policy 
responses:  
OECD data indicate that Australia’s per capita waste generation is 690 kilograms per 
year. This figure is frequently used by governments and non-government organisations 
as a driver to motivate industry, governments and communities to take more action on 
waste, but it is based on ‘estimated data referring to the late 1990s’ (OECD 2005c).  
Accurate national data on waste and recycling would support more balanced, less 
reactive policy development. (sub. 103, p. 54)     




The cost of data 
Some participants commented on the costs of data collection, including the Building 
Products Innovation Council, which noted: 
… if the cost of collecting the data is too high compared to the application of the 
analytical results from the data then we should not proceed (on economic grounds). In 
our view it is preferable to estimate the costs involved in the data collection and then 
compare this to the benefits that might be achieved through redirection of the funds that 
would otherwise be spent on data collection to encouragement of research or practices 
that aim to reduce waste regardless of the finite amount actually disposed. (sub. 86, 
pp. 1–2) 
AEEMA also questioned the cost effectiveness of more data: 
Although we would prefer to have more precise data, AEEMA has found that obtaining 
greater detail on domestic appliance recycling rates and material flows involves 
significant cost, yet would not result in significantly more accurate data, or increased 
recycling. (sub. 59, p. 9) 
Some participants asserted that some data are not being made available, or are not 
collected on a consistent basis, limiting their usefulness. In this regard, it may be the 
case that much of the costs of data collection are already being borne, and 
standardising definitions or converting the data already collected into a format that 
is useful from a national perspective, not just from the perspective of the individual 
jurisdiction, would incur only small additional costs. For example, the Alex Fraser 
Group noted: 
Standardisation of audit protocols, the ability for comparisons to be made state-by-state 
and region-by-region is essential. Currently all levels of government enforce reporting 
systems and capture significant quantities of information, but because of its 
non-standardisation, much of it is unusable. (sub. 27, p. 16) 
The Commission observes that while data are costly, there is also a cost in not 
having reliable data available for sound policy development, as noted by the DEH: 
There are uncertainties about applying and interpreting the quantitative results of   
cost–benefit analysis when a lack of reliable data makes it difficult to undertake 
quantitative assessment of all benefits and costs (especially those incurred due to 
environmental externalities), thus potentially skewing policy decisions away from 
environmentally sound outcomes. (sub. DR214, p. 14) 
The Australian Waste Database 
Experience with the Australian Waste Database (AWD), which was initiated by the 
Cooperative Research Centre for Waste Management and Pollution Control Ltd in 
the 1990s, serves to illustrate the difficulties in collecting uniform, national data.     




Funding for this exercise was limited, and subsequent changes to the structure of the 
industry and lack of compulsion to report data has resulted in it now containing few 
data items of any currency or comparability across jurisdictions (or even within 
jurisdictions).  
Some participants thought the AWD provided a useful model for improved data 
collection. For example, the Waste Management Association of Australia 
(WMAA), National Landfill Division noted: 
It’s a fairly sophisticated and useful instrument for dealing with waste data because it 
looks at the sources that generate the waste as well as the actual material composition. 
This database has died through lack of support from state governments. It was 
maintained by the federal government for a while, and I think it might have gone to the 
CSIRO … but it’s not being kept up to date and isn’t really being used. But it is a 
systemised approach which is capable of giving you consistent data. … I think in the 
Waste Management Association there is some interest in reviving this database and 
possibly the Waste Management Association taking some role in maintaining it, 
because it’s very much in our interests. We’re very interested in that and we think that 
the collection of data on waste is an important issue. (trans., p. 1127) 
Other participants believed that the AWD is not a model that would produce good 
results: 
… the Australian Waste Database was not successful and NSW would not support any 
similar efforts because of the degree of resources involved and the low probability of 
success. (NSW Government, sub. DR195, p. 1) 
A way forward on data 
The Commission considers that a nationally consistent set of data would be useful 
for comparing jurisdiction’s performance against their particular waste management 
objectives and against each other. For example, it would appear that the use of a 
comparatively high landfill levy in New South Wales has not achieved as high 
levels of recycling (48 per cent of total waste generated was recycled in 2002-03, 
according to Hyder Consulting  (DEH, sub. 103, attachment A)) as Victoria’s 
approach that focuses more on education and industry support (51 per cent 
recycling rate).  
Section 12.3 discusses the implications of standardising definitions of waste across 
jurisdictions, including how this would improve data comparability. Jurisdictions 
may argue that it is difficult to collect data on a nationally consistent basis because 
definitions of waste are determined by the legislative and regulatory frameworks, 
and these vary across jurisdictions. For example, the NSW Government noted:  
The waste data collected by NSW is of high quality, transparent and reported publicly 
on a regular basis … The data are also structured around the regulatory framework,     




which limits the flexibility to adjust the data or the reporting to be consistent with all 
states and territories. (sub. DR195, p. 1) 
The Commission notes, however, that there are other policy areas where differing 
legislative frameworks have not prevented the collection of national data that is 
broadly consistent, and appropriately qualified as to any inconsistencies in 
supporting information. As such, there may be value in establishing nationally 
consistent definitions, such as those in the AWD, with jurisdictions collecting data 
against these definitions as they see a policy need. Such an approach would allow 
each jurisdiction to assess the costs of the additional administrative burden against 
the benefits for their jurisdiction. The Commission would encourage a lead role by 
industry, as suggested by the WMAA, National Landfill Division above, in such an 
exercise, supported by State and Territory Governments.  
The Commission also considers that data could be used to understand the size and 
scope of particular waste-related problems. For example, since: 
•  landfilling tyres is perceived to be causing problems, data could be collected on 
the externalities associated with the disposal of tyres, and used to develop 
appropriate policy responses; and 
•  plastic-bag litter and its impact on the environment is a key concern, collection 
of data on these impacts could be undertaken.  
The NSW Government also noted that data collections needed to be focused on 
particular policy issues and be cost effective: 
Data collection efforts should instead be focussed on those areas where meaningful 
data can be extracted quickly and at relatively low cost. It is recognised that work is 
underway in a number of product sectors, for example packaging, to develop cost 
effective data sets that will inform an analysis of products and their environmental 
benefits and costs, particularly with regard to product stewardship work. These 
initiatives should be encouraged. (sub. DR195, p. 1) 
The Treated Timber Product Stewardship Group noted its particular data needs: 
We need good quality national data to be collected on disposal of waste timber, which 
includes the level of contamination (chemical and physical) as well as how the waste is 
presented (for example, size, shape, condition). This data is necessary for performing 
informed cost–benefit analysis as well as assessing the environmental impacts of 
alternatives to current practices. (sub. DR262, p. 4) 
Data collection need not always be ongoing, which tends to be costly. One-off 
specific collections of data for identified policy problems is a suitable approach in 
some circumstances. The DEH suggested that ‘governments … can commission 
work to seek additional information to better understand the problem’ (trans., 
p. 980).      




To justify a case for government intervention in the collection of data, market 
failures in information, or compelling environmental or social issues, need to be 
demonstrated. Moreover, the benefits of government intervention should outweigh 
the costs. Ongoing data collections will need to demonstrate significant benefits for 
their relatively high cost compared with more targeted collections. An appropriate 
balance will need to be found between avoiding the burdens on industry and local 
government of too much data collection and the risk of poor policy making resulting 
from too little. While a number of participants noted that a lack of data was 
hindering their efforts at developing markets for recovered resources, it is not clear 
why governments should be responsible for providing or funding such market 
research. 
The ABS may be well placed to assist governments at all levels to improve waste 
data collections in a cost-effective manner, subject to resources being made 
available: 
At the inaugural ABS Centre of Environment and Energy Statistics Advisory Board 
meeting in August 2005, members highlighted that waste and waste management 
would be a topic of emerging and increasing interest. (ABS, sub. 47, p. 8)  
The ABS noted that its potential role could include: 
Assisting others in collection and collation of waste data, particularly in the area of 
defining agreed statistical concepts, frameworks, standards and data requirements. 
(sub. 47, p. 8) 
Good data are an important component of good policy practice based on rigorous 
cost–benefit analysis and poor data can result in policy that addresses little more 
than perceived problems and ill-informed aspirations. Governments can guide the 
development of relevant data sets. 
The Australian Government should work with the State and Territory 
Governments to coordinate the development and implementation of a concise, 
nationally consistent data set for waste management that: 
•   facilitates evaluation and comparison of waste management policies across 
jurisdictions; 
•  assists governments in undertaking cost–benefit analysis;  
•  focuses on the data needed to address priority policy issues; 
•  has regard to data collection practices already in use, including the framework 
provided by the Australian Waste Database; and 
•  recognises the importance of government-funded data when there is a market 
failure in information. 
RECOMMENDATION 13.1     
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14  The main issues and the way forward 
Key points 
•  Waste management policy needs to be refocused on the environmental and social 
externalities that can be associated with waste collection and disposal, and 
supported by more rigorous policy development processes, if it is to best serve the 
community.  
•  The reforms the Commission is proposing would produce a marked departure from 
the recent trends in waste management policy. The common ground is a reliance on 
regulation to address the externalities that can arise from waste disposal. However, 
from that point major divergences arise, with the Commission proposing the 
abolition of landfill levies and other interventions designed to achieve selected 
waste diversion targets. 
•  Some reforms could be introduced immediately. Others might need to be phased in 
to lessen adjustment costs, or because they will take time to be designed and 
implemented. 
•  The Australian Government could play an even more prominent role than it has in 
the past. It should use its powers and responsibilities to encourage and otherwise 
help State and Territory Governments develop sound and, where appropriate, 
nationally-coordinated approaches to waste management policy.  
 
 
In many ways, this report challenges the conventional wisdom about waste 
management policy. Instead of focusing on achieving ever higher levels of 
diversion of waste from landfill or increasing the resources recovered, it asks policy 
makers to clarify objectives and consider all of the costs and benefits of the policy 
options facing the community, whether financial, environmental or social in nature. 
The options that maximise net community benefits will depend on location and 
circumstances, and will not be achieved through simple adherence to the waste 
hierarchy. 
14.1  The objectives and focus of waste management 
policy 
At the heart of any policy review, the objectives of government intervention need to 
be clarified. The Commission considers that waste management policy should be 
guided primarily by an objective of reducing the risks of harm from waste to human     




health, the environment and social amenity (environmental harm), to give the best 
returns to the community generally.   
Waste management policy does not currently focus on this objective alone. It has 
tended to also include the pursuit of objectives such as reducing waste, increasing 
resource recovery, conserving resources and improving sustainability. These 
objectives are often explicitly or implicitly linked to the waste hierarchy, and are 
not necessarily consistent with reducing the risks of environmental harm. Indeed, 
waste minimisation and resource recovery have tended to become ends in 
themselves, rather than means for achieving better environmental and social 
outcomes. This has resulted in policy approaches being adopted with little regard to 
location, or circumstances, or the overall costs and benefits to the community  
Left to themselves, markets will not reduce the risks of harm to human health and 
the environment from waste to acceptable levels. The two main market failures that 
government intervention should address concern waste collection and disposal 
(including illegal dumping and littering).  
•  The market failures in collection occur mainly with respect to household waste. 
These involve the likelihood that, in the absence of government intervention, 
waste collection services would not be universally supplied, and that private 
disposal of waste by householders would lead to unacceptable health and 
pollution impacts.  
•  The market failures in the collective disposal of waste in common facilities 
concern the externalities of landfills, and other large-scale waste disposal 
options, such as energy-from-waste and other alternative waste technologies. 
Similarly, illegal dumping and littering create externalities.  
Waste management policy needs to be refocused on these issues, not upstream 
environmental matters or broad issues such as greenhouse gas abatement. To the 
extent that there is a case for intervention, such upstream issues should be addressed 
as directly as possible, not through waste management policy. Using waste 
management policy to address these issues is likely to be inefficient and ineffective.  
Taking indirect action through waste management policy also presumes that direct 
actions are not being taken, or that the upstream externalities that have not been 
addressed are substantial. Yet with the exception of a comprehensive response to 
greenhouse gas abatement, a host of existing policies already address directly many 
upstream externalities occurring within Australia. If governments want to address 
climate change effectively and efficiently, it would be best done at a national and 
international level, not through piecemeal measures such as landfill regulation.      
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The Commission is not recommending that market failures further upstream in the 
product life cycle should be ignored. Quite the contrary — direct intervention at 
various points throughout the product life cycle should be continued, and where 
necessary, supplemented by additional measures. This would help ensure that 
product prices reflect all relevant costs.  
14.2  The Commission’s preferred policy framework  
The Commission’s preferred approach is different to current approaches but starts 
with some common principles (table 14.1 at end of chapter). One of those principles 
is a conviction that market failures associated with waste collection and disposal 
should be primarily addressed through regulation. Regulation has tightened over 
recent decades, but could be improved through greater use of performance-based 
approaches, and tighter compliance. Other areas of commonality include 
recognising the importance of community support for resource recovery; that local 
governments are struggling with the responsibilities of waste disposal and resource 
recovery; and that sound data are needed to develop sound policy. And a reasonable 
degree of commonality extends to other issues, such as recognising that some 
products might cause problems if disposed of through inappropriate channels.   
But from that point some important divergences emerge. For example, the 
Commission does not support the use of landfill levies, or subsidies that are not 
based on downstream externalities. The Commission considers that the waste 
hierarchy should not be used as a formal basis for developing policy, nor should 
broad waste-diversion or recycling targets be used. And as noted, waste 
management policy should not be used to address upstream problems. The 
Commission is also sceptical about the case for establishing many extended 
producer responsibility and product stewardship (EPR and PS) schemes, and is 
calling for much tighter assessment of such schemes.  
This is not an exhaustive account of the differences between the Commission’s 
approach and current policy. To understand the Commission’s approach the reader 
is encouraged to carefully consider all of the Commission’s findings and 
recommendations, and the summary contained in table 14.1. But at its core, it is fair 
to say that the Commission’s approach is based on getting the regulation right and 
then letting markets (which rely on a well-informed community) play a greater role 
than they are permitted at the moment. The suite of recommendations contained in 
this report are aimed at eliminating market failure, and government-imposed 
distortions in waste management, so that markets can operate efficiently. This 
would allocate all resources — including natural resources, labour and capital — in 
ways that achieve the best result for the community, and achieve a superior result     




compared to resource recovery targets developed by governments, almost regardless 
of the sophistication and effort that goes into their derivation. It might mean that the 
mix between landfill disposal and resource recovery will change, but provided all 
relevant externalities are addressed, this should not be regarded as a negative 
outcome. 
Other features of the Commission’s approach concern policy development 
processes and helping the community make informed choices about waste 
management policy. Unfortunately, much waste policy in Australia has been 
initiated with insufficient assessment of the overall costs and benefits. Waste 
disposal problems, and community support for the remedies proffered, are too often 
simply asserted, rather than demonstrated.  
14.3 Adjustment  issues 
Some of the changes the Commission is recommending could be introduced 
immediately. Others might be disruptive for the waste industry, and hence could 
warrant a phased introduction to ease the adjustment process, or will take time to 
properly design and implement (box 14.1). But they should be introduced as soon as 
practicable to maximise the net benefits to the community generally. 
Thus improving compliance with landfill regulations and full cost recovery could be 
introduced more or less immediately, whereas removing landfill levies or subsidies 
not based on soundly-identified market failures might need to be phased out. 
Landfill levies and financial subsidies have been the main ways in which 
jurisdictions have been pursuing the achievement of selected targets and waste 
hierarchy related objectives. Financial subsidies are used to directly support 
resource recovery facilities, such as alternative waste technology plants and 
materials recovery facilities. Landfill levies also subsidise these activities indirectly 
by making disposal a relatively more costly option for waste disposers. Removing 
these subsidies abruptly could create some adjustment problems for the waste 
management industry.  
However, this would depend on the net effect of all of the Commission’s 
recommendations on the waste industry. For example, tightening compliance will 
help ensure that the full costs of regulation (and hence the internalised cost of the 
externalities) are passed on to users, and in some cases, would raise gate fees. And 
in those jurisdictions where landfill levies are relatively low (or nonexistent) 
adjustment issues caused by the removal of levies would be commensurately lower 
(or nonexistent).      
  THE MAIN ISSUES 





Box 14.1  Staging the reforms 
The Commission’s proposed reforms would need to be introduced over time.  
Immediate or short-term reforms would include:  
•  dropping use of waste diversion targets;  
•  tightening compliance with landfill regulations; 
•  ensuring appropriate cost-recovery practices are in place for all landfills;  
•  not introducing any new subsidies unless warranted by downstream externalities;  
•  beginning to phase out landfill levies (and shelving plans to increase or introduce 
levies); 
•  beginning to phase out existing subsidies not based on externalities;  
•  establishing expert scientific panels as needed to assess evidence of the risks and 
environmental impacts of waste of concern; and 
•  giving broader consideration to the use of basic forms of pay-as-you-throw charging 
arrangements at the household level. 
Medium-term reforms would include:  
•  refining the use of performance-based regulation for landfilling; 
•  undertaking research into the residual externalities from compliant landfills;  
•  considering regional responsibilities for waste disposal and resource recovery;  
•  referring upstream issues identified to appropriate ministries for consideration,  
•  reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of existing extended producer 
responsibility and product stewardship schemes, including the National Packaging 
Covenant; and 
•  developing consistent classifications and definitions, and systems for exempting 
recyclables from waste regulation.  
Longer-term reforms would include:  
•  revising waste strategies (and supporting legislation) to focus on reducing the risk of 
harm to human health, the environment and social amenity to acceptable levels, not 
on reducing waste or conserving resources per se;  
•  completing phase out of levies and subsidies; 
•  removing regulatory impediments to use of recovered materials;  
•  adopting regional approaches to waste disposal; and 
•  amending planning legislation to make large-scale facilities matters of regional or 
state significance. 
 
     




Some initiatives will take time to roll out. For example, developing a more 
performance-based approach to landfill regulation, adopting uniform classification 
systems (and definitions), removing inappropriate objectives from waste legislation, 
and removing unnecessary regulatory barriers to the use of recovered resources, 
cannot happen overnight. But even in these cases, there are some sound basic 
foundations on which the states and territories can build, and lessons they can learn 
from each other. Assessing the merits of existing EPR and PS schemes will also 
take time. But more rigorous assessment processes for new or currently proposed 
schemes should be introduced as soon as possible so that only soundly-based 
schemes addressing real environmental issues are implemented.  
The Commission’s recommended approach will not see the abandonment of much 
useful work which has already been done to improve waste disposal facilities and to 
improve resource recovery activities. It will, however, remove government 
distortions and provide an environment which is more likely to result in the best 
results for the community as a whole.  
14.4  Role of the Australian Government 
While the State and Territory governments hold most of the policy levers in waste 
management, the Australian Government has significant coordinating and 
leadership roles to play. It also has the crucial power to levy indirect taxes — a 
virtual necessity in implementing most EPR and PS schemes. The Commission 
considers that the Australian Government could play a more significant role than it 
has in the past by: 
•  working with the State and Territory Governments to develop and implement 
consistent waste classification systems and databases. At a minimum, this would 
help ensure that more consistent data was collected (which in turn would assist 
with monitoring and benchmarking performance), and that similar processes 
would apply for exempting products from regulation. This work would lay the 
ground for exploring opportunities to achieve further consistency in regulatory 
standards applying to wastes. 
•  facilitating research into the significant externalities caused by waste disposal. 
The Australian Government could provide a central coordinating role in ensuring 
more robust analysis of environmental issues is undertaken. There may be scope 
for this to be done on a collaborative basis, involving the State and Territory 
Governments, and research institutions, such as the CSIRO and the universities.  
•  refining information, education and awareness programs to help ensure the 
community is well informed about waste management issues. In particular, effort 
should be directed at identifying and addressing areas of community concern.      
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•  playing a leadership role in the development of EPR and PS schemes. The 
Australian Government should insist on clear objectives and that thorough, up-
front identification of the problem precedes the development of such schemes. 
•  ensuring that upstream market failures that concern waste policy makers are 
reviewed by other relevant ministries. Where appropriate these should then be 
addressed directly.  
•  ensuring rigorous adherence to regulatory impact assessment guidelines. In turn 
the Australian Government could encourage the State and Territory 
Governments to do likewise. 
14.5 Concluding  remarks 
Waste management policy should assist markets to find the balance between waste 
avoidance, resource recovery and disposal that maximises net benefits to the 
community. The Commission considers that, in many ways, Australian policy 
makers have yet to establish the right mix of policies to allow this to happen. Too 
much faith has been put in simplistic policy frameworks — such as the waste 
hierarchy — and waste minimisation and resource recovery have tended to be 
regarded as ends in themselves.  
The reforms the Commission is proposing will help achieve the appropriate balance 
by, among other things: requiring a more rigorous approach to identifying 
environmental problems; tightening regulatory compliance; and reinforcing the 
roles of prices and awareness raising in assisting the community to make more 
informed choices. Addressing relevant market failures throughout the product life 
cycle, and removing government-imposed distortions, will facilitate the ability of 
markets to achieve the most appropriate balance between waste avoidance, resource 
recovery and disposal.  
As in other areas of environmental policy, the way forward is not always intuitively 
obvious. But what is clear is that simple rules such as ‘recycling is good, more is 
better’, are no substitute for sound policy-making procedures. Waste management 
policy should be refocused on the environmental and social problems created 
directly by waste collection and disposal (including litter), not upstream problems. 
And policy makers and community attitudes need to be guided by open and rigorous 
analysis of costs, benefits and risks if waste management measures are to best serve 
the community.     




Table 14.1  Summary of main issues and the way forward 
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Landfills can damage the environment (chapters 4, 9 and 12 and appendix B) 
• Regulation has tightened 
considerably, but tends to be 
prescriptive. Where 
regulations are complied with, 
environmental damage is 
reduced to low levels.  
• Make regulation as 
performance based as 
possible and tailored to the 
circumstances of each 
landfill.  
• Desired level of pollution 
control achieved at lower cost. 
• Allow operators maximum 
flexibility in meeting 
environmental standards. 
• Enforcement of regulations 
appears variable and lax and 
some (local-government 
owned) landfills do not 
recover their full costs. 




• Ensure full cost recovery of 
government-run landfills. 
• Less risk of environmental 
damage.  
• Full cost pricing (including 
environmental costs) will 
promote the right level of 
recovery. 
• Landfilling is discouraged 
through landfill levies. Levy 
revenue is often earmarked 
for environmental projects. 
• Remove the levies as 
regulations are a better way 
of addressing externalities.  
• Raise funding for projects 
through general revenue. 
• Inappropriate cost impost on 
the community removed. 
• Better assessment of the 
merits of projects funded.  
Waste avoidance and resource recovery can be good for the environment (chapter 4) 
• The upstream benefits of 
resource recovery vary 
according to circumstances. 
Downstream external benefits 
are small. 
• Address upstream sources 
of externalities directly (for 
example, require mining 
operations to meet specified 
standards) and greenhouse 
gas abatement nationally. 
• Far more effective and 
efficient responses to 
upstream environmental 
issues. 
• Lower risk of perverse 
outcomes. 
• Maximising resource 
efficiency (the return to one or 
more natural resources) is a 
major determinant of policy.  
• But, as a partial indicator, 
resource efficiency fails to 
consider the returns from 
using all inputs. 
• Policy should be guided by 
consideration of all inputs 
and all costs and benefits, 
whether financial, 
environmental or social in 
nature. 
• Policies are more likely to 
maximise the returns to the 
community generally. 
• Resource recovery is 
promoted through landfill 
levies, subsidies, state 
strategies etc. 
• Make support for resource 
recovery as transparent as 
possible using direct policy 
instruments. 
• Transparent subsidies and 
charges help householders 
and others make better 
choices. 
• The waste hierarchy is used 
to help guide policy and set 
waste diversion targets. 
• Waste policy should be 
guided by assessments of 
all costs, benefits and risks. 
• Avoids costly measures that 
do not deliver commensurate 
environmental benefits. 
• Targets have been set for 
recycling and waste diversion 
in various jurisdictions.  
• Discontinue use of targets 
as they are difficult to set at 
an optimal level. 
• Full cost pricing will give the 
right balance between 
disposal and recovery. 
• In line with the hierarchy, 
waste avoidance is seen as 
highly desirable. 
• Greater adoption of pay-as-
you-throw methods for both 
recycling and disposal. 
• Reduction in waste generation 
commensurate with full costs 
of collection and disposal. 
  
(Continued on next page)    
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Table 14.1  (continued)  
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Community support for recycling should count (chapters 6 and 11) 
• Surveys show high levels of 
community support for 
recycling, but less is known 
about the strength of this 
support. 
• Support for recycling does 
not always extend to a 
willingness to purchase 
products with recycled 
content. 
• More direct testing of 
people’s preferences and 
willingness to pay for 
recycling.  
• Governments should provide 
better information on, and 
promote debate about, the 
costs and benefits of 
recycling and other waste 
management options. 
• Community and policy 
makers able to make better 
informed waste management 
choices. 
Waste legislation should reduce risks to acceptable levels (chapters 3, 6 and 7) 
• Some of the objects of 
existing State and Territory 
legislation are inappropriate 
and inconsistent. They include 
reducing harm to the 
environment, but also include 
adherence to the waste 
hierarchy, using less 
resources, and avoiding 
waste.  
• Overriding objective should 
be to reduce risks to human 
health, the environment and 
social amenity to acceptable 
levels. 
• Waste avoidance and 
resource recovery are not 
objects justifying 
government intervention in 
their own right. 
• Help avoid perverse 
outcomes, for example, that 
recycling is maximised 
irrespective of net 
environmental benefits.  
• Reduce net costs to the 
community. 
Extended producer responsibility or product stewardship schemes may be warranted in some 
circumstances (chapter 10)  
• Governments have urged 
industries to adopt extended 
producer responsibility (EPR) 
or product stewardship (PS) 
schemes for many products. 
• There is rarely a thoroughly-
researched and clearly-
justified case for government 
intervention.  
• Use much clearer, earlier and 
more rigorous processes for 
identifying where government 
intervention is warranted. 
• Ensure focus is on potential 
harm to human health, the 
environment and social 
amenity. 
• Give closer consideration to 
other approaches, including 
doing nothing. 
• EPR and PS schemes are 
only adopted when there is 
likely to be a net benefit to 
the community. 
Plastic-bag litter can cause problems (chapter 8) 
• Plastic-bag litter is unsightly 
and may harm marine 
wildlife. 
• Governments plan to phase 
out plastic shopping bags by 
the end of 2008. 
• Identify the nature, extent 
and underlying causes of 
plastic-bag litter. 
• Evaluate recent plastic-bag 
reduction efforts. 
• Examine whether other 
options — such as tougher 
anti-litter laws and targeting 
away-from-home sources of 
plastic-bag litter — would be 
more effective. 
• Adoption of the most effective 
and efficient response to the 
problem of plastic-bag litter. 
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Table 14.1  (continued)  
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Institutional and regulatory factors can impede resource recovery (chapter 12) 
• Classifying materials as 
waste sometimes impedes 
opportunities for them to be 
recovered for recycling. 
• Improve exemption 
processes to help ensure 
recovery opportunities are not 
unduly constrained. 
• Better recovery of materials, 
particularly from industrial 
waste streams. 
• Some product specifications 
favour use of virgin materials. 
• Make product specifications 
performance based wherever 
possible. 
• Better recovery, as materials 
judged on performance, not 
origin. 
Local governments face considerable challenges in providing waste services (chapter 12) 
• Local governments deliver 
kerbside collection services. 
Many also own, or contract 
for the supply of, resource 
recovery and disposal 
services. 
• Planning, scale and 
technology issues are 
requiring regional solutions to 
waste disposal and resource 
recovery. In response, 
different models for regional 
groupings of councils have 
emerged. 
• In large urban centres, State 
Governments should 
investigate moving waste 
disposal and resource 
recovery services to 
appropriately-constituted 
regional bodies. Collection 
could still be managed 
through local government. 
• Retain existing arrangements 
in rural areas with technical 
and other advisory help from 
State and Territory 
Governments. 
• Better matching of tasks with 
responsibilities and 
capabilities. Regional 
approach to planning 
commensurate with regional 
impacts. 
• Potential for waste services 
to be delivered at lower cost, 
due to scale efficiencies in 
contract management. 
 
Using waste to generate energy can be a useful form of resource recovery (chapters 4 and 8) 
• Energy-from-waste plants (for 
disposal of municipal solid 
waste) are not strictly 
prohibited in Australia, but 
are out of favour with many 
policy makers and the 
community. 
• Technological developments 
have provided the potential 
for flue emissions to be safely 
controlled. 
• Such plants are used in many 
developed countries. 
• Modern, well-regulated 
energy-from-waste facilities, 
while financially costly, would 
have minimal net negative 
environmental externalities 
where they displaced fossil 
fuels used in electricity 
generation.  
• Cement kilns meeting all 
relevant environmental 
standards should not be 
prevented from using waste 
as an energy source. 
• Better utilisation of wastes 
that might otherwise be sent 
to landfill. For example, 
packaging that is not readily 
recyclable would provide 
useful energy recovery with 
no adverse environmental 
implications. 
 
Waste data are needed for developing sound policy (chapters 2 and 13) 
• Waste data are inconsistent 
and incomplete.  
• The data are influenced by 
the requirements and 
regulatory structures of the 
different jurisdictions. 
• Past attempts at establishing 
a national waste database 
foundered because it was 
costly and lacked support. 
• EPHC should coordinate the 
development of a nationally-
consistent data set for waste 
management. 
• Adopting common definitions 
would be an important first 
step. 
• Data should only be collected 
where there is a clear policy 
need.  
• Enable comparisons of waste 
management performance 
across jurisdictions.  
• Enable each jurisdiction’s 
waste management 
performance to be compared 
against their policy 
objectives. 
  
(Continued on next page)    
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Table 14.1  (continued) 
The current situation  The Commission’s preferred 
approach 
Main benefits of change 
Life cycle assessment can be used in estimating costs and benefits (chapter 4 and appendix B) 
• Life cycle assessment (LCA) 
can be used to identify some 
of the environmental impacts 
of production processes, from 
raw material extraction to 
final disposal. 
• Some researchers have used 
LCA in estimating the costs 
and benefits of waste 
management policies. 
• The costs and benefits thus 
derived are not adjusted for 
the risks of environmental 
damage occurring. Nor do 
they take into account some 
upstream policies that 
address externalities. 
• Deficiencies relating to risk 
adjustment and failure to take 
upstream policies into 
account mean LCA must be 
used cautiously in estimating 
the costs and benefits of 
waste policies.  
• Some of these deficiencies 
might be able to be overcome 
(at some cost), but given that 
waste policy should focus on 
downstream externalities, this 
should not be given a high 
priority. 
• Where LCA is used, 
consideration should be 
given to referring any 
upstream issues identified to 
relevant upstream policy 
makers. 
• Prevent highly unreliable 
estimates of costs and 
benefits from influencing 
policy development. 
• Help to refocus waste policy 
on the main policy-relevant 
market failure — downstream 
externalities. 
 
     




     




A  Conduct of the Inquiry 
This appendix outlines the inquiry process and lists the organisations and 
individuals that have participated.  
Following receipt of the terms of reference on 20 October 2005, the Commission 
placed a notice in the press inviting public participation in the inquiry and released 
an issues paper to assist inquiry participants in preparing their submissions. The 
Commission received 123 submissions before releasing the draft report. A further 
150 submissions were received following the release of the draft report (a total of 
273). Those who made submissions are listed in table A.1. 
The Commission also held informal discussions with organisations and government 
departments and agencies. This visit program assisted the Commission in obtaining 
a wide understanding of the issues and the views of inquiry participants. 
Organisations visited by the Commission are listed in table A.2. 
In February and March 2006, the Commission held public hearings in Adelaide, 
Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. In addition, public hearings 
were held via telephone conference with participants from regional Victoria and 
Western Australia. Following the release of the draft report a second round of 
public hearings were held in Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney in 
July and August 2006. Draft report public hearings were also held via telephone 
conference with participants from the Northern Territory and Tasmania. A total of 
56 individuals and organisations participated in both rounds of public hearings 
(table A.3 and A.4).      




Table A.1  Submissions received 
Participant Submission  no. 
ACT NOWaste - ACT Department of Urban Services  36, DR139 
AGL  62 
Agsafe Ltd  DR168 
Alex Fraser Group  27 
Amcor Australasia  DR167 
Animal Health Alliance (Australia) Ltd  12 
Aquaponics Network Australia  78 
Ash Development Association of Australia  DR149 
Ausasia Link Pty Ltd  72, 74 
Australasian Bioplastics Association  69 
Australasian Contaniner Reconditioners’ Association  DR245 
Australasian (Iron and Steel) Slag Association  DR171 
Australasian Paper Industry Association Ltd  DR199 
Australian Bureau of Statistics  47 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  85, DR268 
Australian Council of Recyclers  40, 109, DR197 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association  59, DR182, DR258 
Australian Environment Business Network  DR138 
Australian Food and Grocery Council  93 
Australian Local Government Association  77 
Australian National Retailers Association  DR207 
Australian Paper  DR144 
Australian Retailers Association  DR211, DR271 
Australian Services Union  DR157 
Australian Tyre Importers’ Group  DR270 
Australian Tyre Recyclers Association  51, DR169 
Ms Martha Ban  DR246 
Mr Phil Barresi MP  64 
Prof Sharon Beder  17 
Mr Ben Blackburn  DR127 
Mr Peter Boddis  DR132 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Boomerang Alliance  54, DR183 
Brisbane City Council  DR154 
Ms Kathryn Brown  DR230 
M. Brown  DR251 
Building Products Innovation Council  86, DR220 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development  70, DR209 
Mr Greg Butler  DR131 
C & D Recycling  44 
Mr Gary Callanan  DR236 
Canmakers Institute of Australia  115 
Carbon Partners Pty Ltd  68 
Mr R.L. Carr  DR142 
Mr Peter Carroll  DR162, DR216 
Cement Industry Federation  71, DR174 
Central Queensland Local Government Association  121 
Ms Carolyn Chalkley  DR238 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia  97, DR128 
Ms Debra Chant  DR130 
City of Ryde  DR176 
City of Whitehorse  26 
Ms Rita Clark  DR227 
Clean Up Australia  DR185 
Mr Ron Coleman  DR221 
Ms Susan Coleman  DR233 
Collex Pty Ltd  80 
Compost Australia  DR148 
Compost New South Wales  110 
Compost Queensland  111 
Compost South Australia  94 
Consumer Electronics Suppliers Association  66 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Ms Jennifer Crawford  DR210 
CropLife Australia Limited  12, DR156 
Mr Bruce Crunkhorn  34 
CSIRO  24 
Custom Composts  96 
Darwin City Council  DR205 
Department of Agriculture and Food (Western Australia)  81, DR184 
Department of Environment (Western Australia)  101 
Department of Health (Western Australia)  63 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tasmania)  114 
Department of the Environment and Heritage  103, DR214 
Mr David Dettrick  DR180 
Mr Romi Dhanji  DR237 
Mrs Jill Dumsday  39, DR152 
Earth Carers  DR173 
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council  DR155 
Eco Waste Pty Ltd  83, 112, DR193 
Ecohouse Pty Ltd  100 
ELV Recyclers  105 
Energetics  9 
Energy Developments Ltd  37 
Energy Networks Association  DR213 
Engineers Australia  13 
Environment Business Australia  DR202 
Mr Rudy Ericson  DR134 
Mrs Judith Evans  39, DR152 
Evergreen Energy Corporation Pty Ltd  25 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries  DR141 
Ms Lynne Forster  DR186 
Mr Laurie French  DR129 
Friends of the Earth Melbourne  22 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Ms Sylvia Giulieri  DR226 
Global Olivine Western Australia  118, DR172 
Mr Warren Godson  45 
Golder Associates  31 
GRD Limited  41, 116, DR181 
Green Planet Environmentals Pty Ltd  89 
Green Roofs for Healthy Australian Cities  78 
Councillor Dick Gross, City of Port Phillip  16 
Hanson Landfill Services  43, DR125 
Ms Denise Harding  DR229 
Healthy Soils Australia Ltd  32, 88 
Heatherdale Community Action Group Inc.  DR244 
Ms D. Hinton  DR241 
C. Ho  DR235 
Housing Industry Association  87 
Mr Lawrence Huang  DR145 
Hyder Consulting  56, 122, DR147, DR264 
Ipswich City Council  DR198 
Joint Working Group Tyres  75 
Ms Jan Kassulke  DR135 
Keep Australian Beautiful NSW  DR212 
Kennedy's Classic Aged Timbers  14, 107 
KESAB Environmental Solutions  20 
Kimberly-Clark Australia  DR263 
Kogarah Council  DR265 
Mr Frank Krstic  DR228 
Kwinana Industries Council  DR166 
Landfill Management Services Pty Ltd  50, DR188 
Chin-an Lee  DR247 
Leeuwin Lions Club  DR146 
Local Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales  98 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Local Government Association of South Australia  102 
Local Government Association of Tasmania  60 
Local Government Association of the Northern Territory  19 
Mr Norman Longworth  DR124 
Ms Jennifer Loy  48 
V. Mall  DR252 
Marrickville Council  DR151 
Maunsell Australia Pty Ltd  DR175 
M.E.T.T.S. Pty Ltd  3, 106, DR153 
M2W2 Professional Services  49 
Ms Lisa Mach  DR254 
Martin  DR133 
T. Marwick  DR255 
Ms Ruth Mary  99 
Master Builders Association of Victoria  DR200 
Ms Lyndall McCormack  8, 65, DR165 
Dr Jo McCubbin  79 
Mr Graham McDonagh  7 
Ms Hayley McHugh  DR234 
Melbourne PC User Group  DR163 
Motor Trades Association of Australia  33 
Municipal Association of Victoria  113, DR179 
Municipal Waste Advisory Council  52, 119, DR190 
National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia  DR194, DR266, DR269, 
DR272, DR273 
National Centre for Sustainability  11 
National Packaging Covenant Industry Association  92 
Mr Patrick Navin  23 
Ms Amanda Neill  DR224 
Ms Valerie Neill  DR223 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
NSW Government  95, DR195 
Ms Christine O’Neill  DR243 
OPS Asia Pacific  18 
M. Ottewill  DR222 
Packaging Council of Australia  67 
Paper Round  DR178 
Ms Tina Pearce  DR242 
Penrith City Council  DR261 
Plantations North East Inc  DR215 
Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association  120, DR203 
Ms Anna Pleadin  DR248 
Powerlink Queensland  DR218 
Product Stewardship Australia  66 
Product Stewardship Council  DR161, DR219 
Publishers National Environment Bureau  2, DR137 
Queensland Government  DR267 
Resourceco  46 
Ms Cristina Romero  DR225 
Ms Mary Scott  21 
Shoalhaven City Council  DR189 
SITA Environmental Solutions  42, DR143 
A. Slik  DR239 
Ms Mercedes Slik  DR240 
Solo Resource Recovery  6 
Mr James G. Somerville  DR126 
South Australian Government  DR217 
South East Queensland Construction and Demolition Waste 
Working Group 
61 
Southern Oil Refining Ltd  DR192 
Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils  84 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority  10, 123 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Spartel Pty Ltd  73, DR196 
Steel Can Recycling Council  115 
Strategic Initiatives  58 
Mrs Gith Strid-Nwulaekwe  DR250 
Sustainable Futures Group Pty Ltd  57 
Sustainable Living Tasmania  DR158 
Mr Gordon Sutcliffe  DR201 
Tasmanian Government  DR164 
Tech Partners Australia  35 
G. Thomas  DR253 
Timber Queensland  90 
Treated Timber Product Stewardship Group  DR262 
Ms Wendy Trethewy  DR249 
Ms Trina Tune  DR232 
Urban Agriculture Network-Western Pacific  78 
Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce  38 
Victorian Government  DR187 
Victorian Waste Management Association  DR170 
Mr Gerard van Rijswijk  DR191 
Visy Industries Pty Ltd  53, DR177 
Mr Adrian Vlok  DR259 
Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of New South 
Wales 
15, DR160 
Waste Management Association of Australia  DR136 
Waste Management Association of Australia,  
Compost Australia Division 
55 
Waste Management Association of Australia,  
Energy from Waste Division 
82 
Waste Management Association of Australia, National Landfill 
Division 
28, DR159 
Waste Management Association of Australia, New South Wales,  
Alternative Waste Treatment Working Group 
30 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Waste Management Association of Australia,  
New South Wales Branch 
1, DR150 
Waste Management Association of Australia,  
Queensland Division 
91 
Waste Management Association of Australia,  
Strategic Planning and Implementation Working Group 
76 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Tasmanian Branch  29 
Waste Management Association of Australia, 
Western Australia Branch 
DR260 
Waste Reduction Group  DR206 
Wentworth Shire Council  5 
Western Australia Waste Management Board  DR208 
WM Waste Management Services Pty Ltd  DR140 
WSN Environmental Solutions  104, 117, DR204 
Ms Jennifer Yu  DR257 
Mr Peter Yu  DR231 
Mr Vincent Yu  DR256 
Zero Waste Action Group  108 
Zero Waste Australia  4 
     




Table A.2 Visits 
Organisation 
Amcor Australasia 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Australian Council of Recyclers 
Australian Industry Group 
Australian Local Government Association 
BDA Group 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development 
City Waste Services (Brisbane City Council) 
Collex 
Department of Environment (Western Australia) 
Department of Environment and Conservation (New South Wales) 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
Department of Premier and Cabinet (Queensland) 
Department of State Development (Queensland) 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Environment Protection Authority (Victoria) 
Global Renewables Ltd 
Housing Industry Association 
Kwinana Industries Council 
Minerals Council of Australia 
Packaging Council of Australia 
Planet Ark 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association 
Publishers National Environment Bureau 




The Treasury (Australian Government) 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.2  (continued) 
Organisation 
Thiess Services 
Victorian Waste Management Association 
Visy (Visy Recycling and Visy Industries) 
Waste Management Association of Australia 
Waste Management Board (Western Australia) 
WSN Environmental Solutions 
WWF Australia 
Table A.3  Initial public hearings – participants  
Canberra 20 February 
ACT NOWaste - ACT Department of Urban Services 
Australian Local Government Association 
Zero Waste Australia 
Healthy Soils Australia 
Cement Industry Federation 
Melbourne 22 February 
Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development 
Councillor Dick Gross, City of Port Phillip 
Carbon Partners Pty Ltd 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Tasmanian Branch 
Melbourne 23 February 
Dr Jo McCubbin 
National Landfill Division, Waste Management Association of Australia 
Alex Fraser Group 
Green Planet Environmentals Pty Ltd 
Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce (Auto Parts Recyclers Association of 
Australia/Motor Trades Association of Australia) 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.3  (continued) 
Adelaide 24 February 
Resourceco 
Graham McDonagh 
KESAB Environmental Solutions 
Warren Godson 
Compost South Australia 
City of Burnside 
Brisbane 27 February 
Kennedy’s Classic Aged Timbers 
M.E.T.T.S. Pty Ltd 
CSIRO 
Compost Queensland 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Queensland Division 
Sydney 28 February 
Collex Pty Ltd 
Evergreen Energy Corporation Pty Ltd 
Southern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils 
Eco Waste Pty Ltd 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Joint Working Group Tyres 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Strategic Planning and Implementation Group 
Waste Management Association of Australia, New South Wales, Alternative Waste Treatment 
Working Group 
Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of New South Wales 
Australian Council of Recyclers 
Zero Waste Action Group 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.3  (continued) 
Sydney 1 March 
Department of Environment and Conservation (New South Wales) 
Ausasia Link Pty Ltd 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association 
Waste Management Association of Australia, New South Wales Branch (Commpost NSW) 
SITA Environmental Solutions 
Australian Food and Grocery Council 
Local Government and Shires Association of New South Wales 
Perth 2 March 
Western Australian Local Government Association and Municipal Water Advisory Council 
GRD Ltd 
Department of Agriculture (Western Australia) 
Custom Compost 
Department of Health (Western Australia) 
Melbourne 6 March 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Consumer Electronics Suppliers Association and Product Stewardship Australia 
Building Products Innovation Council 
Housing Industry Association 
Harrie Hofstede 
Packaging Council of Australia 
Environment Victoria 
Table A.4  Draft report public hearings – participants 
Perth 17 July 
Municipal Waste Advisory Council 
Department of Agriculture and Food, Western Australia 
Global Olivine Western Australia 
Waste Management Association of Australia, Western Australia Branch 
Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council 
Harrie Hofstede 
Earth Carers 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.4  (continued) 
Sydney 25 July 
Australian Council of Recyclers 
GRD Limited 
Clean Up Australia 
Australian National Retailers Association 
Environment Business Australia 
Sydney 26 July 
SITA Environmental Solutions 
Waste Management Association of Australia, New South Wales Branch 
City of Ryde 
National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia 
Department of Environment and Conservation (New South Wales) 
Product Stewardship Council 
Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of New South Wales 
Brisbane 27 July 
Ipswich Waste Services, Ipswich City Council 
Brisbane City Council 
Adrian Smith 
M.E.T.T.S. Pty Ltd 
Energy Networks Association and Powerlink Queensland 
Canberra 31 July 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Australian Services Union 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Association 
Cement Industry Federation 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries 
Melbourne 1 August 
Australian Paper Industry Association 
Paper Round 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.4  (continued) 
Melbourne 2 August 
Darwin City Council 
Plantations North-East Inc 
Peter Carroll 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association 
Melbourne 3 August 
Waste Management Association of Australia, National Landfill Division 
Sustainable Living Tasmania 
Australian Paper 
Master Builders Association of Victoria 
     




     





B  Environmental and other externalities 
associated with waste 
Externalities are unintended costs and benefits of an activity that are experienced by 
people other than those involved in the activity. If the impacts of externalities are 
not reflected in the costs incurred by the parties involved in the activity, markets 
may tend to over-provide negative externalities (such as pollution), or under-
provide positive externalities (such as the public health benefits of immunisation). 
This appendix describes some of the externalities that can arise from waste 
management, and examines some published estimates of their magnitude. A 
distinction is drawn between downstream and upstream externalities (figure 1.1). 
Downstream externalities can arise directly from waste management practices. They 
include the pollution emitted from landfills, incinerators and recycling plants. 
Upstream externalities can arise at a point in a product’s life cycle before it 
becomes waste. An example of an upstream externality is the damage caused by 
pollution emitted during manufacturing. 
The existence and magnitude of externalities depend in part on where they occur. 
For example, the damage done to human health by pollution is generally lower if 
the pollution is emitted in remote areas, than if it is emitted in metropolitan areas. 
Policies that directly target externalities can reduce their magnitude. If a policy 
requires a firm to adopt practices to avoid environmental damage, to repair any 
damage caused, or to pay compensation to the community for causing the damage, 
the cost of the damage should be reflected in the firm’s costs. Where the damage is 
reflected in the costs of production, it is said to have been ‘internalised’ and no net 
external cost remains. 
Some studies of waste management have included estimates of the costs imposed by 
externalities. Expressing the external costs and benefits in dollar terms makes it 
possible to compare them with the financial costs and benefits of waste 
management using a common unit. Estimates of the costs and benefits of 
externalities are, however, always subject to a degree of uncertainty.      




B.1  Estimating external costs and benefits 
Typically, the externalities associated with waste management — such as pollution, 
traffic noise and damage to mining land — are not traded in a market, so it is not 
possible to observe what people would be prepared to pay to prevent the pollution 
or noise, or to conserve the mining land. Instead, researchers rely on a number of 
techniques to estimate the value that people place on nontraded goods, including: 
•  stated preferences 
•  revealed preferences 
•  estimates of the value of life and health 
This section briefly describes some of these techniques. 
Stated preferences 
The simplest approach to estimating the costs and benefits of externalities is to ask 
people how they value them. This can involve asking people what they would be 
willing to pay to avoid damage, or what they would be willing to accept in 
compensation if damage does occur. For example, researchers could ask people 
‘what would you be prepared to pay to preserve an area of native forest?’ Or they 
could ask ‘what is the minimum you would accept as compensation for the loss of 
an area of native forest?’. 
This approach — known as contingent valuation — has been widely used to 
estimate the value of ecosystems and animal species, and survey techniques have 
become increasingly sophisticated as researchers have tried to increase the accuracy 
of their results. Nevertheless, there are a range of concerns with using contingent 
valuation analysis to estimate the costs and benefits of externalities. 
The main concern is that most people do not think about the environment in dollar 
terms. Because they are seldom asked to pay to protect the environment, people 
tend not to have any point of reference when asked how much they value one 
particular component of it. This may lead them to give responses that do not reflect 
their true preferences for environmental protection. Sometimes they may refuse to 
respond because they disagree with any monetary value being placed on the 
environment. In other cases, people may overstate their preferences for 
environmental protection because they know they will not actually have to pay. 
Given these concerns, it is likely that estimates of the value of externalities that are 
based on contingent valuation analysis represent the upper bound of the true costs of 
environmental damage.     






An alternative to asking people how they value the environment is to observe their 
behaviour. Based on the choices people make in their consumption of goods and 
services that are traded, it may be possible to estimate how people value nontraded 
goods such as the environment. For revealed preference techniques to produce 
reliable estimates, researchers must have access to large samples of accurate data. 
One commonly-used technique for estimating the value of externalities is hedonic 
pricing. This technique is based on the assumption that the price paid for a good 
reflects the value the buyer places on its attributes. For example, house purchasers 
with children may be prepared to pay more for houses located close to schools. 
Similarly, a house that is close to a landfill may have a lower price than an 
otherwise identical house that is not near a landfill. The difference in prices would 
reflect any disamenity of living near a landfill, among other things. Hedonic pricing 
uses statistical techniques to disaggregate the price of a good into its component 
elements including, in this example, the value that people place on not living near 
landfills. 
Another approach to revealed preferences is to estimate the value of the work that 
people undertake to prevent or repair damage to the environment. This approach 
was used by the Allen Consulting Group (2006a) to estimate the external costs of 
plastic-bag litter. The Allen Consulting Group noted that, in 2005, volunteers 
donated approximately 1.5 million hours to Clean Up Australia Day. It assumed that 
their labour was worth $16 per hour (after tax), and that plastic bags accounted for 
2 per cent of the litter collected. As a result, the value of removing plastic bags from 
the litter stream was estimated to be approximately 2 cents per bag. 
Estimating the value of life and health 
Some externalities can cause damage to human health. In such cases, researchers 
may base estimates of the costs of externalities on estimates of the value of human 
life and health. One technique that has been used by economists is to estimate the 
value of a statistical life — what the community would be prepared to pay to 
prevent one death. Such estimates are based on the value of saving one life on 
average, not of saving one particular life. For example, if people are prepared to pay 
$1000 to avoid a one in 2000 risk that they will die, the value of a statistical life 
would be estimated to be $2 million ($1000 multiplied by 2000). 
Estimates of the value of a statistical life can be based on stated preferences, 
revealed preferences, or other methods. For example, researchers could ask people 
how much they would be prepared to pay to reduce the probability that they would     




contract a fatal illness. Alternatively, they could observe how much higher wages 
are in jobs that are associated with a high risk of death and use that as a basis for 
their estimate. Other techniques estimate the value of life based on people’s 
expected earnings over their lifetimes. This approach tends to produce lower 
estimates of the value of a statistical life than stated or revealed preference 
techniques. 
Similar techniques can be used to estimate the value that people place on good 
health. Stated and revealed preference techniques can be used to estimate how much 
people would be prepared to pay to avoid an episode of illness, or estimates could 
be based on the loss of income that people experience when they are unwell. 
Abelson (2003) attempted to estimate a value of a statistical life for the purposes of 
public policy and cost–benefit analysis in Australia. He reported a range of overseas 
estimates of the value of a statistical life and health, but found there were few 
Australian estimates. Based on published estimates, he recommended that public 
agencies adopt: 
•  $2.5 million as the value of ‘avoiding an immediate death in a healthy individual 
in middle age’; and  
•  $108  000 as the value of one year of a person’s life in average health 
(Abelson 2003, p. 58). 
The reliability of such estimates depends on how well the assumptions made by 
researchers reflect community preferences. For example, overestimating the 
discount rate that people apply to health could significantly underestimate the value 
of a statistical life. 
Having estimated the value of a statistical life or good health, it may be possible to 
estimate the external costs of reduced health arising from damages such as 
pollution. For example, if it is assumed that the value of one year of a person’s life 
is $108 000, and that emitting one tonne of a pollutant would, on average, reduce a 
person’s life expectancy by six months, the external cost of the pollutant would be 
estimated to be $54  000 per tonne of emissions ($108  000 divided by two), or 
$54 per kilogram. 
B.2 Downstream  externalities 
The externalities that can arise after a material has become waste are referred to as 
downstream externalities. This section addresses the external costs and benefits of 
waste transport, landfill, and thermal treatment.     






Most waste collection is done by heavy trucks, which cause noise, traffic congestion 
and air pollution and increase the risk of accidents. The magnitude of these impacts 
depends on factors such as the size of the trucks, the distances they travel, the fuel 
they use, the population density along their routes, and the number of stops made. 
Whether they should be considered externalities depends on the existence and 
effectiveness of any direct measures to internalise the externalities. For example, 
drivers take out insurance against traffic accidents. This increases the costs of 
transport, and internalises a significant part of the costs of property damage caused 
by road accidents. Similarly, regulations to reduce some vehicle emissions have 
increased the costs of transport and reduced the damage done by pollution 
(PC 2006a). 
The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA NSW) estimated in 1996 that a 
heavy truck imposed external costs of between $0.26 and $0.28 for each kilometre 
travelled (EPA NSW 1996c). It applied this estimate to information on the mass of 
waste collected by trucks and the average distances it was transported. Based on 
these data, it estimated that, in 1996, the external cost of transporting waste to a 
landfill was between $1.20 and $2.90 per tonne of waste (EPA NSW 1996c). 
The EPA NSW estimates were based on the external costs of traffic noise, vehicle 
emissions, accidents and congestion estimated by the Bureau of Transport and 
Communications Economics (BTCE) in 1994. The BTCE (1994) estimate of the 
external costs of accidents allowed for the internalisation of some of the costs of 
property damage through insurance, however it is not clear that all of the direct 
measures that can internalise the external costs of pollution, noise and congestion 
were taken into account. This suggests that the BTCE may have overestimated the 
external costs of transport (PC 2006a). 
Although the Commission considers that the BTCE (1994) — and therefore the 
EPA NSW — may have overstated the external costs of waste transport, other 
researchers have agreed that these figures are probably of the correct order of 
magnitude. BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) agreed with the EPA NSW (1996c) 
estimate for waste collected in metropolitan areas. Because population density and 
traffic volumes are lower outside of metropolitan areas, it proposed a lower estimate 
of between $1.20 and $1.50 per tonne of waste collected in rural areas. 
Landfill 
Waste disposed to landfills can be the source of a number of downstream 
externalities, including emissions of greenhouse and other gases, pollution of soils     




and water through leachate, and the loss of amenity experienced by nearby residents 
and firms. This section sets out estimates of the external costs imposed by 
properly-located, engineered and managed landfills, and by landfills with lower 
standards of environmental performance. 
Estimates of the total external costs of landfills 
There have been a number of estimates of the total external costs of disposing waste 
to landfills in Australia and overseas. EPA NSW (1996c) estimated that, in 1996, 
the external costs of landfills in New South Wales were between $10.50 and 
$33.20  per tonne of waste disposed to landfill. This included waste transport 
externalities of between $1.20 and $2.90 per tonne of waste, which are not a direct 
external cost of landfills themselves. Landfills in metropolitan areas were estimated 
to impose larger external costs than those in rural and regional areas, mainly due to 
the impacts of traffic and lost amenity. The ACT Government (2002) estimated that, 
in 2002, the environmental costs of landfill were $34 per tonne of waste. BDA 
Group and EconSearch (2004) estimated that, in 2004, the external costs of 
metropolitan landfills were between zero and $14.30 per tonne of waste, and that in 
rural areas the costs were between zero and $16.10 per tonne of waste. The 
externalities associated with rural landfills were estimated to impose higher external 
costs than the externalities associated with metropolitan landfills because it was 
assumed that rural landfills do not incorporate the landfill gas controls that are 
found in metropolitan landfills, and therefore emit more greenhouse gases. Davies 
and Doble (2004) estimated that, in 1999, the external costs of landfills in the 
United Kingdom were up to £6 per tonne of waste, depending on the location of the 
landfill and whether it has systems to recover energy from the waste. 
Consultancy firm Nolan-ITU (now incorporated into Hyder Consulting) has 
published a number of estimates of the external costs and benefits of waste 
management systems that include landfill. These represent the extreme high end of 
the existing estimates. Hyder Consulting stated that its: 
… best estimate of the environmental externalities of a landfill in Australia compliant 
with legislation (and including gas extraction systems with conversion to electricity), in 
the face of all the existing data gaps and inadequacies, without further research to 
substantiate it, is between $100 and $280 per tonne, with the most significant impacts 
arising from air and water pollution. (sub. DR264, pp. 2-3) 
The estimates of landfill externalities published by Nolan-ITU have been widely 
quoted in Australia. Because of their prominence, the Commission has gone to 
considerable lengths to understand these estimates. The Commission’s analysis of 
one of the estimates published by Nolan-ITU (2004b) is set out below. This analysis     





suggests that Nolan-ITU’s estimates of the downstream externalities of landfill are 
implausibly high. 
Nolan-ITU estimate of the downstream external costs of landfill 
Nolan-ITU (2004b) was commissioned by Global Renewables (a wholly owned 
subsidiary of GRD Limited) to compare the financial and external costs and benefits 
of sending mixed waste either to landfill or to an Urban Resource – Reduction, 
Recovery and Recycling (UR-3R) facility. The UR-3R process is an alternative 
waste technology (AWT) that applies mechanical and biological treatment to mixed 
municipal waste. The Nolan-ITU report included estimates of the net environmental 
benefits of the UR-3R option compared to the landfill option. The net benefits are 
comprised of benefits that arise directly from the UR-3R process, and avoided costs 
associated with reduced landfill disposal. Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated that 
processing waste at a UR-3R facility rather than disposing the waste to landfill 
delivers environmental benefits valued at $230 per tonne of waste. 
It is not clear from Nolan-ITU (2004b) how much of the $230 is related to avoided 
downstream externalities. The Commission has made a number of requests to Hyder 
Consulting for further information on the derivation of the $230 figure, and the 
allocation between upstream and downstream externalities. Hyder Consulting’s 
responses to these requests (sub. 116; sub. 122; sub. DR147; sub. DR264) did not 
provide the detail requested, and therefore the Commission has attempted to impute 
from the Nolan-ITU report its estimates of the downstream externalities of landfills. 
This has necessitated the adoption of a number of inferences and assumptions (as 
detailed below). 
The figure of $230 per tonne includes: 
•  upstream benefits, such as the benefits of recycling; 
•  avoided downstream costs, such as the costs of leachate and landfill gas; and 
•  benefits of the UR-3R process, such as the benefits of applying soil conditioner 
or ‘organic growth media’ generated from organic waste. 
Referring to the estimated benefits of the UR-3R process, Hyder Consulting stated: 
Most of the benefits of using the GRL [Global Renewables Limited] technology arise 
from avoided landfill impacts. (sub. 116, p. 4) 
GRD Limited stated that Nolan-ITU (2004b): 
… estimate the long-term environmental costs of leachate and landfill gas emissions at 
significantly more than $150 per tonne of municipal solid waste disposed of to 
best-practice landfill. (sub. 41, p. 13)     




The Commission has not been able to obtain a more definitive allocation between 
upstream and downstream benefits, and so has made some inferences based on 
information given in Nolan-ITU (2004b) (table B.1). Nolan-ITU disaggregated the 
$230 figure into a number of categories that give an indication of the sources of the 
benefits. The Commission has assumed that ‘recycling credits’ and ‘organic growth 
media application’ are not downstream benefits, and that ‘avoided landfill’ 
associated with dry recyclables recovery and organic growth media production is a 
downstream benefit. How much of the benefits of ‘stabilisation and energy 
recovery’ should be counted as upstream and downstream is not clear from the 
report. Hyder Consulting stated: 
The nature of the environmental benefit from stabilisation of waste is a significantly 
reduced leachate and landfill gas generation. (sub. 116, p. 8) 
This suggests that the benefits of stabilisation arise downstream. However, it is not 
possible to determine how much of the benefits of ‘stabilisation and energy 
recovery’ arise from stabilisation, and how much from energy recovery. Nor is it 
possible to determine whether any or all of the benefits of energy recovery should 
be counted as downstream or upstream benefits. Therefore, it is not clear how much 
of the estimated benefit from ‘stabilisation and energy recovery’ occurs upstream 
and downstream. 
Table B.1  Nolan-ITU estimates of the environmental benefits of the UR-3R 
process over landfill waste disposal, by impact category 














Dry recyclable materials recovery  
 Avoided  landfill  12  12  –  –
 Recycling  credits  17  –  17  –
Organic growth media production  
 Avoided  landfill  87  87  –  –
  Organic growth media 
application 
12 –  12  –
Stabilisation and energy recovery  103 –  –  103
Total 230  99  29  103
a Nolan-ITU data. Total may not equal the sum of the benefits due to rounding. b Productivity Commission 
estimates. – Nil or rounded to zero 
Sources: Nolan-ITU (2004b); Productivity Commission estimates. 
Because no definitive allocation of the benefits of stabilisation and energy recovery 
is available, the Commission has estimated the upper and lower bounds of the 
downstream external costs of landfill that are implied in Nolan-ITU (2004b). The     





lower bound is estimated assuming that none of the benefits of stabilisation and 
energy recovery arise downstream. The lower bound estimate of the downstream 
external costs of landfill is $99 per tonne of waste (43 per cent of the $230 per tonne 
benefit of the UR-3R process over landfill). The upper bound estimate is $202 per 
tonne of waste (88 per cent of the total) — assuming that all of the benefits of 
stabilisation and energy recovery arise downstream. 
The Commission has used these proportions to infer how much of the benefits of 
the UR-3R process are related to avoided leachate and landfill gas production. For 
example, Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated that sending waste to a UR-3R plant rather 
than landfill delivers external benefits of $106 per tonne of waste arising from 
avoided air emissions. The Commission has assumed that this includes a 
downstream component arising from landfill gas of between $46 and $93 per tonne 
of waste. Likewise, the Commission has assumed that the $101 external benefit for 
avoided water emissions includes a downstream component of between $43 and 
$89  per tonne of waste. These figures are consistent with the previously-cited 
statements of Hyder Consulting (sub. DR264) and GRD Limited (sub. 41) regarding 
the magnitude of Nolan-ITU’s estimates of the external costs of landfill. 
Landfill gas 
In most estimates, the largest single contribution to the external costs of landfills 
arises from emissions of landfill gas. Landfill gases are generated when organic 
waste decomposes, and typically comprise methane (approximately 55 per cent of 
total volume) and carbon dioxide (approximately 45 per cent) (DEH 2002). Other 
trace gases can produce unpleasant odours or be toxic to humans, plants and 
animals. This appendix draws a distinction between greenhouse gases — such as 
carbon dioxide and methane — and ‘pollutants’, which are the other gases emitted 
from a landfill. 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
Although some greenhouse gases and the greenhouse effect are a natural part of the 
climate system, evidence that human activity has increased the greenhouse effect 
has mounted rapidly in recent years (CSIRO 2005). Human-induced climate change 
is likely to have a range of impacts, including on human settlements, agriculture and 
ecosystems. Overall, these impacts are generally considered likely to be adverse, 
particularly for vulnerable communities and the environment. Estimating the 
external costs of greenhouse gas emissions from landfills involves estimating the 
quantities of gases emitted and the unit cost of these emissions.      




Methane and carbon dioxide both contribute to the greenhouse effect. Methane has 
a 100-year global warming potential that is 21 times greater than carbon dioxide, 
meaning that over 100 years the effect of one tonne of methane is equivalent to the 
effect of 21 tonnes of carbon dioxide. For the purposes of this appendix, carbon 
dioxide and methane are aggregated into tonnes of ‘carbon-dioxide equivalent’ 
(CO2-e) emissions. 
The quantity of greenhouse gases generated in a landfill depends on the 
composition of the waste, the local climate and the design and management of the 
landfill. The Australian Greenhouse Office estimated ‘the weighted average 
emission factors for the municipal, commercial and industrial, and construction and 
demolition waste categories’ (AGO 2005, p. 21). It concluded that, on average, each 
tonne of municipal waste in a landfill generates 0.74 tonnes of CO2-e gases; each 
tonne of commercial and industrial waste generates 1.04 tonnes; and each tonne of 
construction and demolition waste generates 0.20 tonnes (AGO 2005). 
Once the gas has been generated, the amount that escapes from the landfill depends 
on whether any gas-management system is in place, and how effective it is. If there 
are no gas-management systems incorporated into the landfill, it can be assumed 
that almost all of the gases will eventually escape into the atmosphere. Some 
landfills incorporate networks of pipes that run through the waste and capture some 
of the gas. The captured methane can then be burned, which yields heat, carbon 
dioxide and water. Because carbon dioxide has a much lower global warming 
potential than methane, simply flaring landfill gas significantly reduces its 
environmental impact. 
Captured methane can also be burned for electricity production, and this reduces the 
demand for fossil-fuel derived electricity. The combined effects of preventing 
methane from escaping and reducing the demand for fossil fuels can significantly 
reduce the net greenhouse gas emissions of landfills. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency estimated that if a landfill gas-management system captures 
75  per  cent of the landfill gas, and this gas replaces fossil fuels in electricity 
generation, the net greenhouse gas emissions of the landfill are reduced by 
92 per cent (US EPA 1998). 
This appendix compares the net greenhouse gas emissions of two alternative 
landfill-management scenarios. The base case assumes that the landfill has no 
gas-management system, and that all the gas escapes. The alternative assumes the 
landfill has an efficient gas-management system, and that the captured gas replaces 
fossil fuels as an energy source, reducing the net greenhouse impact by 92 per cent. 
This can be regarded as a maximum, as 75 per cent gas capture seems to be at the 
upper end of performance estimates for Australian landfills.     





While it is possible to estimate the quantities of greenhouse gases that are emitted 
from landfills, there is still uncertainty regarding the effects of these gases on 
climate and the environment, the likely impacts and their related costs, especially in 
the long term. The task of estimating these costs is an extremely complex one. 
Tol (2005) reviewed 28 studies that contained estimates of the marginal damage 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions. The estimates ranged from a benefit of 
US$1.80 per tonne  of  CO2-e emissions to a cost of US$455  per tonne. After 
reviewing the methodology of each of the studies, Tol (2005) concluded that the 
costs were unlikely to exceed US$13.64 per tonne of CO2-e emissions. 
The estimates reported by Tol (2005) are of the costs that would be incurred across 
all countries. Even leaving aside the uncertainty of these estimates, the extent to 
which estimates of global damage costs can be used to estimate the costs to 
Australia of greenhouse gas emissions — or the benefits of greenhouse gas 
abatement — is open to debate. What is clear, however, is that the benefits to any 
individual country of unilateral efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are 
likely to be extremely small. Indeed, unilateral abatement efforts in Australia could 
cause some production to be transferred to other countries leading to global 
environmental outcomes being unchanged or even worsened. 
Because of the difficulties involved in estimating the external costs of greenhouse 
gas emissions — or the benefits of abatement — a better approach for the purposes 
of cost–benefit analysis may be to use the costs of abatement under government 
programs as a proxy for the external costs of emissions. Governments have decided 
that these costs are worth incurring, presumably because they believe that the 
benefits to the community (from avoided damage and any other factors) are at least 
as large. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH 2005g) reported that the 
average cost of abatement for Australian Government programs was $4 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide (based on Australian Government expenditure to the end of 
2003 and abatement projections). Some of these programs might impose costs on 
the private sector and so the total cost could be somewhat higher than $4 per tonne. 
The lowest cost abatement was reported as being $0.20  per tonne for the 
Greenhouse Challenge program (which targets energy efficiency improvements) 
(AGO 2004). In contrast, a review of the Australian Government’s Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target found that the cost of abatement to the economy arising 
from this scheme was expected to be about $32 per tonne (AGO 2003). This scheme 
has industry development as well as greenhouse gas abatement objectives and so the 
$32 per tonne figure is likely to exceed what the Australian Government would 
regard as an acceptable cost for achieving abatement alone.      




The NSW Government has introduced the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
scheme. This is an emissions trading scheme that aims to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the production and use of electricity and to encourage 
activities that offset emissions. The trading price in April 2006 was approximately 
$15  per tonne of CO2-e emissions (NSW Government 2006). A greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme has been operating in the European Union since January 
2005. Since the scheme began, the price of permits for emitting greenhouse gases 
has fluctuated between €10 and €30 per tonne of carbon dioxide (Energy 
Information Administration 2006), and in October 2006 was around €12 per tonne 
of carbon dioxide (Point Carbon 2006). 
A number of assessments of waste policy have included estimates of the external 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions. EPA NSW estimated that the ‘environmental 
damage costs’ (1996c, p. 60) of landfill greenhouse gases were between $7.80 and 
$14.60 per tonne of CO2-e . BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) estimated that the 
external costs of carbon dioxide emissions were $15  per tonne.  Nolan-ITU  and 
SKM Economics (2001) used a value of $20.60 per tonne of CO2-e . Nolan-ITU 
(2004b) used a slightly lower value of $20 per tonne of CO2-e . 
This report assumes that the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions is between 
$5 and $20 per tonne of CO2-e  emissions (table B.2). This range is chosen to reflect 
the uncertainty associated with estimates of the external costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions, and is consistent with most of the previous Australian estimates of the 
external costs of greenhouse gas emissions that have been used for waste policy 
assessment. The range is also broadly consistent with the current costs of 
greenhouse gas abatement in Australia. 
Because the greenhouse effect is a global phenomenon, the effect of greenhouse 
gases does not depend on where they are emitted. One tonne of methane emitted 
from a metropolitan landfill has the same effect as one tonne emitted from a rural 
landfill (or from any other source in any location). 
Other gas emissions 
Landfills emit traces of non-greenhouse gases, some of which can have adverse 
effects on human health and the environment. There have been few attempts to 
estimate the external costs of non-greenhouse landfill gas emissions in Australia. 
This may be because non-greenhouse landfill gas is not regarded as posing a serious 
risk to human health or the environment. For example, in its estimate of the external 
costs of landfills, EPA NSW (1996c) considered that if landfill operators comply 
with environmental management guidelines, non-greenhouse gases may not cause 
any damage to human health or the environment.     





Table B.2  Estimated external costs of greenhouse gas emissions from 
waste sent to landfill, dollars per tonne of wastea 




  Low  High Low  High Low  High 
Landfill with no gas management  4  15  5  21  1  4 
Landfill incorporating gas capture 
and electricity generation b 
0  1 0  2 0  1 
a Based on estimates from AGO (2005) that one tonne of municipal waste generates 0.74 tonnes of CO2-e; 
one tonne of commercial and industrial waste generates 1.04 tonnes of CO2-e; and one tonne of construction 
and demolition waste generates 0.20 tonnes of CO2-e. b Landfill gas capture and electricity generation is 
assumed to reduce the net greenhouse gas impact of landfills by 92 per cent, taking into account the effects of 
displacing fossil fuels used in electricity generation (US EPA 1998). 
Sources: AGO (2005); US EPA (1998); Productivity Commission estimates. 
Eunomia Research and Consulting (2002) estimated that non-greenhouse gas 
emissions from ‘high quality’ landfills in Italy impose costs of between €0.03 and 
€0.10 per tonne of waste; and that gas emissions from ‘lower quality’ landfills 
impose costs of between €0.08 and €0.20 per tonne of waste. In Australia, BDA 
Group and EconSearch (2004) estimated that the external cost of non-greenhouse 
gases was less than $0.01 per tonne of waste in 2004.1 In its estimate of the benefits 
of the UR-3R process over landfill, Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated the benefits of 
avoided air emissions, including landfill gas. The Commission’s interpretation is 
that Nolan-ITU estimated that non-greenhouse gas emissions from ‘best-practice’ 
landfills impose costs of between $46 and $93 per tonne of mixed waste. The huge 
difference between the estimate of Nolan-ITU (2004b) imputed by the Commission 
and the estimate published by BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) is examined 
below. 
BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) used data from the National Pollutant 
Inventory to estimate the average emissions from landfills of seven air pollutants.2 
They then estimated the external costs of the emissions by multiplying the quantity 
of each pollutant by the EPA NSW load-based licensing fee for that pollutant. 
Under the load-based licensing system, fees are charged for emitting pollutants into 
the environment. 
BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) acknowledged that the load-based licensing 
fees they used as proxies for the external costs of emissions have been set well 
                                              
1  This estimate refers to the combined external costs of leachate and gas. It could not be 
disaggregated to determine the costs of landfill gas alone.  
2  Volatile organic compounds, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, benzene, hydrogen sulphide, 
mercury and fine particles.     




below the estimated external costs of the pollutants. For example, EPA NSW (1998) 
proposed a fee of $310 per tonne of emissions of fine particulates. The estimated 
external cost of emissions of fine particulates was $18 500 per tonne (EPA NSW 
1998), almost sixty times more than the proposed fee. Acknowledging the 
discrepancy, BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) calculated that even if the 
external costs were 100 times greater than the fees charged, the actual external costs 
of landfill gas would be less than $0.40 per tonne of waste. 
Nolan-ITU (2004b) applied life cycle assessment techniques to estimate the 
emissions of 32 pollutants from landfills. To estimate the external costs of these 
emissions, Nolan-ITU multiplied the estimated pollutant volumes by valuations 
derived from a number of sources from Australia and overseas, not all of which 
could be located by the Commission. The difference between the estimates of 
Nolan-ITU (2004b) and BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) may be explained in 
part by the fact that Nolan-ITU included a larger number of pollutants in its 
analysis. However, the Commission’s assessment is that the inclusion of more 
pollutants explains only a small part of the large difference between the two 
estimates. Much more significant is the treatment by Nolan-ITU (2004b) of the risk 
that landfill gas will damage human health or the environment. 
The Commission’s interpretation of Nolan-ITU (2004b) is that its estimates of the 
external costs of landfill gases relate to the gases’ ‘potential to affect human health 
or the environment’ (Nolan-ITU 2004b, p. 31), rather than expected outcomes. The 
potential external cost is likely to be much larger than the expected cost, as 
illustrated below for emissions of benzene and methyl chloroform. These examples 
are used because these gases account for around 70 per  cent and 15 per  cent 
respectively of Nolan-ITU’s (2004b) estimate of the external costs of air emissions 
avoided through the UR-3R process. 
Benzene emissions from landfills 
Benzene is an aromatic hydrocarbon that can also be described as a volatile organic 
compound. It is a colourless liquid that evaporates quickly to air. Once in the air, it 
reacts with other chemicals and breaks down within a few days (DEH 2005c). 
Benzene occurs naturally in crude oil and in emissions from volcanoes and forest 
fires. It is present in petrol because of its natural occurrence in crude oil, but it is 
also sometimes added to petrol (US DHHS nd). It is used in the chemical industry, 
and glues, adhesives, cleaning products and paint strippers may contain benzene. 
Benzene is known to be a human carcinogen (US DHHS nd). It also has a high 
acute toxic effect on aquatic life and can kill or damage plants. However, 
concentration levels do not build up in plant or animal tissue. Benzene is a precursor 
hydrocarbon leading to the formation of photochemical smog. On a scale of zero to     





three, benzene is rated at 2.3 as a health hazard and 1.0 as an environmental hazard 
for the National Pollutant Inventory (DEH 2005c). 
The main way that people are exposed to benzene is by breathing air that contains 
it. In Australia, the main sources of air emissions of benzene are motor vehicles, 
domestic solid fuel burning, oil and gas extraction, lawn mowing and service 
stations. Between them, these sources account for about 87  per  cent of total air 
emissions of benzene (DEH 2004). Cigarettes are responsible for much more of the 
human exposure to benzene than is suggested by the proportion of emissions they 
contribute (in Australia, they contribute 0.4  per  cent). This is because of the 
deliberate and passive inhalation of relatively undispersed cigarette smoke. In the 
United States, approximately half of the total human exposure to benzene comes 
from cigarette smoke (US DHHS nd).  
In relation to landfills in the United States, Tchobanoglous and Kreith noted: 
… the occurrence of significant concentrations of volatile organic compounds [VOCs] 
[including benzene] in landfill gas is associated with older landfills, which accepted 
industrial and commercial wastes that contained VOCs. In newer landfills in which the 
disposal of hazardous waste has been banned, the concentrations of VOCs in the 
landfill gas have been extremely low. (Tchobanoglous and Kreith 2002, p. 14.18) 
They also noted that landfill gas recovery systems can reduce these emissions 
further. This finding of very low emissions is borne out in Australian data, that 
show landfills as contributing 11 tonnes, or 0.06 per cent of total benzene emissions 
to air (DEH 2004). Even this low figure is likely to greatly overstate the 
significance of benzene air emissions from landfills. This is because benzene is 
generally present in small quantities dispersed through the waste in landfills. Also, 
when benzene in the waste evaporates, it is released into the open air where it would 
be expected to react, disperse and be diluted to extremely low concentrations. For 
example, in one case where benzene was detected near a landfill, the concentration 
was found to be several thousand times lower than in the air at petrol stations 
(County of San Diego DEH nd). 
The strongest evidence that benzene causes cancer comes from studies of 
occupational exposure (US DHHS nd). In light of this, there have been significant 
efforts to reduce and document the exposure of workers to benzene in the 
petroleum, chemical and other industries where high concentrations may be 
encountered. In the United States, a national survey of occupational exposure done 
in the 1980s estimated that over 272  000 employees in 31 industries and 
117  occupations were potentially exposed to benzene (NIOSH nd). Landfill 
workers, and indeed workers in the nonhazardous waste management industry 
generally, are not represented among them. This suggests that US authorities did not 
consider landfills to be a significant cause of occupational exposure to benzene.     




The Commission’s interpretation is that Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated that benzene 
emissions to air from landfills result in external costs of at least $31 per tonne of 
waste. This is based on two assumptions: 
•  the Commission’s lower bound estimate that at least 43 per cent of the benefits 
of the UR-3R process identified in Nolan-ITU (2004b) arise from reduced 
downstream impacts; and 
•  the Commission’s inference from Nolan-ITU (2004b) that each tonne of 
municipal waste causes emissions of at least 36 grams of benzene gas from 
landfills over 30 years. 
Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated that the cost of benzene gas emissions from landfills 
is $871 730 per tonne of benzene. In the Commission’s view this estimate is not 
credible, mainly because it does not consider the concentration of benzene that 
people will be exposed to, and whether this concentration represents a risk to human 
health or the environment. The failure to discount future costs is an additional 
shortcoming. From the evidence examined, it is the Commission’s conclusion that 
exposure to benzene from modern landfills does not pose a significant risk to human 
health or the environment. There may be some effect related to benzene’s role as a 
precursor of photochemical smog. However, given the quantities of benzene emitted 
from landfills, this is likely to be very small. Totally eliminating benzene gas 
emissions from all landfills in Australia would be equivalent to reducing benzene 
emissions from motor vehicles by 0.1 per  cent, according to National Pollutant 
Inventory data (DEH 2004). 
Methyl chloroform emissions from landfills 
The second most significant contributor to the external costs of landfill-gas 
pollution, as estimated by Nolan-ITU (2004b), is methyl chloroform, also known as 
1,1,1 trichloroethane. The Commission’s interpretation of Nolan-ITU (2004b) is 
that it implies that sending one tonne of municipal waste to landfill leads to 
emissions of at least 84 grams of methyl chloroform, and that this results in an 
external cost of at least $6 per tonne of waste. 
Methyl chloroform is used as a solvent and is found in household cleaning products, 
glues and aerosol sprays. The US EPA (2006a) reported that acute inhalation of 
methyl chloroform can have effects including dizziness, nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhoea, loss of consciousness, and decreased blood pressure. Most studies have 
not reported adverse health effects in humans from chronic exposure to low levels 
of methyl chloroform (US EPA 2006a). Given the small amount of methyl 
chloroform that is emitted from landfills, the likelihood that it will be dispersed and 
diluted in the atmosphere, and the fact that no adverse effects on human health have 
been identified from long-term low-level exposure, it is unlikely that emissions of     





methyl chloroform from landfills will impose any significant external costs on the 
community. 
When the estimated costs of benzene and methyl chloroform emissions are 
excluded, the Commission’s estimate of the lower bound of the external costs of 
landfill gas derived from Nolan-ITU (2004b) falls from $46 per tonne of waste to 
$8 per tonne. It is likely that further analysis of the physical properties, human 
health effects, exposure pathways and risks associated with other air pollutants 
identified by Nolan-ITU (2004b) would reduce this estimate even further. 
Leachate 
Leachate is liquid that has passed through a landfill, and may have become 
contaminated with metals, organic and inorganic compounds, including toxins. 
Leachate can be contained within a landfill, it can be pumped out, treated and 
discharged to sewers, or it can escape into the soil and groundwater. If it remains 
within the landfill, or is treated and safely disposed of, leachate does not cause any 
damage to human health or the wider environment. However, if it escapes from the 
landfill and comes into contact with groundwater, surface water or soil, it may. 
The concentration of pollutants in leachate depends on the composition of the waste 
in the landfill. Glass, plastics, aluminium, ferrous metals and concrete are largely 
inert in landfills, and, as such, compounds derived from them are not found in 
significant concentrations in leachate. Heavy metals (in most chemical forms) are 
also reasonably inert in landfills (Scott et al. 2005), but because they can be highly 
toxic, the small amounts that can be found in leachate could cause significant 
damage to human health and the environment if the leachate escapes. 
There is very little information on how leachate is transmitted once it has left a 
landfill. This makes it difficult to estimate the average costs of leachate impacts. 
That leachate might escape from a landfill does not imply that the chemicals in the 
leachate will necessarily cause damage to the environment or human health. If the 
local environment has the capacity to assimilate the pollution, the damage done may 
be quite small. If it is sensitive to pollution, the damage could be significant. 
Likewise, if the pollutants enter the food chain, or come into contact with people by 
other means, they could have serious impacts on human health. If the pollutants do 
not come into contact with people, or if they are sufficiently diluted by the time they 
do, their impact on human health will be minimal.     




Managing the risks of leachate 
The volume of leachate that is produced within a landfill depends mainly on the 
amount of moisture that comes into contact with the waste, so landfills in areas that 
experience high rainfall would be expected to produce more leachate than landfills 
in areas with low rainfall, other things being equal. Modern landfills incorporate 
engineering features to control the amount of water that enters a landfill, while it is 
being filled, and after its closure. Some operators adopt a dry tomb approach to 
landfill management, aiming to minimise the amount of moisture that enters the 
landfill in order to slow decomposition and minimise gas and leachate generation. 
Other landfill operators have adopted the bioreactor approach to landfill 
management. This involves collecting and recirculating the leachate through the 
waste to accelerate the degradation process. 
How much leachate escapes from a landfill depends on its design and management. 
Engineered landfills are lined with impermeable materials such as clay and plastic 
sheeting that can prevent or significantly impede the escape of leachate from the 
landfill (chapter 8). Some materials used in landfill liners have the capacity to retain 
many of the pollutants that are found in leachate (O’Leary and 
Tchobanoglous 2002). Some landfills have sumps where leachate is collected and 
pumped out of the landfill before being treated and discharged to sewers, or in the 
case of bioreactor landfills, recirculated through the waste. Such systems 
significantly reduce the potential for leachate in landfills to cause environmental 
damage. 
Estimating the external costs of leachate emissions 
The external cost of the damage done by leachate emissions also depends on a 
variety of local factors including the location of the landfill, the concentration of 
pollutants in the leachate, the height of the water table, the applications for which 
groundwater is used, and the capacity of the landfill liner and the surrounding 
environment to assimilate the pollutants. 
BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) used the National Pollutant Inventory and the 
EPA NSW load-based licensing fees to estimate that the external costs of leachate 
were less than $0.01 per tonne of waste.3 Miranda and Hale (1997) estimated that 
the external cost of leachate from landfills in the United States was between zero 
and US$0.98 per tonne of municipal waste. 
                                              
3   This estimate refers to the combined external costs of leachate and landfill gas. It could not be 
disaggregated to determine the cost of leachate alone.      





Nolan-ITU (2004b) applied life cycle assessment techniques to estimate the external 
cost of leachate. Its estimate included a larger number of pollutants than the 
estimates of BDA Group and EconSearch (2004) and Miranda and Hale (1997), 
which might be expected to increase the estimated external cost of leachate 
emissions. However, the Commission’s assessment is again that the inclusion of a 
larger number of pollutants explains only a small part of the difference between the 
estimates. The Commission’s interpretation of Nolan-ITU (2004b) is that the 
external cost of leachate was estimated to be between $43 and $89 per tonne of 
mixed waste sent to landfill. The Commission’s assessment is that this represents 
the potential external cost of leachate if all the leachate that is generated escapes 
from the landfill and comes into contact with people and sensitive ecosystems. 
Estimating the expected external cost of leachate damage requires some analysis of 
the risk that leachate will cause damage. Some government agencies have argued 
there is a low probability that leachate from landfills that comply with planning and 
environmental-management  regulations will cause environmental damage. For 
example, EPA NSW (1996c) considered that compliance with environmental 
management guidelines can prevent leachate from causing. The Australian 
Government Department of the Environment and Heritage stated: 
… the majority of landfills currently servicing major population centres now meet 
stringent planning and regulatory requirements in relation to location, design, 
construction and operation. Consequently, such landfills generally do not present 
significant risks in terms of generating external environmental costs through air and 
water pollution, noise, dust and the generation and spread of disease. (sub. 103, p. 16) 
Where landfill operators comply with regulations, they incur the cost of preventing 
leachate damage. This has the effect of internalising some or all of the external cost 
of leachate. Taking account of the assumptions made in the various estimates 
discussed above, and their applicability in estimating expected rather than potential 
costs, the Commission considers that the external cost of leachate from a 
properly-located, engineered and managed landfill in Australia is likely to be less 
than $1 per tonne of mixed waste.  
Landfills that do not incorporate proper design and management practices may 
impose much higher external costs. However, some regulatory responses to leachate 
suggest that, even if some leachate does escape from landfills, the damage to the 
environment may not be large. For example, the Victorian EPA guidelines for 
‘best-practice’ environmental management of landfills state that if a landfill accepts 
solid, inert waste, a landfill liner that allows seepage of no more than 1000 litres of 
leachate per hectare per day is sufficient to ‘maintain groundwater quality as close 
as practicable to background levels’ (EPA Victoria 2001c, p. 27).     




Indirect estimates of the external costs of leachate 
An alternative approach to directly estimating the external cost of leachate damage 
is to use the costs of avoiding the damage or cleaning it up as a proxy. The 
European Commission suggested: 
Cleanup costs and avoidance costs approaches might be more suitable and justified as 
long as all the effects of leachate in the short and long term are not known, although the 
valuations based on these techniques do not reflect individuals’ willingness to pay [to 
avoid the damage done by leachate]. (European Commission 2000a, p. 47) 
Estimating the costs of cleaning up leachate damage using this avoidance cost 
approach involves estimating the costs to landfill operators of managing their 
landfill in a way that minimises the potential for leachate damage. Current landfill 
regulations are designed to minimise the risks of leachate causing damage to human 
health and the environment, and appear to be very effective. However, for the sake 
of illustration, it may be useful to examine the costs of further reducing the potential 
for harmful emissions. The cost of a ‘belt-and-braces’ approach to landfill 
management can provide a reality check on estimates of the external costs of 
leachate, and serve as a point of reference for estimates of the cost effectiveness of 
policies to reduce leachate emissions. 
The Commission understands that installing a liner that meets nonhazardous landfill 
management guidelines in Victoria costs between $60 and $70 per square metre. 
For a large landfill, this equates to between $3.00 and $3.50 per tonne of waste. 
Landfills that handle hazardous waste may be required to install double liners, 
costing up to $7 per tonne of waste. The WMAA National Landfill Division stated 
that incorporating a leachate treatment plant into an existing landfill adds to the 
costs of the landfill by between 50 cents and $1 per tonne of waste (trans., p. 152). 
This suggests that installing a liner and leachate-treatment system to minimise 
leachate externalities is likely to cost less than $5 per tonne of waste for a landfill 
that handles nonhazardous waste. Even installing a double liner capable of 
minimising the risks associated with landfilling hazardous waste would cost less 
than $8 per tonne of waste. 
There are limited data available on the costs of cleaning up the damage done by 
leachate emissions. Eshet, Ayalon, and Shechter (2005) reported seven estimates of 
the costs of cleaning up leachate damage. They acknowledged that ‘methods such as 
the clean-up cost do not provide the real value of the damage and are only a partial 
substitute for the actual damage cost’ (Eshet, Ayalon, and Shechter 2005, p. 494). 
Most of the seven estimates reported by Eshet, Ayalon, and Shechter (2005) were 
secondary studies based on the same primary sources. For this reason, the estimates 
reported were all of a similar magnitude and ranged from zero to US$2.03 per tonne 
of waste.     






Landfills can reduce the amenity of nearby households and firms. The European 
Commission identified a number of disamenity effects associated with landfills, 
including: 
… odour, flies, seagulls, wind-blown litter, noise, visual intrusion, and traffic … [as 
well as deterioration in aesthetic attributes including] deteriorations in taste, odour, 
appearance, or visibility. (European Commission 2000a, p. 48) 
Researchers overseas have used hedonic pricing techniques to estimate the external 
costs of lost amenity associated with landfills. The European Commission (2000a) 
reported the results of one study based on US data that showed house prices were 
12.8 per cent lower if a house was located adjacent to a landfill, than if the same 
house was not close to a landfill. If the house was more than 5.5 kilometres from a 
landfill, there was no statistically significant effect on house prices. Porter (2002) 
reported estimates that the price of houses within 160 metres of a landfill may be as 
much as 15 per cent lower than houses not located near a landfill, and the price is a 
few per cent lower for houses within 1.6 kilometres of a landfill. 
These results imply that if a landfill was located in a lightly-populated area, the 
external costs of lost amenity would be minimal. Where landfills are located in 
metropolitan areas, buffer zones would reduce the amenity impacts significantly, 
and for this reason they are required in some states and territories (chapter 8). The 
land required for buffer zones has an opportunity cost — the landfill operator 
forgoes earnings by deliberately leaving the land empty and unused. Therefore, 
where regulations require landfill operators to purchase land specifically for the 
purpose of maintaining buffer zones, some or all of the external costs of lost 
amenity are internalised. 
Estimating the external costs of lost amenity that are imposed by each tonne of 
waste is difficult, and relies on a number of assumptions about the size of the 
landfill, its life span and the rate at which it is filled. In reality, once a landfill is 
established and accepting waste, the external cost of depositing one additional tonne 
of waste in the landfill (the marginal external cost) is likely to be close to zero. 
However, by using a number of assumptions, it may be possible to estimate the 
average external cost of lost amenity caused by landfill, which may be larger. 
EPA NSW (1996c) reported estimates that property prices would be between zero 
and 1 per cent lower for dwellings located within two kilometres of a landfill. It 
assumed that there would be on average 6300 dwellings within two kilometres of a 
landfill, and the reduction in property prices would be spread over 50 years with a 
7 per cent discount rate. Based on annual waste disposal volumes, it estimated the 
external cost of disamenity from sending waste to landfill is up to $3.70 per tonne     




of waste. If housing density were lower — as would be the case were the landfill to 
incorporate buffer zones — the external cost per tonne would be lower. 
As well as the negative effects on amenity that occur during the life of a landfill, 
there can be some offsetting positive effects. Porter (2002) noted that neighbours of 
landfills may benefit from having their roads paved and widened. In many cases, 
after a landfill is closed, what was a disused quarry is rehabilitated as a public park, 
sports ground or golf course. This may increase the amenity of nearby residents, 
albeit in the post-closure phase, and, depending on the discount rates applied by the 
residents, the benefit could be substantial. The Commission is not aware of any 
estimates of the external benefits of site remediation, so those benefits are excluded 
from estimates of the external costs of landfill. 
Estimated total external costs of landfill 
The external costs of a landfill depend on its location, the type of waste it accepts, 
and the design and management systems in place to deal with leachate and landfill 
gas. Bringing together all of the estimates discussed above, the Commission 
estimates the total external costs of landfills vary from zero to $24 per tonne of 
waste, depending on the type of waste accepted and the presence of gas-capture 
systems with electricity generation (table B.3). If the landfill is properly located and 
incorporates a liner and an efficient landfill-gas management system with electricity 
generation, the external costs are probably less than $5 per tonne of waste. A 
poorly-located and managed landfill could impose much higher costs. 
Thermal treatment of waste 
Thermal treatment refers to technologies that involve burning waste, including 
incineration, gasification and pyrolysis, none of which are widely used in Australia 
for general-waste treatment. It can also refer to the use of waste as a fuel source in 
industrial processes such as cement kilns. There are a number of positive and 
negative externalities associated with thermal treatment. The negative externalities 
include emissions of greenhouse gases and pollutants to air, and any hazards that 
might arise from residues, such as ash, when they are disposed to landfill. The main 
positive externality associated with thermal treatment arises from reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions that come from using waste instead of fossil fuels to 
generate energy. By reducing the volume of waste that is sent to landfill, and 
converting it to a largely inert ash, thermal treatment can reduce some of the 
externalities associated with landfill.     





Table B.3  Estimates of the external costs of properly-located, engineered 
and managed landfills, per tonne of waste 




Properly-located, engineered and managed landfill 
  Leachate  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Greenhouse gas emissions  $4 to $15  $5 to $21  $1 to $4 
  Other gas emissions  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Amenity  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Total  $4 to $18  $5 to $24  $1 to $7 
Properly-located, engineered and managed landfill with efficient methane capture and 
electricity generation 
  Leachate  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Greenhouse gas emissions  $0 to $1  $0 to $2  $0 to $1 
  Other gas emissions  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Amenity  Less than $1  Less than $1  Less than $1 
  Total  $0 to $4  $0 to $5  $0 to $4 
Sources: AGO (2005); BDA Group and EconSearch (2004); EPA NSW (1996c); European 
Commission (2000a); Nolan-ITU (2004b); Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001); Porter (2002); Tol (2005); 
Productivity Commission estimates. 
The estimates of external costs discussed below are for thermal treatment of 
municipal waste in modern facilities based on incineration. As this practice is not 
widely used in Australia for general-waste treatment, the estimates are based largely 
on overseas data. 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
The main greenhouse gas emitted from thermal treatment plants is carbon dioxide. 
The volume of carbon dioxide generated by combustion depends on the 
composition of the waste. Paper, plastics, and organic waste are the main sources of 
carbon dioxide emissions from thermal treatment of municipal waste. 
McDougall et al. (2001) reported estimates of the carbon dioxide emissions from 
combustion of these waste materials. Nolan-ITU (2004b) estimated the proportion 
of Australian municipal waste that is comprised of each of these materials 
(table B.4). By combining these estimates, it can be concluded that burning one 
tonne of municipal waste in a thermal-treatment plant in Australia would lead to 
emissions of approximately one tonne of carbon dioxide.     




Table B.4  Emissions of carbon dioxide from thermal treatment of 
municipal solid waste 









arising from waste 
combustion 
Tonnes of CO2-e 
per tonne of 
material burned 
1.28 0.06  2.74 2.65 0.59  1.28 
Proportion of the 
Australian municipal 
waste stream 
comprised of waste 
material 





Tonnes of CO2-e 
per tonne of 
municipal waste 
burned 
0.11  –  As much as 0.274  0.30  0.29 
a Figure is a total for all plastics. – Nil or rounded to zero. 
Sources: McDougall et al. (2001); Nolan-ITU (2004b); Productivity Commission estimates. 
Displacement of fossil fuels 
Electricity generation is the largest single source of greenhouse gas emissions in 
Australia. Most of these emissions arise when coal and natural gas are burned in 
power plants. The greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation 
depend on the fuel source. For example, generating 1kWh of electricity from brown 
coal combustion results in emissions of 1.23 kg of CO2-e. By contrast, electricity 
generated using hydro power gives rise to negligible greenhouse gas emissions. 
If municipal waste displaces fossil fuels as an energy source, emissions of 
greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels are reduced. This would partly offset the 
negative effects of greenhouse gas emissions from thermal treatment. Enviros 
Consulting Limited et al. (2004) estimated the combustion of one tonne of 
municipal waste in a thermal-treatment plant can generate 581 kWh of electricity. 
Given the combustion of one tonne of municipal waste yields approximately one 
tonne of CO2-e, this implies generating 1 kWh of electricity from waste combustion 
leads to the emission of 1.72 kilograms of CO2-e (1000/581). 
The external costs of thermal treatment, therefore, depend on whether the facility 
incorporates electricity generation. If it does not, the external costs of carbon 
dioxide emissions may be of the order of $5 to $20 per tonne of waste.4 If the 
facility does incorporate electricity generation, the external cost would be lower. 
                                              
4   Assuming the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions is between $5 and $20 per tonne of 
CO2-e.     





How much lower depends on the displaced energy source. For example, if 
energy-from-waste replaced a low-emission energy source such as hydroelectricity, 
the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions would be between $5 and $20 per 
tonne of waste. If energy-from-waste replaced brown coal, the net external cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions would be between $1 and $6 per tonne of waste 
(table B.5). If energy-from-waste replaced brown coal as an energy source, the net 
greenhouse gas emissions from municipal waste disposed to an efficient 
energy-from-waste facility would be lower than the emissions if the waste were 
disposed to a landfill with no gas-management system. 
Table B.5  Estimated net external costs of greenhouse gas emissions from 
sending municipal waste to an energy-from-waste facility 
   Displaced  Fuel 








Emissions of CO2-e per kWh of 
electricity  Kilograms  1.23 0.93  0.49  – 
Net emissions of CO2-e from 
combustion of one tonne of 
municipal wastea  Tonnes 0.28  0.46  0.71  1.00 
Low $/tonne  of  waste  1  2  4  5 
Net external cost of 
energy-from-waste 
greenhouse gas 
emissionsb  High $/tonne  of  waste  6 9 14  20 
a  Based on the assumption that 1.72 kilograms of CO2-e are emitted per kWh of electricity generated from 
municipal waste combustion. b The low estimate assumes that the external cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
is $5 per tonne of carbon dioxide. The high estimate assumes the cost is $20 per tonne. – nil or rounded to 
zero. 
Sources: ABS (2001); AGO (2005); Enviros Consulting Limited et al. (2004); Productivity Commission 
estimates. 
Other emissions to air 
Thermal-treatment facilities generate gases and particulate matter that can escape as 
flue gas and fly ash. McDougall et al. (2001) listed a number of pollutants that arise 
from the combustion of municipal waste, namely carbon monoxide, hydrochloric 
acid, hydrogen fluoride, sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates, heavy metals, 
dioxins and furans. These pollutants can be harmful to human health and the 
environment. 
There is particular concern over emissions of dioxins and furans. These compounds 
are highly toxic to humans and are suspected of being carcinogenic, although only 
one of the 210 compounds classed as dioxins and furans has been specifically linked     




to cancer in humans (McDougall et al. 2001). Dioxins are formed in combustion 
processes where carbon, oxygen and chlorine are present, which includes thermal 
waste treatment. 
Modern thermal-treatment facilities incorporate technologies that significantly 
reduce emissions of dioxins, furans and other pollutants. In Europe, where thermal 
treatment is commonly used in waste management, regulations require facilities to 
incorporate these technologies. These regulations have been very effective in 
reducing emissions of dioxins and other pollutants. For example, the German 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (2005) stated that, since 1990, total emissions of dioxins from Germany’s 
63 thermal waste treatment plants have fallen from 400.0 to 0.5 grams per year. 
Between 1990 and 2001, emissions of lead from thermal treatment of household 
waste fell from almost 58.00 to 0.13 tonnes per year. Over the same period, 
emissions of mercury fell from 347.0 kg to 4.5 kg per year. These reductions mean 
that thermal treatment of domestic waste is responsible for less than one thousandth 
of Germany’s total air emissions of lead and mercury: 
Requirements as to levels of heavy metals, dusts, and acid gases such as sulphur 
dioxide, hydrogen chloride, etc., have been similarly tightened, and these gases are 
consequently no longer relevant in terms of public health. (German Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 2005, p. 7) 
This suggests that, other than the effects of greenhouse gases, the external costs of 
air pollution from thermal treatment facilities that incorporate modern pollution 
controls can be very small. 
Solid-waste residues from thermal treatment 
There are two main types of solid residues from municipal waste combustion: ash, 
and flue gas cleaning residues. Ash can accumulate under the burnt waste, or escape 
from the facility into the atmosphere, or be captured before it escapes. Flue-gas 
cleaning residues accumulate when the flue gases are treated to prevent pollutants 
from escaping to the atmosphere. Modern thermal waste-treatment facilities 
incorporate fabric filters to prevent fly ash from escaping. The ash residues are 
disposed to landfills, or used in construction applications such as road base, while 
the flue-gas cleaning residues are regarded as hazardous waste in most countries, 
and are disposed to controlled landfills (European Commission 2000a). 
The residual ash from combustion is much more inert than municipal waste, and the 
thermal treatment destroys pathogens in the waste, so the volumes of leachate and 
gas generated when the ash is sent to landfill are significantly reduced (McDougall 
et al. 2001). However, because the ash residues may contain heavy metals at up to     





four times the concentration of the original municipal waste (Porter  2002), the 
leachate can be more toxic. The net effect depends on the landfill that accepts the 
ash residues and its capacity to prevent leachate emissions. If the ash is sent to a 
hazardous waste landfill, the impacts are likely to be controlled, and the external 
cost would be minimal. If the ash were disposed to a landfill that did not incorporate 
adequate pollution controls, the impact could be significant. 
Loss of amenity 
Thermal waste-treatment facilities can lead to losses of amenity similar to those 
caused by landfills. The European Commission (2000a) identified factors such as 
dust, noise, odour, traffic and visual intrusion as the sources of the disamenity. As is 
the case with landfills, there are only likely to be significant disamenities if the 
facility is located close to residential or commercial areas. 
The Productivity Commission is not aware of any direct estimates of the external 
costs of the amenity loss caused by thermal waste treatment facilities. The European 
Commission noted: 
… although there are differences in the types of nuisances and disamenities associated 
with living close to an incinerator and close to a landfill, there are also obvious 
similarities. It would therefore not seem unreasonable to expect a somewhat similar 
profile of welfare losses associated with a landfill and an incineration plant. (European 
Commission 2000a, p. 102) 
B.3 Upstream  externalities 
The extraction of minerals and forest products can cause damage to mining land and 
forests. Transporting and processing virgin materials can lead to greenhouse gas 
emissions, air and water pollution. If these damages are not reflected in the costs to 
firms of producing goods, they are externalities. Because they do not arise directly 
from the generation or disposal of waste, but rather at a point earlier in the product’s 
life cycle, these damages are often referred to as upstream externalities. If waste 
management practices lead to reductions in the use of virgin materials, some 
upstream externalities may be avoided, although the processes involved in recycling 
could result in some externalities themselves. 
This section sets out some of the issues that should be considered when attempting 
to estimate the upstream external costs and benefits of waste management. Life 
cycle assessment (LCA) — a materials accounting technique that has been used to 
estimate the environmental costs and benefits of recycling — is discussed. One 
prominent Australian study of kerbside recycling is considered.     




Life cycle assessment 
LCA is a material accounting technique that catalogues the inputs of materials and 
energy and the emissions of pollutants that are associated with a product or 
production process. The practice of LCA is guided by a series of International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) standards, which have been reproduced as Australian 
and New Zealand Standards. The standard that sets out the principles and 
framework for LCA states: 
LCA studies the environmental aspects and potential impacts throughout a product’s 
life (that is cradle-to-grave) from raw material acquisition through production, use and 
disposal. (Standards Australia 1998, p. iii) 
The standard (Standards Australia 1998) sets out four stages to be completed in an 
LCA:  
1.  The goals of the LCA and its scope are defined. The scope of the study includes 
the inputs and emissions that are to be measured and the boundaries of the 
product system. While the standard states that LCA studies the impact of a 
product from cradle-to-grave, it is conceivable that an LCA could begin at a 
point later in the product’s life cycle than raw-materials acquisition, and could 
end at an earlier point than final disposal. For example, if a product is imported, 
it may not be possible to assess the impacts of raw-materials acquisition and 
manufacturing. If it is exported, it may not be possible to assess the impacts of 
consumption and disposal. 
2.  A ‘life cycle inventory analysis’ is undertaken. The life cycle inventory 
quantifies the material and energy inputs and outputs associated with the product 
or process at the various stages of its life cycle. The accuracy of the 
LCA depends on the reliability of the inventory data. 
3.  A ‘life cycle impact assessment’ is carried out. The impact assessment involves 
‘associating inventory data with specific environmental impacts and attempting 
to understand those impacts’ (Standards Australia 1998, p. 7). This could include 
evaluating the contribution of certain emissions to impacts such as global 
warming potential, photochemical-smog formation and damage to human health. 
In some cases, emissions of different chemicals contribute to the same 
environmental impact. The ISO standard for LCA allows for emissions to be 
aggregated ‘in very specific cases and only when meaningful’ (Standards 
Australia 1998, p.  8). For example, carbon dioxide and methane can both 
contribute to global warming, and could be reported as emissions of CO2-e. This 
is acceptable because there is broad agreement that the global warming potential 
of methane is 21 times that of carbon dioxide. Cases where there is agreement 
about the relative damage caused by two chemicals are uncommon, and 
therefore aggregation of chemicals would be expected to be uncommon.     





4.  ‘Life cycle interpretation’ is the stage at which ‘the findings from the inventory 
analysis and the impact assessment are combined together … consistent with the 
defined goal and scope in order to reach conclusions and recommendations’ 
(Standards Australia 1998, p. 8). 
The ISO standard for LCA places some limitations on the way that the results of an 
LCA are reported. For example, the standard states: 
There is no scientific basis for reducing LCA results to a single overall score or number 
[such as dollars], since tradeoffs and complexities exist for the systems analysed at 
different stages of their life cycle. (Standards Australia 1998, p. 4) 
The Commission agrees that ‘tradeoffs and complexities’ exist within and outside 
the scope of an LCA study, and they make it problematic to use LCA to estimate the 
external costs and benefits of processes such as landfill, energy-from-waste, 
recycling and AWTs. One obvious factor that affects the reliability of LCA is that 
there is a shortage of reliable life cycle inventory data in Australia. The Building 
Products Innovation Council (trans., p. 646) raised concerns that due to the lack of 
reliable local data, LCAs are being based on overseas data that do not accurately 
reflect Australian conditions. However, even when reliable data are available, using 
the results of an LCA to estimate the external costs and benefits of a process is 
likely to lead to inaccurate and unreliable estimates. 
The results of an LCA are reported as a list of the physical inputs to, and outputs 
from, a production process. The physical characteristics of a pollutant are an 
important determinant of its potential to cause damage to human health and the 
environment, but the actual damage done by emissions depends on factors like the 
background concentration of pollutants in the environment, the pathways through 
which exposure occurs and any measures taken to reduce their impacts. These 
factors are not adequately accounted for in LCA. 
The Commission has identified three characteristics of LCA that make it a poor tool 
for estimating external costs and benefits. Namely, LCA: 
1.  cannot differentiate between externalities and impacts that have already been 
internalised through direct policy intervention; 
2.  has no mechanism for accounting for the location of avoided pollution; and 
3.  does not take time into consideration. 
These concerns are elaborated on below.     




Some environmental impacts are internalised 
Natural resource extraction, transport, processing and manufacturing can damage 
human health and the environment. Some of the potential for damage has been 
identified by governments, and in some cases policies have been adopted that have 
the effect of internalising the costs of the damages so they are reflected in the firm’s 
costs of production. For example, governments may levy pollution taxes on firms, 
or require them to offset some or all of the damage they cause by undertaking 
environmental improvements elsewhere. Such policies are discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
In an LCA, only the physical effects of production processes are identified. 
Measures to internalise environmental externalities are not taken into account, and 
therefore where such policies exist, LCA would tend to overstate the externalities 
associated with a production process. 
The size of upstream benefits depends on location and time 
As it is currently practiced, LCA is unable to account for the source of any avoided 
pollution or when it would have occurred. Both of these factors are significant in 
determining the external costs of pollution or benefits of avoided pollution. 
Estimates of the external cost of fine particulate emissions made by EPA NSW 
(1998) illustrate the importance of location. Fine particulates can affect people who 
suffer from respiratory illnesses and can contribute to photochemical smog. 
EPA NSW (1998) estimated that, in 1998, the external cost of particulate emissions 
in the greater Sydney region was $18  500 per tonne. If the emissions occurred 
outside the greater Sydney region, where population density is lower, EPA 
NSW (1998) estimated that they impose no external costs. In the results of an LCA, 
no distinction would be drawn between avoided urban air pollution and avoided 
pollution in sparsely-populated areas, although in a properly conducted cost–benefit 
analysis, the external costs could be very different. 
Imports and exports further complicate the analysis and strengthen the case against 
using LCA to estimate the external costs and benefits associated with particular 
products. Where goods are imported, reduced consumption in Australia may lead to 
reduced pollution in other countries. Most air and water pollutants — the notable 
exception being greenhouse gases — have localised effects on human health and the 
environment. In such cases, it is unlikely that there is any external benefit to 
Australia from avoiding consumption of the product. Likewise, reducing domestic 
consumption of a particular virgin material may not lead to any external benefit to 
Australia, if the reduced domestic demand is made up for by increased exports.     





Similarly, LCA results do not include any consideration of the timing of avoided 
emissions. The life cycle impacts of a product or process may occur over a long 
period, and the cost to the community depends in part on when the impacts occur. In 
general, the community will place a greater value on avoiding an emission of 
pollution today than avoiding the same emission in the future. In cost–benefit 
analysis this is reflected by the use of discount rates that adjust the external cost of 
pollution (or benefit of avoided pollution) depending on when the emission would 
be expected to occur. 
The location and timing of avoided pollution are key factors in determining the risk 
that the pollution will cause damage to human health and the environment, and 
therefore the size of any externalities. Failure to account for risk will tend to 
overstate the size of environmental externalities. 
Estimates of upstream externalities 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) used LCA to estimate the external costs 
and benefits of kerbside recycling in Australia. They concluded that kerbside 
recycling delivered environmental and other external benefits valued at $420 per 
tonne of recyclable material recovered, most of which was attributed to upstream 
benefits. The largest contribution to the environmental benefits of recycling was 
estimated to arise from reduced air and water pollution associated with avoided 
virgin materials processing (75 per cent, or $315 per tonne). The ‘natural resource 
value’ of recycling — associated with resource conservation and reduced 
environmental impacts of resource extraction — was estimated to contribute a 
further 21 per  cent ($88  per  tonne) of the benefits. Reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions were estimated to deliver 4 per cent ($17 per tonne) of the benefits of 
recycling. The downstream impacts of recycling were estimated to comprise a 
benefit of around $6.70 per tonne, arising from reduced landfill impacts, and a cost 
of around $8.40 per tonne, caused by the collection trucks required for kerbside 
recycling (figure B.1)  
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) based their analysis on the assumption that 
materials collected through the kerbside recycling system were recycled back into 
the same product — known as ‘closed-loop’ recycling. This not always the case, 
and would tend to bias upward the estimated benefits of recycling. 
Since they were first published, the Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) 
estimates of the costs and benefits of recycling have been applied in a number of 
prominent studies of the costs and benefits of waste management in Australia. The 
estimates in Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) are discussed below.     




Figure B.1  Sources of environmental costs and benefits of kerbside 























































































Data source: Nolan ITU and SKM Economics (2001). 
Avoided air and water pollution 
Industrial processes, including virgin materials processing and recycling, can lead to 
air and water pollution. If that pollution constitutes a residual net externality (taking 
into account any direct measures to internalise the costs) and recycling reduces the 
total volume of pollution emitted, it would deliver an external benefit. Nolan-ITU 
and SKM Economics (2001) estimated that avoided air pollution delivers benefits of 
approximately $275 per tonne of material recovered (around 65 per cent of the total 
benefit of recycling), and avoided water pollution delivers benefits of approximately 
$40 per tonne of material recovered (around 10 per cent of the total benefit). 
To estimate the benefits of avoided air and water pollution, Nolan-ITU and SKM 
Economics (2001) used LCA to estimate the volumes of air and water pollution that 
would be avoided if virgin materials were replaced by recycled materials. The LCA 
accounted for emissions of 22 air pollutants and 23 water pollutants. The volumes 
of avoided pollution were multiplied by existing estimates of the external costs of 
pollution, and this was reported as an external benefit of kerbside recycling. The 
estimates of the external costs of pollution came from Australian and overseas 
sources, not all of which could be located by the Commission.     





The Commission’s assessment of the benefits of avoided air and water pollution 
estimated by Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) is that they are overstated for 
three reasons: 
1.  The estimates did not take into account the effects of upstream policies such as 
pollution taxes and environmental offsets. While recycling may lead to reduced 
pollution, it may also lead to reduced environmental offsets, or reduced 
pollution-tax revenues. If this is the case, then recycling may not deliver the 
estimated net benefit to the community. 
2.  Hyder Consulting (sub. 116, p. 8) stated that in the valuation model used by 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics, ‘the impacts [of avoided air and water 
pollution] have been valued as occurring in populated areas’, where they would 
impose higher external costs. In fact, some of the emissions would have occurred 
in less densely-populated areas where their external costs would be much 
smaller. 
3.  Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) did not apply any discount factors to the 
benefits of avoided emissions that would arise in the future. 
Not taking the location or timing of pollution into account are examples of the 
general problem of using potential rather than expected cost estimates. As has been 
discussed for downstream pollution from landfills, expected costs can be very much 
lower than potential costs. Although the Commission has not analysed the risks 
associated with upstream pollution, it would appear that similar differences exist, 
and hence the Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) estimates are likely to 
substantially overestimate the expected costs of pollution, and therefore the benefits 
of recycling. 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
Extracting and processing virgin materials can lead to emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Replacing virgin materials with recycled materials can lead to lower 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) estimated 
that reduced greenhouse gas emissions credited to kerbside recycling deliver 
benefits of $17 per tonne of materials recycled (approximately 4 per cent of the total 
benefit of recycling).  
To derive this figure, Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics used LCA to estimate the 
volume of greenhouse gas emissions avoided through kerbside recycling, and 
assumed avoided greenhouse gas emissions deliver external benefits of $20.60 per 
tonne of CO2-e.     




Currently there is no comprehensive nationally-coordinated  policy to address 
greenhouse gas emissions and internalise the external costs of emissions. Should 
such a policy be adopted in the future, estimates of the external costs of greenhouse 
gas emissions relating to recycling would need to be reconsidered in the light of the 
policy. 
Resource extraction 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) estimated that slower extraction of mineral 
and forest products delivers external benefits of approximately $88 per tonne of 
material recycled through the kerbside system (21 per cent of the estimated total 
benefit). The benefits of slower resource extraction are related to reduced impacts 
on the land used for mining and forestry, and the contribution of slower resource 
extraction to sustainability. 
Land-use impacts of mining 
Mining can cause losses of native vegetation and wildlife habitat, pollution of 
waterways and losses of recreational or aesthetic values. If these impacts are not 
reflected in the cost of extracting mineral resources, they are net externalities. It 
appears that Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) assumed that avoided impacts 
on mining land deliver external benefits of approximately $20 per tonne of material 
recycled through the kerbside system. 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) used an estimate of the costs of 
mining-land rehabilitation as a proxy for the external cost of damage to mining 
land. This estimate was in turn drawn from ‘United States data adapted to Western 
Australia’ (DEST 1997, p. 38). The Commission has not researched estimates of the 
external costs of damage to mining land, but considers an estimate of the costs of 
mining-land rehabilitation based on overseas data to be an unreliable proxy for the 
true external costs of mining-land use in Australia. 
There are a number of factors that would need to be taken into account in estimating 
the external costs of damage to mining land. The magnitude of the externality 
depends on the location of the mine, the practices of the mining company, and the 
existence and effectiveness of direct policies to address the externalities. For 
example, the external costs of a mine in a tropical rainforest or on the fringe of a 
city would be larger than the external costs of a mine in an uninhabited area in the 
remote outback. Likewise, an open cut mine will have different costs to an 
underground mine.     





Regulations and license conditions placed on mining companies can serve to 
internalise the externalities associated with damage to mining land. Regulations that 
require mining companies to avoid environmental damage or repair any damage that 
is caused can reduce the net external costs of mining. Other regulations require 
mining companies to pay compensation for environmental damage, or to undertake 
environmental-improvement work away from their mine sites to offset the damage 
done by mining (chapter 5). Through such policies, mining companies must bear 
some or all of the costs of the damage caused by their operations, and the 
externality is partially or fully internalised. 
Given the range of factors that influence the external costs of mining-land use, they 
are difficult to estimate, and it is unlikely that overseas estimates of the costs of 
mining-land rehabilitation are a reliable proxy for the external costs of mines in 
Australia. 
Mineral-resource depletion 
Extracting mineral resources today reduces, or at least disperses, the stock of 
resources that are available for extraction in the future. Nolan-ITU and SKM 
Economics (2001) identified resource depletion as an externality associated with 
mineral extraction. Their estimate appears to value the benefit of slower resource 
depletion at around $60 per tonne of materials recycled. 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) based their estimates of the benefit of 
slower resource depletion on an estimate of the external cost of electricity in 
Western Australia, which, in turn, was ‘based on a German study on the costs of 
substituting renewable energy for coal in the generation of electricity’ 
(DEST 1997, p. 38).  The  estimates were described by DEST (1997, p.  39) as 
‘controversial’, and they are not related to the rate of extraction of mineral 
resources. 
Where a mineral does become increasingly scarce, the world price tends to rise. 
Rising prices encourage exploration for new supplies, make recycling more 
attractive and promote substitution to other materials. In this way, price operates to 
both limit demand and increase supply in the future. In addition, firms with rights 
over mineral reserves make decisions as to the quantities they will extract over time. 
In doing this, they recognise that minerals extracted now cannot be extracted in the 
future, that is, they have an opportunity cost. If firms predict future scarcity leading 
to price increases they may limit current production in order to be able to benefit 
from higher prices later. These dynamic market responses to scarcity mean the 
opportunity cost of using non-renewable resources does not specifically introduce a 
market failure (Kahn 1995). Of course, nobody can predict the future with certainty,     




but as Kahn (1995) noted, markets are the best mechanism available for taking into 
account anticipated future conditions. As there appears to be no market failure 
associated with extraction rates for nonrenewable resources, it is not appropriate to 
treat resource depletion as an externality. 
Forest production 
Forests provide a number of environmental benefits. They act as a sink for 
greenhouse gases, reducing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
They can prevent soil erosion and salinity. They provide habitat for wildlife, and 
have recreational and scenic values to people. When forests are harvested, some of 
these benefits may be lost. Some are regained if the forest regenerates, while others 
such as biodiversity may be lost forever. As well as the loss of the environmental 
benefits of forests, harvesting can lead to direct negative impacts such as runoff into 
local water courses. If the environmental impacts are not included in the costs of 
forest production, the impacts can be considered externalities. 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) considered the environmental impacts 
associated with forest production to be externalities that could be reduced by 
recycling paper and cardboard. They assumed that every tonne of virgin native 
forest that was not harvested delivered external benefits of approximately $36 per 
tonne of wood, while regrowth and plantation forests delivered benefits of around 
$13 and $7 per tonne respectively. 
The values chosen by Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001, p. A-17) were based 
on ‘hypothetical non-wood charges’ sourced from an Industry Commission report 
on recycling. The Industry Commission (IC 1991) noted that forests have wood and 
non-wood values. The wood values are the market value of trees as a source of logs, 
while the non-wood values reflect the external benefits provided by forests. It made 
the point that forests might be managed differently where both types of values were 
considered. The Industry Commission illustrated this point by arbitrarily selecting a 
set of values to represent the non-wood values of forests. These values were not 
derived by any systematic means, rather they were simply chosen to demonstrate 
the effect of different valuations of the non-wood values of forests. Nolan-ITU and 
SKM Economics (2001) used these hypothetical charges as the basis of their 
estimates of the non-wood value of forests. 
Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001, p.  A-17) acknowledged there were no 
published estimates of the external costs of forest production, and they had adopted 
the Industry Commission’s figure ‘in the hope that the adoption of a value would 
prompt further debate and research in the area’. However, it also described the 
Industry Commission’s hypothetical values as a ‘conservative estimate of the     





environmental value of timber’ (Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics 2001, p. A-17). 
There appears to be no basis for the judgement that this value is conservative. 
The external impact of forest production depends on the location and characteristics 
of the forest. Native forests may deliver larger external benefits than plantation 
forests because they contribute more to biodiversity, scenic and recreation values. 
Plantation forests can deliver many of the benefits associated with native forests, 
but can also impose costs through the use of water resources that could be used for 
other activities. 
The extent of the externalities can be influenced by government policy. The 
Australian, State and Territory Governments have agreed on a National Forest 
Policy Statement (NFPS) that sets a number of requirements for the management of 
Australia’s forests. The NFPS includes commitments to safeguard ‘areas that have 
important biological, cultural, archaeological, geological, recreational and landscape 
values’ (DAFF 2002). The NFPS also sets out guidelines for the pricing of forest 
products, including: 
Prices will be market based, at least cover the full cost of efficient management 
(including regeneration) attributable to wood production, include a fair return on 
capital, and provide an adequate return to the community from the use of a public 
resource. (DAFF 2002) 
If the provisions in the NFPS are met, some of the external costs of forest 
production will be internalised. These factors suggest to the Commission that the 
benefits of avoided forest production are highly variable, and that because it does 
not account for direct policies like the NFPS, any analysis based on LCA may lead 
to overestimates of the benefits of recycling. 
Total upstream benefits of kerbside recycling 
The Commission accepts that recycling some materials can deliver some upstream 
environmental and human-health benefits. However, the estimate that kerbside 
recycling systems deliver upstream benefits of $420 per tonne of mixed recyclables 
recovered that was published by Nolan-ITU and SKM Economics (2001) is 
substantially biased upward. The Commission considers the estimate to be biased 
upward because: 
•  it does not take into account the internalisation of upstream externalities through 
direct mechanisms, such as requirements for environmental offsets; 
•  it values all pollution as if it occurred in a large metropolitan area when, in 
reality, some of it occurs in regions where the human-health costs of pollution 
are generally much lower;     




•  it relates to the potential impacts of pollution without any risk adjustment to 
estimate an expected impact. The potential impact is effectively a worst-case 
scenario that is unlikely to reflect the damage done by pollution in Australia; 
•  it includes an external benefit of approximately $60 per tonne for mineral 
resource conservation. The Commission considers there is no externality 
associated with mineral-resource depletion and therefore the appropriate value 
for the purposes of cost–benefit analysis is zero; 
•  it is based on the assumption that recycling occurs in a ‘closed-loop’ system; and 
•  the costs and benefits of avoided externalities that may occur in the future are 
not subject to any discount rate. 
As well as being biased upward, there are a number of factors that cause the 
Commission to question the reliability of the estimate, including: 
•  the scarcity of reliable life cycle inventory data for Australia; 
•  the variability of the environmental impacts of resource extraction and 
processing facilities; and 
•  the use of mining-land rehabilitation costs and hypothetical non-wood charges 
as proxies for the external costs of mining and forestry activities.     
 





C  Case studies of three Australian 
product stewardship schemes  
This appendix examines Australia’s product stewardship schemes for: 
•  waste oil 
•  consumer packaging  
•  newsprint. 
C.1 Waste  oil 
Since 2001, waste oil has been subject to the Product Stewardship for Oil (PSO) 
Program. The rationale for this scheme is that large quantities of used oil would 
otherwise be discharged into the environment, leading to adverse impacts on human 
health and the productive capacity of the economy (Allen Consulting Group 2004; 
DEH 2005d). Such impacts could occur because it is relatively easy for people to 
dispose of used oil inappropriately. 
Policy instruments 
The key policy instrument used in the PSO Program is an advance recycling fee. Oil 
producers and importers have to pay a fee of 5.449 cents per litre (or per kilogram 
for greases) on petroleum-based oils and their synthetic equivalents (excluding 
exports and single-use oils). The resulting revenue is used to offset the cost of 
subsidies paid to oil recyclers.1  
Used oil can be cleaned of contaminants and then used as an industrial burner fuel, 
hydraulic oil, incorporated into other products, or re-refined back into new 
lubricating oil. 
                                              
1  Strictly speaking, the subsidies are not financed directly by the fee. Rather, the fee was set so 
that, over the life of the PSO Program, no government funding was required to finance the 
expected subsidies. However, in any given year, there may be a disparity between government 
revenue and payments. In 2004-05, revenue was $25.1 million, after accounting for drawbacks 
(for exports) and refunds, while $13.7 million was paid for oil recycling.     
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The recycling subsidies vary according to the volume and type of recycled product 
produced (table C.1). The rate structure provides a significant preference in favour 
of re-refined base oil, sometimes referred to as ‘lube-to-lube’. As a result, a 
disproportionate share of subsidies go to this product (figure C.1). 





(cents per litre 
or kilogram)a
1.  Re-refined base oil (for use as a lubricant or a hydraulic or transformer oil) that 
meets the criteria mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Product Stewardship (Oil) 
Regulations 2000 (Cwlth). 
50
2.  Other re-refined base oils.  10
3.  Diesel fuels to which the Excise Tariff Act 1921 (Cwlth) applies.  7
4. Diesel  extenders  (filtered,  de-watered and de-mineralised).  5
5.  High grade industrial burning oils (filtered, de-watered and de-mineralised).  5
6.  Low grade industrial burning oils (filtered and de-watered).  3
7.  Industrial process oils and lubricants, including hydraulic and transformer oils 
(re-processed or filtered, but not re-refined). 
0
8.  Gazetted oil consumed in Australia for a gazetted use.b 5.449
9.  Recycled oil mentioned in item 5 or 6 that has been blended with a petroleum 
product that meets the criteria mentioned in Schedule 2 of the Product 
Stewardship (Oil) Regulations 2000 (Cwlth). 
9.557
a  Paid per litre on oils and per kilogram on greases. b  This category was created so that the levy of 
5.449 cents could be reimbursed for specific uses of oil that do not create recyclable waste and pose a low 
risk to the environment. 
Source: Product Stewardship (Oil) Regulations 2000 (Cwlth). 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) claimed the different 
subsidy rates are set so they: 
… broadly reflect the recycling effort and investment required to produce recycled oil 
of better quality with improved environmental outcomes. The underlying principle is 
that benefits should only be paid where they might serve as an incentive for increased 
recycling activity. This has been given precedence over other factors. The hierarchy is 
thus designed to encourage the increased recycling of waste oil and not to simply 
reward current good practice or provide industry assistance. (DEH 2005e, p. 9) 
However, a formal evaluation of the PSO Program (prepared for the Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage) questioned whether the subsidy rates reflect the costs 
and benefits of different treatment methods: 
… since the PSO Program’s introduction a number of oil life cycle analyses have been 
undertaken … These studies challenge the perceived environmental supremacy of lube-
to-lube recycling, and have confirmed that burning of high grade reprocessed used oil     
 





or, in the case of cement kilns even lower grade used oil, has an environmental impact 
similar to re-refined base oil. (Allen Consulting Group 2004, p. 23) 
Figure C.1  Subsidy payments and volumes recycled under the Product 
Stewardship for Oil Program, 2004-05 
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per cent of all subsidies/volume
a
Subsidies paid Volume recycled
a Excluding payments for categories 8 and 9 (see table C.1 for definitions), which do not contribute to the total 
volume of oil recycled under the Product Stewardship for Oil Program. Transitional assistance funding is also 
excluded.  
Data source: DEH (2005a). 
As a result, the evaluation recommended the subsidy for high-grade burning oil be 
raised relative to that for lube-to-lube oil. However, the author of the evaluation 
(Allen Consulting Group) recently changed its view. Australia’s only operator of a 
used oil refinery, with assistance from the Allen Consulting Group, noted: 
A recent life cycle analysis by a highly regarded German research institute (IFEU) has 
found that re-refining produces significantly better environmental and economic 
outcomes than burning, after considering a number of environmental and resource 
criteria.  
It is therefore argued that: 
•  Lube-to-lube re-refining should be the preferred means of addressing the issue of used 
lubricating oils … 
•  The $0.50 per litre benefit rate is appropriate and should retain continuing relevancy by 
being increased by the CPI index … 
•  There are health hazards from burning used lubricating oil in anything other than 
cement kilns. Not only is burning a poor use of a valuable resource, but the release of 
harmful chemicals into the environment or into glasshouses is undesirable … 
Prior to the IFEU analysis, there had been a number of previous life cycle analysis 
studies, which influenced the ACG [Allen Consulting Group] review [evaluation of the 
PSO Program] to propose an increase in the burning oil benefit rate. (Southern Oil 
Refineries, sub. DR192, pp. iii–iv and 11)     
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Similarly, the DEH noted: 
… the Commission … refers to the independent review of the Product Stewardship 
(Oil) Act 2000 (Allen Consulting Group 2004) and questions whether the subsidy rates 
reflect the costs and benefits of different treatment methods. DEH considers that the 
Allen Consulting Group analysis of this matter was flawed. (sub. DR214, p. 24) 
A past problem with the PSO Program was that the advance recycling fee was being 
levied on products and end uses that did not produce a recyclable waste and had 
minimal impact on the environment. This was subsequently addressed by 
amendments to the relevant legislation, although with a significant time lag 
(DEH, sub. 103). 
The PSO Program also includes government-funded transitional assistance of 
$34.5 million over the period 2001–07. This is intended to be ‘an interim measure 
to engender change that will ensure the long-term viability of Australia’s oil 
recycling industry’ (DEH 2005a, p. 124). 
Administrative arrangements 
The PSO Program is implemented as government regulation. It is administered by 
existing agencies, which would tend to reduce the administrative cost of the 
Program. However, the administrative arrangements are somewhat complex in 
practice. This complexity is reflected in the number of parties involved and the 
numerous legislative instruments used to implement the Program.2  
The advance recycling fee on domestic oil production is collected as an excise by 
the Australian Taxation Office. For imports, it is collected as a customs duty by the 
Australian Customs Service. Subsidy payments are administered separately by the 
Tax Office. Further complexity arises due to the need to exempt exports and non-
recyclable oils from the fee.  
The advance recycling fee is set by the Treasurer. The DEH is responsible for 
ongoing monitoring and review of the Program, and for administering the 
transitional assistance funds. An Oil Stewardship Advisory Council — including 
                                              
2  The legislation underpinning the Program is the Product Stewardship (Oil) Act 2000 (Cwlth); 
Product Stewardship (Oil) (Consequential Amendments) Act 2000 (Cwlth); Excise Tariff 
Amendment (Product Stewardship for Waste Oil) Act 2000 (Cwlth); Customs Tariff Amendment 
(Product Stewardship for Waste Oil) Act 2000 (Cwlth); Product Grants and Benefits 
Administration Act 2000 (Cwlth); and Appropriation (Supplementary Measures) Act (No. 2) 
1999 (Cwlth). The Product Stewardship (Oil) Regulations 2000 (Cwlth) specify the benefits 
paid to encourage recycling.     
 





government and industry representation — has also been created to provide advice 
to the Australian Government on the operation of the PSO Program. 
However, the DEH defended the administrative arrangements: 
The Allen [Consulting Group] Review found that the administrative costs of the 
programme were reasonable and compliance costs were not unreasonable. The Allen 
Review noted that administrative costs had been constrained by using existing excise 
and customs arrangements. It also noted that the programme was reasonably flexible 
for business while identifying some concern about the paperwork burden (Allen 
Consulting Group 2004, p. x). (sub. DR214, p. 24) 
A positive aspect of the Program is that the relevant legislation requires annual 
reporting on its operations and the conduct of evaluations at least every four years.3 
The DEH reports on the Program’s operations each year as part of its annual report.  
The first evaluation of the PSO Program was undertaken by Allen Consulting 
Group (2004). It concluded there was a sound basis for the Program, but found it 
difficult to reach definitive conclusions about effectiveness due to data limitations. 
It also found that relying on the customs and excise system would be a major 
problem over the longer term, given the system is complex and not designed for 
environmental regulation. It therefore recommended a tradeable certificate scheme 
be considered when the Program is next subject to an evaluation, which is due by 
2008. As noted above, the evaluation also raised concerns about the distortionary 
effects of the subsidy rates. 
Conclusion 
The PSO Program addresses a clearly-identified and potentially significant problem. 
Namely, market failures leading to the disposal of a hazardous product in a way that 
could have adverse impacts on human health and the environment. 
The use of an advance recycling fee seems appropriate, given the technical 
feasibility to readily process oil for reuse, the adverse consequences of otherwise 
disposing of waste oil, and that levying a fee at the time of disposal/recycling would 
encourage inappropriate disposal. 
The choice of regulation also seems appropriate. There is not a strong case for a 
voluntary or co-regulatory approach. This is because existing industry bodies lack 
adequate coverage and resources, there is a high risk of harm, and there has been a 
long history of oil not being disposed of appropriately (Allen Consulting 
Group 2004). 
                                              
3  Product Stewardship (Oil) Act 2000 (Cwlth), ss.35–36.     
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The DEH (sub. 103) noted the Program had been effective in significantly 
increasing oil recycling. In 2004-05, over 220 million litres of used oil was 
recycled, representing about 80 per cent of potentially-recoverable used oil.  
However, the administrative arrangements for the Program appear complex and the 
recycling subsidies introduce a distortion into the market for recycled oil. As noted 
above, an evaluation of the Program recommended a shift away from relying on the 
customs and excise system when the Program is next evaluated (Allen Consulting 
Group 2004). The evaluation also recommended the subsidy for high-grade burning 
oil be raised relative to that for lube-to-lube oil. The DEH (sub. DR214) rejected 
this recommendation because it considered the evidence used was not valid. The 
Commission has not formulated its own recommendation on this matter because it 
is beyond the terms of reference for this inquiry, but notes the subsidies should be 
based on the externalities avoided, not ‘infant-industry’ arguments or favouring 
particular industries in a manner suggested by the waste hierarchy (chapter 7). 
C.2 Consumer  packaging 
In 1999, Australia adopted a stewardship scheme for consumer packaging based on 
co-regulation. The scheme has two elements:  
•  The National Packaging Covenant — an agreement between governments and 
firms — specifies the self-regulation component of the scheme.  
•  The National Environment Protection (Used Packaging Materials) Measure 
(NEPM) specifies the supporting government regulation, which is implemented 
by individual states and territories.  
A common criticism of the arrangements introduced in 1999 was the lack of 
consistent performance measurement by affected parties (DEH, sub. 103; Local 
Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales, sub. 98;  Municipal 
Association of Victoria, sub. 113; National Packaging Covenant Industry 
Association, sub. 92). Hence, little quantitative evidence exists about the scheme’s 
overall effectiveness or net benefit to the community. 
Various qualitative evaluations of the Covenant have been conducted (Boomerang 
Alliance 2004; ISF 2004; Lovell and Wilson 2004; Meinhardt Infrastructure and 
Environment 2004; Nolan-ITU 2004a; Perchard 2005). However, their usefulness 
was constrained by an inability to objectively weigh different pieces of information 
(DEH, sub. 103).  
The most extensive evaluation was conducted by Nolan-ITU (2004a). It reviewed 
actions by 54 Covenant signatories and conducted interviews, surveys and     
 





workshops with a range of interested parties. It concluded the achievements of 
individual firms varied, ranging from ‘very little’ to ‘substantive improvements’. 
Another major criticism of the arrangements introduced in 1999 was that a large 
proportion of packaging waste — so-called away-from-home waste — was not 
covered. Some parties — particularly local governments — were also critical of the 
relatively small funding commitment firms made to collecting and processing 
packaging waste (for example, Boomerang Alliance 2004; ISF 2004; Meinhardt 
Infrastructure and Environment 2004). 
The revised Covenant and NEPM 
In 2005, the packaging stewardship scheme was revised to address some of the 
above criticisms. Key changes were the introduction of more consistent 
data-reporting requirements, and the inclusion of packaging waste occurring away 
from homes and workplaces. As a result, the Covenant now sets three ‘overarching 
targets’ (detailed in chapter 10). 
The supporting NEPM requires parties that are not Covenant signatories to ensure 
the collection of their packaging and its reuse, recycling and/or energy recovery. 
The extent to which this is required is supposed to reflect the material-specific 
targets in the Covenant. Individual jurisdictions have the option of recovering 
collection costs from non-signatories, who have to keep detailed records on their 
activities. The NEPM also requires local governments to provide data on their 
recovery activities, including the weight of recyclable materials collected. 
Action plans and annual reporting requirements 
Covenant signatories have to produce action plans specifying what actions they will 
take, the key performance indicators used to measure their accomplishments, and 
the baseline data and targets they will use. All signatories have to report annually on 
their performance.  
The annual reporting requirements are very detailed and are likely to be costly to 
comply with (table C.2). Individual firms are required to report on matters including 
the weight of packaging they have sold, the energy and water used to produce 
packaging, and the proportion of packaging manufactured from recycled material. 
Firms also have to implement the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging, 
which is incorporated as a schedule to the Covenant.     
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Table C.2  Annual reporting requirements of the National Packaging 
Covenant 
















1.  Total weight of consumer packaging (domestic 
and imported) sold per annum into the 
Australian market and the total weight of 
products packaged 
      
2.  Resources (energy and water) used to 
produce packaging  
      
3.  Improvements in design, manufacture, 
marketing and distribution to minimise the 
environmental impacts of packaging 
      
4.  Changes to protection, safety, hygiene, shelf-
life or supply chain considerations affecting 
amount and type of packaging used 
      
5.  Average percentage per annum of post-
consumer recycled content in packaging 
manufactured  
      
6.  Total weight, by type, of ‘non-recyclable’ 
packaging sold per annum into the Australian 
market 
      
7.  Total weight of consumer packaging disposed 
to landfill 
     NPCC 
8.  Consumer packaging as a percentage by 
weight of total waste and relative to other 
waste stream components 
         
9.  Total weight of consumer packaging recycled 
through (a) domestic and (b) away-from-home 
recovery systems 
         
10.  Total weight of recycled consumer packaging 
sold to end users 
      
11.  Number of Councils operating according to 
good practice collection principles and state-
based benchmarks 
         
12.  Percentage of households with access to 
kerbside collection systems 
       
13.  Percentage of households with access to 
other domestic collection systems 
       
14.  Number of commercial and industrial premises 
with packaging recycling collection systems 
      NPCC 
(Continued on next page)     
 





Table C.2  (continued) 
















15.  Percentage of councils and government 
agencies providing public-place recycling 
infrastructure 
         
16.  Provision of recycling collection facilities for 
post-consumer packaging generated on-site 
          
17.  Amount and type of consumer packaging in 
the litter stream 
       
18.  Contamination rates in consumer packaging 
recovery systems (for example, kerbside, 
events, venues, public places and workplaces) 
          
19.  Improvements in consumer knowledge about 
the functional attributes of packaging, 
including recyclability/reuse 
      NPG 
20.  Improvements in littering behaviour          NPCIA
21.  Estimated tonnage of consumer packaging (a) 
recycled and (b) sent to landfill from on-site 
collection facilities 
          
22.  Formal adoption of the Environmental Code of 
Practice for Packaging (Schedule 5 of the 
National Packaging Covenant) and 
development of systems for its implementation 
      NPCC 
23. Application  of  Covenant  compliance 
procedures by the NPCC to identify non-
complying signatories 
     NPCC 
24.  Implementation of NEPM procedures by 
jurisdictions 
       
25.  Enforcement of the NEPM to ‘free-riders’ and 
non-complying Covenant signatories 
       
26.  Implementation of ‘buy recycled’ purchasing 
policy or practices 
          
27.  Establishment of baseline performance data            
28.  Annual reporting against action plan            
29.  Demonstrated improvement and 
achievements against individual targets and 
milestones 
          
 a NPCC refers to the National Packaging Covenant Council; NPCIA refers to the National Packaging 
Covenant Industry Association; and NPG refers to the National Projects Group. 
Source: NPCC (2005).     
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As noted previously, the packaging NEPM requires local governments to provide 
detailed data on their recovery activities, including the weight of recyclable 
materials collected. The Municipal Association of Victoria (sub. 113) noted this can 
place a significant burden on the staff of some municipalities, particularly in rural 
areas. 
Administrative and funding arrangements 
The Covenant is managed by the National Packaging Covenant Council (NPCC), 
which includes representatives from government and industry. Signatories’ action 
plans and annual reports are lodged with the NPCC, which can audit the action 
plans. The NPCC publishes its own annual report on progress toward reaching the 
overarching targets, using the 29 performance indicators listed in table C.2. 
There is matched funding by government and industry for Covenant administration 
and projects. This cannot be used to subsidise waste collection costs, but can fund 
development of collection services.  
Administration of the Covenant is budgeted at $750  000 per annum, funded by 
matched contributions from industry and government. Overall, firms have 
committed to providing a minimum of $3  million per annum for Covenant 
administration and projects. Their contributions are paid via the National Packaging 
Covenant Industry Association, with contributions from individual firms based on 
their turnover and sector.  
Local governments remain very critical of the Covenant’s funding arrangements, 
noting the relatively small contribution firms make to funding the collection and 
processing of packaging waste (ALGA 2006; Southern Sydney Regional 
Organisation of Councils, sub. 84). 
Conclusion 
As detailed in chapter 10, the Commission considers the case for the National 
Packaging Covenant and supporting NEPM has not been substantiated by policy 
makers. The Commission has, therefore, recommended that a review of the National 
Packaging Covenant scheduled for 2008 be expanded by the Australian 
Government beyond an assessment of effectiveness. In particular, the review should 
include an independent investigation of whether sufficient evidence exists to justify 
the scheme. Such a review should be independent, draw on objective and scientific 
evidence about the consequences of landfilling or creating energy from packaging 
waste, and consider all costs and benefits.     
 






Since 1992, Australia has had a stewardship scheme for used newsprint. The 
scheme is based on a voluntary agreement that is essentially negotiated between 
firms without government involvement. However, governments do participate to a 
small degree via the Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC). 
Historical background 
The origins of the scheme can be traced back to the early 1990s, when Australia’s 
sole newsprint manufacturer — Australian Newsprint Mills (jointly owned by News 
Limited and Fletcher Challenge) — decided to invest in a plant at Albury to recycle 
old newspapers. 
The manufacturer decided to negotiate an agreement with Australia’s major 
publishers to ensure increased collection of used newspapers and magazines, and to 
provide a viable market for its recycled newsprint.  
The publishers are represented by an industry body — the Publishers National 
Environment Bureau (PNEB) — whose members are: 
•  ACP Publishing  
•  APN Newspapers  
•  Independent Print Media Group 
•  John Fairfax Holdings 
•  Marinya Media (Rural Press Limited) 
•  News Limited 
•  Pacific Magazines 
•  PMP Limited 
•  West Australian Newspapers (PNEB, sub. 2). 
In 1992, an Industry Waste Reduction Agreement was made under processes 
established by the then Australian and New Zealand Environment Conservation 
Council, an intergovernmental body. A key feature of the agreement was a 
newsprint recycling target of at least 40 per cent by 1995. 
The agreement underpinning the newsprint stewardship scheme has subsequently 
been renegotiated three times. The second agreement operated from 1996 to 2000, 
the third agreement from 2001 to 2005, and the fourth (current) agreement applies 
from 2006 to 2010.      
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There has also been a change in ownership of the newsprint manufacturer, which is 
now owned by Norske Skog Australasia. 
The current agreement 
The current newsprint agreement — titled the National Environmental 
Sustainability Plan (Newspapers) 2006–2010 — is endorsed by the EPHC and sets 
three targets (box C.1). Norske Skog and PNEB have jointly committed to reporting 
annually on progress towards reaching these targets. 
 
Box C.1  Targets in Australia’s newsprint stewardship agreement 
The stewardship agreement for newsprint sets three targets to be achieved by 2010: 
1. Recover 76 per cent of newsprint consumed annually in Australia.  
2. Remove 250 000 tonnes annually of publication grade paper from the waste stream 
(includes printing waste and unsold publications).  
3. Meet other sustainability targets, subject to technical and financial constraints: 
(a)  recycle aluminium printing plates; 
(b)  reuse or recycle cardboard and paper packaging; 
(c)  negotiate with computer manufacturers to dispose or recycle old computers at 
time of replacement; 
(d)  purchase recycled office paper and recycle used office paper; 
(e)  reuse or recycle waste oil; 
(f)  recycle photographic film; 
(g)  recycle plastic wrapping film; 
(h)  reuse or recycle waste printing ink; and 
(i)  recycle toner cartridges. 
Source: Newsprint Producer and Publisher Group (2005). 
 
 
Norske Skog supports the collection of used newsprint by entering into long-term 
contracts that provide guaranteed prices and quantities to local governments and 
other collectors (Kelett 2002). Newsprint Producer and Publisher Group  (2005) 
noted that Norske Skog planned to increase the capacity of its Albury plant and this 
would in turn raise the volume of used newsprint it would seek to obtain from 
collectors. 
The major publishers have supported Norske Skog’s recycling plant at Albury by 
specifying the use of recycled fibre in their newsprint contracts. These contracts 
have an unusually long duration (10 years) compared to those used in other     
 





countries (PNEB, sub. DR137). In addition, the major publishers created an Interim 
Support Fund that provided $6 million for projects that increased the collection and 
recycling of used newsprint. In the latest stewardship agreement, the publishers 
have committed to donating $1 million worth of free advertising annually to 2010 in 
their publications for the promotion of newsprint recycling. They also plan to 
encourage recycling by providing free educational materials to schools and local 
governments, running competitions, and maintaining a website (Newsprint Producer 
and Publisher Group 2005). 
Potential benefits 
If newsprint is collected in a clean and dry condition, it can be recycled repeatedly 
into new newsprint, provided that some virgin material is also used to maintain 
quality. Used newsprint can also be used in the manufacture of cardboard and other 
paperboard, coating on plaster sheeting for housing and construction, egg cartons, 
home insulation and cat litter (Newsprint Producer and Publisher Group 2005). 
Using recycled newspapers and magazines to produce newsprint can increase its 
tensile strength and opacity. This enables the production of lighter and thinner paper 
without a reduction in quality. The reduced weight and thickness reduces transport, 
handling and printing costs, and leads to less wrapper and roll waste (Newsprint 
Producer and Publisher Group 2005). 
The executive director of PNEB has noted, however, that newspaper recycling does 
not reduce the number of trees cut down for harvesting: 
… forget the old line about how many trees it takes to make a given newspaper or 
magazine or emotive offerings like how much rainforest is destroyed to produce a 
Saturday edition of your local paper. 
Let me set the record straight: The material used in newsprint manufacture in Australia 
is a byproduct from the production of timber. Plantation pine forests are thinned to 
allow the best trees to grow large enough to be turned into timber for housing and 
construction. 
These thinnings lie rotting in the forest unless the newsprint manufacturer — the 
scavenger of the forests — collects them. Sawmill waste can be used for newsprint too. 
No old growth eucalypt is used in newsprint manufacture. (Kelett 2002, p. 4) 
Rather, he identified the environmental benefits from newsprint recycling as being 
less greenhouse gas emissions and reduced landfilling of waste: 
How does recycling newspapers and magazines help the environment? 
Producing pulp for paper making through de-inking creates less greenhouse gas 
because de-inking paper uses one-sixth of the energy of pulping wood.     
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It reduces pressure on landfill. … at the start of 1990, 72 per cent of newsprint used in 
Australia went to landfill, now 72 per cent is collected for recycling. 
(Kelett 2002, pp. 3–4) 
However, the Commission considers that reduced use of landfills is not an 
environmental benefit per se. 
Conclusion 
The newsprint scheme appears to have been very effective in achieving its goal of 
increased recycling. The rate of newspaper recycling increased from 28 per cent in 
1989 to 75 per cent in 2004 (Newsprint Producer and Publisher Group 2005). 
PNEB  (sub. 2) claimed Australia now recycles more newsprint than any other 
country. 
There is little information available about the benefits and costs of the scheme. 
However, the scheme sets targets that appear to be arbitrary, rather than being based 
on robust evidence of a net benefit. The third (sustainability) target seems only 
remotely relevant to the primary purpose of the scheme — to support a market for 
recycled newsprint. 
PNEB acknowledged key benefits from the newsprint scheme were those to the 
industry from increased product quality and lower ink use: 
Quality of Australian-made newsprint contained recycled fibre is superior to newsprint 
made from all virgin fibre in calliper (thickness), finish, opacity and show through. 
Price is the same, making Australian recycled content newsprint a clear choice for 
publishers regardless of the environmental benefits of landfill avoidance and energy 
conservation. Also, recycled content paper uses less ink because of the smoother finish; 
another economic benefit. (sub. DR137, p. 2) 
It is doubtful the environmental benefits are very significant from a waste 
management perspective. Newsprint is not a hazardous waste, and so its disposal in 
landfills seems unlikely to have major adverse impacts. The other environmental 
benefit the PNEB has noted — reduced greenhouse gas emissions due to lower 
energy consumption — might eventually be more efficiently achieved by broader 
policy instruments operated at the national level. 
Nevertheless, the Commission considers that the newsprint stewardship scheme has 
been worthwhile. The scheme has been effective in increasing recycling and, given 
it is essentially a private arrangement entered into by a handful of large firms, it 
appears to have delivered net benefits. 
     




D  EPHC National Waste Framework 
The Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) (‘the Council’) National 
Waste Framework was included as an attachment to the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage’s submission to this inquiry (sub. 103). It is reproduced 
here and discussed in chapter 6.1 
1.  Goal 
To assist EPHC achieve its goal to protect and manage Australia’s environment and 
its natural and cultural heritage by identifying and addressing waste management 
issues of national importance.   
2.  Objective 
To establish a systematic framework to determine waste issues upon which national 
collaboration would be appropriate. The framework will be used by all jurisdictions 
in developing proposals for EPHC action.   
3.  Defining Waste Issues 
A crucial first step in determining whether a waste issue requires national action is 
to clearly define and characterise the issue. Factors to consider in characterising the 
issue include: 
•  environmental, economic and social drivers 
–  volume and toxicity of the waste 
–  risks to human health 
–  resource use efficiency  
–  people affected 
–  current costs, who is bearing them  
–  potential cost of addressing the issue 
                                              
1 In the Department of the Environment and Heritage’s submission, the framework was 
accompanied by a table of policy instruments. That table has not been reproduced here.     




•  actual and potential environmental impacts 
–  quantified where possible 
–  whether a precautionary approach is justified 
•  timeframe across which the issue operates, including recovery time 
•  geographical context, locations affected 
•  existing frameworks 
–  applicability 
–  barriers to resolving issue through these 
•  research needs 
•  identification of stakeholders. 
In addition, variation in all these factors across jurisdictions should be identified and 
noted. 
4.   Filter Criteria 
The standard filter criteria, tailored to waste issues, are set out below, and in 
diagrammatic form in box D.1. 
What is the significance of the problem? 
Consider: 
•  severity of environmental/health risks 
•  degree of risk of continuance or reoccurrence 
•  potential for resource recovery 
•  downstream consequences (benefits and costs) 
–  of the issue 
–  of unilateral action 
–  of bilateral action 
–  of multilateral action 
–  of national action. 
If the waste issue affects a limited area, risks are low and consequences are limited, 
it may be best resolved by individual jurisdictions or bilateral arrangements. If the 
issue affects a broad area, risks are high and consequences substantial, a national 
approach may be considered in light of the other criteria (see questions below).      




What is the extent of the issue or market? 
Consider: 
•  geographic range (which jurisdictions are affected?  to what extent?) 
•  local (e.g. area or state/territory specific) issues or market 
•  statutory differences between jurisdictions (eg regional environment, land-use, 
industry) 
•  trans-boundary (including downstream) impacts 
•  international impacts 
•  priority of issue in different jurisdictions. 
If on the basis of consideration of the above the issue is localised, varies greatly 
across jurisdictions, has limited trans-boundary impacts and is generally of low 
priority, it may be best resolved by individual jurisdictions or bilateral 
arrangements. If the issue is of international or national significance and generally 
of high priority, a national approach should be considered in light of the other 
criteria (see questions below). 
Is there a role for Government intervention? 
Consider: 
•  what is the need for government intervention?   
–  protection of the environment 
–  advancing public good  
–  protecting public health and safety 
–  market failure — identify and justify intervention 
•  are existing legal and policy settings adequate? 
–  international treaties and agreements 
–  national laws, policy framework 
–  state and territory laws and policies 
•  consequences of government inaction. 
If industry, community and market forces are unable to resolve the issue then 
government can play a beneficial role. If the issue is adequately addressed through 
existing arrangements, no further action may be required. If existing arrangements 
are inadequate, consequences of inaction are significant, and the scale and scope     




support national action, a national approach should be considered in light of the 
other criteria – see questions below.  
Are there benefits from national action? 
Consider: 
•  existing laws, policies and programs 
–  scope 
–  effectiveness 
–  gaps 
•  would national action duplicate or undermine existing state / Commonwealth / 
national arrangements? 
•  what are the benefits to Government, industry and the community from national 
consistency? 
•  is a national approach cost effectiveness for all jurisdictions? 
•  what are the relative cost and benefits of other ways to get the same or better 
outcomes? 
If national action would duplicate or undermine existing effective arrangements or 
if alternative approaches would generate greater benefits with fewer costs, the issue 
may be best resolved by individual jurisdictions. If existing arrangements are 
ineffective or could be strengthened through national consistency, and a national 
approach is cost effective, a national approach should be considered in light of the 
other criteria — see questions below.   
Who has the powers, responsibilities and influence? 
Consider: 
•  benefits of uni/bilateral vs. national approach 
•  role of the National Environment Protection Council (NEPC) in regulatory 
solutions  
•  Commonwealth powers in external affairs, trade and tax 
•  state and territory roles in implementation and enforcement of national and 
international agreements 
•  Commonwealth role as facilitator, including working with national industry 
bodies     




•  roles of different spheres of government 
•  level of enforcement required  
•  other ways the issue could be addressed 
•  potential tools (see section 6) 
•  issue should be led by the jurisdiction(s) with primary interest. 
Different policy tools and approaches are available to address waste issues. Powers 
and responsibilities play an important role in determining which tool is most 
appropriate in a particular case — see Part 6 below. 
5.  Prioritisation 
Only the most important issues, which will generate the highest environmental 
benefit from national cooperation, should be referred to the Environment Protection 
and Heritage Standing Committee (‘the Standing Committee’) and Council for 
consideration. The primary considerations in assessing priority are: 
•  significance of impact or harm 
•  analysis of the cost and associated benefits of any action 
•  the level of social and community concerns. 
6.  Potential Tools 
When developing proposals for EPHC action on national waste management issues, 
jurisdictions should consider and evaluate a range of different policy tools so the 
tool most suited to addressing the issue is identified and recommended. Options and 
approaches outside the EPHC/NEPC framework, including informal cooperation, 
should also be considered. In evaluating potential tools, jurisdictions should: 
•  recall the scope and scale of the issue 
•  recall the distribution of powers and responsibilities 
•  identify stakeholders 
•  identify capacity of government and industry 
•  identify (and quantify, where possible) the direct and indirect consequences of 
the different tools 
•  consider appropriate evaluation mechanisms.     




7.  Recommendation to Standing Committee / Council 
The waste framework should be applied to all waste issues proposed for Standing 
Committee and Council consideration. All jurisdictions should be notified and 
endeavour to meet to discuss the application of the waste framework to a particular 
waste issue prior to it being put on the Standing Committee and/or Council agenda. 
 





What is the significance of the problem?  Limited, low risk 
Resolved by individual jurisdictions, bilateral 
arrangements etc.  Widespread, high risk, chronic 
What is the extent of the issue or market?  Localised, low priority 
National, international, high priority 
Is there a role for government 
intervention? 
No
Resolved by industry, community and market 
forces
Yes 
Are there benefits from national action?
Yes 
Who has the powers, responsibilities and 
influence? 
Shared  Australian Government States and territories 
Identify best approach and 
forum for future action 
Resolved by Australian 
Government 
Resolved by individual jurisdictions, 
bilateral arrangements etc. 
Resolved by individual jurisdictions, bilateral 
arrangements etc. 
No 
Resolved by individual jurisdictions, bilateral 
arrangements etc.     
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